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Abstract 
 
This project has two primary purposes. The first purpose is to formulate the key problems 
involved in enactments of morality in interpersonal interaction, and how these problems are 
constructed and managed in participants’ discursive practices. Based on a communicative 
perspective situated in a grounded practical theory approach (chapter 1), this project draws on 
literatures across the field of communication (chapter 2) and applies discourse analytic methods 
(chapter 3) to video recordings of interpersonal interactions. Results of these analyses indicate 
that doing morality involves confronting the problematic nature of difference with regard to the 
fundamental commitments of interaction (intersubjectivity, chapter 4); the conditions of the 
particular relationship and its closeness (intimacy, chapter 5); the judgment-inflected ideas and 
norms arising in cultural contexts (ideology, chapter 6); the impact of salient cultural differences 
implicated in intercultural contact (culture, chapter 7); and the effects of difference on 
relationships over time (conflict, chapter 8). The second purpose of this project is to move 
toward identifying normative ideals for local concepts of moral communication in interpersonal 
relationships (chapter 9).   
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Chapter 1 
A Grounded Practical Theory Approach to Moral Interaction 
Goffman (1967) claimed that interaction is a committed enterprise. The expectations and 
responsibilities attendant on such a commitment are part of what makes interactants morally 
accountable to one another. The other side to the morality of human interaction is that it 
produces, reproduces, ratifies and instantiates the social order. As Garfinkel (1967) proposed, 
people’s day-to-day interactions are orderly recreations of the mechanisms of interactive 
processes, the practices and activities that move interaction along and make it work. To disrupt 
the order is to break the social contract, if you will, by which people are ordinarily able to get on 
in the world. Thus, morality is not only visible when people mention it explicitly or in obviously 
morally-imbued contexts, such as religious arguments: morality is apparent and relevant from the 
most contentious social controversy to the tiniest hitch in social graces.  
This work is centrally about the discursive construction of morality—the ways in which 
talk orients to the ideological judgments of persons and their actions in interpersonal 
conversation. Based on a grounded practical theory discourse analytic approach to interpersonal 
interaction, this work argues that the pervasive possibility of difference underlies moral 
interaction. Specifically, the threat of potentially irreconcilable differences between close 
interactants is made visible through, constituted by, and managed in discursive practices for 
accomplishing intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, and conflict. These “moral 
problems” are part of a moral vocabulary with which discourse analysts (and potentially 
interactants themselves) can make sense of the communicative constitution of close 
relationships. Data include more than 50 hours of naturally-occurring talk, primarily from video 
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recorded observation and home movies, supplemented with audio. Through discourse analysis 
influenced by grounded practical theory, this project examines morality as an interactional 
achievement comprising practices for dealing with the potential problems of difference. 
The “problems” of moral interaction involve different angles on what morality is and 
how it affects interpersonal interactions. “Intersubjectivity” captures the sense in which all 
interaction has, at its base, a foundation of morality insofar as it demands a commitment to the 
rules and regulation of participating with others in the social world.  Morality as an interactional 
achievement involves participants’ co-constructions of intelligibility in relational situations: 
interactional sense is accomplished by conforming to tacit expectations, and to make explicit 
those expectations by questioning or violating them is to threaten the common ground on which 
such expectations depend (Garfinkel, 1967). Practices for achieving morality are practices for 
maintaining the assumptions of sharedness on which social interaction relies—thus, problems 
with morality involve the inevitability of difference.  
“Intimacy” represents the context by which morality matters in different ways for 
different relationships between interactants. Intersubjectivity is a moral requirement for strangers 
as well as lovers, but its enactment will differ along the continuum of closeness and distance, and 
for different relationship “types.” Because this study looks at people who are ostensibly “close,” 
“intimacy” is an important condition governing what morality is or looks like as an interactional 
achievement between people.  
 However, morality is not only the basis of a responsibility to interaction and others, and 
particularly in intimate relationships, its character and enactment require more than passing or 
superficial acts of judgment. Moral interactions are deeply consequential. Their success and 
failure can determine the success or failure of moments as fleeting as a service encounter or as 
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enduring as filling a political office. This project focuses on a midpoint between such moments 
to look at close relationships—which are both constructed moment-to-moment, and maintained 
over time—as a site of morality. Judgments in relationships which would be constitutive of 
doing morality at this level of significance involve “ideology”—judgments must enact or 
implicate communication, character and actions which are socially and culturally significant, 
which are essentially “right,” or “wrong,” in a consequential way. 
 “Culture,” then, references a problem which is tied up in the intrinsic connection between 
the context of intimacy (the morality of the relationship) and the context of society (the morality 
of the community). While ideology is indeed cultural, its use in this project focuses on the ways 
in which judgments are attributed to individual rhetorical choices within the context of 
presumably shared cultural assumptions. The use of culture, on the other hand, focuses on the 
ways in which judgments are attributed to backgrounds and patterns of community values 
enacted in and made salient by the context of intercultural interaction. 
 Finally, “conflict” describes a mode of interaction intrinsically related to the enactment of 
morality. Because morality orients to potentially, and perceivably, different ideological 
differences between close interactants, conflict is relevant to the extent that such differences 
cause trouble and are managed over time. Intersubjectivity can cause conflict when people fail to 
uphold interactional expectations, violating the almost sacred “trust” people have that others will 
act in intelligible ways. Intimacy shapes the relational conditions which govern how conflict 
unfolds, why it matters, and why it is moral in a particular way (versus, for instance, conflict 
between non-intimates). Ideology involves values and norms which are the interpretive 
mechanisms by which conflict is enacted and made sense of. And culture refers to the ways in 
which salient differences may be invoked or indexed to manage possible conflict. 
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 What is difference? Difference involves distinctions between things, and is identified 
constantly in daily life (Littlejohn & Domenici, 2007). Differences are (a) perceived and 
interpreted, (b) made and communicated, and (c) assessed and judged. Difference is in a way at 
the heart of human interaction. From Garfinkel’s (1967) perspective, the fact that human beings 
are not “the same” requires difference to be something which is continuously overcome—or 
ignored—in order to establish some intersubjective basis by which people are judged 
recognizably “as people” and their actions make some sort of respond-to-able sense. But 
difference also refers to ideologies, the names and labels humans devise for abstractly 
representing what counts as right and wrong kinds of persons or actions.  
 Differences which are perceived are not straightforward. Some differences have probably 
been learned and treated as salient for social reasons (skin color, for instance) while other 
differences are rarely noted or remarked on (hence expressions such as “the sort of person who 
wouldn’t stand out in a crowd”). Difference also exists in tension with “sameness.” On one hand 
people associate difference with positive evaluations, particularly in individualistic cultures such 
as the U.S. People with exceptional talents or who are seen as “distinguishing themselves” are 
valued. On the other hand, there is a limit to what differences are tolerable and to what extent. 
People who share certain values are taken to be somehow “the same.” References are made to 
“our people” or “people like us.”  
 This project investigates moments of morality—where ideological judgments are made, if 
fleetingly, salient—and the role of difference in marking where ideological judgments will be 
associated with potential problems or conflicts. In particular, the contradictions inherent in being 
close in the context of differences make interactions morally dilemmatic. The goals of this 
project are (1) to formulate key problems which participants confront when doing moral practice 
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in interpersonal relationships, as well as ways of dealing with those problems, and (2) to describe 
important points of reflection relevant to determining local normative ideals of a concept of 
moral communication.  
Over the course of the next several chapters, I will describe an approach to morality as a 
communicative practice in the context of interpersonal relationships. Though many of the claims 
made herein may be true of other kinds of situations, I focus on how morality is enacted by 
people in close friend and family (and occasionally romantic) relationships in largely private 
settings. Because qualities and processes that characterize “morality” can also be true of other 
concepts, I focus on how interactants treat one another’s communicative actions as morally 
implicative. Morally implicative discourse, as will be made clear throughout this project, 
involves the consequential relationship between interaction and ideology, as well as conflict and 
difference. 
Morality and Communication 
Morality has been studied in a number of ways, largely in humanistic disciplines such as 
philosophy and rhetoric, but also in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and other social 
science disciplines. Morality is often taken to refer to the social and cultural senses of persons 
and behaviors which are good (and right) or bad (and wrong) based on descriptive or normative 
judgments made by particular groups of people (Stace, 1937). In communication studies, 
morality is studied in many ways, specifically via the perspective that it is created, reflected, and 
negotiated through communication. This project focuses on the importance of communication 
and morality in interpersonal relationships. It is suggested that morality, though it can have 
societal and interactional meanings, is particularly significant relationally.  
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“Morality” is an ambiguous concept and is visible in different ways depending on the 
level at which one looks and the context in which one is looking. Though morality is 
accomplished moment-by-moment in the nature of interaction as an accountable social 
enterprise, this project focuses primarily on morality at the level of ideological assumptions and 
judgments (though not necessarily ones so-named by participants). In interpersonal relationships, 
the “morality” implicated in discourse goes deeper than the surface action of an utterance—
labeling something as a criticism, for instance, which is as true of doing evaluating as it is of 
doing morality. Rather, various interactional moves, from eye contact to gossip, are indicative of 
ideological assumptions, and are taken by interactional participants as consequential for 
identities (not just what someone is doing communicatively, but the kind of person who does 
such things) and for the relationship (not just that people are individuals-acting-together, but that 
they share a joint commitment and responsibility to the other).  
Thus, the common thread that links disparate and complex moral interactions together is 
that, in close interpersonal relationships, morality is a way of making sense of the deepest ties 
that bind people together. Morality is about a sense of good or right—and bad, or wrong—that is 
seen as more fundamental and less changing. Morality lies at the intersection of how people 
work out stances and identities in the moment, and how these things are maintained over time, 
taken as inherent. To ignore that participants treat morality as being about certain kinds of people 
and their deeply-held beliefs would be to ignore what makes morality so important to people’s 
everyday lives. For that reason, this project combines a perspective aimed at participant actions 
of which they may be unaware (or would not call “moral”), and the sorts of tensions, troubles 
and arguments of which they, at least at times, are.  
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In interpersonal relationships, the threat of morality is the threat of irreconcilable 
difference. Morality causes anxiety and tension because it makes visible the work people are 
doing to constitute their relationship as one in which basic values and ways of being are 
unproblematically shared. Even something so seeming-innocent as one’s movie preferences can 
point to deeper differences between people. Morality is enacted where people are seen to work 
out how interactional moments are implicative of potentially damaging ideological differences, 
and the tensions and dilemmas that such working-out entails. Differences may not always 
themselves make a difference to those in close relationships, but ideological differences can be 
signaled by small moves as well as large ones: not asking about one’s day, someone changing his 
or her mind on something previously agreed, a sudden emphasis of distinctions rather than 
shared interests or goals. This work examines moments of trouble where differences which seem 
quite small could be implicative of something morally serious.   
This work examines differences and their role in morality and ideological judgment by 
focusing on discourse—the social, symbolic, rhetorical moves and acts which people coordinate 
with each other in ordinary interpersonal interaction. As explicated by Bergmann (1998) in an 
introduction to a special issue of Research on Language and Social Interaction on the 
relationship between morality and discourse, there are two primary discourse approaches to 
morality: one can start with morality and look at how it is shaped in interaction, or one can start 
with interaction and look at how it implicates morality. I tack back and forth between these 
perspectives.  
On one hand I do adhere to the idea of what Bergmann calls “proto-morality.” This idea 
assumes that interaction is based on assumptions of responsibility that interlocutors have to one 
another and to the interaction. To violate this responsibility is to be held accountable for a 
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wrongdoing. The error is a structural one, but it is named and oriented to participants as a 
personal or social error. This leads to attributions such as “she's so rude,” but at the basis of this 
perspective, an account of the so-called “rudeness” is really due to the violation of an expected 
turn-taking procedure. This perspective is consistent with concept of “intersubjectivity” (chapter 
4) as a foundation upon which anything labeled “morality” rests.  
On the other hand, I do not necessarily want to end the discussion there. In terms of 
making practical changes in talk, it is conceivable to be able to say things like “being sensitive to 
preference will improve interactions.” On the other hand, telling someone in the midst of a 
divorce that they ought to worry about their second pair parts more just doesn't seem to do the 
trick. People in troubled situations with their close others perceive problems as being based on 
differences of attitudes, values, emotions, personalities—attributions that may be mistaken or 
based on deeper, unexamined assumptions, but attributions that are consequential. Such 
attributions are made relevant, are treated as relevant, and shape the interaction—ultimately, can 
shape the relationship itself. Thus, I also want to study how moral concepts, once made relevant, 
exert an influence on the interaction and the people involved. This perspective centers on 
“ideology” (chapter 6), seeing as relevant the ways in which people do morality through their 
implicit and explicit judgments self and of one another’s character and actions.  
Based on these discourse approaches, moral practices are discursive practices, and 
involve a wide-range of potential communicative actions, from winking to gossiping. 
Furthermore, because the approach described in this chapter sees communication as social and 
relational as well as symbolic, it is not only the case that winking and gossiping practices 
symbolize moral orientations or judgments on behalf of participants. Such symbolism would 
indeed be meaningless if there were no social element to interaction—no need for getting on 
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with others—and thus, such symbolism is more consequential for closer relationships, for 
relationships with explicit commitments which index shared histories and potential futures.  
Close relationships are therefore my site of study. However, I see relationships as 
discursive constructions that are worked out between participants over the course of 
interacting—in the moment, and across interactions. “Relationality” is a concept that situates 
identities “in relation” to one another in particular, namable ways. Close relationships are 
consequential in ways in which less close, or institutional, relationships are not. Thus, this makes 
close relationships an important site for considering the importance of conflict and morality in 
everyday life. This is why “intimacy” (chapter 5) is analyzed as an important condition for 
mediating how intersubjective proto-morality and interpersonal ideology are enacted. 
Morality is not just an interpersonal discursive practice, however; it is also a cultural and 
performative, rhetorical one. Morality is not designed by individuals on a purely personal basis, 
but is infused in the teachings, religions, norms, expectations and ideologies of particular 
communities. From notions of politeness to beliefs about appropriate relationships, cultural 
settings shape and are enacted and maintained through people’s performances of selves as moral 
and moralizing beings—identities-in-relation who do not only instantiate judgable performances, 
but also perform judgments toward others, in relationships and in communities. Such 
performances constitute the rhetorical means by which local participants influence appropriate 
behavior, choose particular sensibilities of performance, convince one another of their 
authenticity, and construct persuasive narratives for explaining the ideological bases of their 
interactional commitments. For this reason, “culture” (chapter 7) in terms of context, practice, 
identity and intercultural contact is examined in this work. 
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Thus, morality is undergirded by social/relational/interactional commitments in particular 
cultural contexts. These aspects distinguish morality as an interactional practice with ideological 
implications. There are many kinds of interactional choices which can potentially, but not 
necessarily, “do” morality. Criticizing someone, for instance, is a way of performing judgment. 
But in order for that judgment to be moral, it must link to ideological assumptions—deeply-
rooted and often tacit notions of what a person ought to be or do in a serious way. Criticizing 
someone for leaving the toilet seat up is not, by itself, a moral practice. The leaving-up of toilet 
seats does not alone make someone a “bad person.” However, this criticism would implicate 
ideology, and thus constitute a moral practice, if it can be shown empirically to be indicative of 
morality. If toilet seat leaving-ups are just one way in which a partner demonstrates disrespect to 
her or his loved one, in concert with other demonstrations of disrespect over time, then the doing 
of this criticism is a doing of morality—as is the criticizeable offense. 
 This dissertation unfolds by (1) setting up the project, its perspective, relevant literatures, 
and method (chapters 1-3); (2) describing five discursive practices for accomplishing morality, 
and participants’ techniques for managing them (chapters 4-8); and (3) discussing how reflecting 
on the empirical results of these practices might lead to the reconstruction of normative ideals for 
moral communicative practice (chapter 9). The remainder of chapter one describes the grounded 
practical theory approach which guides this work, including theories and assumptions which 
motivate the analysis. Chapter two covers various literatures within the communication 
discipline as well as across various language and social interaction disciplines to set up the 
central questions of this project. Chapter three sets up the discourse analytic method and the data 
used the analysis. Chapters four through eight feature analyses of moral discursive practices for 
accomplishing intersubjectivity (chapter 4), intimacy (chapter 5), ideology (chapter 6), culture 
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(chapter 7), and conflict (chapter 8). Chapter nine summarizes the project, examines important 
considerations for investigating local ideals of moral communication, discusses limitations, and 
identifies potential directions for future research. In the next section of this chapter, I outline this 
project’s grounded practical theory approach, a metatheoretical orientation developed by Craig 
and Tracy (1995). The section thereafter reviews the theoretical influences and assumptions 
which guide this project and its analyses.  
A Grounded Practical Theory Approach 
This section provides detail on grounded practical theory (GPT), the metatheoretical 
approach that guides this project. First, I discuss some of the background on GPT and outline its 
key tenets. Second, I describe how this approach is linked to viewing communication as a 
practical discipline. And third I discuss communication as a practice, and what that means for 
this project.  
Background and Practice of GPT 
Developed by Craig and Tracy (1995), grounded practical theory (GPT) is influenced by 
interpretive and practical metatheory. While scientific metatheory judges theories by their ability 
to predict and control realities about the world, interpretive metatheory judges theories by their 
ability to describe and explain people’s experiences and sensemaking; and practical metatheory 
judges theories by their usefulness or ability to effect normative change (Craig, 2009). Because 
GPT orients to the notion of “practical” in at least two senses—as that which is useful or 
effective, and as that which is accomplished in everyday activities—GPT is both a theory about 
practice, but also a theory about the practice of theorizing. Theorizing practices is a process that 
aims to be practically relevant.  
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GPT assumes that theory and practice are mutually constitutive, in line with Craig’s 
orientation to communication as a practice (1999, 2006). GPT is also based on the perspective of 
communication as a practical discipline (1989), with the goal of research being to develop 
normative theories about what ought to be (Craig & Tracy, 1995). The ideals identified in 
particular practices provide principles for guiding the conduct of, and critiquing, the practice. 
Such principles, often implicit in interaction, are made explicit through the process of 
reconstruction of situated problems and techniques. 
A grounded approach (similar to grounded theory, Charmaz, 2005) assumes that theory 
must be grounded in empirical data and attend to the practical activities of interactional 
participants. Theories are data-driven and are used to normatively guide critique of those 
practical activities as well as inform the practices of researcher-theorists. This is a highly 
reflexive orientation in which theory guides practice and practice guides theory, and it has 
engendered various concomitant approaches, the most consistent being the methodological 
approach of action implicative discourse analysis (AIDA) developed by Tracy in 1995 (and to 
which I return in chapter three). 
The purpose of GPT is to develop theoretical reconstructions—idealized, generalized 
descriptions of tacit practices, made explicit and used for informing and judging situations—
based on empirical analysis. Reconstruction takes place on problem, technical, and philosophical 
levels. The problem level of GPT reconstruction requires a focus on dilemmas and troubles 
commonly experienced in peoples’ private and public lives. The technical level of GPT 
reconstruction collects strategies that people employ when encountering problems. The 
philosophical level of GPT reconstruction develops norms for judging the use of strategies. 
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GPT is guided, as mentioned, by two orientations to communication and practice. On one 
hand, GPT is based on the notion of communication as a discipline which engages with practical 
theory, or the creation of normative theory for improving communication. On the other hand, 
GPT is based on the notion of communication as a practice, a meaningful human activity which 
can be organized, talked about, reflected on, and improved. These perspectives are discussed 
further in the following sections.  
Communication as a Practical Discipline 
 Craig (1989) suggested that the approach of a practical discipline is one which relates 
theory and practice through critical reflection. As practical theories aim to address practical 
problems in the world (Craig & Muller, 2007), a practical discipline seeks to cultivate 
communication as an art. Unlike critical theory, which involves a similar interest in addressing 
problems through theoretical critique, practical theory would not just study social problems of 
power and inequality, but also mundane, everyday considerations (Craig, 1989).  
 To propose communication as a practical discipline is to acknowledge the many 
perspectives within the field. Because the traditions in the field have their own confluence of 
theories, the perspective of communication as a practical discipline is a metatheoretical one 
(Craig & Muller, 2007). As mentioned at the beginning of the last section introducing GPT, 
metatheories involve different ways of judging theory. Such judgments are based on certain 
ontological, epistemological, praxeological and axiological motivations (Craig, 2009). There are 
theories in communication, for instance, which look more scientific, believing that the world 
exists objectively to our study of it (ontology), that it can be studied empirically (epistemology), 
that it should in some ways strive to be carried out and presented in the manner of natural science 
research (praxeology), and that theory should be value-free in its contributions to society 
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(axiology). A practical metatheory would see even these aims within an overall orientation to 
improving, if not the practices of communicators in everyday life, then at least the practices of 
communication theorists.  
 Craig’s (1999) theory of a field of communication starts from this idea of communication 
as a practical discipline particularly as a way of bringing coherence to the multitude of 
communication paradigms and theories. Craig insists such eclecticism can be productive across a 
possible field, and not just within particular research programs, if communication areas strive for 
“dialogical-dialectical coherence.” This awareness of the tensions and complementarities 
between communication programs would foster debate across communication. The metamodel 
which Craig develops based on this goal of productive argumentation provides a reconstruction 
of communication theory within the concept of communication as a practical discipline.  
 Based on this practical orientation, it is not the case that communication theories would 
seek a unifying theory, or propose particular theories as truer than others, but that different 
theories would be useful in their own ways. Craig (1999) provides the example of transmission-
based understandings of communication processes—important to the history of communication 
research and to many areas of communication study today, though much maligned in others—as 
providing a practical conception of communication in certain contexts where it has cultural 
currency. Thus, the metamodel does not aim to reveal what communication is, but demonstrates 
how communication can be constituted in different ways for different purposes.  
 For Craig (1999), communication theory is a kind of metadiscourse. Metadiscourse 
(literally, “discourse about discourse”) is one of many related terms (metalanguage, 
metacommunication, metapragmatics) which make visible the very human phenomenon of 
reflexivity in speech. Language provides the ability to comment on the world, but also on itself. 
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To say anything about communication is to participate in the practice of communication. 
Communication theories make arguments about discourse through discourse. Thus the technical 
or intellectual practice of communication theory is derived from, and informs, everyday talk 
about communication. The goal of communication as a practical discipline is to “reconstruct 
communication theory as a theoretical metadiscourse engaged in dialogue with the practical 
metadiscourse of everyday life” (p. 129).  
 The current work advances this aim through the GPT approach. GPT offers a way of 
theorizing which is aimed at practice. This project theorizes ways of thinking and talking about 
communication as a moral practice. GPT is grounded in the practical communication activities of 
everyday life. This project’s argument and evidence is grounded in naturally-occurring, ordinary 
conversations. GPT aims to develop practical theories for addressing communication problems. 
This project offers points of reflection for developing ideals of moral practice to critique and 
improve moral interactions. Furthermore, the GPT project is part of the practical orientation to 
the discipline which seeks dialogical-dialectical coherence (or at least debate) across the field, 
which this project pursues by bringing numerous perspectives in conversation. The next section 
further presents the meaning of communication as a practice, and how practice is conceptualized 
in this project.  
Communication as a Practice 
In order to present this grounded practical theory investigation into the communicative 
concept of morality, it is important to review what is meant by “communicative” and 
“communication as a practice” for the purposes of this project. The communication discipline is 
rife with definitions of “communication” as an object of study as well as a way of seeing the 
world. Thus, the remainder of this section specifies this project’s primary view of 
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communication as a complex practice. Taking a grounded practical theory perspective already 
implies a practice-based understanding of communication. According to Craig (2006), practices 
are coherent sets of activities which are meaningful to people. Their meaningfulness and 
possibilities of improvement also make practices capable of being judged and changed—
practices can be reflected on. The conceptualization of communication as discursive practice 
emphasizes everyday talk activities—telling stories, calling people by nicknames, etc.—as the 
constitutive activity that shapes human interaction (Craig, 2007; Tracy, 2002). 
 In proposing that communication is a practice, Craig (2006) claimed that there is a 
cultural concept of communication—that “communication” is meaningful as a coherent activity 
recognized by many people (assumedly in the western world, but possibly all over—Craig does 
not specify). Katriel and Philipsen (1981) identify “communicating” as a U.S. cultural category, 
and Cameron (2000) identifies a similar interest in the concept of communication in the United 
Kingdom. Often studies of communication and culture look for the way culture is expressed 
through communication, rather than looking for cultural concepts of communication (e.g. Clyne, 
1996), but indirectly, any communicative study that is culturally grounded will indicate the 
presence or lack of such a thing. Studies of norms, politeness and interactional rules across 
cultures certainly indicate that people in different places have concepts of culturally appropriate 
ways of talking (Kiesling & Paulston, 2005).  
Being a coherent, identifiable practice, “communication” is also a concept that people 
will invoke in talk. It can be judged, evaluated, reflected on, and potentially improved. It is 
certainly the case that examples of people talking about communication, to laud or lambast it, 
abound in ordinary talk. As Craig (e.g., 2008) has pointed out, particular communicative 
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concepts (dialogue, argument, rhetoric, voice) are regularly named, evaluated, and put forward as 
the reason, or solution, for problems in society—from marital spats to international crises.  
Practices involve different ranges and occurrences in human activity. For example, 
practices can contain almost anything people do, not just in a moment, but across lifetimes and 
throughout communities. For Bourdieu (1977), practices comprise the daily activities of people 
who share certain ideologies or beliefs about the world. The practices are ways of building up 
collectivity and addressing practical issues in everyday life. Bourdieu would not necessarily see 
“talk” as the only important community practice. As an anthropologist, he was interested in the 
range of activities that people do together. Because I am mainly interested in characterizing 
situated instances of interaction rather than interaction across a speech community, I assume that 
not all practices are created equal “in the moment.” Some community practices will be relevant 
to a particular interaction, and some will not. The determining factor of what is relevant will 
depend on what is indexed in interactants' discourse and interaction. 
Practices can also be distinguished by their occurrence. Some practices one sees in a 
particular moment are common to many such moments, while others are particular not to a kind 
of moment, but to a site or institutional activity. Schatzki (1996) conceptualizes practice as both 
a performance, and a coordinated entity. Coordinated entity practices are doings and sayings that 
are temporal and spatial, linked by (1) understandings of what to say and do; (2) explicit rules, 
principles and/or instructions; and (3) projects, purposes, beliefs and emotions. Performance 
practices constitute the carrying out of practices in such a way as to sustain the understandings, 
explicit regulations, purposes and moods that formulate their patterns in human action. Practices 
can be dispersed, that is, occurring in many areas of social life. Describing, explaining and 
imagining, for instance, would be dispersed practices. Such practices require an understanding, 
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largely tacit, of “how to” do and recognize the practice. Integrative practices refer to complex 
practices found in particular domains. They involve dispersed practices, but those always link 
back to the integrative practices, such as in business practices, by way of explicit rules and goal-
oriented logics.  
 By focusing on morality as a dispersed discursive practice, I propose that morality is a 
recognizable activity in which people engage; that there are particular ways of engaging in the 
activity; and that these means of engagement are symbolic, involving discourse but also 
movement, gesture, space, and other elements of the social-semiotic world. I also propose, as 
Craig's (2006) article on communication as a practice requires, that there is a “cultural concept” 
of morality in communication—of a subset of the communication possibilities focused on 
communicating well in situations of difference. 
GPT conceptualizes communication as a practice, and for the current project, morality is 
both a broad and a dispersed sort of practice. In particular, this project sees morality as a 
discursive practice. Discourse, like practice, is a concept that is applied at different social or 
analytical levels as well as to different ranges of activity. A “larger level” discourse is the focus 
of many critical theorists. For Foucault (1992), for example, practices in discourse are ways of 
constituting certain institutional aspects of the world: through language, people create objects, 
vocabularies that surround them, and ways of dealing with them. A “discursive practice” for 
Foucault might be the practice of creating technical definitions of illness for diagnostic purposes.  
The “discourse” is then about who is normal and who is not. Since this project is not necessarily 
working at the level of societal critique, this kind of discourse is less an object of study for me, 
and more a site of cultural knowledge. For instance, in an ordinary argument, someone may use 
the word “crazy” to describe someone's apparently unreasonable actions. Certainly this draws 
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from some cultural concept of what is reasonable, and which may owe its formulation to the 
societal “discourses” of what constitutes sanity and insanity, but making that link is not my 
primary goal. Rather, I am interested in how a term like “crazy” situates itself in a particular 
moment and between particular people. This is analogous to later sections of this work which 
deal with ideology and culture as interactionally accomplished. Depending on the context, 
Foucault's notion of discourse may be relevant insofar as it is enacted in interaction.  
 That establishes the level of discursive practice with which this project is interested: 
interaction between people in conversation. But what is the range of discursive practice? Does it 
stop at talk?  According to Bateson (1972), “communication” involves the whole system of 
interaction—not just words, but the environment as well. The meaning of communication could 
not only, or even primarily, be linguistic: the context had to be taken into account, which for 
Bateson could include past interaction and situational factors, but the most important contextual 
element comprised the nonverbal or metalinguistic dimension of communication. Bateson’s 
perspective contains cybernetic elements that have made it amenable to the sociopsychological 
tradition from which classic interpersonal communication emerged. While not adhering entirely 
to Bateson’s cybernetic approach, his focus on certain ideas such as metacommunication, and 
especially the importance of context, are important to the current undertaking. 
 Most people accept the idea that “communication” is broader than words: everything 
from the twitch of an eyebrow to the clothes one wears “communicates” something. In this 
project, discourse occupies a similar range of activities. As Jaworski and Coupland (2006) note, 
“discourse,” even at the level of interaction, can mean more than just participants' talk. Though 
the talk may be the explicit organizer of how people come together and what they are expected to 
attend to, situational resources abound in any interaction. In the world of making conversation, 
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many actions and objects in the surrounding space—including the space of shared knowledge 
between participants—become an important resource in interaction. In nonverbal research, facial 
expressions, gestures, and other physical movements can convey as much meaning to a turn-at-
talk as do actual utterances (e.g., Manusov, V., Manusov, V. L., & Patterson, 2006). 
Paralinguistic information—pauses, intonation, emphasis and other sound-related elements—
have long been treated as interactionally relevant by conversation analysts (Schegloff, 2007). 
And researchers interested in embodiment have demonstrated numerous ways in which physical 
movement and placement, objects, gestures, and spatial orientation contribute to analyses of 
interaction (Fox, 1999; Goodwin, 2000, 2003b, 2003c; Heath, 2002). 
These contextual elements comprise the world at hand from which participants may draw 
to accomplish particular purposes in interaction—such resources potentially include anything in 
the realm of the discursive, communicative, material, abstract, social, psychological, etc. All of 
these things are available for references and use in interaction. The use component gets done in 
the actions that people do with one another. Therefore, as Craig (2006) has stated, 
communication is a practice: it is something that people do. But the things that people do require 
materials—equipment, as Heidegger (1962) would say. Thus, in addition to being a practice, 
communication is also a symbolic activity with social, relational, interactive, cultural, 
performative, and rhetorical dimensions.  
In this section I reviewed grounded practical theory, the perspective of communication as 
a practical discipline, and concept of communication as a practice. In doing so, I specified the 
current project’s focus on the ranges and occurrences of practice and discourse. The next section 
develops further the perspective taken in this project by discussing particular theories and 
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assumptions associated with or amenable to the practical, interpretive, and empirical and 
problem-centered thrust of grounded practical theory work.  
Theories and Assumptions 
 This project is primarily influenced by the focus on interpersonal interaction and 
relationality found in interpersonal communication research, and the empirically-driven 
discourse analytic work found in LSI research. This section begins with some theories, theorists 
and ideas relevant to this project and associated with interpretive, practical, empirical 
communication research, and ends with some assumptions based on these theoretical influences. 
This section focuses on the theoretical perspectives which provide a social and discursive 
approach to interpersonal communication and relationality. First I discuss social interaction from 
a sociological perspective. Then I consider some interpersonal approaches to close relationships. 
I follow with a discussion of context and culture. I end by considering communication 
approaches to conflict.   
 From a sociological perspective, the two primary scholars drawn on in this work include 
Harold Garfinkel and Erving Goffman. Ethnomethodology takes an explicitly moral orientation 
to social interaction (Heritage, 1984). Garfinkel (1967, 2006) developed his ethnomethodological 
perspective to understand how interactions are morally accountable. The word, 
“ethnomethodology,” refers to people’s methods for socially organizing the world and making 
sense of it.  
In order to piece together people’s ways of doing ordinary interaction, Garfinkel (1967) 
developed a number of “breaching” experiments, carried out by his students, in which people 
would purposefully violate interactional expectations. For example, someone might sit right next 
to someone else on an empty bus, or ask endless questions about an event such as a flat tire. 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  22 
 
Reactions to these breaches were swift and negative, even more so when the participants had 
closer relationships. People have interactional expectations, and to violate them is to violate 
social norms and, to some extent, the very order that keeps social life running smoothly. A 
similar principle lies behind expectancy violation theory (Burgoon, 1978). Expectations are built 
into the structures of interaction, and violating them, even in a tiny way, has serious 
consequences. Thus people are held accountable to their part in maintaining the social order, in 
accomplishing everyday interactions and conforming to their norms. 
Goffman’s (1959, 1961, 1967, 1974, 1981) work similarly studies what he called the 
“interaction order,” in a different but nonetheless sociological way. Goffman, like Garfinkel, 
examined the invisible world of social interaction—the unspoken rules and expectations for 
participating in situations. For Goffman, communication is performance. Through concepts such 
as face (1967), ritual (1967), framing (1974), and footing (1981), Goffman investigated moments 
of ordinary interaction in ways that accounted for what people performed in social interaction, 
and why. For Goffman (1974), communication frames and defines a situation and thus the 
morally appropriate roles and actions that should occur within it.  
Both Garfinkel and Goffman, in focusing on social interaction, ask the question of how 
people know how to act, and what to do, with one another. Garfinkel’s inquiry into these 
questions emerged from work by Parsons (1937) and Schutz (1967) (Heritage, 1984), while 
Goffman’s drew from Mead (1934), Schutz (1967) and Durkheim (1895) (Calhoun, Gerteis, 
Moody, Pfaff & Virk, 2007). For Garfinkel, intersubjectivity served as part of the 
phenomenological lineage which, for him, helped explain people’s ability to interpret and 
produce intelligible social interactions (Heritage, 1984). For Goffman, face (1967) served as the 
mechanism by which interactants followed one another’s “line” or actions in order to define a 
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situation and fit one’s actions within the setting. These concepts emphasize an orientation to the 
other as the foundation for interaction. Without an other, there would be no reason to create a 
social order, no one to perform for. This and related research is discussed further in chapters two 
and four.  
Intersubjectivity is a concept which provides a particular way of getting at relationality, 
or how people interact in relation to one another. Relationality has been an important concept in 
interpersonal communication research. The concept of intersubjectivity, however, has not often 
been taken up as a way of getting at how people relate to one another in and through 
communication within interpersonal research traditions, though potential connections have been 
noted (Morganti, Carassa & Riva, 2009). Instead, two different theoretical standpoints have been 
influential: symbolic interactionism, and the interactional view. These comprise two important 
approaches in interpersonal research on close relationships.  
Mead’s (1934) and Blumer’s (1969) symbolic interactionism, for example, focuses on the 
ways in which people treat the world based on the meaning that world has for them. For 
example, according to the concept of the “looking glass self,” your self-concept is formed based 
on what you assume other people think about you or see you as (see Cooley, 1902). This 
perspective focuses on the ways in which individuals' actions, attitudes and beliefs are formed 
from the social and relational bases of interacting with others. The interactional view, developed 
by the Palo Alto school, saw the organization of human interaction as a system of variables 
involving time, environment, and various subsystems which together were greater than the sum 
of their parts (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). The relationship between people and their 
environment, as well as each other, was based on a engaging communicatively and modifying 
communication with regard to feedback from the system.  
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Though these perspectives could be applied to many different kinds of social 
relationships, in interpersonal communication research, they are usually applied to close 
relationships—friends, family, romantic partners. These relational contexts provide “sites” in 
which relationality is particularly strong or accomplished between particular others. This focus 
on closeness suggests the concept of intimacy. Work by Baxter and Fitch is particularly relevant 
to looking at intimacy within this project. Baxter (2004a, 2004b), for instance, focuses on some 
of the problems and dilemmas of intimacy, and the competing emotional needs that arise, 
drawing from Bakhtin’s (1981) dialogism. Intimacy is a central concern for making sense of 
people’s contradictory needs to be close but independent. Fitch (1998) takes a cultural and 
discursive approach to relationships and a relational approach to communication. Intimacy is 
constructed through cultural relational codes and built in talk. This and related research is 
discussed further in chapters two and five.  
 The focus on relationality and intimacy makes close interpersonal relationships an 
important relational context for this project. However, there are many other elements of context 
which are treated as potentially relevant to analysis in this work. Context in part incorporates 
something similar to the system perspective taken in the interactional view (Watzlawick, Beavin 
& Jackson, 1967), but also involves environmental elements, interpersonal histories, and culture. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Bateson (1972) proposed seeing communication as a 
system, and the Palo Alto school’s interactional view, described above, built on this notion. 
Rather than taking this more cybernetic approach, this project focuses on the actors within a 
system and the ways in which they simultaneously construct and are constrained by situated and 
cultural context. 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  25 
 
 Goffman’s (1959, 1961, 1967, 1974, 1981) focus on situations looked at how the 
immediate social context—the definition of the situation, and rules and roles which it afforded—
created for interactants their appropriate actions. In conversation analysis, such context is treated 
as relevant with regard to the placement of utterances in relation to prior and following turns at 
talk (Psathas, 1996). For discursive psychologists, mental states such as emotions and attitudes 
may be rhetorically employed and thus become interactionally relevant (Potter, 1996). And for 
micro-ethnographers and others who study embodiment and environment as potentially 
interactionally relevant, the situated context can include space, gesture, and objects (e.g., 
Goodwin, 1986; Heath, 2002). All of these resources are treated as potentially situationally 
relevant context in the current work. 
Cultural context is also potentially relevant to moral discursive practices. Culture is a 
widely debated concept which has changed its meanings over time among (as well as within) 
various disciplines. For this project, culture involves shared systems of symbolic and material 
practices (Fitch, 1998) which are largely based on tacit (Philipson, 1975; Bourdieu, 1977) 
ideological relationships. From a discourse analytic perspective, discursive practices are ways of 
constructing culture—organizing particular speech codes based on the ideologies that undergird 
their logic. Culture may be explicitly named (e.g., “we don’t share that value” or “she’s from the 
Middle East”), indexed in ways of speaking and common knowledge (e.g, accent, what is 
explained or not explained, known references), or acted upon in ways which are not always easy 
to empirically ground. Culture is ideological. According to Bakhtin (1981) ideologies refer to 
systems of ideas, interrelated beliefs spoken into being through language. Rather than being 
unitary and homogenous, however, Bakhtin argued that ideologies were heteroglossic, multiple 
and contradictory, and that the impulse to unify language existed in tension with language’s 
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tendency toward dialogism. This and related research is discussed further in chapters two, six 
and seven. 
Finally, as mentioned, the grounded practical theory approach is problem-oriented. 
Problems are identifiable when oriented to as problematic in interaction, and where participants 
treat elements of communication as problematic, there will be a potential for conflict. Conflict is 
sometimes seen as a society occurrence (where groups, or even nations, clash) but is also an 
interpersonal occurrence, and is always present or possible in some degree (Simmel, 1953). 
Conflict in communication research is defined in various ways—sometimes at a broad level as 
perceivably irreconcilable disagreements in a context of interdependence (Roloff & Soule, 
2004), sometimes at a local level as patterns of communicatively constructed divergence over 
time (Bailey, 2000a).  
The notion of difference is at the root of conflict. But this does not mean that difference is 
the cause of conflict, indeed, Baxter (2007) sees the problem of difference as the problem of 
sameness—it is people’s assumptions that difference is negative that leads to conflict. For this 
project, it is not the case that sameness or difference in themselves are problematic. Rather, 
participants treat difference as threatening and work to construct common ground, partly for 
practical reasons, but also because of the assumption or ideology that similarities are a 
foundation for intimacy. It is not the case that differences are inherently bad, but that one cannot 
say “differences are good” and leave it at that—differences are problematic. Differences 
inherently dilemmatic, and their constructions and subsequent responses are hard to manage and 
consequential in their management.  
According to Craig (2007), the question “what is a communication problem?” yields the 
question, “how should we theorize communication problems?” A discursive focus on conflict 
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suggests that theorizing morality as a communication problem requires understanding how 
participants see difference and conflict as interrelated and problematic. This and related research 
is discussed further in chapters two and eight. In this section so far I have discussed theoretical 
perspectives on social interaction, relationality, context and problems—and the ways in which 
these concepts cue intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, and conflict—as a foundation 
for this project. These perspectives yield a number of assumptions which guide this work and its 
analyses:  
Assumption 1: Social interaction is problematic—it is fraught with conflict potential. On 
the surface, it seems as if communicating is an effortless activity—that it can be done on 
“autopilot.” As has often been pointed out to me, most of the time, communication works: it does 
what it is supposed to do, and everyone goes along with their business. On the other hand, 
communication is consequential. Even small discords can have serious impact. And rather 
importantly, it has also been suggested that interacting is not as effortless as it seems. To assume 
social interaction is problematic is to assume a particular kind of world that we live in—an 
ontological perspective of chaos and multiplicity.  
Assumption 2: Social interaction is moral—we are accountable and judgable for our 
actions. If we were machines, and interactional problems were conceived of merely as errors, it 
seems conflict would not exist. Upon encountering a problem, we would simply seek to correct 
the error. There would be no need to blame, justify, repair or engage in the countless other 
careful activities that we feel we must employ to maintain order. Social interaction matters in 
ways that are not easy to pinpoint or address, but which we all certainly feel. To focus on the 
moral aspect social interaction is to assume certain things about human beings, what they are 
like, and how they conduct themselves in regard to one another.   
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Assumption 3: Closeness is consequential—close relationships may not be more 
important than the many social ties which bring people together, but they certainly have a deep 
impact on people’s lives and are treated by participants as mattering in fundamental ways. 
Though morality is potentially relevant to all interaction, looking at its construction between 
intimates highlights the ways in which morality involves a struggle between the desire for a 
shared life, and the backdrop of difference amidst which effortful constructions of sharedness 
take place.  
Assumption 4: Conflict is revelational—it exists in intersections between the ordinary 
veneer of expected everyday goings on, and the invisible world of effort that keeps it together. 
When things go wrong, we notice them in ways we did not before. To return to assumption 1, by 
accepting the commonplace state of things, one must orient unproblematically to social life, 
taking interest in its workings, but not ready to judge. By seeing interaction as harmonic, one 
misses what such harmonies are assuming, what effort it takes to maintain them, and thus the 
opportunities for addressing important everyday problems in human life. As a discourse analyst 
interested in conversational problems, I see conflict as potentially relevant to most discourse. I 
assume that people are different, and that this can cause tension. I assume also that relationships 
are unstable, and that this, too, can be an insecurity for people. Furthermore, I assume that 
discourse is not easy. There are often multiple goals to be achieved in talk. Determining what 
and how to say things can involve differing and even contradictory impulses. Thus, the potential 
for conflict is always there because interaction is fraught with tensions. Even very small moves 
can lead to trouble. The fact that they often do not, however, points out how careful people are 
about managing this trouble.  
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These assumptions make explicit the justification for a problem-oriented approach to 
studying morality. By looking at the problems of morality as a discursive practice through the 
GPT frame, a better understanding of the practice can be obtained. This understanding can 
potentially be useful for making practical changes in communication action, as well as for 
analysis and theorization by communication scholars. The ideas and assumptions described in 
this chapter thus provide a theoretically-informed perspective within the GPT approach for 
analyzing problems of, and formulating ideals for, morality as an interactional practice. The 
following two chapters describe the literature and methods of this project. The next chapter, 
chapter two, lays the foundation for morality as an area of research. Chapter two argues for a 
unique communicative concept of morality as a practical interactional achievement in 
interpersonal relationships. 
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Chapter 2 
Morality as Discursive Practice 
This project draws from a range of literatures across the area of language and social 
interaction (LSI) as well as across the communication discipline. The thrust of practical 
theorization is such that the usefulness of the theory is more important than its faith to one 
particular theoretical tradition. In that spirit, the theories described in chapter one drew from a 
number of disciplinary and interdisciplinary traditions within and related to communication 
scholarship; and the review undertaken here draws similarly from a range of perspectives.  
Primarily this work aims to contribute to two bodies of literature in communication 
research: interpersonal communication research and discourse analytic LSI research. These 
established communication traditions provide the background on the contextual and 
epistemological basis of this work. The LSI tradition provides much of the grounded practical 
theory and discourse analytic approach and methodology, while the interpersonal tradition 
provides the focus on relationships and relationality as a site of communication study.  
After describing a brief history of these areas and their general approaches to the topic of 
morality, I discuss how interpersonal communication and LSI research inform a unique 
communicative concept of morality. Following that section, I discuss research on five moral 
“problems” articulated within a range of research programs related to the study of interpersonal 
communication, discourse and interaction. Within that section, I review the practices involved in 
enacting intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture and conflict as the means of accomplishing 
morality in interaction. This is followed by a section which displays examples of those practices. 
Chapter two ends with a discussion of the questions and directions which arise from bringing this 
research together as the basis of the current project.   
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Interpersonal Communication and LSI Research 
Interpersonal communication research developed alongside the institutionalization of the 
discipline of communication. The first communication departments and research programs of the 
early 1950s, influenced by social psychology, focused on developing communication theories 
through scientific research on interpersonal processes (Rogers, 1994). Major work in this line of 
research includes Berger and Calabrese’s Uncertainty Reduction Theory (1975), which like the 
Palo Alto school (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967) took an axiomatic systems approach to 
communication. Later, more constructionist approaches began to emerge, such as Pearce and 
Cronen’s Coordinated Management of Meaning (1980), and Baxter and Montgomery’s (1996) 
relational dialectics. These programs heralded a more qualitative approach to interpersonal 
communication, and paved the way for a new way of studying of interaction to emerge. 
LSI grew up in—and eventually, grew out of—interpersonal communication research. 
Language and Social Interaction is an area that emerged out of the “social approaches” to 
interpersonal communication research, which included a group of scholars committed to taking a 
new, language based, qualitative approach to communication study (Leeds-Hurwitz, 1989, 1995, 
2009, 2010). Influenced by qualitative work outside communication (such as in sociolinguistics, 
sociology and anthropology), these scholars took on a more social constructionist than post-
positivist stance, and saw the empirical analysis of talk as central to their enterprise. Eventually 
these people came to be what is now called “LSI” in communication, though LSI as a category 
spans disciplines.  
   There are several research traditions that have shaped LSI’s direction and influenced its 
scholarship over the years. Ethnomethodology, for example, has been a founding area from 
which conversation analysis emerged. Other influences include linguistic pragmatics, 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  32 
 
interactional sociolinguistics, ethnography of speaking, philosophy of language, and language 
and social psychology (Fitch & Sanders, 2005; Glenn, LeBaron & Mandelbaum, 2003; Maynard 
& Peräkylä, 2003).  
LSI research focuses on understanding the basic constructs of language and interaction, 
explaining the functions of talk, and describing strategies employed in particular sites of 
interaction. A typical LSI study will identify features of language, describe interpersonal, 
organizational or political functions of talk, and show how these things create interaction. LSI 
scholars study a variety of sites including health and educational settings, legal or law related 
areas, democratic fora and meetings, businesses and organizations, and mundane (“non-
institutional”) sorts of interactions between family or telephone conversants (Tracy, 2008a).  
   This project’s approach to analysis a discursive one, which I will explain further in 
chapter three. However, there are important potential intersections between LSI and 
interpersonal work that have been little explored in the current research. For example, LSI has 
been more site-based than relationship-based, and even studies that clearly imply relationships 
(phone calls between friends, conversations between family) have privileged interaction 
mechanisms and strategies over seeing how those link up to relationships. Furthermore, there are 
myriad fascinating and consequential studies in the field of interpersonal communication on 
topics such as hurtful communication, deception, support and intimacy (Smith & Wilson, 2010) 
which are not engaged with directly by most LSI research (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2010). 
 Thus, the current project joins these areas of communication research to investigate the 
communicative practice of morality in interpersonal interaction. From the interpersonal 
perspective, morality is largely related to individual beliefs or values, while in discourse studies, 
morality is espoused in the judgments interactants make of one another. Both of these aspects of 
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morality seem to be true to some extent, but are simultaneously too specific, and not entirely 
unique. Why use the term “morality” at all? Is it a useful concept for research? 
Many areas of the communication field have explored the concept of morality in different 
ways, all of which can be said to characterize some aspect of morality. Interpersonal research, as 
mentioned, has largely looked at morality in terms of individual beliefs and values (e.g., Fogel, 
1993; Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993; Killen & Hart, 1999; Miller, 1994, 1999; Miller & Bersoff, 
1992). Cultural perspectives take up the same idea on a communal level, focusing on the norms 
among groups of individuals who share a common background or way of life (e.g., Boromisza-
Habashi, 2007a, 2007b; Philipsen, 1975). Rhetorical and critical work has engaged morality 
through normative lenses which identify the rightness or wrongness of communicative practices 
(e.g., Benardete, 2009; Burke, 1935; Condit, 1987). This work follows discourse analytic 
traditions by looking at morality as an interactional achievement. The next section specifies the 
discursive approach to morality undertaken in the current project.  
A Communicative Concept of Morality  
 Discourse approaches to morality have largely consisted of two varieties: one which 
looks at morality as inherent in the basic structure of interaction, and another which looks at how 
morality shapes and is shaped by interaction (Bergmann, 1998). Discourse scholars (or even 
scholars who consider discourse at all) contributing to these approaches (e.g., Bergmann, 1993; 
Cameron, 2000; Ibarra & Kitsuse, 2006; Marston, 2000; Stokoe, 2003), have looked at morality 
in many different ways. Morality is a squishy concept which seems to contain many different 
aspects, and yet also overlaps with other concepts, such as ethics, evaluation, and judgment. This 
project differentiates morality as a concept by focusing on unique problems with which it is 
associated and through which it is worked out in practice.  
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Morality is not the same as other concepts, but does involve practices which aim to 
produce, reflect or challenge those other concepts (i.e., judgments, ethics, norms, values, mores). 
Individual beliefs and values, for instance, can be espoused or indicated through moral practices. 
Ethics provide institutional systems for organizing and evaluating moral practices in particular 
settings. Evaluation and judgment are assessments that might also be mobilized as moral 
practices, if such assessments deal in some way with the problems of difference which are 
consequential for relationships.  
Thus morality encompasses the concepts of interactional commitment and responsibility, 
judgment and evaluation, beliefs and values, and ethical guidelines where participants must also 
deal with problems of difference. As stated in the previous chapter, this is not to say that 
“difference is a problem.” Indeed difference is not just always potentially present, but is often the 
basis of creativity and learning in interaction. Rather, it is the possibility that differences may 
prove insurmountable and lead to debilitating and relationship-troubling conflict that underlies 
participants’ treatment of difference as problematic.  
In the introduction in chapter one, “the discursive construction of morality” referred to 
the ways in which discourse constructs ideological judgments of persons and their actions in 
interpersonal conversation. Morality as an achievement, in moments and over time, is about 
about how to be a “good person” in interaction, where being a good person is accomplished 
through everyday choices in social actions and here, particularly toward or with close others. For 
the purposes of this project, the term morality will generally be used in the following ways: 
1. “morality” will refer to an analytical concept which describes the accomplishment 
of an interaction in which participants enact ways of doing and being which can 
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be judged as right or wrong with regard to the interpersonal and interactional 
commitments implicated in discourse processes.  
2. “moral interaction” (also “moral event” or “moral encounter”) will refer to a 
particular instance of people doing morality, or the phenomenon of such 
instances.  
3. “moral practices” or “moral discursive practices” (also “moral activities” or 
“moral rituals”) will refer to the communicative practices in which participants 
engage for the purpose or in service of achieving “morality” as an interactional 
accomplishment.  
4. “moral communication” will refer to espoused and situated normative ideals for 
what counts as an appropriate moral discursive practice, how it should be 
practiced, under what conditions it should be practiced, with whom it should be 
practiced, and its relationship to situational, relational, and cultural ideologies 
about identity, communication, action and relationships in the world.  
In other words, “morality” is a complex construct which can describe many aspects of 
social life—situations, judgments, ethics, problems, orientations, rituals, identities—but is 
empirically visible in the deployment of ideological implications in contexts of potential 
difference. Morally-inflected concepts such as norms, judgments, evaluations and ethics may 
always be potentially moral (and certainly layer atop proto-morality, discussed more in the 
following section), but are analytically labeled “moral” if participants orient to consequential 
differences. This happens when people ignore or do not notice (or pretend not to notice) 
differences, as in apparently-shared cultural contexts, constructing a sense of shared moral 
action. This also happens (and is perhaps more visible) when participants orient to differences or 
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possible differences. In such cases, the work of morality involves managing the difference based 
on what it might mean for the relationship. Such management may constitute the briefest quip, 
an apology, a humorous remark; but differences may also be pursued and even emphasized. 
Morality is not something which people “have,” but is continually accomplished through 
the ways in which people hold one another critically accountable for social actions. This 
consequentiality is embedded in the working-out of intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, and 
conflict differences in close relationships. The next section reviews the problems and practices 
associated with moral interaction across LSI and communication literatures.  
Moral Problems, Moral Practices 
The labeling of something as a problem is not merely an identification, but an action in 
its own right—one which may assign or deflect blame in different ways (Tracy & Muller, 2001). 
In describing the following “problems” of moral interaction, I am only in part asserting that they 
are problems. A different, and I would propose more important, component of these alleged 
problems is that they represent a name for empirically-visible practices which participants treat 
as morally relevant. In other words, though participants may not “call each other out” on 
intersubjectivity violations, they will treat those violations as morally consequential, for 
example, by saying “are you listening?” or “look at me when I’m talking to you” or “you 
misunderstood me.”  
Morality as an interpersonal discursive achievement is accomplished at different levels 
and under particular conditions. In this section I review literature related to ideas and practices 
which can become morally problematic in interaction. Specifically, this section discusses how 
intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture and conflict have been conceptualized with regard 
to morality, and how these concepts capture problematic aspects of moral interaction.  
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Intersubjectivity: The Proto-Morality Approach 
 This section reviews the concept of intersubjectivity as a key problem within the 
approach to morality which sees morality as omnirelevant (Bergmann, 1998). In discussing 
proto-morality, other practices within which intersubjectivity takes place are also discussed, i.e. 
turn-taking. This section begins by linking intersubjectivity to omnirelevant moral practice, and 
stating its importance in relationships. I then cover major work which takes or contributes to the 
proto-morality approach, primarily including Garfinkel, conversation analytic studies, and 
discursive psychology work. The section ends by considering examples of specific interactional 
practices and how they are morally implicative.  
Intersubjectivity is the most fundamental moral practice, without which other more 
complex interaction rituals would be destined to fail. Accomplishing intersubjectivity is a 
practice basic to nearly all interactions—there must be some basic shared understanding of a 
situation (Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1967) in order for interaction to move along—but it is 
particularly meaningful in close relationships as a way of achieving relationality. Displaying 
signs that one is attending to the other and the interactional and relational situation at hand is 
necessary. Over time, the particular patterns and means of doing intersubjectivity with close 
others mark a relationship as special, different from others. This section focuses on 
intersubjectivity as conceptualized in the approach that morality is omnirelevant. This foundation 
for morality as an ideological concept emphasizes the extent to which morality is managed in the 
ubiquitous give-and-take expectations of communication, and is required for ideological 
judgments to even exist. 
 Intersubjectivity is founded on the commitment to upholding expectations when 
interacting with others. Participants are treated as responsible for and accountable to interactional 
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expectations, but even more so in close relationships. Because interactional expectations are 
always relevant, approaches that deal for instance with intersubjectivity would see morality as 
omnirelevant. Seeing morality as omnirelevant implicates interaction as a committed enterprise 
in which people are held responsible for their actions—and judged accordingly. Most of this 
research is considered language and social interaction research, and comes out of 
ethnomethodological, conversation analytic, and discursive psychological traditions.  
 According to Bergmann (1998), the proto-morality approach begins with interaction and 
notices how it is moral. This is based largely on work by Garfinkel (1967, 2002, 2006, 2008; 
Heritage, 1984) in which interaction forms the basis of the social order. Because human beings 
are responsible for the social order, their interactional choices, including intersubjectivity 
practices, are seen as part of that commitment. Conversation analysis, which grew out of 
ethnomethodology, further distinguished what such morality means in interactional terms largely 
through the notion of adjacency, or the next-to-ness of sequential utterances. Not only is one 
responsible for providing a second pair part when a first pair part is proffered, but one is 
furthermore responsible for providing the conversationally preferred second pair part (Schegloff, 
2007). Intersubjectivity is achieved insofar as next utterances display understandings of prior 
utterances, and following utterances ratify that display of understanding (Schegloff, 1992). 
What this means is that when someone speaks, interlocutors’ commitment to the 
orderliness of social interaction demands a response. Not just any response is permitted: a 
response must be fit to the original utterance, such that, for example, question first pair parts are 
best fitted by answer second pair parts; invitations make relevant acceptances, or at least, 
rejections; and how-are-yous regularly require some acknowledgement and answer (usually in 
the form of “fine”) plus a turning-back of the question to the original speaker. Anything less will 
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incur swift, though not always spoken, judgment. At the least, a violation of such basic 
interactional moves will result in a strange look, or pursuit by one speaker of the missing or 
appropriate action implicated by the other speaker’s violation. In more extreme situations, such 
violations can lead to serious, even violent conflict. This is rarely, however, the result of single 
interactional moment. For the most part, interactional violations which are moral to this extent 
will result in discomfort, awkwardness, annoyance, frustration, or confusion.  
A number of studies, some of which explicitly study the “morality” of interaction and 
some which do not, have taken up morality in this manner. Garfinkel’s (1967) breaching 
experiments notoriously demonstrated the implications for social judgment when participants 
violate interactional expectations. Students of Garfinkel inflicted various violations upon 
strangers, friends and loved ones, engaging in such activities as (1) asking endless questions 
about apparently simple situations (e.g., a flat tire), (2) facing the other people on an elevator 
rather than the door, and (3) withholding “reasonable” responses to questions and comments. Not 
only did such breachings incur the stupefication, annoyance, and sometimes wrath of others, but 
were also experienced as deeply troubling to the “breachers” themselves. For Garfinkel, these 
experiments were ways of getting, indirectly, at the way in which social order is produced and 
the morality with which it is interwoven (Heritage, 1984).  
Conversation analysis took a similar, but more technical, approach to the basis of 
morality in interaction. In conversation analysis, morality is relevant in the ways people do and 
do not attend to the obligations of ordinary interaction—for instance, the structural demands for 
a preferred second pair part to certain first pair parts (i.e. that invitations should be followed by 
acceptances), or indeed the accountability that arises when people contribute no second pair part 
at all, constituting a “noticeable absence” (Heritage, 2005; Silverman, 1998). There is also work 
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in conversation analysis on the kinds of actions which are treated by participants as having a 
moral or judgmental dimension, including complaining (Drew & Walker, 1998) and blaming 
(Maynard, 1998).  
In these traditions, morality is studied from the perspective of social actions—the word 
“morality” is not always used. Conflict-relevant activities such as disalignments (Stivers, 2008), 
complaints (Drew, 1998), and news-expression (Maynard, 1998) have moral implications which 
may or may not be explicitly discussed. Research on conflict, argument and disagreement from 
an interaction perspective often involves attention to the ways in which people interactively 
orient to their exchanges as conflicted turn-by turn, and often the turns that constitute conflicted 
sequences are morally infused. Turns may question the reasonableness of prior turns, bring up 
prior turns as evidence of guilt, project disagreeing next turns with preference structure, or 
demand accountable responses (e.g. Grimshaw, 1990).  
In discursive psychology, some strands of which are highly conversation analytic, 
morality is made relevant in interaction through the way in which talk draws on moral concepts 
in the invocation of accountability, responsibility, intention and other psychological themes 
(Edwards, 2006). The notion of script formulations, for example, draws on the traditional social 
psychological concept of scripts as mental rules for action, but reframes them as built through 
descriptions in talk that construct action as part of a routine or standardized procedure (Edwards, 
2005). Morality is treated in part as the practical accountability of action, as in 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, but is also treated more explicitly in some studies 
as the discursive mobilization of moral concepts, logics and motives in people’s sense-making 
activities (e.g., Sneijder & te Molder, 2005; Stokoe, 2003; Stokoe & Wallwork, 2003).  
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Much of work by scholars who study the orderly accomplishments of sequential 
interaction would see morality in one of two ways: (1) as a subjective label which describes 
particular actions in talk; or (2) as the foundation for participants’ commitments to contribute 
appropriately to interaction. This review has focused on the latter, in which morality, like action, 
could be seen as omnirelevant. By such analysis “morality” is still a label, but it is label with an 
interactional meaning rather than being about beliefs or values. When someone for instance 
accuses another of being “a bad person,” what they are really doing is describing, for example, a 
recurrent pattern of dispreferred interactional choices made by a conversational partner. Moral 
concepts are used to do action in talk, but talk is also to some extent morally undergirded in 
interactional commitments.  
There are many potential practices implicated by research within the proto-morality 
perspective. Intersubjectivity is a practice which involves many different verbal and nonverbal 
devices, and is described in more detail in chapter four. In this section I will touch on the 
concepts of turn-taking, adjacency, preference, and assessment, which are the generative 
mechanisms of talk in conversation analysis, and therefore means by which participants organize 
and display intersubjectivity.  
Turn-taking is the basic mechanism for moving interaction forward. People usually speak 
one at a time and generally wait until the end or near the end of an utterance before providing 
their own turn. The handing back and forth of turns allows conversation to unfold as a social 
activity. Conversations move forward in terms of actions that get accomplished, for example, 
asking someone out on a date (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 2007). Turn-
taking can become problematic. People might “speak out of turn” or “speak over one another.” 
There can be a “competition for the floor.” People may not take a turn designed for them, or they 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  42 
 
may misinterpret the turn. However, these problems are overwhelmingly not the norm, according 
to Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974). 
The concept that makes this moving-forward work coherently is adjacency. Turns are 
made relevant to prior turns, and shape upcoming turns. The nearness of one turn to another 
makes it relevant. Turns are therefore addressed to upcoming turns, and the following turns 
indeed address themselves to the prior turn. This allows not just a random exchange of turns, but 
one guided by relevance and adjacency (Schegloff, 2007). It is possible, of course, to run into 
trouble with adjacency. Someone might misinterpret what the turn is about, and provide an 
irrelevant turn. Someone may not hear the last few turns, addressing a turn instead to a yet older 
and now-irrelevant turn from several turns back. 
Relevance of adjacent turns in terms of nearness is not itself going to make interaction 
work. Turns must also be preferred in order to be relevant, that is, they are not just “related” in 
proximity to adjacent turns, but provide the expected and appropriate format of response 
(Pomerantz, 1984). This is where the “action” of turns becomes significant. Turns have types, 
such as being openings, requests, assessments, etc. Thus the responding turn must be able to 
recognize the type and give a type-conforming response. Assessments, for example, can be either 
ratified or challenged. A challenge may be conversationally dispreferred, but its format is 
preferred because it conforms to the type of adjacency pair. Preference is at the root of 
interactional problems in conversation analysis. It is by doing dispreferred actions that people 
accomplish troubles and disagreements in interaction.  
These practices form the foundation of more complex practices described later in this 
chapter and in the analysis chapters. Adjacency, for example, is part of what makes actions 
intelligible for interlocutors, and displays of intelligibility are part of what makes up the practice 
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intersubjectivity, discussed in chapter four. The work reviewed in this section implicates that 
morality is potentially omnirelevant based on responsibility to the social order and judgment of 
people’s interactional moves. This view of morality is assuredly important, but I want to make a 
distinction between the view of morality as omnirelevant and the more social or ideological view 
of invocations of morality as an interactional resources.  
It is not the case for instance that proto-morality does not exist, but that its empirical 
instantiations’ crossing-over into morality proper would be the result of sustained patterns of 
interaction, which can only be seen when taking a more relational or cultural—in another word, 
contextual—perspective. Furthermore, morality is not only an invocation used by participants or 
analysts to describe an action—it is also a situated accomplishment which may not be explicitly 
named, but which is treated as meaningfully moral. Activities taken as moral in this sense by 
participants, such as some of those mentioned in this section (e.g. blaming), are the focus of the 
next section.  
In the next section I look at how intimacy forges the relationship between proto-morality 
practices, such as intersubjectivity, and ideological moral practices, such as gossip. The next 
section focuses on an approach to morality which begins with concepts commonly viewed as 
morally-charged in society, and the ways in which these concepts are enacted and shaped in 
situated interaction.   
Intimacy: Linking Identities to Relationships 
 This section reviews the concept of intimacy as a key problem within the approach to 
morality which sees morality as the ways in which ideologies are constructed and shaped in 
interaction (Bergmann, 1998). In discussing intimacy, the proto-morality of intersubjectivity is 
thus linked to the ideological moralities more familiar and namable to participants. This section 
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begins by linking intersubjectivity to intimacy, and intimacy to relating and identity, as moral 
practices for doing closeness in relationships. I then cover major work which takes or contributes 
to this approach to morality, primarily including symbolic interactionism, Goffman, studies of 
identity, interpersonal communication research, and discourse analysis. The section ends by 
considering examples of specific intimacy practices and how they are morally implicative. 
Proto-morality and its practices take place in any kind of interaction. Intimacy presents a 
different order of such practices, one designed to signal other-orientation as intimate and 
enduring. The relational component of interpersonal interaction is qualitatively (and to some 
extent quantitatively) different for close relationships. Thus, intersubjectivity practices unfold in 
a particular way, shaped to be made relationally meaningful. The accumulation of doing 
intersubjectivity in a particular way accomplishes intimacy. This means that in a sense, 
“intimacy” is what distinguishes ideological and relationally-implicative morality from the 
morality of all interactions. Intimacy is also a condition for morality to be ideological in the 
sense in which it is consequential for relationships. In this section I discuss intimacy practices as 
the constitution of relational identities. 
This emphasis on relationality brings me to interpersonal communication. So far I have 
focused on the discursive analytic perspective based in a grounded practical theory approach. 
Due in part to my “site” of study—interpersonal relationships—interpersonal communication 
research is relevant; however, it is also theoretically relevant to my perspective on the concept of 
moral interaction. Interpersonal communication research treats “relating” as theoretically 
significant. Many of the discursive concepts and approaches which have been described (and 
which are described later) do not. Indeed, insofar as “relationships” may often be assumed, a 
priori, as those which seem obvious (mother, sister, friend), many strong empirical discourse 
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approaches, such as conversation analysis, would see looking at relationships as imposing 
analytic categories onto the data. However, that is not, in focusing on relationality, what I mean 
to do. Instead, I seek to ground relating in discourse and see relationships as discursive 
constructions.  
In order to understand intimacy as a practice for discursively constructing relationships, 
the next portion of this section links interaction, relationality, and identity. Interaction and 
relationality are key interests in interpersonal communication research. The symbolic 
interactionist perspective, which has had an enduring influence on interpersonal scholarship, 
formulates “identity” at the center of interacting with others. An identity cannot be formed 
outside of society, and is most meaningful in interacting with others. Self concept is based on a 
person’s perception of their own identity, usually based on stable notions of one’s “personality.” 
This sense of unitary stability is deceptive, however, as the self concept is in fact dynamic and 
complex, formed out of interactions with others and changing over time (Markus & Wurf, 1987). 
Social identity refers to one’s identity in relation to particular groups, for example, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, occupation. Social identity theory seeks to explain when and why people act 
more as individuals and more as group members in different situations (Tajfel, 1978, 1982). The 
idea of “identity” in interpersonal research is based on the notion that individual differences do 
exist and are important in communication (Daly, 2002). 
 Impression management refers to the ways in which people make effortful (if not 
conscious) attempts to control information and thus create a particular view of a person or 
situation (Schlenker, 1980). Based in social psychology, this idea is taken up sociologically by 
Goffman’s notion of facework. Facework is the work people do to make their actions consistent 
with and interpretable in relation to a desirable presentation of self (Goffman, 1967). Face can be 
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threatened, saved, maintained, supported, attacked, etc. Facework is especially apparent in 
tenuous, conflicted or interactionally troubled situations. Because one aspect of morality is that 
people talk themselves into existence as moral beings, face is an important and performative 
notion of self that is relevant to the doing of morality. 
Terms for “identity” have long been opposed by conversation analysts. The CA 
perspective seeks to discover the basis for conversation in talk-in-interaction—the ways in which 
structures for interacting are sequentially organized into meaningful talk. Thus, intersubjectivity 
practices, as described in chapter four, would not be conceived of psychologically or 
phenomenologically, but would have to be indicated, for example, by instances of repair. As 
Schegloff (1992) noted, repair—correcting what one is saying—recognizes a problem of 
understanding that could occur for the talk recipient, and so is oriented to this notion of the 
intersubjective. As mentioned earlier in this section, intersubjectivity is a foundational practice 
for doing intimacy, and involves the positioning of identities as in relation through discursive 
resources.  
This CA perspective extends also to any word with which one might identify a talk 
participant: mother, boy, Latina, teacher, etc. All such terms would be seen as an analyst’s 
creation, not one necessarily attended to by conversational participants, and thus to label and 
then go even further to make claims about such labels (i.e. “she spoke that way because she is a 
woman”) would be seen as grossly unempirical. This is one reason why certain strands of CA 
often come into confrontation with more critical perspectives (Billig, 1999; Schegloff, 1997; 
Schegloff, 1998; Schegloff, 1999a; Schegloff, 1999b; Wetherell, 1998; Stokoe & Smithson, 
2001). 
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Although taking an empirical view, and strongly influenced by many conversation 
analytic ideas, this project does not go so far as to eschew any references to categories of 
identity. Indeed, part of the aim of this project is that relationships and identities do matter to 
participants, but that this “mattering” must be attended to by participants, and shown to be a 
feature of the interaction. Thus, a discourse perspective is needed which would account for the 
claims made about identity in interpersonal, sociological and other literatures, but still allow for 
such claims to be situated in the interaction between participants. “Intersubjectivity” is one 
concept used to accomplish this in chapter four, while in chapter five, the concept of “facework” 
becomes more central. Both are part of the way in which talk does identity.  
“Identity-work” is a concept used in various areas of the communication field and, 
similarly to the idea of facework, implies a kind of effortful management of identity. Tracy’s 
(2002) definition of identity-work shifts the perspective more squarely to a discursive one by 
defining it as the work talk does to manifest the “who” doing the talking. In other words, who a 
person seems to be (based on prior performances or discourse) will shape how their talk is 
interpreted; and how people talk will shape the person their interlocutors take them to be. Antaki 
and Widdicombe (2008) take a similar stance in noting that identity is both an achievement and a 
tool. From a discourse perspective, identities are not always and already equally relevant, but 
become salient in different ways and in different situations. 
 This concept is the one I wish to employ in this project. In identifying “relationships” as a 
context for moral talk, and in orienting to interpersonal and discursive research, this project has 
to at once acknowledge and value “relationships” and “relationality” as important ideas in 
communication research, while grounding those ideas in specific interactional moves. According 
to Tracy (2002), “relational identities” are the identities people enact with particular others. 
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Having an identity that is “relational” does not just refer to a quality of being identifiable as “in 
the relationship” (i.e. “they’re siblings”) but also refers to the specific ways in which people 
discursively indicate that they are “doing” some cultural notion of “being a sibling” together.  
The site of this project is not a physical place, but a kind of interaction—the kind oriented 
to the ways in which people interact with one another as particular, meaningful “others”: a kind 
of interaction based in relating “closely,” in sharing a history and a commitment to particular 
modes of interaction and their maintenance. In other words, the site of this project is the 
relationship between people, as it is enacted in discourse. And the uses of “identity” here, as I 
hope has been apparent, refer to the relationship and ways of constructing it, and not to 
individuals or their traits.  
Intimacy has been linked to a number of communication activities, including arousal 
(Patterson, 1976), social support (e.g., Burleson, 1985, 2003), communication competence 
(Buhrmester, 1990), self disclosure (Laurenceau, Barret & Pietromonaco, 1998), talk about the 
relationship (Knobloch, Solomon & Theiss, 2006) and nonverbal cues (Patterson, Jordan, Hogan 
& Frerker, 1981). In these literatures, such actions are often based on having an effect on 
attention and involvement in experimental observation, or based on self-reports of people’s 
feelings of intimacy with regard to these actions. These communication activities are relevant, 
but the way in which they are seen and analyzed is based on how they are accomplished in 
ongoing interaction. 
Tannen (e.g., 1999) has studied the ways in which talk (particularly women’s talk) works 
to do intimacy or rapport. Style and actions in communication, such as listening/understanding 
practices (continuers or feedback such as “yeah” and “m hm,” eye contact, sharing similar 
experiences), demonstrate that one is “on the same page” and cares about the other. When such 
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practices are not employed, it is seen as a threat to intimacy. In fact, some of Tannen’s examples 
point to the way in which these practices are associated with deeper differences between people, 
as when what appears to be a small disagreement turns to the viability of the relationship itself. 
From Tannen’s perspective, this indicates that different communicative moves have different 
meanings, in this case, for men and women, as in different cultural contexts.  
Goldsmith and Fitch (1997) looked at advice as a way of doing social support, and the 
dilemmas involved. They demonstrated that advice seeking, receiving and giving can involve 
problems that construct but also depend on the intimacy assumed by the relationship between the 
people in the advice situation. Giving advice, for example, could be seen as “butting in” as well 
as caring or supportive. Maynard and Zimmerman (1984) examined the use of topics as a way of 
establishing intimacy between non-close interactants, establishing the basis of membership 
categorization and relational development through self-disclosure. Others have looked at the role 
of laughter (Coates, 2007; Jefferson, Sacks & Schegloff, 1987), storytelling (Mandelbaum, 1987, 
1993; Stokoe, 2006) and troubles-talk (Jefferson, 1988) in doing intimacy. 
 Intimacy practices are buttressed by intersubjectivity practices. Displays of 
understanding, of common knowledge, and of an optimally shared orientation to or stance on a 
variety of aspects of life are all related to doing intersubjectivity in particular ways with 
particular others. Other ways of jointly organizing talk can display intimacy, for example, co-
constructed talk, overlap, convergence, narrative, positioning, facework, and support.  
 Co-constructed talk and overlap are ways in which the basic turn-taking structure of 
social interaction can be modified and used to convey social meanings. Though as mentioned in 
the last section turns overwhelmingly pass between speakers and occur close to the ends of 
former turns (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974), violating such expectations can mean 
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different things. Turn-taking violations may be problematic, and attributions of rudeness or 
demands to let one finish speaking would signal that being the case. But sometimes people share 
turns to jointly construct stories or attitudes, thus showing how closely they are aligned through 
experiences or opinions. Overlaps can signal conversational involvement. These “violations” 
then become supportive (e.g., Mandelbaum, 1987; Schegloff, 2000).  
 Co-constructed talk is similar in some ways to the notion of convergence—that speaking 
styles will converge when people want to identify or affiliate with one another. Giles’s 
communication accommodation theory (Giles, Taylor & Bourhis, 1973) developed a specifically 
cultural approach to the concept of convergence as a way of explaining people’s desire to 
accommodate (or not) in conversations with others. Accommodating one’s speech in terms of 
accent, word choice, pacing, etc., is a way of displaying interest and sharedness with another 
person, as well as intimacy where such convergence is particularly strong. Divergence, on the 
other hand, often signals the opposite—a way of putting distance between interactants and 
signaling disagreement or disaffiliation (Bailey, 2000a; Giles & Coupland, 1991).  
 Narrative has already been mentioned as one way in which people can do intimacy with 
another through jointly-told stories. Often such story-telling is for an audience: a dramatized 
version of married couples’ stories of their relationships occurs at the beginning of the film 
“When Harry Met Sally,” and demonstrates various examples of jointness in storytelling. Stories 
are a way in which people make sense of their relationships. Stories are not only jointly-told as a 
way of showing experiential closeness, but can become “myths” for couples and families, told 
over and over again to each other and close others. References to stories (“remember when?”) 
left untold, or only told in part, also demonstrate the shared memory and history which identifies 
people as being in a close relationship (Norrick, 2000). 
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Positioning can also be a way of doing relational identities. Narrative, for example, can 
be a way of positioning people in relation to others and to communities. Narratives can present 
certain versions of selves and other, and of relationships. Identity enactments describe ways of 
accomplishing one as having a certain kind of situational, relational, personal or cultural identity 
(Tracy, 2002). Identity positioning, for example, is a way of enacting identity against, with, in 
contrast to or in relation to the identities of others (Davies & Harre, 1990). Thus, to position 
one’s self in relation to someone in certain ways indicates different levels of intimacy. 
Facework, a way of managing the positive portrayal of an appropriate identity (Goffman, 
1967), is also always in relation to another’s identity, and thus is a form of positioning to some 
extent. Doing facework for others is ubiquitous, but special ways of doing facework occur 
among friends. Attending to another’s face is a way of showing care about that person’s social 
identity, of mending conversational troubles, and reinforcing solidarity with another (Agne & 
White, 2004; Cupach, 1994; Lim & Bowers, 1991; Trees & Manusov, 1998). Facework is also a 
way of doing support, another practice which shows closeness. Social support involves myriad 
communication activities, such as giving comforting messages, showing empathy, and displaying 
sensitivity (Burleson, 1985; Burleson, 2003; Burleson & Albrecht, 1994). 
Relationships are particularly suited to the empirical study of how people work out their 
moralities in relation to one another. It is indeed, in close relationships, where the concept of 
“morality” becomes most personally consequential. In conflict-relevant situations between close 
others, an idea of how to do the business of engaging or avoiding conflicts will practically 
demand an idea of how to conduct that business well. 
 So far this section has grounded the concept of intimacy in relationships as being related 
to intersubjectivity, relationality, interaction, and identity. As indicated by the last paragraph, 
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however, there is an idea of how to do closeness in contextually appropriate ways. This indicates 
the role of ideology in the moral practice of intimacy. Practices are not created brand new in 
every interaction, but are guided by, and therefore also ways of reconstructing and achieving, 
ideas about what a practice is and how it should be done. The normative ideas about moral 
practice and the logical assumptions that link them are what I am calling ideology. In the next 
section I look more closely at the concept of ideology as a cultural construct shaping how 
practices for doing intimacy should unfold.   
Ideology: The Cultural Logic of Morality 
 This section reviews the concept of ideology as a key problem within the approach to 
morality which sees morality as constructed and shaped in interaction (Bergmann, 1998), as well 
as within cultural approaches. Therefore in discussing ideological practices, I also discuss how 
ideology is cultural. This section begins by linking ideology to intimacy as moral practices for 
doing relationships. I then cover major work which takes or contributes to an ideological 
approach to morality, primarily including Bakhtin, Goffman, interpersonal communication 
approaches, and various discourse analytic and ethnography of communication research. The 
section ends by considering examples of specific ideological practices and how they are morally 
implicative. 
The last section mentioned the concept of ideology as being part of the logic by which 
people judge intimacy practices in interpersonal relationships. In this section I focus on the 
connection between ideology and relationships. This connection is a cultural one: ideologies are 
culturally constructed and meant to represent the normative ideas of practical conduct for a 
particular people. This means that ideology is what provides the logic or organized sense of what 
moral practice should be in a particular cultural context. This section is about work which has 
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focused on the ways in which interaction is guided by and instantiates sociocultural beliefs about 
appropriate, good, or right behavior, and the consequences this can involve. This research falls 
under several areas of communication, including language and social interaction, discourse 
analysis, rhetoric, critical approaches, interpersonal communication research, and cultural 
approaches. Though ideology and culture (as well as relational intimacy and interactional 
intersubjectivity) are deeply intertwined, the focus on ideology involves a focus on a rhetorical 
perspective in which, in situations where culture is assumed to be shared and is thus not salient, 
people’s moral actions will generally be attributed to choice. 
As mentioned in chapter one, “ideology” is not meant here in the strongest sense—having 
to do with power, or manipulation—but regarding an “idea-system” as Bakhtin (1981) would 
say, a constellation of beliefs, reasons, assumptions and attitudes about what the world is like, 
how people should be, and such. Thus, this section discusses the other approach to morality in 
discourse described by Bergmann (1998) in which the analyst begins with morality—a concept 
such as truth or politeness employed in human interaction—and looks to how it plays out 
between, guides, and is shaped by people’s intercourses with one another. Also relevant to this 
work, as mentioned in the last chapter, are discourse studies which focus less on morality as 
omnirelevant and more on morality as oriented to in participants’ actions of judgment. However, 
in this section I focus on more socially-oriented studies of socially interaction which do not focus 
on the sequential organization of talk.  
Ideologies are linked to cultural value judgments—they are wrapped up in identities, 
aesthetics, epistemology, and morality (Schieffelin, Woolard & Kroskrity, 1992). Ideology is 
part of what gives cultural practices their moral inflection—why practices are treated as “moral” 
will be linked to the ideologies that participants index as guiding practice, the beliefs about 
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“normal” life situated in historical and material processes which are often obscured (Blommaert, 
1999). Ideologies tend to be enduring and unquestioned ideas of the nature of right and wrong in 
the social world, and are treated as taken-for-granted, commonsensical notions (Blommaert & 
Verschueren, 1998) similar to Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of doxa. 
As mentioned, for Bakhtin (1981) ideology means a particular way of viewing the world, 
a view which is constituted by the material and social system in which it is embedded. It is 
through speech that ideology is transmitted: everyday speech, and its endless recycling of 
stylized and standardized quotations, provides interpretive frames for situations by re-
conceptualizing and re-accenting utterances spoken before. By such everyday speaking do social 
actors engage practically with cultural ideologies in order to achieve social significance in local 
interactions. Ideologies are similar to discourses in the Foucauldian sense—cultural themes and 
sometimes cultural coercions underlying and rationalizing everyday practices.  
 Ideology, then, has to do with the worldview embedded in the norms of particular 
societies—ways not only of implicating what the world is, but also what it should be, and how 
people can achieve that in their everyday lives. “Respect your elders,” “be honest with lovers,” 
and “honor your family” are examples of ideological norms that provide the logic for local ways 
of speaking and how they are judged. This logic is often unstated and is one into which cultural 
participants are socialized rather than something which is taught explicitly. Philipsen (1975) 
defined culture as that which is “shared, tacit” (p. 13). This emphasizes part of what makes 
conceptualizing culture so tricky: it is amassed by largely unacknowledged expectations. It also 
emphasizes the connection between ideology and culture. 
According to Bakhtin (1981, 1986), discourse is social, material, dialogic and ideological, 
and that this is part of why discourse matters so much in moral interaction. Bakhtin's interest in 
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everyday speech (despite being a literary critic) makes what he says relevant to a discursive 
perspective. Bakhtin claimed that when people speak, they participate in a world of people, 
referencing relationships and the words of others. Speaking is material because it has 
consequences for one’s self and for others. The ways in which things are said matter. The 
dialogism of speech points to language’s heteroglossia—that there are always many “languages,” 
ways of speaking, and ideological commitments inherent in any speech, and that these languages 
and perspectives are always engaging one another in a dynamic interplay of meanings. Thus, 
language is ideological because it indexes “idea-systems,” cultural ways of thinking and 
believing that are marshaled rhetorically in people’s speech. The multiplicity of ideologies in 
discourse can be quite different and contradictory, but as Kim (2007) proposes, they are often not 
mutually exclusive, but define and are defined by (or against) one another.  
 In most LSI work, ideology is not an oft-referenced term; however, it refers to the kinds 
of morally-inflected topics taken up in studies of language and interaction. In 1988, Maynard 
suggested that the study of language and interaction was an important site for addressing the 
study of social problems from a perspective oriented to the “interaction order” (Goffman, 1967). 
Maynard (1988) proposed that integrating “micro” language-oriented studies would demonstrate 
how people use language to confront the problems they encounter in everyday life. This is not to 
say that more “macro” studies ignore the situated occurrence of morality in conflicted talk. 
Gordon (1990) for instance studies the way in which social structures have built-in cultural 
expectations about the role of emotion in everyday problems, including specific names for 
emotions, norms about when and how to show emotions, and beliefs (ideologies) about the 
nature of emotions. He refers to these expectations as “emotion culture.” 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  56 
 
Most LSI studies, however, focus on discourse more directly, taking up particularly 
morally-inflected strategies by which people use discourse to deal with problematic situations. 
One such strategy is through categorization practices. Often drawn from Sacks’ (1992) concept 
of the membership categorization device (MCD), these literatures look at ways in which 
linguistically placing people in certain “categories” based on age, gender, race or other master 
identities (Tracy, 2002) presupposes a moral ordering. For instance, Nikander (2000) analyzes a 
50-year-old woman’s talk regarding her identity as both “old” and “little girl” in ways that index 
cultural notions of age appropriateness.  
A study by Rapley, McCarthy and McHoul (2003) join categorization practices with 
accounting practices, arguing that both are inescapably moral. In their analysis of lay and expert 
media accounts of a mass murder in Tasmania in 1996, they found that explanations for the 
moral categorizations of selves, others and tragic situations were remarkably congruent among 
all accounts, regardless of their standing as ordinary “people on the street” versus professionals. 
The authors argue that moral accounting grounds the technical, clinical or scientific judgments 
made by professionals. 
Others have approached morality and conflict from the angles of support talk, resolution 
and problem-solving. White and Watson-Gegeo (1990) for example looked at what they called 
“tangles”—conflicts, dilemmas and problems—and the way in which people draw on moral 
assumptions in their discursive attempts to “disentangle.” Other studies of how discourse draws 
on moral concepts include research on criticizing, blaming, arguing, and generally doing face-
threatening actions. Tracy (2008c) looked at conflict at a school board and how “face-attacks” 
could be situationally appropriate ways of doing, for instance, “moral indignation”—showing 
passion and commitment for important community issues.  
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 What I am calling the “ideological” approach is not only taken by language and social 
interaction scholars. Most interpersonal research, for instance, also starts at this level—by 
looking at morality as related to beliefs, values, judgment, and ideologies (though not necessarily 
using the latter term). In this literature, judgment is not about actions that assess prior turns, but 
is more about the ways in people judge one another as good, bad, reasonable, unreasonable, etc. 
Classically, such work has looked primarily at morality as a dimension of attitudes toward 
particular actions which are measured in the service of learning how communication reveals, or 
is shaped by, people’s internal notions of right and wrong (e.g., McCroskey, Richmond & Daly, 
1975).  
 Others who have not taken this more strict social scientific approach have looked at 
morality and its relationship to emotion and conflict (e.g. Jones, 2001; Planalp, 1999). Baxter’s 
relational dialectics (2004a, 2004b) sees intimacy and independence as complementary 
emotional needs in tension with one another. For Baxter, ideology is captured in relational 
discourses such as “couples should spend time together” or “sisters should be able to tell each 
other everything.” Fitch (1998), who takes a cultural approach to discourse in relationships, links 
morality to relationships and culture through the concept of interpersonal ideologies, “premises 
about personhood, relationships and communication around which people formulate lines of 
action toward others and interpret others’ actions” (p. 12). She notes that such premises are often 
unspoken and assumed. 
 The interpersonal approach to morality usually begins with an assumption of what 
morality means. Rhetorical approaches are similar in this regard. Burke (1935, 1945, 1966) 
however goes more deeply into the human foundations of morality, which he identifies as the 
need for actions to “fit” the environment. Thus, certain moral concepts such as “duty” will be 
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invoked to explain motives for particular actions in order to make one’s conduct appear suitable, 
appropriate or as Burke calls it “pious” with regard to a situation. In a sense, some of what Burke 
says is not too different from Goffman’s (1959, 1961, 1963, 1967) perspective. Morality is for 
Burke deeply ceremonial. Ritual actions, from legal and religious ones to social ones, perform a 
social and cultural function for establishing a sense of order, rightness, or identity. Thus, Burke’s 
view is also not too different in some ways from Garfinkel’s (1953, 1967, 2006). 
 The ideological approach does not leave behind the concepts of commitment and 
responsibility which were important to intersubjectivity and to the proto-morality approach. 
Similar to the discussion of intimacy, looking at ideology means focusing on commitment and 
responsibility at more relational and communal levels. It also tends to take a more social and 
cultural approach. Goffman (1959, 1961, 1963, 1967) for example is considered by Bergmann 
(1998) as the exemplar of this approach to morality. Though Goffman does not consider culture, 
his descriptions of the “rules” of the interaction order are certainly grounded in particular 
contexts—the ones he discusses, however, are generally situational rather than cultural.  
 The ideological approach comes from many more disparate communication traditions 
than did the proto-morality approach. Cultural approaches within the ethnography of 
communication tradition come closest to the way in which morality is studied in the current 
project. In this research, discourse analysis is situated within culturally-contexted relationships to 
uncover the culturally variable practices and meanings of interaction (Carbaugh, 2007). Some 
work that takes a cultural approach also considers the importance of relationality (e.g. Fitch, 
1994) as well as looking at the use of moral concepts (such as “respect”) as strategy (e.g. Buttny 
& Williams, 2000; Bailey, 2000a). However, much of this work tends to see morality as 
synonymous with norms; does not engage as closely the concept of commitment explored by 
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proto-morality approaches; or does not incorporate difference and conflict explicitly in the 
consideration of ideology or norms.  
 Ideology and “discourses of” are often analyzed negatively. The research above, as I 
hope to have made clear, does not necessarily require seeing these concepts as oppressive. The 
tradition of doing so comes from a particular place, and is often attributed to Marx, who equated 
ideology with the false consciousness that kept certain social groups oppressed (Purvis & Hunt, 
1993). Many of the terms discussed in this and the next section overlap regarding these 
concepts—ideologies, discourses, doxa, premises, assumptions, and others—and they each offer 
different emphases and have been analyzed in more or less negative ways. Like “rhetoric,” 
ideology has developed a negative pall through its associations and usages, but this project takes 
a more sociological perspective which sees ideology as the social construction of shared 
meanings. It can certainly become oppressive, and is undoubtedly problematic, but is not 
necessarily only a tool of the powerful.  
 Purvis and Hunt (1993) make a distinction between discourse theory as describing 
internal societal ideas, and ideology as describing external ideas—in other words, ideology is a 
name for a large concept in society or culture, and discourse is the linguistic way of describing 
that concept. This is similar to the perspective taken in this project. Ideology represents a general 
social value such as “trust.” Discourses refer to ways of formulating the ideology as mottos or 
sayings, such as “be trustworthy” or “trust me.” A discourse of trust is a way of describing what 
the ideology is.  
 These ways of describing, however, are not floating above and guiding interaction. 
Rather, they are ways of making sense of practical interactional choices, for instance, whether to 
disclose something personal to a friend, and how (Tracy & Ashcraft, 2001). As Gal (1992) notes, 
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Ideology is conceptualized—implicitly or explicitly—not only as systematic 
ideas, cultural constructions, commonsense notions, and representations, but also 
as the everyday practices in which such notions are enacted; the structured and 
experienced social relations through which humans act upon the world. (p. 445-
446) 
Practices for forming sociocultural bonds require the constitution of broad, shared ideas 
of how to be in the world, and also provide ways of talking about problems with the ideology 
(i.e., “I wouldn’t trust you any further than I could throw you”). Thus, ideology is a way of 
creating a sense of commonality or shared values and ways of doing things. However, ideologies 
are multiple, and this sharedness thus an effort; furthermore, ideologies often provide the means 
of positioning people and ideas as different from, or even against, one another (Gal & Irvine, 
1995). Ideologies provide the logic for explanations of why certain practices exist (because they 
are “good”) and thus can inherently imply that opposite practices are “bad.” 
There are many potential practices implicated by research within the ideological 
perspective. In the remainder of this section I will discuss briefly the concepts of judgment 
rituals, demonstrations, identity enactments, and metadiscourse. I will then discuss how they are 
relevant to my analyses, and definitions and examples of them will be provided in the vocabulary 
section. 
Judgment rituals involve the kinds of assessment and accounting relevant to the proto-
morality approach, as well as speech acts such as blaming and criticizing, but also more 
complicated rituals of judgment, such as gossip. There are many kinds of discursive practices 
which can do judgment. I begin with accounting, partly because accountability is what makes 
even the smallest actions morally implicative, partly because research on accounting spans 
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interpersonal and discourse analytic approaches. Accounting is one category of discourse, in the 
general discursive world of reason-giving, which specifically deals with problematic situations. 
Giving accounts is one activity in which people respond to potentially problematic situations by 
mitigating their own responsibilities (Tracy, 2002). Account-giving is quite broad because it 
involves a number of different practices such as justifying, arguing, being defensive, and 
criticizing-back. Accounting shows attendance to a problem, but also provides plenty of room to 
avoid being explicit, and so is a site where managing the directness of moral talk becomes 
visible.  
Accounts can be described with speech act verbs, such as blaming, justifying and 
apologizing. Narratives are a common way of giving accounts (White, 1980), as are descriptions 
and explanations. An “account” will often combine particular ways of describing people and 
situations, attributing reasons and causes, and explaining behaviors. Accounts are ways of 
mediating the relationship between particular events and situations in our daily lives, and the 
identities of our selves and others as we make our way through, within and in relation to such 
circumstances. By accounting, we seek to present to others how this relationship should be 
interpreted, and what moral implications can be drawn about the persons and situations 
embedded therein. 
Accounting accommodates many different kinds of practices that seek to negotiate one’s 
responsibility with regard to problems or potential problems. Another category of moral 
practices involves passing judgment on others or on situations for which the teller of the 
situations perceives herself as not being accountable. Complaining is one example of an activity 
that does this (Edwards, 2005). Troubles telling and other narrative events are others (Jefferson, 
1988). One kind of ritual in which people regularly engage is that of reproaching or complaining-
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to—criticizing someone’s actions as problematic, wrong, or bad in some way (Tracy, 2002). This 
can be done ritually when it follows a particular format, for example, criticism-account-
reformulation-apology: Bill says Suzy never takes out the trash; Suzy says she is too tired when 
she gets home; Bill says he gets home even later than she does; Suzy says she is sorry. As 
indicated by the long history of research on the demand/withdrawal syndrome among romantic 
couples (e.g., Christensen, 1987, 1988; Christensen & Heavey, 1990), criticizing or “nagging” 
rituals are easy patterns for intimate people to fall into, but can seriously damage a relationship 
over time.  
Another category involves gossip or complaining-about, in which people evaluate the 
actions and characters of non-present third parties (Bergmann, 1993; Edwards, 2005). Gossip is 
an especially ritualized activity because it often involves an explicit contrast between the 
character and actions of the gossip-subject versus the gossip producers and receivers. This 
contrast serves to emphasize the goodness of the in-group by pitting it against the badness of the 
out-group or “bad” person, similar on a small scale to Garfinkel’s status degradation ceremony 
(1956) or even Burke’s scapegoat (1935).  What Garfinkel (1956) calls the “status degradation 
ceremony” is probably the most extreme form of passing judgment, and is described as a ritual 
destruction of total identity in a community, but also takes place within interpersonal 
interactions.  
Gossip may be a way of doing status degradation. Gossip, like status degradation, also 
follows particular structural formats. It involves a pre-gossip phase in which the gossiper tests 
the possibility of receptions to the gossip and gossip phase which is often characterized by vulgar 
language, reconstructions of events and dialogue, and moral indignation (Bergmann, 1993). 
Gossip involves delicate maneuvering by interactants because though it is “about” threatening 
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the reputation of others, it is in practice face-threatening to the gossip producer (who can be seen 
as “a gossip”) as well as the gossip-receiver (who can be seen as passively participating in the 
gossip).  
Gossip involves different kinds of instances of judging others, in other words, it is really 
a set of moral discursive practices. Stance-taking, which may or may not involve or occur within 
gossip, is similar in that it potentially involves many kinds of discursive practices. As Bergmann 
(1993) notes, gossip is especially complex because it is itself a morally-suspect activity. Tellers, 
recipients, and subjects of gossip achieve different kinds of status and tainting throughout a 
gossip event. 
 Another class of practices has to do with ways of talking which I refer to as 
“demonstrations,” often which are themselves judged as ways of enacting moral practices. 
Impoliteness research is an area of this kind of class, involving many practices that can achieve 
actions or personalities labeled “rude.” Brown and Levinson (1987) developed the theory of 
politeness, the two main types of politeness (positive and negative), and the conditions under 
which face-threatening actions are done or not done. Critiqued for its claims to universality and 
its inability to handle more complex situations (Tracy, 2008c), it continues to be a strong area of 
research in linguistics, and has given rise to numerous impoliteness studies (e.g. Bousfield, 2008; 
Culpepper, 1996; Mills, 2002). 
Emotionality is another kind of demonstration. It is a special category of doing morality 
because in a sense it is the most apparent lamination atop the many practices detailed above. 
According to Planalp (1999), we can tell something is morally meaningful to a person based on 
the emotions they communicate: emotions cue or index a set of personal or cultural ethical 
standards regarding events, people, or actions being talked about. Morality is emotionally 
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charged. This “charge” is exactly part of why communication is a kind of commitment that 
carries serious consequences for participants. One cannot give a criticism and walk away; one 
cannot ignore a plea and expect to be shrugged off.  
The way in which we show the accountability of social actions most directly is by 
communicatively performing certain verbal and nonverbal actions that correlate with cultural 
notions of “feeling.” Such emotional display can be accomplished by a number of means: word 
choice, tone of voice, facial expression, etc. Whether emotions really “are” a person’s feelings, 
moods or mental attitudes is not relevant; what is relevant is that emotions are taken by others as 
such (or as manipulations of such). Emotions are treated as relevant, interpretable, something to 
respond to (Perinbanayagam, 1991). Their display involves particular meaningful actions (a 
glare, a sob) indicative of a particular stance.  
In interactions between members from the House of Lords, for example, once someone 
asks a question, they tend not to get a chance to follow up, and definitely not directly. Often, 
people will display a response to the answer to their question with emotionality markers, even 
rather exaggerated ones in such a formal setting, including eye-rolling, visible sighing, frowning, 
head-shaking, and arm-crossing (Robles, 2011). Emotions can be rhetorically expressed to 
achieve particular purposes or present certain identities (Bailey, 1983). 
According to Parrott (2003), emotions are a key way of doing positioning—one can 
convey one’s position by evincing the emotions appropriate to one’s position, and do the same 
for others. For instance, stating that someone should feel “shame” is a way of positioning them in 
a conflict or in relation to others in a social drama. Parrott’s claim makes another important 
point: that all of these strategies are interrelated, and can be accomplished in concert with one 
another.  
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The last section of practices discussed here involves the use of language and 
metadiscourse. Language in this case refers to topicalization, “taboo” words, or use of formal 
languages (e.g., code-switching). Taboo words are a part of “sin talk”—conversations that 
revolve around classically “sin-relevant” topics such as excessive drinking, infidelity, deception, 
and violating sexual mores. Such talk of course occurs through and within some of the rituals I 
just described, but here I point out particular regularly-occurring topics that are taken up across 
ways of talking about them. Sinful topics are easiest to share with those closest to us, but also are 
constantly in danger of breaking the social norms about what is appropriate to talk about in 
certain situations.  
 Over time, particular words develop strongly value-laden, moralized meanings. They are 
often politicized, contested, and when they become highly abstract, can be regarded as 
“meaningless.” Words for categories of person, such as MCDs (Sacks, 1992), are moralized in 
this way. So are racial slurs and pejorative terms (Bergmann, 1998; Thurlow, 2001; van Dijk, 
1992) as well as what Goffman called “stigma terms” (1963, p. 132). Terms that reference “bad” 
kinds of communication, such as “hate speech,” are included in this category (Boromisza-
Habashi, 2010), as are terms with strong positive connotations such as “freedom” and “equality,” 
or “democracy” and “children” (Tracy, 2008c, 2010). Such words are not only tricky because 
they are emotionally sensitive, clearly impart value, and have contested meanings, but also 
because they are often invoked strategically to manage other kinds of morally problematic 
situations. 
Metadiscourse is a broad category of communication activities that comprises a net of 
relevant practices. At one level, metadiscourse is literally “talk about talk,” in which people 
explicitly describe, explain, and evaluate communication: ordinary folks, as well as 
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communication researchers, do this—albeit the latter does so about the former, and at a remove 
(Craig, 1999). The reference to “hate speech,” above, is a kind of metadiscursive term related to 
a devalued form of communication. Metadiscourse can also refer to particular practices that 
indicate commentaries or normative attitudes toward ongoing talk (Jaworski, Coupland & 
Galasinski, 2004).  
Metadiscourse involves in part what people say about communication (literally, discourse 
about discourse). Metadiscourse, or metacommunication, involves the ways in which people 
explicitly mark the topic of their talk as (1) prior talk, (2) the process of talk ongoing at the 
moment, and (3) future talk. For example, (1) “I don’t think the argument we had last night was 
very productive”; (2) “what you’re saying right now isn’t very intelligent”; (3) “I think next time 
you talk to her you should be more polite.” “Discourse” of course needn’t be taken primarily as 
“talk,” as people are capable of commenting on nonverbal communication in relevant ways as 
well (for example, “look at me when I’m talking to you”). And people also can comment on 
communication in ways that draw more specific attention to communication functions, which is 
sometimes called more specifically “metapragmatics” (Jacquemet, 2006; Silverstein & Urban, 
1996). Examples of this include “it really angers me when you call me that” and “no one will 
understand you if you phrase it that way.” 
Framing is a metadiscursive way marking the boundaries or characteristics of some area 
of life so as to “define” a particular situation as one kind of thing versus another. Often this is 
done very implicitly in the particular words one uses. In situations of high institutionalization, 
the vocabulary with which to frame something is often already provided, and members of the 
institution (as well as those frequently in contact with it) are aware of the rituals for employing 
the vocabulary and interacting with one another. According to Bateson (1972), “framing” occurs 
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through metacommunicative messages that state how utterances or actions should be “taken” or 
interpreted. For example, a linguistic expression may be expressed as an insult, but a 
metacommunicative, nonverbal component, such as a sarcastic tone of voice, would frame the 
utterance as “not to be taken as an insult.” Goffman (1974) defines “frame” as the “definitions of 
a situation…built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events—at least 
social ones—and our subjective involvements in them” (p. 11).  
Framing is often done to set up a particular behavior or attitude that is to be 
communicated. Framing frequently becomes relevant in conflict. How someone frames an 
argument (even as an “argument” in the first place), an issue, a controversy, will matter to who in 
the matter is set up as “problematic” (thus accountable!) and how the situation is to be 
understood in a moral sense. Arguments around same-sex marriage in the United States are a 
good example of this. Framing it as a “controversy” gives it particular import. Framing it as a 
political, personal, legal or religious issue provides yet another definition of the situation and 
implicates who the major players in the scene are, what they are like, and how the discussants 
stand in relation to the situation.  
Framing and commenting on communication and communicative situations is the basic 
way in which people understand “what is going on” in a situation—it allows people to interact 
(Bateson, 1972; Goffman, 1974). Gumperz’s (1982) theory of conversational inference sought 
out the linguistic details of talk that do metacommunicative and framing work, and as it turns 
out, there are myriad such devices (Jaworski, Coupland & Galasinski, 2004; Tannen, 1993). 
Reported speech is an example of a particular metadiscursive device which can be employed in 
talk to comment indirectly on what is being said. Reported speech, or constructed dialogue, 
involves the many ways in which people use the words of others in what they say. Discussing 
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something someone else said, or quoting someone, is a way of indexing a variety moral weights 
in social interaction, including epistemic access and authority, strength of claims, blame-ability, 
investment in a situation, ideologies, and rhetorics. Reported speech can be used to decrease 
responsibility for an utterance, strengthen something’s epistemic value, or convey indirect 
emotions, feelings and opinions (e.g. Buttny, 1997; Buttny & Williams, 2000). 
Metadiscourse is a sort of “net” that captures many of the morally-tinged discursive 
practices described in this section. In a sense, any communicated morality will inevitably 
comment on an aspect of life that is ultimately itself communicative. To gossip about a woman 
and label her a “slut” is to comment on various communications of personality and behavior 
attributable to that person: her style of dress, interactions she’s had with others, stories she’s told, 
regularly occurring speech acts, presentations of self. That such disparate activities can become 
crystallized in judgment is part of what makes morality inherently ideological and cultural. There 
must be a mechanism for making such connections and drawing conclusions from them. In other 
words, there must be a theory of morality, a cultural concept of how morality is communicated 
and on what basis it generates judgments of people and actions. 
Based on this approach, morality is ideological because it involves people’s beliefs, 
values, expectations and sense of right and wrong, often heavily steeped in a social and/or 
cultural context. From this perspective, the consequentiality of action is more intense, 
progressive, long-term and larger scale than the consequentiality of a single dispreferred 
response as described in the section on proto-morality. Though this work also focuses on 
individuals in single interpersonal relationships, the commitments and consequences of this 
context continue to be relevant in a way not considered from the proto-morality approach. The 
stakes, in this approach, are higher.  
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  69 
 
 The work reviewed in this section implicates a definition of morality based on social 
judgment of persons and their actions, and the cultural norms on which such judgments are 
made. In some ways, this definition seems to better capture people’s commonsense experiences 
of morality in their everyday lives. It offers what about morality seems so important to social 
life. It links notions of morality to social and cultural contexts in ways that make sense. 
However, it is missing two important components. One is that it does not consider as strongly the 
interactional grounding of morality. Rather than moving away from the proto-morality approach, 
the ideological approach should be able to meet it halfway. One example of this is Tracy and 
Ashcraft’s (2001) discussion of the relationship between interactional and ideological dilemmas.  
 This section discussed how relationships involved ideology, and some of the ways in 
which ideology is culturally constructed. In the next section I delve deeper into what makes 
ideology cultural, and how cultural practices shape relational interactions.  
Culture: Organizing Ideologies 
This section reviews the concept of culture as a key problem within cultural approaches 
and approaches to morality as constructed and shaped in interaction (Bergmann, 1998). In 
discussing cultural practices, I also return to ideologies. This section begins by linking culture to 
ideology and discussing how ideologies are rhetorical. I then cover major work which takes or 
contributes to a cultural approach to morality, primarily including Goffman, Burke, Bateson, 
Geertz, Bourdieu, and ethnography of communication. The section ends by considering 
examples of specific cultural practices and how they are morally implicative. 
Culture and ideology go hand in hand. As discussed in the last section, ideologies are 
cultural. In separating then, I do not mean to imply that culture can be free of ideology or 
ideology free of culture, but that “ideology” provides a way of describing how cultural 
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participants conceptualize differences within an assumedly shared community, whereas “culture” 
emphasizes the difference between people of saliently different backgrounds. Though ideology 
and culture are deeply intertwined, the focus on culture here involves a focus on a perspective in 
which, in situations where culture is not assumed to be shared and is thus salient, people’s moral 
actions will generally be attributed to their background or participation in patterned ways of 
speaking and being. 
Ideologies evolve out of particular places and histories and peoples. They are practiced 
into being. However, the histories and efforts of ideologies are often invisible. The tacit 
assumptions that justify and rationalize ideologies are normalized and taken for granted as 
commonsense (Jaworski, Coupland & Galasinski, 2004). “Culture,” too, is often invisible where 
it is shared (Fitch, 1998). The rest of this section deals with various approaches and their 
relationships to culture, ideology, and morality.  
Goffman does not much talk about culture explicitly—though as a sociologist conducting 
ethnography he worked amidst the same kinds of bounded “sites” as do anthropologists, his 
focus is “moments” rather than societies. As Streeck (2002) notes, however, Goffman’s 
perspectives imply that culture is consistent with a particular framing of experience. Goffman 
(1974) connects the frame to the enactment of it, asserting that “what people understand to be the 
organization of their experience, they buttress, and perforce, self-fulfillingly” (p. 563). He also 
discusses how the frameworks of everyday life are taken for granted. Again, this points to the 
tacit nature of expectations and ideologies. According to Goffman, interactants rely on the 
surface matter of ordinary interaction—gestures, expressions, smiles and utterances—to cue 
them to the frame. But acting within the frame is not only a guessing game, it is a guessing game 
in which that which is being guessed at may be cloaked in other frames. This is what makes 
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everyday experiences vulnerable. Frames can be misapplied, mistaken, broken, mangled; they 
can becoming trapping, stifling, deceptive. And yet, as constructed as frames are, they are taken 
by participants as “real,” and that of course is what leads to problems.  
To reinterpret this notion of frames from a cultural perspective, that which is culturally 
constructed to guide interactions is often assumed to be reasonable, right, and good. The moral 
frame in which cultural assumptions operate can cause problems when working within that frame 
as well as in situations in which framings differ. Ideologies are part of what builds up and makes 
sense of cultural frames. In practical everyday interactions, the tacit workings that keep cultural 
participation going allow social life to run smoothly, and are embodied rather than reflected on 
(Bourdieu, 1977). But when something goes awry, the unreflective nature of daily practice 
reveals itself as problematic.  
The invisible nature of morality in the most mundane moments of cultural participation is 
part of what makes culture a rhetorical practice. Ideologies work because they are highly 
persuasive, thus implicit—enthymematic (Aristotle in Bitzer, 1959; Jackson & Jacobs, 1980). 
Burke’s rhetorical methods and analyses (1935, 1945, 1950, 1966) draw on the crucial, 
enthymematic role that orientations play in human life. Orientation is Burke’s word for what I 
am calling ideology. Orientations are ways of seeing the world which guide associations between 
events and causes, motives and actions, needs and responses. To learn is to be enrolled in a 
particular orientation. As Burke points out, however, such learning ill-prepares one for 
encountering new experiences. Humans often engage in “faulty selection of means” (1935, p. 9) 
based on attributing complex situations to shorthand, motivated moral exigencies such as “duty.” 
To say one acts in the name of duty is to apply a particular interpretation that conceals as much 
as it reveals. The symbolic choices one makes in attributing blame, deciding actions and 
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justifying beliefs are rhetorically constructed out of the orientation in which one lives. Though 
Burke does not discuss culture specifically, his views are analogous to the role of culture as 
rhetorically motivated through the enactment of ideology in interaction. 
Fitch, like Burke, connects culture and rhetoric, but more explicitly considers the 
relationship between the two. In her article on cultural persuadables (2003), she discusses “how 
culture constrains and enables persuasion” (p. 100) based on what people can be persuaded of, 
what may be used to persuade them, and how such persuasion might unfold. Rhetoric, thus, is 
culturally motivated—the foundational, unstated premises that make persuasion work so well are 
cultural in nature. Persuadables exist in the cultural domain between that which is not 
persuadable (and which must thus be enacted through coercion) and that which needs no 
persuasion (is taken for granted). Thus for Fitch, ideologies would probably not be seen as 
persuasive, or at least, would be highly implicit in their persuasion. Persuadables are part of the 
stuff of culture, strategic communicative events made intelligible through their coherence in 
relation to cultural “common sense” notions of right and wrong in the interpersonal world.    
The importance of strategy in morality requires a rhetorical and performative orientation 
as well. Strategy is the link between discursive practices and moral judgments. In order to judge 
people's communicative conduct as good or bad, talk must be purposeful in some way (as well as 
assumed to be purposeful by others)—it has what we might call a “motive” to convey 
evaluations, as well a “motive” for how, and why, to convey them in particular ways. In terms of 
joining moral concepts and rhetorical expression, perhaps no scholar was better suited to the task 
than Burke (1935, 1945, 1960). Although Burke, like Bakhtin, does not always (or even often) 
consider particular instances of language use outside literary examples, he is explicitly interested 
in language as social, symbolic, and oriented to motives. He devises a sort of underlying human 
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motivation for action based on principles to which he assigns religious names, such as the 
primary one, “piety” (essentially a desire for “fit” or appropriateness). Though Burke's ideas are 
not based in empirical analysis, his perspective is culturally and historically sensitive to the role 
of morality in everyday life and how people perform themselves as moral beings.  
So far this section has made more explicit the link between ideology and culture, and how 
that link is rhetorical. The remainder of this section focuses on how exactly to conceptualize 
culture. In this project, culture is a practice. Seeing culture as a practice traces its lineage to 
anthropology. From Boas (1940) to Bateson (1958) to Geertz (1973) and Bourdieu (1977), many 
of the most influential anthropologists have taken some form of a practice approach. Bateson’s 
(1958) cybernetic approach was more interested in process than practice, but his consideration of 
patterns of actions is not inconsistent with practice theory.  
The practice approach is clearest in Geertz (1973) and Bourdieu (1977)—Geertz whose 
symbolic approach and consideration of local logics provided the foundation for practice 
theory’s arrival on the anthropological scene, and Bourdieu, who helped usher practice theory in 
alongside others such as Giddens (Ortner, 2006). Geertz (2004) for example took a cultural 
approach to a particularly moral system, religion, arguing that relgion formulated a particular 
view of reality and gave meaning to action. Like Malinowski (1925), Geertz built on the 
functionalist approach that religion occupies a local social purpose, and focused on the morality 
of religion through people’s religious practices beyond only mental or psychological “beliefs”: 
“out of any dim and inaccessible realm of private sensation into that same well-lit world of 
observables in which reside the brittleness of glass, the inflammability of paper…the dampness 
of England” (2004, p. 10). 
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 Practice theory focuses on the ways in which cultural systems constrain, but are also 
constituted and transformed by, local practices—the activities, actions, rituals and events 
accomplished by people in their everyday life. Thus practice theory is a perfect fit for close 
ethnographic analysis and social theory. Oddly enough, however, early practice theorists did not 
articulate a concept of culture (Ortner, 2006). Culture was left to be discovered as being equal to 
the place and people studied, which reinforced the essentialism attributed to the classic 
anthropologists such as Benedict and Boas.  
Several advancements of research and theorizations of culture—in cultural studies, 
critical theory, and the historical turn—have reinterpreted culture in numerous ways (Ortner, 
2006). In following, in particular, Bourdieu’s notions of practice (1977, 1990, 1991), this 
analysis looks to the role of norms of symbolic and linguistic practices through which people 
enact themselves as belonging to a common habitus, or a tacit, embodied mindset comprised of 
memories, histories, practices and dispositions into which people are socialized as they become 
members of a culture. Doxa represents all that is undiscussed and assumed regarding the 
practices and their enrollment in habitus. Doxa is “known” and guides practice—it involves a 
sense of what is going on and what to do within a scene. The unified sharedness of such doxa 
joins people in a particular cultural tradition (Bourdieu, 1998). In this project, ideologies link the 
doxa to the habitus.  
Though ideologies rest on many unexamined and invisible beliefs, they are not 
“unexpressed.” Rather, their expression offers a partial, but persuasive, reasoning for being part 
of a certain group which accomplishes certain activities. This is not to say that what people name 
as their norms or reasons would necessarily be “accurate” (Bourdieu thought they could not be—
1977) but that such invocations nonetheless reveal something about the way people make sense 
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of actions through locally appropriate moral ideals. Doxa is in fact not wholly unified or shared, 
as evidenced by some of the analyses in later chapters. But ideologies of cultural practice are 
managed interactionally to create consistency and intelligibility as one goes along in one’s daily 
life. 
 In ethnography of communication, cultural research is often associated with particular 
communities. In taking an ethnographic approach to communication activities, researchers seek 
to understand discourse within its local variations and meanings (Cameron, 2001). Rather than 
defining a local setting by region or ethnic background, ethnographers of communication look 
for “speech communities” bound by ways of speaking and beliefs about speaking (Philipsen, 
1975). Thus in a particular region where other attributes such as race or religion are not 
linguistically marked, class or profession distinctions may be. This provides a more explicitly 
communicative way of identifying how people construct themselves as a group. Speech 
communities are both accomplished in moments and maintained over time, “constituted in local 
and continuous performances of cultural and moral matters” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 42). 
 Ethnography of communication research takes up theoretical concerns, such as the 
relationship between identity and communication practices, local rules and ways of talking about 
communication, and community-specific meanings for cross-cultural communication practices 
(Carbaugh, 2007). Such studies focus on members’ perspectives on communication in their 
everyday lives. Who counts as a member of a community is, of course, not always clear. In a 
sense, Goffman’s (1981) notion of participation frameworks, like framing, can also be taken as a 
way of seeing culture as interactional practice: different people participate to different extents in 
conversations, just as they do in communities.  
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Practices are both local enactments, and guided by cultural norms and expectations. To 
come across the doing or referencing of a practice in talk is to come across an underlying and 
often unarticulated idea of what the practice means, how it should be done, and who should do it. 
Such unarticulated ideas—ideologies—often become explicit when culture is perceived as 
different. There are many potential practices implicated by research within the cultural 
perspective, and all of the practices discussed in the previous sections can exist in culturally 
specific forms or with culturally specific meanings as a way of practicing, or participating in, a 
community. In the remainder of this section I will discuss briefly the concepts of language, 
person reference, codes, ritual, and socialization. I will then discuss how they are relevant to my 
analyses, and definitions and examples of them will be provided in the vocabulary section. 
Language, as mentioned in the previous section, involves uses and forms of language. 
Language practices which are particularly relevant to a cultural approach involve code-
switching, terms, and dialect. Code-switching involves the grammatically-constrained switching 
between different languages, for example, English and Spanish (Bailey, 2000b). This is different 
from say “Spanglish” or forms of talk in which a language is incompletely known, and thus 
unknown words are filled in with words from the fluent language, or unknown words are 
invented to “sound like” the nonfluent language. Terms can refer to special concepts with no 
easy translation which mark a particular kind of identity or activitity, for example, “sa-jiao” 
refers to a whiny or needy type of person (usually female) in Taiwanese communities (Yueh, 
2010). Terms can also be more explicitly communicative, for example, “palanca” refers to a kind 
of narrative form in Spanish Colombia (Fitch, 1998). The use of dialect is another way in which 
modified forms and sounds of language can mark someone as being a part of different 
communities, or groups within a community (Bayard, Weatherall, Gallois & Pittam, 2001). 
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Person-reference refers to the naming and labeling of people, and can involve formal 
naming, titles, pronouns, forms of address, and nicknames. Names (including naming a child and 
choosing surnames in marriage) are cultural resources which are made sense of against the 
background of naming practices in a community (Carbaugh, 1996). Titles mark people off in 
professional, institutional, and hierarchical relationships, and how these are used in address can 
signal closeness and distance (Fitch, 1998). Pronouns and other naming terms that associated 
with groups of people are one way of doing membership categorization (Sacks, 1992). 
Nicknames and diminutives offer particular coded ways of signaling special, intimate 
relationships with others, and are often used in rule-governed ways (Mehrabian, 2001).  
According to speech code theory, a code is a principle governing what, how, and when to 
speak in certain ways in a given community. Speech communities will have multiple and often 
distinctive codes which are assessed by members and guided by a particular psychology, 
sociology and rhetoric. The premises of a code are woven into the speech itself. Communities 
assess the meanings of codes, and codes impact social life in meaningful ways (Griffin, 2008; 
Miller, 2005; Philipsen, 1997). Codes are very similar to ideology (or perhaps language 
ideology—Blommaert, 1999) and contain many different kinds of practices. 
Rituals involve particular styles and patterns of communication for achieving particular 
purposes, and can be quite simple, for example, saying “sorry” as a way of restoring interactional 
balance rather than as an apology (Tannen, 1995). A ritual discussed in the previous section 
involved criticism. Rituals govern how communication is delivered and the subsequent unfolding 
which results. Often rituals are stereotypical or at least common (consider for instance greetings 
and getting-to-know-you talk). Rituals can also be complex and institutionalized. Weddings, for 
instance, are essentially a communication ritual in which the declaration of a certain kind of 
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person transforms, legalizes and publicizes two other people’s relationship (from unmarried to 
married) (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2002). 
Socialization is a cultural practice which has briefly been mentioned before. Socialization 
is a way to model for others the forms of participation which will make them welcome, 
legitimate, “normal” members of their society. This can include language, nonverbal 
communication, speech codes, rituals, and any other practice which has been described (Ervin-
Tripp, 1964; Ochs, 1993, 2001). Norms, customs and ideologies are inculcated through the 
teachings, often implicit, of how to be a moral member of society. It is a process, however, 
which can lead to any number of outcomes, is incredibly complex, and involves the influence of 
many different kind of people, situations, and setting within a community (Parsons & Bales, 
1956). Through socialization (or “sociation”), people come to see and enact themselves as 
members of a society (Simmel, 1953).   
These practices, as well as the others mentioned throughout the last few sections, are not 
for example “cultural not ideological.” As mentioned throughout this chapter, all of the practices 
described could be labeled as intersubjective, intimate, ideological, cultural. Indeed, practices 
within one “group” can be ways of doing another, or several others. Separating them has been 
part of the attempt to show what some of the research in a particular area has focused on, as well 
as the ways in which, in interaction, what otherwise might be called “variables,” “conditions” 
and “levels” of concepts are messy and interrelated. 
This section focused on the cultural aspect of practice and morality with regard to 
interaction in close relationships, and so focused on practices most relevant to cultural research. 
Research in this area has not often linked looked at conflict (Jacquemet, 1999), even though 
morality and conflict in cultural context are probably concurrent enough to be practically 
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mutually constitutive. Next, I look at definitions of conflict morally, of morality through conflict, 
and of “moral conflict” to propose that difference, and its conflict implications, is a key 
component of morality as a discursive practice. The next section examines conflict as a relevant 
practice in moral interaction. 
Conflict: Confronting Morality 
This section reviews the concept of conflict as a key problem across the variety of 
approaches to morality in interaction previously discussed. In discussing conflict practices, then, 
I consider also the role of relationships, ideologies, and culture. This section begins by linking 
conflict to conflicted practices such as disagreement. I then cover major work which takes or 
contributes to work on conflict which is relevant to morality, primarily including interpersonal 
communication approaches and relational dialectics, work on moral conflict, argumentation 
pragmatics, and discourse studies. The section ends by considering examples of specific conflict 
practices and how they are morally implicative. 
The last section discussed the importance of culture in moral practice. This section 
focuses on conflict, which is a form of interaction that makes visible the work people are doing 
with regard to intersubjectivity and ideology in intimate, culturally-contexted interactions. This 
section takes up a practice which is significant to morality, and which is itself intersubjective, 
intimate, ideological, and cultural: conflict. This section is about work which has focused on the 
ways in which interaction involves difference and conflict around moral issues, some of which 
has led to normative and critical approaches to communication research. This research falls 
under several areas of communication, particularly in defining conflict, and includes language 
and social interaction, rhetoric and argumentation, and group and interpersonal research. This 
section defines this conflict-based approach to morality, discusses its implications for a 
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communicative definition of morality, and argues why this concept of morality alone is 
insufficient. 
Conflict and disagreement are sometimes used nearly interchangeably, but usually, 
conflict is considered to be more protracted and serious. In devising a scale for intrafamily 
conflict, Straus (1979) for instance notes that many conflict theorists use “conflict” to mean 
“conflict of interests,” in which the differences between people or groups of people often 
inevitably collide when they interact. Straus distinguishes this from “hostility,” marked by 
negative feelings that may be associated with conflicts of interest, and his focus of study, 
“conflict tactics,” which refer to the particular moves people use to deal with conflict. Though 
Straus does not discuss the difference between “conflict” and “disagreement,” his use of the 
terms indicates that “conflict” is more likely to involve hostility and to take place over time, 
while “disagreement” may be relatively bounded and involve little hostility.  
Studies of conflict and communication grew rapidly after a 1972 Speech Communication 
Association (now the National Communication Association) conference on the topic. In her 
history and overview of the area, Putnam (2006) listed three key components that the many 
different definitions of conflict tend to share: interdependence between parties, incompatibility, 
and an expressed struggle. These align in part with the definition of morality developed herein 
(e.g., interdependence as relational commitment, incompatibility as difference). Researchers 
from different areas of communication treat each of these notions slightly differently. For 
instance, where do incompatibilities, or differences, come from? Are they individual, cultural? 
For this reason, “conflict” is a concept that is unpacked in a variety of ways across the field. 
Treating conflict in these different ways has led to a variety of conflict models, approaches and 
methods. In interpersonal communication research, studies of conflict will often consider, to 
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differing extents, people’s relationships, personal histories, perceptions toward/ideas about 
conflict, and aspects of identity (gender, culture) and their effect on conflict.  
Conflict, of course, is not necessarily categorically “bad.” On the other hand, it is a 
pervasive issue of concern in all areas of communication, and no less for interpersonal 
relationships. Some of the most influential theories of communication—Uncertainty Reduction 
Theory, the Theory of Interpersonal Deception, Relational Dialectics Theory—are important to 
understanding how conflict arises, unfolds, resolves or remains in interpersonal relationships. 
Key research in interpersonal communication has considered how communication cycles can 
lead to destructive patterns of interpersonal behavior (Christensen, 1988); impacts of hurtful 
messages (Vangelisti, 1994); and various other aspects of what is called the “dark side” of 
communication, including abusive communication and “stalking” (e.g., Spitzberg, Nicastro & 
Cousins, 1998).  
The first important consideration for understanding relational conflict is to consider the 
type of relationship in which it occurs. A large amount of work on conflict in relationships has 
been done regarding family communication. Medved (2004), for example, examines conflict in 
the context of work-family balance and ways in which people practically manage conflict in their 
lives. Romantic relationship and friendship research has investigated differences in conflict 
between romantic relationships at different stages and among different age groups, same-sex and 
cross-sex friendships, intergenerational friendships, and concerning cultural background (e.g., 
Zachilli, C. Hendrick & S. Hendrick, 2009; Zhang & Lin, 2009) 
The communication environment is a crucial aspect of this research. As Watzlawick, 
Beavin and Jackson (1967) pointed out, dysfunctional communication in families is not the result 
of a single “trouble member” of the family, but is fundamentally entangled within the family as a 
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system. Ordinary patterns of communication are crucial in understanding how people deal with 
or around possibilities for conflict. Aspects of family life including the structure of the family 
and whether the family tends to address or avoid conflict influence how conflict occurs 
(Bradford & Barber, 2005). Morality is thus bound up in conflict situations, even through 
people’s beliefs about how to communicate in conflict, and how that affects communication in 
conflict situations (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002).  
The idea that people have particular conflict orientations or “styles” is associated with 
work by Thomas and Killman (1974) and has been used in describing how individuals manage 
conflict in business and interpersonal situations. Based on continuous axes of “cooperativeness” 
and “assertiveness,” one’s placement (high to low) could pinpoint whether that person had a 
competing, avoiding, compromising, collaborating, or accommodating style. Based on a person’s 
style, and the compatibility of that style with the style of participants in the conflict, predictions 
could be made regarding how that conflict would be addressed (if at all) and how well or poorly 
it would play out.    
Whether conflict is expressed or unexpressed is another important matter relevant to this 
project. Most of the data to be analyzed in later chapters do not feature overt conflict. 
Regardless, however, conflict does get “pointed to” and managed in different ways. According to 
Roloff and Soule (2002), unexpressed conflict exists when incompatabilities do not result in 
confrontation, but can still (and often do) have an impact on relationships. The process of 
conflict which unfolds over time may be attended to and ignored in an on-and-off manner, until 
there is a “quarrel” or the problematic event or behavior is discussed. Sometimes acknowledging 
the problem “escalates” the conflict; other times, the problem will come up again and again, 
depending on how it is dealt with each time. Expressing forgiveness is an important 
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communication action that can lead to conflict resolution (if temporary) in romantic 
relationships—when done well (Merolla, 2008). Narratives also are employed for making sense 
of conflict, giving accounts of conflict situations, or managing disagreement so as to keep it from 
becoming a full-blown conflict (Kjaerbeck, 2008).   
According to Relational Dialectics Theory, contradictory impulses that can lead to 
conflict are a normal part of relationships, and cannot be resolved—only managed, or balanced 
(Baxter & Montgomery, 1996). It is when this managing goes astray that relationships can run 
into conflict, for example, over competing desires for independence and intimacy between 
romantic partners. The polarization of these desires can lead couples to see themselves as 
significantly “different” and can contribute to increased conflict and, eventually, the decline of 
the relationship (Baxter & West, 2003). This captures a key point about conflict and morality: 
differing moral inclinations or values will often be a part of conflict, what Roloff and Soule 
(2002) refer to as “principled conflict.” 
This idea of “principled conflict” is similar to Pearce and Littlejohn’s (1997) “moral 
conflict.” Moral conflict is conflict about ideologies or fundamental beliefs which differ in often 
intractable ways between social groups. Pearce and Littlejohn take a practical theoretical 
approach to moral conflict by seeking to develop forms of communication for dealing with this 
kind of conflict. These moral and practical angles on conflict demonstrate overlap between 
Pearce and Littlejohn’s project and this one, but not as much as would initially appear to be the 
case. Their practical approach is not, for instance, grounded in empirical interactions, but devised 
in response to large-scale case studies of conflicts glossed as “culture wars” (p. 10), “the 1992 
gay rights battles” (p. 14) or “the divorce mediation of Jane and Roy” (p. 19). Furthermore, the 
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identification of something as a moral conflict is assessed by the analyst based on examples of 
apparently irreconcilable and fundamental differences of belief.  
The current project, however, takes seriously the view of Tracy and Muller (2001) that an 
analyst’s naming of a problem organizes a scene in different ways from participants’ problem-
namings, and in fact both of these could potentially be different from the problems which 
participants orient to in their interactions. For Pearce and Littlejohn (1997), moral conflict 
involves incommensurate moral orders. Moral orders are produced in discourse, but reflect rather 
than construct their ideological foundations. Moral orders have their own ideologies of conflict 
which only work within their own order, leading efforts to seek common ground destined to fail 
(Freeman, Littlejohn & Pearce, 1992).  
Pearce and Littlejohn (1997) seem to largely see moral conflict as misunderstanding, or 
even a problem of translation. For example, the authors’ list for how to see a moral conflict relies 
on objective criteria, i.e., where interactants use “the same vocabulary but mean different things 
by it” (p. 68). Firstly, the focus is communicative, but the task of the analyst is to discover what a 
group means when it says “honor,” rather than what “honor” means for a group in an 
interactional moment. Secondly, the ways in which people rhetorically “misunderstand” one 
another is not considered. And because Pearce and Littlejohn are looking at larger-scale 
conflicts, their unit of analysis is larger and necessarily occludes the fits and starts of local 
ordinary interactions and their ideological sense-making.  
Conflict that take on this more heavy social significance of Pearce and Littlejohn’s 
(1997) “moral conflict” involves the presence of arguments, as do everyday conflicts. 
“Arguments” are a key characterization of and practice for conflict. Argument pragmatics 
scholars study argument in an interactional rather than classic formal sense, though many have 
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retained more classical vocabularies to different extents. Walton (1995), for example, has done 
numerous works on ordinary argumentation, grounding arguments in examples of people’s 
interactions rather than in logical form. According to Walton, analyzing arguments should be 
based on people’s commitments to particular views rather than looking on the basis of 
conforming to logical presentation (Walton & Krabbe, 1995). For this reason, possible 
occurrences in argument that are usually ignored or criticized are seen by Walton as normal and 
even positive aspects of the argument process. Such aspects of argument include fallacies (1995) 
and emotion (1992).  
The Amsterdam school headed by van Eemeren (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 
1987) also considers arguments from a more pragmatic perspective. Their normative model of 
discourse, rather than being based on logic, is based on an ideal “critical discussion,” which has 
its own rules for interaction. These rules, however, are not based primarily in empirical instances 
of people as they argue in real life. Others argumentation pragmatics scholars such as Jackson 
and Jacobs (e.g. 1981, 1982, 1989) take a closer look at discourse, starting there rather than with 
models to determine whether interaction is indeed an argument. 
Discourse studies of conflict look for features of conflict talk in interaction. Giving 
dispreferred responses, for instance, is a particularly conversation analytic approach. Other 
sociolinguistic approaches include how people index disagreement, disalign from each other’s 
stances, disaffiliate from each other’s identities, and diverge in communicative style (Grimshaw, 
1990; Bailey, 2000a). Accounts (Antaki, 1994), complaints (Dersley & Wootton, 2001), 
opposition markers (Kuo, 1992), assessments (Schiffrin, 1985) and responses to assessments 
(Pomerantz, 1984) can be used to do conflict.  
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Schiffrin referred to everyday argument as “the organization of diversity in talk” in the 
title of her 1985 article. Conflict is the most explicit moral practice for managing difference. 
Conflict often reveals (or involves strategic revelations of) disputants’ maneuvers. Metadiscourse 
in conflicts, or what Jacquemet (1999) calls “metapragmatic attacks,” are performative ways of 
calling out others’ strategies (i.e., “don’t use that tone with me” p. 43). By serving this 
potentially unmasking function, conflict can do serious damage, but can also serve to stimulate 
reflection on critical issues.  
 Conflict is a regular feature of concern for communicators and scholars of 
communication. According to several scholars, “conflict” is becoming more and more relevant in 
modern society, attributed varyingly to greater diversity, scarce resources, more needs to 
cooperate globally, sometimes all of these things (e.g. Ayim, 1997; Deetz, 1992, 1994; 
Littlejohn& Domenici, 2007; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997). Whether or not that is the case, it is 
certainly taken to be the case, even for people in their everyday lives, that the world is changing 
and somehow, this change makes conflicts and attendant moral considerations more difficult to 
deal with, and more consequential. The consequentiality of interaction and the role of difference 
in formulating moral stances and dealing with conflict is just as important, and more 
immediately crucial, for people in close relationships.   
 Conflict, though formulated here and in much of the literature as a “problem,” is not 
inherently negative or bad. It is problematic insofar as it is delicate, difficult, and potentially 
harmful. As Simmel (1904) pointed out, conflict is the process of confronting tensions and 
seeking to resolve them, and is a necessary and unavoidable social practice that in theory can 
reestablish unity. For Simmel, then, it is the causes of conflict that are most troubling. The idea 
of conflict as the working out of contradictions and differences is fundamental to the current 
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work. However, there are two departures: (1) from a discourse analytic approach, conflict is 
interactionally achieved through the display of acts which can later be said to have caused, or 
represent the causes of, the conflict; and (2) as mentioned by Baxter (2007) such contradictions 
cannot ever really be resolved. Conflict is certainly a working-out and a managing-of, but not an 
answer to difference. Sometimes—in some contexts, perhaps often—conflict exacerbates 
differences, or is a way of doing so. 
As has been indicated in this section so far, moral ideas and conflict situations go hand-
in-hand. Morality is made relevant by the possibilities and occurrences of conflict. And conflict 
is relevant in the attention that is paid to morality. Thus, any empirical grounding of morality 
must be prepared to confront participants’ indexings of notions of conflict potential, and any 
study of participants’ conflict interactions will deal to some extent with concepts and invocations 
of morality. 
There are many potential practices implicated by research within the conflict perspective. 
In this section I will discuss briefly the concepts of conflict, argument, disagreement, and 
dispreference. I will then discuss how they are relevant to my analyses, and definitions and 
examples of them will be provided in the vocabulary section. The first thing to note is that 
because the moral practices discussed in the previous sections involve conflict, and can also 
accomplish conflict, some of them will be mentioned here again as moral practices for doing 
conflict and conflict-relevant activities, such as disagreement.  
Certain ways of speaking, including speech acts, characterize conflict for interpersonal 
research as well as in language and social interaction. “Criticizing” seems to be a key practice in 
causing or creating conflict (Zhang & Lin, 2009). Displays of contempt, defensiveness, and 
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withdrawing also create, maintain, or worsen conflict situations in relationships (Gottman, 1994). 
This points out another critical point of inquiry regarding how communication expresses conflict.  
Emotional expression is another practice for doing conflict. Conflict is marked by 
negative emotionality displays, such as hostility, disappointment or negative evaluations of 
others’ personalities or behavior. As Simmel (1953) has noted, antagonism and hostility are 
primary components of conflict. These are part of the experience of conflict as a “struggle.” How 
people express emotions leading up to or within conflict situations, especially showing anger, is 
memorable, accountable, and consequential for the people in the relationship. Expressions of 
anger affect retrospective narratives of conflict, shape how the conflict unfolds, and make 
important impressions on the relationship itself, especially when such expressions develop into 
patterns over time (Clark & Phares, 2004). How couples interpret the emotional state of their 
interactions is a strong predictor of relationship satisfaction (Flora & Segrin, 2000). Emotional 
expression can also become a source of conflict itself, with serious and generally negative results 
for relationships especially when partners’ attitudes toward emotional expression are not 
congruent (Mongrain & Vettese, 2003). All of these actions have moral implications and 
relational consequences, and are part of how conflict is achieved between people. This also 
applies to work on communication strategies people have for addressing, avoiding, engaging, 
and managing conflict.  
Accounting is another practice which is involved in conflict. Accounting is related to the 
ways in which people frame their conflicts and attribute blame, guilt and forgiveness for 
relational problems. Accounting literature in interpersonal research has taken a number of 
different tacks. Narratives, for example, are way in which people give accounts for their and 
others’ actions. The stories people tell about conflict situations—who was responsible for what, 
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why things unfolded as they did—are part of the ways in which people make moral attributions 
to the various players in a drama and make sense of their social world (Orbuch, 1997; White, 
1980). Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1995), for instance, found that narratives about 
guilt, specifically regarding relational transgressions and subsequent actions of apologizing, 
confessing, and recognizing value differences, were related to maintaining a close relationship 
following a serious moral conflict episode, such as cheating.  
In addition to the role of giving accounts and how those accounts impact relationships, 
the role of accounts as interpretations, and which are themselves interpreted by others, is also 
important. Baumeister, Stillwell and Wotman (1990) discussed the role of accounts in providing 
different subjective interpretations of the same offense episode based from the perspective of the 
offender and the offended. They found that the role of anger, and the reasons people attributed to 
it, were an important part of how people made sense of conflict situations: who behaved 
unreasonably, who behaved reasonably, where the fault for the situation lay, and why things 
happened as they did.  
People may not use the word “conflict” to describe their ordinary interactions. This points 
to the occurrence of metadiscourse as a moral practice for conflict. Other common words would 
be “fight,” or even “quarrel” or “argument.” The lay meanings of these terms seem to have 
similarities to the notion of “conflict,” involving the criteria of consequentiality and negative 
emotions. I will mean these when I use the word “conflict.”  
Conflicts involve argument practices. Jackson and Jacobs (1981, 1982, 1989) draw on 
speech act theory to characterize sequences of argument based on the social function or 
interactional purpose of the argument. Brockriede (1975) defines “argument” as an interactional 
process in which participants engage in reason-giving for particular perspectives they have. In 
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order for their argument to be coherent, the perspectives must be different enough to disagree 
about, but should not be so vastly different that there is no common ground from which to talk 
about them. The perspectives should also not be obvious: there should be something worth 
arguing about, that requires persuasion and reason-giving, and cannot be solved merely by 
looking up the information online or finding some bit of empirical evidence. In other words, 
people argue about things that are interpretable.  
Not all conflict involves an argument. Arguments can involve an engagement with 
conflict, but sometimes conflict happens precisely because people do not really “argue” about 
what is going on. Conflict is a more long term and complex practice characterized, sometimes, 
by arguments, but more generally by a collection of social actions that involve processes that 
take place over time and between people with relationships, and which involve difference and 
emotion. This definition points out multiple communicative aspects of conflict, and is consistent 
with conversation analytic (Stivers, 2008), sociolinguistic (Grimshaw, 1990), and various 
discourse approaches toward conflict and communication.  
In addition to arguments, disagreements can also be a moral practice for conflict. 
Conflicted social actions are composed in part, for example, of disagreements about certain 
things which are explicitly oriented to in talk (for example, disagreements about what to do in a 
certain situation; disagreements with another person’s opinion; etc.). Disagreements often 
involve the topic or content of conversation, while dispreferred and disaligning practices focus 
on the actions of conversation.  
The concepts of alignment and affiliation come out of the conversation analytic tradition 
and are ways of focusing on the talk-in-interaction rather than the researcher’s interpretation of 
there being a “disagreement” at play. Alignment is a similar concept to preference, and refers to 
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the way in which utterances are sequentially required or projected by the actions of prior 
utterances. Affiliation covers the more socially-inflected notion of agreement in talk, and refers 
to whether participants take the same perspective or stance as a co-participant (Stivers, 2008). 
Disagreement and dispreference could be categorizeable as conflict if participants oriented to it 
as such. This orientation could be accomplished explicitly (if one or more participants name their 
interaction as a conflict) or implicitly (if one or more participants treat series of disagreements as 
part of a coherent problem, as consequential for their relation, as needing to be addressed, as 
negatively marked in meaningful ways). Bailey (2000a) discusses how divergence in styles of 
talk, which involve disalignment and dispreference if not content disagreement, can accomplish 
social conflict between different ethnic groups over time.  
Conflict emerges as a potential theme throughout the analyses in this work. For the most 
part, conflict does not begin as a major issue in the beginning chapters, though problems, 
troubles and dilemmas are pointed out as being possible conflict markers or instantiators. 
However, each chapter subsequently demonstrates how conflict becomes more and more of an 
issue for moral practices: its cause, enactment, and constitutive partner, difference, are all 
components of moral discursive practice. Chapter eight develops the theme of conflict most 
explicitly by looking at divergent or disaffiliation practices as moral discursive practices, and 
their creation of conflict in a family over time.  
 Based on this approach, morality is deeply tied to difference and the conflict implications 
of difference. This builds on the previous approaches. First, the prospect of difference lurks 
behind the interactional and intersubjective expectations of proto-morality. Interactional 
violations done in error indicate a lack of sharedness regarding being present in the moment, 
paying attention, knowing the appropriate responses, engaging in a common system of 
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expectations, etc. Interactional violations done deliberately indicate knowing the basis of 
sharedness, but intentionally displaying difference. Second, difference characterizes intimacy, 
both in the tensions between closeness and independence, and in the expected ways of 
demonstrating love, affection and support of others. Third, difference is marked in the 
ideological approach. Intercultural encounters are assumed in some part to involve ideological 
differences and their interactional instantiations, for example, when cutting someone off in an 
argument signals indifference to hearing, and disagreement with, the other’s view. Fourth, 
difference exists within culture but is particularly marked between what might be called 
“national cultures,” as when sustained eye-contact can mean respect in the U.S., and disrespect in 
Japan.  
 It does not seem to be the case that difference is in some way a side issue to morality. 
One could say, for example, that difference only matters where people do not share moral 
orientations; or that morality can be shared, or unshared. But I propose that to take this line is to 
ignore the possible omnirelevance of difference. Difference exists because no one is the 
“same”—not even when they share a close relationship, live in the same cultural context, were 
raised in the same house or even developed in the same womb. Thus, even “sharedness” or 
similarity is interactionally achieved amidst a backdrop of differences, some of which are 
explicit (as in intercultural encounters) and some of which are implicit (as in a culture which 
appears relatively homogenous). This is not to say that morality is always negative, but rather, 
that morality is always fraught: it is effortful, significant, and worked out discursively in 
complex ways as people deal with the potential conflict implications of their potential 
differences.  
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 Scholarship in communication which looks at conflict or related concepts does not 
always contain a critical or ethical orientation, but clearly the importance and consequence of 
conflict in human life often involves these perspectives. Earlier in this chapter I distinguished 
ethics from morality—morality is a name for invocations involved in the doing of ethics, which 
here refers to a more explicit and organized system of right and wrong action. I am not in this 
work trying to be critical, that is to say, determine when people are doing morality “wrong” or in 
such a way that disadvantages others—though of course doing morality can accomplish such 
results. I am also not developing an ethics of communication, or an institutionalized way in 
which practices should be done.  
Instead, my stance is more gently normative. My aim is that by discussing the key 
problems of morality, grounded in empirical work and tested among many cases, one can also 
develop an understanding of morality in interaction which may be practically useful in 
understanding when it is relevant, how people are doing it, what problems are involved, and how 
people might work to address them. In doing so, a practical theory of moral communication can 
be developed—a means not of defining one theory of moral communication, but of devising 
what an ideal of moral communication would mean or involve for participants in close 
relationships in a variety of different contexts.  
This section reviewed approaches and practices for accomplishing conflict in 
interpersonal relationships. Over the course of the last few sections of this chapter, I have 
discussed the kinds of problems and their practices which are particularly relevant to looking at 
morality as an interactional practice. The next section lists some of the practices described in 
these sections and provides an example of how they are worked out in discourse.  
A Vocabulary of Moral Practices 
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 Morality is a practice which can be accomplished through many practices. This section 
categorizes types of moral practice and describes how they are enacted and why (or under what 
circumstances) they are moral, given literature discussed in the previous sections. The dividing 
up of these practices is not meant to imply that they are discrete or separate from one another, 
but is an attempt to discuss what about each set of practices is slightly different in how it 
accomplishes interactional moralities. Prior research on these practices is described above; here, 
I provide a working definition for analysis and give empirical examples of the practices in action. 
These practices cut across accomplishments of intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture or 
conflict. Participants will use whatever resources and practices available to enact and confront 
the morally implicative situations in which they find themselves.  
Under the purview of the concept of morality developed and employed here, these 
practices accomplish morality proper if they can be shown to (1) be grounded in the enactment of 
relational commitment (morality matters to the shared identity of the people, and vice versa), (2) 
invoke and instantiate ideological orientations (significant ideas about what is right or wrong), 
and (3) encounter the prospect of difference in ideological orientations (in needing to confront 
interactional dilemmas and tensions which are the local ways of accomplishing the ideology). As 
mentioned above, these practices are not easily separable, and all can involve ways of doing 
intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, and conflict.  
Interactions. There is a set of moral practices which are observed in the proto-morality 
approach and which constitute the foundation of interaction—the particular rules of turn-taking, 
adjacency and preference which create and maintain the orderliness of interaction. Here I give 
some examples of how these practices unfold in ordinary conversations.  
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I define these terms in the conversation analytic sense described earlier in this chapter. 
This example demonstrates these concepts in practice: 
[fam.evts96.15.E3.2] 
Sam:  You look pretty gramma 
Gramma: What 
Sam:  Your robe’s pretty 
Gramma: I dressed up for thanksgiving ((laughs)) 
Sam:  I didn’t [know (that’s) ( )] 
JR:   [is this your         ] dressy robe? 
Gramma: ((laughs)) (1.0) yes I’m dressed up 
 
The participants here—Gramma and her two granddaughters—converse in an organized 
fashion, with each person taking a turn one after the other. The only instance in which this does 
not occur is toward the end, when JR overlaps with Sam. Sam’s initiation of “I didn’t” projects 
more to come, and thus JR’s entrance with her own utterance, as well as the fact that she doesn’t 
repair and stop speaking, is a violation of turn-taking, though it does not appear to cause trouble. 
As mentioned in a previous section, overlap can signal closeness. Though what is being 
overlapped was not transcribable, it could very well be that the overlapper anticipated and is 
rephrasing or choralizing the overlapped utterance rather than blocking it out.  
The adjacency between each utterance is part of what explains why this conversation 
makes sense. When Gramma says “what,” it is a request for a repeat; thus, “your robe’s pretty” 
can be heard as a reformulation of “you look pretty gramma.” Preference is heeded here as well. 
“Is this your dressy robe?” prefers a yes/no answer (it seeks confirmation or disconfirmation). 
Interestingly, there is laughter and a pause before Gramma’s response, which could indicate a 
dispreferred response, but here it turns out to be preferred.  
Interestingly in this case, and in many of the cases looked at in the analysis, there is a bit 
of cultural context here which adds a “teasing” meaning. “Robes” are generally not considered 
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“dressy” or “dressed up,” and even calling a robe “pretty” sounds less straightforwardly a 
compliment when given in the context of Thanksgiving, which may be taken to be a more formal 
occasion. Thus, the use of concepts such as turn-taking, adjacency and preference will be joined 
also with styles of analysis which are not solely relegated to constructing structural actions.  
This interaction can potentially be moral. Participating in complimenting can be a way of 
constructing the goodness of someone’s identity. On the other hand, the compliment here is 
about a garment and seems to be teasing. The relationship constructed between granddaughters 
and grandmother indicates a kind of closeness that is informal. “Respect” is not conveyed in 
ways that would be culturally appropriate in other kinds of relationships. The possibility for a 
difference of meaning (that the compliment, rather than teasing, could be sarcastic or insulting) is 
assuaged by Gramma’s willingness to play along and both (1) accept the compliment while (2) 
carrying on the joke.  
Judgment rituals. Perhaps the most pervasive of moral practices involves serious 
judgments of persons and their actions. The evaluation of a painting as a good or bad work of art 
would not necessarily constitute a moral judgment, while the distinction between an honest 
person and a liar more probably would. Narratives are an example of a practice that can do 
judgment, for instance, in a story in which someone blames another for a tragic occurrence. 
Thus, narrative also accomplishes speech acts, such as blaming, and blaming is also a kind of 
assessment. The example below demonstrates the unfolding of an assessment as a means of 
judging someone’s identity as inappropriate.  
[fam.frn.jul08.1.E1.1(audio)] 
JR:  Peter’s mom is a bit of a fashion plate 
Raymond: aw I know poor Peter 
JR:  high heels in London, what is she thinking? 
Raymond: poor Peter 
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JR:  yeah. It’s rough to have a mom like that I’m sure 
Raymond: yeah 
JR:  like moms should be like your mom 
Raymond: yeah. Mumly 
JR:  Mumly 
 
In this exchange, JR and Raymond make negative assessments of Peter’s mother, who is 
more than 50 years old, but does not necessarily act or dress like a typical 50-year-old or a 
typical mother. They express regret for Peter and evaluate what mothers “should” be like. After 
this exchange, they cite more evidence related to Peter’s mother’s actions as negative, 
complaining about how she “squeezes her body into tight jeans,” “tries to look like a 20-year-
old” and is “not comfortable with herself and her age.” In doing so, they reveal some of their 
own assumptions about what is expected, typical, and preferred for women of a certain age range 
and with certain roles (such as “being a mother”). Thus, expressions of morality are a way of 
getting at what people’s unstated assumptions about the social world are—the assessments made 
in this exchange are cultural ones. Notice also that the interactants demonstrate convergence to 
show how they affiliate with one another’s assessments. They converge on the topic (with 
preferences for agreement such as “I’m” and “what is she thinking?” as well as the “I know” and 
“yeah”s). But they also converge in style, which is noticeable at the end when JR begins by using 
the U.S. English diminutive for “mother” (mom) then switches to the British English form 
(mum) after Raymond uses it, in fact repeating the adjective as a whole (mumly).  
Accounts are another practice which involve judgment. Pursuing an account is a way of 
invoking judgment against the apparently accountable person, and giving accounts often involves 
accepting or challenging the basis of the account. Accounts can also conflict, do facework, and 
cause quarrelling, as in the following example (1): 
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Ellen:  Whenever he used to feel like getting his rocks off a little bit because he felt 
  depressed with his own situation he would say to me “you’re a nothing, you’re a 
  nobody, all you are is a waitress, that’s all you’re ever gone be”  
Marshall: and wouldn’t that prod you into action? I did that as a teacher 
Ellen:  oh come on! 
Marshall: to prod you into action 
Ellen:  that was cruel behavior! 
 
In the Ellen/Marshall example, Ellen relates a regular occurrence about something her ex-
boyfriend, Marshall, used to say to her. However, Marshall offers a different explanation for the 
situation, implying it was done for different reasons and thus should be interpreted differently 
from how she presents it. Specifically, there is a contrast between the action, which is framed by 
Ellen as “cruel behavior” while Marshall frames it as being to “prod” her into action “as a 
teacher.” This also shows how a narrative can be used to frame Ellen as the victim of Marshall’s 
immoral behavior. 
Complaints and criticisms are other ways of doing judgment that involve different 
assessments. They can also be accomplished by narrative. Other more complex ways of doing 
judgment include status degradation ceremonies and gossip. Status degradation discounts a 
person’s total identity or “character” identity, and is usually a formal, public affair. More 
relevant to the analyses of this work is gossip, which is a more informal, private way of 
degrading someone, as in the following example:  
[frn.assigs09.2.E2.2] 
Anna: do you remember Katie 
Julie: oh yeah 
Anna: did you know she’s pregnant now 
Julie: oh nuh uh! 
Anna: yeah my brother saw it on Facebook. That’s funny 
Julie: well so she sees it as something to brag about or I mean, a good thing 
Anna: she’s not married 
Julie: ohhhhh wow 
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Here, Anna and Julie discuss the possibly discreditable action of someone they knew 
from high school, who is now pregnant. In another situation, such sharing of information could 
constitute a positive or celebratory ritual. This possible meaning is revoked by comments such as 
“that’s funny” (whether in reference to the pregnancy or the fact that it was announced on 
Facebook is unclear), “something to brag about” and “she’s not married.” These comments cast a 
negative pall on the information: “that’s funny” indicating that something is odd or inappropriate 
about the news; “something to brag about” indicating that it perhaps is not braggable, since 
“bragging” is considered self-aggrandizing activity; and “she’s not married” cueing cultural 
expectations for what is considered normal conditions for a happy pregnancy.  
Demonstrations. This category refers to the generic, stylistic, and ritualized means of 
doing morality which may be apart from, concomitant with, or in opposition to the particular 
rituals of talk otherwise employed. As with all of these categories, they are not distinct, but refer 
to a different manner of moral achievement.  
 Politeness, for example, refers to accepted styles of talking that are considered more 
formal and face-attentive. To conform to politeness is a cultural and situational activity which 
can be a positive moral practice in some cases (for instance, a job interview) and a negative one 
in others (for instance, between lovers, where it would be seen as distancing). Impoliteness, also, 
can be more or less appropriate. In this example from a meeting of the British Parliament House 
of Lords (2), for instance, it is an institutionally accepted way of doing disagreement: 
Lord B: Can he tell the house how the present shambles of an organization which runs 
  our railway system will get back to the established practice? 
 
In this instance, a member of the British House of Lords, addressing a governmental 
minister in the third person (“he”), asks for an account for a negative assessment of the country’s 
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railway system. The word “shambles” is highly negative, and Lord B’s requesting of an account 
of the minister positions the minister as responsible, making this a face-threatening, and thus 
impolite, move, yet one which is common in this context.  
Emotional display is another way of doing morality, as well as for doing disagreement. 
Emotional displays involve a number of paralinguistic, verbal, and nonverbal stance indicators of 
person’s feelings or attitudes toward people, situations, etc. In the following example, the 
interactants display negative emotions toward each other: 
[frn.assigs09.3.E1.1(audio)] 
Matt:  I came back, and started ripping the garage apart and there’s just way too much 
  stuff in  there so I tried to move the TV ((sigh)) that was in there which is way 
  too heavy for me to move, and even though I was saying this is way too  
  heavy for me to move, I decided to move it anyway, and of course, I broke  
  it, and uh yah 
Kelsey:  ((laughs)) 
Matt:   Is that funny? 
Kelsey:  Ha yup 
Matt:   Why’s it funny? 
Kelsey:  Because of course you’d break something that isn’t yours. 
Matt:   What is that supposed to mean? 
Kelsey:  That you aren’t careful with other people’s belongings. 
Matt:   That is completely untrue. I am more delicate with other people’s   
  belongings than- 
Kelsey:  I can just see you getting really frustrated and (.) pushing the TV   
  carelessly 
Matt:   Well it was too heavy for me to lift, so I don’t know, I guess I’ll buy her a  
  new one. 
Kelsey:  Moving on, how long did that take you? 
Matt:   Too long, an hour, two hours maybe. Went to work, packed and   
  shipped some stuff, and then came to get you 
Kelsey:  Ya, you were kind of sassy 
Matt  I was not sassy. Maybe I was- I was sassy because you always call   
  right when I’m on my way, or right after I say that I’m on my way, you  
  call and see where I am. Like, I’m driving, in the snow. 
Kelsey:  Fine we don’t have to worry about it in the future because I have my  
  own car, hmm 
Matt:   I know you do, but it’s like I dunno do you think it’s courteous to   
  call somebody and check in on them every five minutes? I mean, don’t  
  take it the wrong way. 
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Kelsey:  You just took that to a whole other level. Screw you, I don’t want to talk  
  about this
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In this example, Matt and Kelsey state negative assessments of and toward one another, such as 
“you’re not careful with other people’s belongings,” “do you think it’s courteous to calls 
somebody and check in on them every five minutes,” and “screw you.” “Bad” language (such as 
the expletive “screw you”) upgrades the negative emotionality. 
 Humor is another practice for doing morality, one which can be highly effective, at least 
in the short term, in potentially conflicted situations, as in the one below: 
[fam.jul08.1.E4.1] 
Carl: I never get any ‘elp washing up 
JR: mm 
Jenny: wha- what ‘ave you done today Carl?  
Carl: well- 
Jenny: you haven’t done nothing today except talk to Peter talk to Roy Parker 
Carl: I’ve been researchin on the internet all day. Sometimes it does- in fact it does take a lot of
 time 
 
In this example, Carl complains about not getting help doing dishes, and Jenny 
immediately counter-challenges the complaint by hinting that Carl hasn’t done much today. Carl 
then relates what he has been doing all day, but it turns out that activity was “researching on the 
internet.” As this is blatantly not a good excuse, particularly in light of Jenny’s having been at 
work all day, it is meant to be taken as a joke. It also works to deflect Jenny’s criticism and shift 
the topic.  
Identity enactments. This refers to moral practices which situate people in relation to 
others. This can also be accomplished by the other practices indicated, not just obvious ones such 
as intersubjectivity and gossip, but any action which is performed jointly between people in a 
relationship. Here, however, such practices can be analyzed as about identity and how identities 
must confront one another.  
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Identity positioning, for instance, is a practice which accomplishes identities in relation to 
other identities. The following example from the House of Lords, for instance, includes explicit 
references to institutional affiliations and identities in relation to one another: 
Lord S: The noble Lord the Minister criticized the Conservatives for um uh privatizing the 
  railways. And I agree with that. But he must be aware that the present government 
  have had 12 years to renationalize the uh railways as some of us uh uh suggested.  
 
References to names, titles, political affiliations and time all position the speaking in 
relation to others in the room. Intersubjectivity is a more action-oriented way of moment-by-
moment orientation toward particular other people. Intersubjectivity is about the recognition and 
deployment of identities—subjectivities—through interactive processes that achieve “common 
knowledge” or lapses of it. Intersubjectivity is in many ways the most basic of identity 
constructions because it is a way of doing mutual attention that is required before other, more 
complex ways of interrelating can occur.  Intersubjectivity practices can include repairing 
misunderstanding, demonstrating attention, and speaking with various levels of context-
dependence. Specific ways of doing intersubjectivity can involve verbal and nonverbal 
components, and even the use of the external world, and objects in it. In the next example, for 
instance, Carl uses his video camera to notice, engage and interact with other members of his 
family, one of whom contests Carl’s use of the device for engaging his attention: 
[fam.jul08.1.E3.1] 
CARL: just interview Jeff- here Jeff 
JEFF:  your flash is upsettin my daughter 
JR:  ((laughs)) 
CARL: (we’ll just interview) there’s no flash on this Jeff, flash is uh   
  down uh- we’d just like to interview you 
 
Carl uses his video camera and the format of an interview to pursue attention from Jeff, 
his son. Jeff, however, uses his infant daughter as a method of critiquing Jeff’s actions and trying 
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to avoid participating in the conversational project of a mock interview. Identities and object thus 
are invoked in service of managing interpersonal engagement through interactional participation. 
Person reference also serves as a way to communicate, for instance, Jeff refers to “my daughter” 
rather than calling her “Lizzy” or “your granddaughter” or “the baby.” By saying “my daughter” 
Jeff incorporates the affront into his own identity and is indignant on Lizzy’s behalf.  
Facework is a practice that involves the efforts a person makes to protect the 
communicated value of one’s own, and other’s, faces, or performed identities. In the following 
example, an apparently accidental face-threat requires face-saving for another: 
[frn.vis05.1.E2.2] 
JR:  your hair is like so gleaming and red 
Jill:  I dyed it- no I just dyed it brown! 
JR:  oh you did? I’m sorry 
Jill:  it’s not supposed to be red! 
JR:  it’s because of the sun. It does look darker 
Christa: it’s not- it has more brownish undertones? I think 
Jill:  ((growls)) 
Christa: it’s not really that red 
 
In this instance, the apparently complimentary action about Jill’s “gleaming red” hair 
turns out to be face-threatening when the other parties find out Jill has just dyed her hair brown. 
Both JR and Christa work to take back what they said and mitigate the error by attributing it to 
the sun and pointing out the “brownish undertones.” This facework supports Jill’s choice (dying 
her hair) and implicitly ratifies her desire not to have red hair. The immediate withdrawal of the 
mis-applied compliment and all of the work to downplay it also shows JR and Christa doing 
facework for themselves as “good friends.” 
Relating involves practices which identify roles and relationships between people. Here, 
relating practices indicate some of the subtle ways in which people demonstrate their 
relationships to each other through positioning expectations with regard to household activities 
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and events. This activity is particularly salient because of an outsider’s presence (the author) and 
in fact, a household gripe is started as a topic through the presence of the researcher and her 
video camera: 
[fam.jul08.1.E4.1] 
Carl: you could video me washing up 
JR: mmm 
?: ( ) 
Carl: that’s the job I always get 
JR: ohh 
Jeff: ( ) not true 
Carl: I never get any ‘elp washing up 
JR: mm 
Jenny: wha- what ‘ave you done today Carl?  
Carl: well- 
Jenny: you haven’t done nothing today except talk to Peter talk to Roy Parker 
Carl: I’ve been researchin on the internet all day. Sometimes it does- in fact it does take a lot of
 time 
Jenny: ((exaggerated yawn)) 
JR: mm 
Jenny: exactly. ( ) 
Carl: and then I lie on the settee for maybe an hour. Or two? 
((laughter)) 
Carl: well I have to get up cuz it gives me neck ache 
Jenny: well that does it 
Carl: well I’m saving meself cuz at the moment Jeff doesn’t need me to do his working. I’m
 working exclusively for Raymond 
Jenny: on things that stick to the ceiling 
Carl: yes ( ) 
JR: ((laughs)) 
((everyone looks up at some sticky red stuff on the ceiling)) 
Carl: ( ) you wanna stand on me shoulders ((to Raymond)) 
JR: ((laughs)) 
Carl: that’s twelve feet at the top. That is defying one of the laws 
Jeff: which one’s that? 
Carl: that what goes up must come down 
 
 Everyone present in the interaction is structurally related, if you will, by birth or 
marriage, except for JR. The primary interlocutors in this exchange are Carl and Jenny, who are 
married, and Jeff, their son (their other son, Raymond, is also present, but doesn’t speak here). It 
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would be a lot to ask that such specific relational ties be indicated by a single exchange, but what 
does this exchange say about the participants’ relational identities? First off, there is the 
complaint about “washing up” (doing the dishes). This is a complaint that only makes sense 
between people who live together. Not necessarily a solely familial “role,” it arises whenever 
people live together, as with roommates. Here, the complaint is challenged by Jenny when she 
asks Carl what he’s done all day. The implication is that he probably has not done much, and 
thus doing dishes would not be much to ask. Jenny seems to be familiar with Carl’s schedule (or 
lack thereof), and Carl confirms this, adding to the intimacy between the living-together 
participants (as roommates are not always familiar with each other’s schedules). This is 
strengthened by Jenny’s references to exactly what Carl has been doing all day (talking on the 
phone) and her mention, by name, of two people with whom Carl has spoken. As this 
information is not elaborated or marked, it shows more common knowledge between Jenny and 
Carl than usually exists between “mere” roommates—upgrading the relationship possibly to 
“friendly roommates.” 
 It is how these utterances get done that indicates a stronger bond between Jenny and Carl. 
Carl’s initial complaint is indirect, passed through JR as a general comment that anyone in the 
room might respond to. That Jenny responds rather than anyone else indicates a stronger 
commitment on her behalf to the activity of doing dishes—who does them, how that is decided, 
and the consequences of it having been decided poorly. Imagine, for instance, if one of their sons 
had responded. Jenny took the comment as directed toward her because she is in some sense 
responsible for household activities such as “doing dishes/washing up” in ways that her sons are 
not. Her choice to respond directly to Carl as if he had addressed her simultaneously goes to the 
heart of the unspoken nature of the complaint (“why do I always have to do the dishes/why does 
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nobody help me do the dishes”) and provides a good reason for Carl to be expected to do dishes. 
Since she asks what he has done all day (implying and later stating, to effect, nothing), she 
indicates by contrast that she has been doing something.  
 There are some odd elements to this exchange that would, of course, bear more looking 
into, because they seem to violate some expectations. For instance, in some sense the traditional 
roles in this situation are reversed. Without information such as names and gender, one might 
gather that Jenny was the husband (out working all day) and Carl a sort of housewife (on the 
phone and internet all day). And based on Carl’s references to “working for” Jeff and Raymond, 
one might think his relation to them was one of business rather than family. This demonstrates 
that relationships are enacted over many scenes, and are hard to pinpoint in single instances. Still 
we can see a picture forming of how these people are related based on their interactional 
commitments, relational expectations, and shared knowledge with one another.  
Language and metadiscourse. This last category is particularly encompassing because 
depending on definitions, it can refer to many of the concepts already referenced. Here, I focus 
on the way in which words are used, referenced, and commented on in a variety of ways.  
The use of particular “loaded” or “taboo” words can invoke or topicalize morality in 
different ways. In the following example, a formulation involving the term “gays” is treated as 
notable.  
[frn.hol08.2.E1.1(audio)] 
Carrie: so I have a question before you start on that, is- when they have the uh- uh gays take over
 bar night? I dunno. What it’s called. Um 
Jane: ((laughs)) It’s usually called Night Out ((laughing)) ( ) 
Carrie:  yeah something like that um is it just the men who go? Or do lesbians go too 
Mary: I think it depends on what sort of like uh 
Jane: to generalize lesbians don’t go out. Once they’ve partnered 
((laughter)) 
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 In this example, a group of four young women, some who would self-identify as 
gay/lesbian and some who would not, have been discussing being a “closeted” gay person as 
being a possible reason for bad poetry. The topic was about to shift to other complaints about the 
young man in question (already identified as definitely a bad poet, possibly gay) when Carrie 
made this segue regarding the “Night Out” phenomenon. Though the talk of these women is 
often peppered with sexually explicit dialogue and detailed discussions of various persons’ 
sexuality and/or sexual activities, Carrie’s phrasing of “gays take over the bar night” is not 
automatically oriented to as either clearly problematic, or clearly not.  
In another setting, for example, “gay” might always be seen as a word to be avoided. 
Certainly that is not the case here. And yet, something about its use seems odd. Jane comments 
on this oddness by, after a pause, laughing, and then formulating the “official” name of the 
phenomenon. Throughout the exchange, until Jane’s second comment about lesbians not going 
out, Carrie treats the topic of conversation as a serious one. Thus, her formulation of “gays take 
over the bar night,” while sounding like it should be joke-y, is not presented with a joking tone, 
accompanied by laughter, or treated ironically. It may be the case that because Carrie does not 
identify as lesbian, while Jane does, her ability to use the word “gay” in certain contexts needs to 
be marked more explicitly when the discourse-context of use could be taken as slightly insulting. 
That Carrie’s questions, too, treat Jane as “expert” in the realm of gay/lesbian activities could 
also have put the frame of this interaction on shaky ground. The slight discomfort is very short-
lived, however, and once the joking frame reasserts itself, the problematic nature of the word 
“gay” as used in the utterance “taking over the bars” is diffused.  
Metadiscourse involves a number of practices. Talk about talk, for instance, involves 
commenting on prior, future, or ongoing communication or particular utterances. The excerpt 
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below is an example in which the speaker, Jill, explicitly comments on her boyfriend’s talk in 
telling a friend about a conversation she had with him:  
[frn.calls08.3.E4.2(audio)] 
JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said
 that” like- like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took)
 it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im 
 
Here Jill’s comment contains both metadiscursive devices (reported speech) to make 
implicit comments on her boyfriend’s talk (she presents his utterance in a “rude” tone of voice) 
and more explicit talk about talk. In the quote, she paraphrases herself as commenting that “it 
wasn’t very nice how you said that.” It is interesting to note that it is not just content being 
referred to here (for instance if Jill had said “it wasn’t very nice what you said”), but the form or 
style of her boyfriend’s questionable utterance is also negatively assessed.  
Framing involves ways of implicitly and explicitly defining a situation and shaping the 
interactional expectations within it. The following example, for instance, takes place in the 
British Parliament’s House of Lords, and features some of the specific, almost ritualistic ways in 
which members are expected to formulate their questions: 
Earl A:  My Lords, does the Minister agree that it would be madness to   
  engage in combat operations on land without appropriate air   
  cover? 
Baroness T: Yes, My Lords. 
References to “my Lords” and referring to the Minister (to whom he is speaking) in the 
third person indicate the high formality of the situation. Such framings reinforce the institutional 
norms of the situation, setting expectations about how people should act and what is appropriate. 
Reported speech, or constructed dialogue, is another metadiscursive device which can 
also accomplish framing and comment on talk, but does so through apparent “quotations.” The 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 110 
 
following is an example of a conversation between two friends about California highways, and 
includes several examples of reported speech using a variety of quotatives: 
[frn.vis05.1.E2.3] 
JILL: I was like “where is 580” 
JR: ((laughs)) 
JILL: No no no what is it- we- what’s the one we live on- ss- 580, right? 780 
JR: 780 
JILL:  Yeah I said “where is 780?” and he goes “uh, you live off of it” and I said “No” 
JR: ((laughs)) 
JILL: “I don’t think that’s 780” and he was like “Jill it’s 780” and I was like “I- I’m 
pretty sure it’s not” 
 
In this example, Jill moves from a past-tense non-standard quotative (was like) to a past-
tense standard quotative (said), a present-tense non-standard quotative (goes), then back to said, 
followed by two examples of “was like.” Though reported speech can be used to “quote” 
imagined thoughts and hypothetical responses as well as things people probably did say, this 
instance seems to primarily construct approximated utterances from the prior conversation being 
described. This exchange also does facework—though not included in the excerpt above, the 
conversation began with JR not knowing where a particular freeway was. Though JR had been 
out of the country for a year, she was familiar with the area for many years. Jill’s immediate next 
turn, bringing up her own confusion despite not having left the area at all, thus saves JR’s face, 
in a way, by threatening her own (Tannen, 1999, suggested this “one down” kind of behavior as 
an equalizing practice associated with women’s communication).  
Conflicts and disagreement. Conflict and disagreement practices can involve 
disagreement, dispreference, disalignment, and argument as well as many of the practices listed 
above. I treat “disagreement” mainly as referring to topical or content disagreement. For 
instance, the following disagreement is over what to call a particular item that Christa (CHRIS) 
received in the mail: 
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[frn.don04.1.E2.1(audio)] 
CHRIS: What were you saying about my Mexican rug? 
VAL:  Oh about when I came in and your- and your aunt and uncle had sent 
  you an I Love Lucy blanket and you had it spread out on your floor 
  “look at my new rug”  like “that’s not a rug, that’s a    
  blanket” you’re like “nuh uh” 
CHRIS: ((laughs)) 
VAL:  “Really for real? I thought it was a rug” “Man shut up” 
CHRIS: I thought it was a Mexican rug. 
VAL:       “I thought it was a Mexican rug I thought my- my-my- relatives were just 
hella white trash” 
CHRIS:  ((laughs)) 
VAL:  dude I’m like people don’t make rugs with I Love Lucy on it  
  good lord 
CHRIS: It looks like a rug 
VAL:  No. It doesn’t. Does it have backing on it? I don’t think so 
CHRIS: Not all throw rugs have- oh 
VAL:  most of ‘em 
 
 
In this example, the two parties experience a difference of opinion over what exactly is a 
“blanket” versus a “rug” and which is the more appropriate label for the gift Christa received 
from her aunt and uncle. One fleeting disagreement may not a conflict make, but several 
disagreements over time, or a disagreement that evolves into an extended quarrel, would count as 
conflict, as would disagreements that link up to conflicts in some way. The exchange above, with 
a bit of background knowledge of the participants’ relationship and prior interactions, may well 
be doing conflict. It also is at least in part jointly told, with Christa requesting the story and 
intermittently backing it up or disagreeing with it.  
Dispreference refers to the concept of preference used in conversation analysis, in which 
the format of a response is not fitted to the original utterance. Disalignment refers to the work 
interlocutors do to separate their identities and opinions from one another, sometimes 
accomplished through disagreement or dispreference, but also through diverging styles of talk. 
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The following example highlights how disagreement, dispreference, and disalignment work 
together:  
[frn.assigs09.4.E1.1(audio)] 
Annie:  if you’re a chick and you just don’t like your nose that’s retarded. Or, the other 
  thing with- 
Carl:  well I don’t know. I wouldn’t say it’s retarded. 
 
In the discussion about cosmetic surgery above, the interactants distinguished between 
“necessary” and “unnecessary” surgery. Annie’s first utterance prefers agreement structurally: 
she proffers an opinion, and in order to keep speaking, Carl should agree with her, especially as 
she has not been saying anything much different from what they had already agreed on. By not 
following with a positive continuer or something like a “yeah” or “go on,” Carl interrupts the 
sequence of actions. The format of his utterance is also dispreferred, as he doesn’t outright say 
“no,” but gives a mitigated lack of assent. Thus, Carl’s utterance is disaligned. However, this 
utterance also disaffiliates. Up until now, Carl and Annie had been largely in agreement on 
surgery, that some is necessary (for example, in injury) and some is unnecessary (for example, 
cosmetic surgery). But Carl disaffiliates from Annie’s use of the word “retarded” and this 
displays an opposing stance toward the topic.  
Arguments are another practice for doing conflict. In this work argument will refer to a 
situated, multi-turn disagreement (which may also involve dispreference, disaffiliation, 
divergence) in which people challenge one another’s utterances/actions (assessments, 
complaints, etc.) regarding a substantive issue, topic, person, object, situation, etc. Arguments 
can involve an engagement with conflict, but sometimes conflict happens precisely because 
people do not really “argue” about what is going on. To return to a previous example, in the 
following conversation, argument does not seem to apply:  
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Kelsey:  Fine we don’t have to worry about it in the future because I have my  
  own car, hmm 
Matt:   I know you do, but it’s like I dunno do you think it’s courteous to   
  call somebody and check in on them every five minutes? I mean, don’t  
  take it the wrong way. 
Kelsey:  You just took that to a whole other level. Screw you, I don’t want to talk  
  about this. 
 
Kelsey’s decision to leave the conversation ends the possibility for argument: neither 
party addresses the issue or gives reasons for why they see it in different ways. However, there 
certainly seems to be a conflict going on, one that started before this particular instance, and is 
likely to come up again in the future. Thus arguments, like disagreements, disaffiliations and 
dispreferreds, are an important aspect of conflict, though while disagreement is a necessary 
criterion for conflict, argument is an option not all people will take. In fact, arguments were 
extremely rare in this project’s data. 
Implications, Questions, and Directions 
 In chapter one, I outlined the approach and some guiding theoretical influences and 
assumptions in which this project is based. In this chapter I delved deeper into particular 
literatures to provide a background of, and foundation for, the continued study of morality. In 
doing so, this review suggested a particular way of conceptualizing morality, namely, that 
interaction is moral where participants engage in practices for dealing with intersubjective, 
intimate, ideological, cultural and conflictual dimensions of difference. This chapter also 
described some of the key research and practices associated with the communication activities 
for accomplishing intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture and conflict.  
These troubles associated with morality as an interactional achievement and discursive 
practice are based on empirical analysis in response to the following questions: what problems 
are constructed, keyed or managed in order to constitute an interaction as “moral?” With what 
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practices do participants enact moral identities and situations? With what techniques do 
participants respond to the problems of morality? Based on these questions of problems and 
practices, the next chapter describes an analytic method for analyzing ways of constructing and 
managing morality in interpersonal interaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. From a documentary on anger 
2. All three “House of Lords” examples are from Robles, 2011 
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Chapter 3 
Morality in Interaction: A Discourse Analytic Method 
 This project seeks to bring a discourse analytic approach to interpersonal relationships. 
Grounded practical theory (GPT) provides the perspective within which this discourse analytic 
approach is employed. Based on GPT, problems and normative ideals should be grounded in 
empirical analysis of situated practices. In this project, the practices are those which involve 
morality—thus the problems and ideals revolve around how to do moral practice well. These 
practices are situated in the cultural, situational, and relational contexts within which people 
interact as intimates. The empirical analysis is undertaken through discourse analysis, which 
involves a specific kind of approach detailed in this chapter. That approach involves (1) a 
number of influences from different methods of doing analysis of interaction, (2) a particular 
way of conceptualizing practices and their situations, and (3) certain data and ways of 
representing that data.  
This chapter describes a discourse analytic approach designed to tackle empirical data 
while drawing on the commitments and literature discussed in chapters one and two. In this 
section, I discuss ways of doing discourse analysis and how they inform and are modified in the 
approach this project employs. Following sections describe the research project, the participants, 
and the data. This chapter ends with a sample analysis demonstrating the importance of these 
data to the aim of the project, criteria for representing data and analysis, and a discussion of the 
analysis chapters to come.  
Method 
Almost all LSI approaches involve, to some extent, analyses of discourse. Discourse 
work that might fall under the LSI umbrella includes a wide range, but there are several 
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approaches which have become definite mainstays. These include conversation analysis, 
discursive psychology, action implicative discourse analysis, ethnography of communication, 
and critical discourse analysis (Cameron, 2001; Tracy, 2008a). 
Conversation Analysis (CA) emerged out of Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology and is 
associated strongly with the Schegloff brand of CA which was developed among Sacks, 
Schegloff and Jefferson in the sociology department at UCLA in the 1960s (Heritage, 1984; 
Schegloff, 2007). CA focuses on small details of talk represented in a transcript (notations 
developed by Jefferson) and sees the role of sequence organization as central to interaction and 
conversation. Discursive Psychology (DP) was developed by scholars in England (Potter, 1996) 
and has strands similar to CA as well as strands that are more critical. DP focuses on grounding 
psychological concepts in their instantiation in discourse. Action Implicative Discourse Analysis 
(AIDA) (Tracy, 1995, 2004, 2008b) is a methodological approach based in GPT (Craig & Tracy, 
1995) which focuses on problems, offers rational reconstructions of participants’ practices, and 
presents a normative critique. Ethnography of Communication (EoC), out of anthropological 
influences and especially ethnography of speaking, joins ethnographic research with discourse 
analysis (Carbaugh, 2007; Tracy, 2008a). And Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) comprises 
interests analyzing features of language use to uncover the workings of power in ordinary, 
institutional and mediated discourse (Tracy, Martínez-Guillem, Robles & Casteline, 2011).  
Many of these discourse analytic methods have influenced the method employed in the 
ensuing analysis chapters. Because the method of analysis described herein exists within the 
perspective of grounded practical theory, the practices, tenets and methodological implications of 
GPT are significant to the approach which this chapter lays out. GPT, as mentioned in chapter 
one, focuses on identifying problems, techniques, and ideals of practice (Craig & Tracy, 1995). 
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The focus on empirical analysis, participant sense-making, and practices are amenable in 
different ways to most forms of discourse analysis. However, not all methods of discourse 
analysis would focus on problems, make any normative moves, or study practice in the manner 
employed herein. 
Influences and Modifications 
The DA approach taken throughout the analysis chapters incorporates many different LSI 
analytic approaches. CA, for example, guides many of my transcription practices and 
vocabulary. It is often the initial way in which I approach data and begin to think about it. 
However, my use of CA is primarily ethnomethodological and discursive psychological because 
it (1) considers the importance of morality and the role of context, and (2) is interested in the 
way moral psychological concepts such as beliefs, attitudes and personality are invoked in talk. 
Furthermore, the understandings of turn-by-turn workings of sequential actions in talk provides 
the starting rather than ending point of most of the analyses in the following chapters. On the 
other hand, CA often focuses on the successful accomplishment of interaction rather than its 
problems, would look at “practices” in a different way, and would not be normative. 
The most similar discourse approach to that which is employed herein is AIDA, which 
was developed alongside and to be consistent with GPT. My use of DA is highly influenced by 
AIDA, in part because of the link to GPT, but also because AIDA has dealt with a number of 
topics and issues related to my interests here. AIDA’s connection to EoC through being 
ethnographically inflected (while not engaging in classic “fieldwork”) lines up with my own use 
of discourse analysis so far. However, I do employ a stronger sense of ethnography involving 
more extensive on-site research and/or contextual research and interviews, as well as a more 
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culturally-focused approach. And AIDA’s evaluative approach, more normative than critical, is 
also relevant. Finally, the rhetorical perspective advanced by AIDA is similar to my own. 
However, there are some important ways in which the approach in this project differs 
from AIDA, and this must be accounted for in a GPT framework. First, AIDA studies practices 
that are of a particular site and scale, for example, school board and city council meetings, 911-
calls, legal oral arguments, etc. (Tracy, 1997, 2009a, 2009b; Tracy & Agne, 2002; Tracy & 
Anderson, 1999; Tracy & Ashcraft, 2001; Tracy & Dimock, 2004; Tracy & Durfy, 2007; Tracy 
& Naughton, 2007; Tracy & Tracy, 1998). Here, I study “morality” as a practice that has 
different variations with different attendant strategies. Second, AIDA favors institutional settings 
where practices are more explicitly defined. Here, I study loose sets of strategies that comprise 
an activity that crosses personal and institutional boundaries and for which there are no obvious 
or formal rules, guidelines or expectations. Third, AIDA’s GPT approach studies recognizable 
practices in defined sites that lend themselves well to normative reflection, indeed, analyzing and 
improving practices in such situations may already be done to some extent at the local level. My 
approach would study practices that are largely tacit and unnoticed, and thus could be difficult to 
reflect on or improve. I will respond to each of these differences in turn. 
Practice. As mentioned in chapter one, Schatzki (1996) makes a distinction between 
dispersed and integrative practices. The latter are the kind AIDA typically looks at. The kinds 
studied in this work are dispersed. Moral practices are not tied to particular times and places, but 
take place in a variety of ways across situations. While “morality” itself implicates a coherent 
type of activity, it is also comprised of the “performances” (Schatzki, 1996), including sets of 
smaller, utterance-level practices, that hold its shape in a recognizable way. Such performance 
practices are of the kind I discussed at the end of the last chapter: things like reported speech and 
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accounting. These present cultural modes of doing interactional business which may be drawn on 
in troubled situations.  
Setting. While AIDA tends to focus on institutional sites, the practices I look at span 
sites. Moral practices can occur in a number of arenas, and some of the examples I have given 
involve institutional sites. However, for this particular project, I am focusing on primarily non-
institutional, often private settings (except in the broad sense of the word “institutional”—I agree 
with Garfinkel that social interaction is a moral institution in itself: Heritage, 2001). More 
specifically, I am focusing on the relationships between interactants, particularly close 
relationships, as part of the “situatedness” of interaction. The familiarity or strangeness, 
publicness or privateness of settings are interwoven with the relationality of the individuals in the 
setting and the sequences of utterances at play. Practices are thus relevant to many areas of life, 
including ones that are less organized. Furthermore, the “setting” like anything is situated in a 
cultural context, which is acknowledged but not necessarily a strong focal interest in AIDA 
scholarship.  
Reflection. Schatzki (1996) notes that the more organized, integrative practices have 
explicit means of addressing performance: rules, expectations and guidelines. Dispersed 
practices, on the other hand, are performed under the guidance of largely tacit norms for 
understanding and doing. To some extent, this makes them harder to reflect on. There is no 
specific rule for how to do morality, so there is no way to freeze it for contemplation—no way to 
write it down, think about it, and think about reforming it—at least, not in the ordinary, moment-
to-moment process of interaction. The goal of my project is to begin to specify some of these 
implicit means of doing a practice, expressly for the purpose of being able to reflect on and 
improve them.  
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Approach and Modes of Analysis 
 The discourse analytic approach taken in this project is influenced by a number of 
different LSI methods. Firstly, it seeks to be detailed and treat the structure of talk and symbolic 
actions as potentially important. Thus, CA is an important contributor to the transcription and 
analytic concepts used in analysis, particularly methods of CA which account for embodied or 
microethnographic details. Secondly, this approach seeks to consider participants’ treatment of 
relationships, attitudes, characters, content and ideas as relevant and significant to their actions. 
Thus, ethnomethodology, Sacks’s perspective, discursive psychology and the concerns of 
interpersonal communication research are influential to analysis. Thirdly, this approach seeks to 
ground talk in multiple contexts, including situations and cultural orientations. Thus, Goffman’s 
perspective and cultural approaches to communication are important to the analytical claims 
made herein. Fourthly, within the GPT perspective, this approach seeks to provide 
reconstructions of participant practices in a more generalizable or abstract way. Thus, analyses 
use AIDA’s approach to interpreting, naming, and describing practices and ideals not necessarily 
named or explicitly referenced in participant actions. This section describes in more detail how 
the analytic method employed herein plays out with regard to “what” is analyzed. 
 First, from the various perspectives associated with CA, interpersonal conversation is 
context-shaped and context-renewing: the setting itself does not construct interaction, rather, 
participants construct interaction which may be sensitive to the setting (Mandelbaum, 2008). CA 
perspectives focus on talk-intrinsic context rather than talk-extrinsic context. The link between 
context and talk must not be made solely by the analyst, but grounded in the actual sayings and 
doing of participants. To make the link as an analyst, or to ask the link of participants, would be 
to rely on mundane reasoning rather than empirically verifiable data (Mandelbaum, 1990). To 
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take seriously the worth of conversation as orderly and empirically analyzable data involves 
paying careful attention to participants actions, even ones which may seem very basic (such as 
taking turns to talk) or very small (such as the twitch of an eyebrow).  
 This perspective is compatible with Ervin-Tripp’s (1996) assertion that “context 
permeates language” (p. 21). That is, in one sense, context is “coded” in language in a noticeable 
way, in explicit references to, say, “this meeting.” However, Ervin-Tripp also emphasizes that 
context involves the background assumptions built into language, for instance, the relational 
information employed in uses of honorifics. Such context may be implicated more subtly and 
involve larger sequences of actions than typically attended to by CA approaches. So, second, the 
analyses employed herein take account of ways in which content or topics of talk, relational 
expectations of interlocutors, and assumptions about interpersonal attitudes may bear on 
interaction. This is not to say that such concerns are “outside” participant actions, but that they 
may be implicit or constructed in ways not easily observable. As Tracy (1998) notes, it is 
problematic to assume that text and context, or talk-intrinsic and talk-extrinsic features, are 
separable. 
Garfinkel (1967) proposed that ethnomethodology’s task, as inherited from Schutz, 
involved treating the “morally necessary character of its [the societal member’s practical 
circumstances] background features as matters of theoretic interest” (p. 37). What was 
unnoticed—not readily available to participants, but not especially clear to sociologists either—
were the background expectancies involved in people’s interpretations. Such interests did not 
always lead Garfinkel to supply detailed histories in his documentary methods—he saw all 
context as indexical, seeable through links to occasions and their activities in the moment—and 
yet, his work on particular cases such as that of the “intersexed” Agnes involved lengthy 
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descriptions of Agnes’s life story and relationships with others in order to make sense of her own 
accounts of self as authentically female.  
Sacks (1992) too saw identities and relationships as potentially crucial components for 
making sense of discursive actions. His example “the baby cried; the mommy picked it up” 
demonstrates how person-references are organized based on their assumed relational identities. 
Interpersonal communication research has long seen relational components as crucial to 
understanding communication, and Ervin-Tripp (1996) noted that even syntax is grounded in 
interpersonal acts: the relationship between interlocutors provides the procedure for structuring 
utterances and their responses. Mandelbaum (1990) suggested that there are two orders of 
communication phenomena which provide objects of study: one focuses on known 
communicative structures such as turn-taking, and analyzes them in various situations; the other 
focuses on situations and looks at what is being done there, and how. This project focuses more 
on the latter while acknowledging that the former is a crucial part of understanding the “what and 
how.” 
The scholarly practice of interpretation involves sophisticated, theoretically-informed 
versions of the same procedures used by participants. This inevitably involves some of what is 
known as “glossing.” A “gloss” is a sort of general account which involves backgrounded 
information. In participants’ talk, such information may be withheld, or may not need speaking. 
In analysis, such information should be proffered as part of an explanation. What is tricky, of 
course, is whether such information is accepted by different scholars as relevant or necessary to 
the explanation provided. The CA perspective solves this difficulty by restricting the scope of 
what is taken to be empirically relevant. Other perspectives, however, such as Goffman’s (e.g., 
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1974) or that of the ethnography of communication, see situational or cultural components as 
crucial aspects of the empirical scene.  
Third, then, certain elements of such “backgrounds” are discussed in analysis, both as 
ways of making sense of otherwise murky or minimally explicable participant actions, but also 
as a provision for understanding what possible contingencies for interaction may exist which are 
not readily analyzable. It is not suggested that such possibilities are always relevant, but only that 
they could be, and thus are included in order to “set the scene” with that which is empirically 
providable (certainly psychological states are relevant, but are often only empirically observable 
in the discourse itself, whereas cultural context is observable to participants and analysts through 
and alongside talk).  
Though it may sound radical, drawing on cultural knowledge (even when it is not 
explicitly seeable in a conversation) has a long history even in classic CA analyses. In 
Jefferson’s (1985) discussion of how participants may investigate and “unpackage” glossed 
accounts, she proposes—as an explanation for a speaker’s gloss of “laying down on the couch” 
for what later turns out to stand in for “in the bedroom sleeping” (p. 437)—that in the U.S. lying 
down on the couch signals a greater commitment to business at hand while sleeping in bed 
implies less commitment. This is not offered as fully explaining the gloss or its interrogation, but 
is suggested as a way of making sense of participant actions which seem to go against 
cooperativeness in conversation. The situational and cultural information discussed in the 
ensuing analyses is offered in a similar spirit.  
 This offer highlights the aim of analyzing such varied modes as talk, nonverbal 
communication, relationships, situations, and culture: the method of analysis is not meant 
primarily as a lens for describing actions, but as a means of reconstructing practices and 
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problems. Practices and problems are built up by, but not exhausted in, specific actions done in 
communication. And so fourth, from the perspective taken by a GPT approach such as AIDA, 
the analyst should provide an account of participant activities that will prove useful in reflection 
toward improving practice. The unit of analysis—the practice—is on par with communication 
events and should be recognizably meaningful to participants (Tracy, 2004). To label practices as 
“morality” is to suggest that morality is a useful name for describing set of actions participants 
do which cohere in a recognizable way.  
Thus, the analyses employed hereafter bring many communicative modes together—
details of talk and symbolic actions; spaces, environments and objects; relationships, situations, 
and cultural contexts—in order to reconstruct, from the ground up and from the ceiling down, the 
sort of “mesolevel” moral events which will involve problems, practices, ideals, and ways of 
reflecting on how to coordinate those aspects of social life. The problems and practices described 
in chapters four through eight (intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, conflict) are names 
for important issues which need to be dealt with in any moral situation. By naming these issues, 
describing their problems, practices for accomplishment and techniques for management, and 
considering their aims or ideals, the following analyses offer a vocabulary for identifying, 
examining and reflecting on moral situations in everyday life. 
The Research Project 
The research I have engaged in to begin a project of studying morality and 
communication involved, roughly, four preliminary data collection processes, and a final, fifth, 
primary one. The first was a survey sent to native speakers of American English living in the 
United States. The second involved questionnaires, interviews, and audio and video recordings 
gathered from survey participants who volunteered to be a part of further research. The third 
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process was a replica of the first, except broadened the population beyond the United States and 
beyond American English (or even English in general). The fourth process replicated the second, 
but with the new population. The fifth focused on obtaining video data from members of the 
preliminary populations who identified, or volunteered acquaintances who identified, as being in 
a close relationship with someone characterized by conflict, argumentativeness, or disagreement.  
I did a preliminary and primary phase for two reasons. First, the four preliminary data 
collection processes were meant to explore ways of obtaining data, and to see what ways might 
best serve data collection with the basic frame of “conflict” in mind. For example, would I find 
enough metadiscourse in the audio/video to talk about it? And if not, would the interviews or 
surveys be supplemental to that? As another example, would certain recorded situations yield 
more of a certain kind of data? Could I “focus” my primary phase in certain areas or sites? 
Second, the four preliminary data collection processes were meant to explore the data 
itself—to work with the data as much as possible without focusing on “conflict” or “morality.” 
Given that I was developing an interest in conflict and morality, and given that I had begun 
reading on these topics, would I see what I had read about? Would I look for those things? 
Would they even be present enough to talk about? Would they explain enough of the cases to 
warrant the significance to which I wanted to attribute them? I wanted to be careful that I was not 
merely finding what I wanted to find. Taking care not to throw my perspective at everything, 
while acknowledging that I am a human being with non-neutral eyes and a passion for the very 
things I am currently writing about, demanded attention to my initial efforts to obtain the data—
even before I confronted the data. 
An overarching goal of these data collection processes was to get a lot of empirical 
evidence. The surveys, questionnaires and interviews were explicitly “primed” to get people 
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talking about communication and communication problems. Directly, this jump-started the 
broader category of metadiscourse (described in the last section of chapter two) in which people 
explicitly discussed their communication. Indirectly, this used the “problem” frame so as to see 
how people would distinguish “conflict” and talk about communication and conflict in different 
ways. 
The audio and video data (both from the interviews, and from participants who recorded 
their everyday lives) were collected with a number of purposes. First, I wanted to add to the 
collections which I had already studied, and in which I had already noticed some of the activities 
that got me interested in this project of morality. Second, I wanted to see how communication in 
interaction could indicate morality in its most basic hiccups: could, would moral practices erupt 
out of, or constitute, something like a noticeable absence? And third, I wanted to look at how 
people oriented to their actions as moral, and what morally-inflected strategies arose in 
cooperation with the achievement of interpersonal troubles, dilemmas or conflicts.  
Data 
The research project, as mentioned, involved surveys, questionnaires, interview 
schedules, audio devices, and video devices (see surveys, questionnaires and interview schedules 
in appendix A). Most of the forced-choice questions in the surveys were not the focus of my 
project, and I only mention them in a supplementary way to the qualitative data that are my 
focus. The audio data are used primarily as examples throughout this project, and as the 
background for analysis. My main focus is on video data obtained during the preliminary and 
primary stages of research.  
The complete naturally-occurring data set is recorded in a chart in appendix B. Most of 
the audio data is older and has been transcribed to various levels of detail over the past six years. 
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Newer audio was transcribed at a basic level. All audio data were used to supplement video 
analyses or as examples earlier in this document. Video data, the focus of analysis, were all 
transcribed to a basic level, and comprise the whole data drawn from for analysis chapters.  
The following chart shows an overview of the range and types of these focal data. 
“Corpus” lists the name of each set of data, usually gathered during a particular time frame 
and/or in a particular location. “Year” refers to the time of data creation. “Hours” are the total 
rounded number of hours in that set which were used in analysis (total hours for the whole set are 
recorded in appendix B). “Format” here refers to how the video was made (in appendix B it 
refers to audio or video, but here, most recordings are video). Home videos were made to capture 
family events and have been donated for use in research. Researcher videos were made by the 
author, informally, with a held camera. Assignment videos were created by the author’s former 
students, and later donated for research. Data videos were made by the author or voluntary 
research participants, formally, with a stationary camera. “Place” is the location of the recording. 
“Language” includes all languages and dialects spoken in the recording. US. English is United 
States English, and Br.English is British English. “Recordings” refers to how many total separate 
videos are included in the set.  
Corpus Year Hours Format Place Language Recordings 
Fam.new 1930s 27 m Home video CA US.English 1 E1 
Fam.ren 1960s 30 m Home video CA US.English 1 E1 
Fam.hols 1980-
90s 
2 h 15m Home video CA US.English 1 E8 
Fam.evts 
 
1994-
2004 
28h Home videos CA US.English 30 E40 
Frn.don 2004 2 h Audio CA A.English 2 
Fam.Frn.vis 2005 2h Researcher 
videos 
CA US.English 4 E5 
Fam.Frn.jul 2008 3h Researcher 
video + audio 
England Br.English, 
US.English 
1 E7 
Frn.assigs 2009 4h Assignment CO US.English 5 E4 
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video + audio 
Frn.sum 2010 2h 15m Researcher + 
data videos 
England Br.English, 
German, 
Farsi 
5 E3 
Fam.vac 2010 3h 10m Data videos Finland Finnish,  
US.English 
3 E3 
Frn.rdm 2010 10h 5m Data video + 
audio 
CO US.English 12 E9 
Fam.nov 2010 2h Researcher + 
data videos + 
audio 
CA US.English 4E4 
Fam.Frn.sum 2010 3h  Researcher 
videos + 
audio 
CA US.English 12E10 
 
Under “recordings,” the letter E followed by a number refers to how many excerpts from that 
recording were pulled out as sections for analysis. The labeled excerpts also contain a final 
number (not shown in table) indicated which of the excerpts the instance analyzed comes from. 
Thus, a label for a particular example in an analysis chapter might be, “Fam.New30s.1.E1.1,” 
where “Fam.New30s” Refers to the corpus and year range (or particular year, if known), “1” 
refers to the first recording in the corpus, “E1” refers to a section of the recording transcribed and 
analyzed, and the final “1” refers to the bit of that section which is displayed in an analysis 
chapter. Audio is noted at the end of transcripts done from audio only. Excerpts reproduced in an 
analysis chapter include video screen shots and may also include more, or less, detailed 
transcription than in original and other versions of transcripts.  
Participants 
The research participant enrollment process relied on the “snowball” method in which I 
emailed the surveys to everyone I knew, and they emailed them to everyone they knew, etc. 
Some people also put the link to the survey on websites and social networking pages, and others 
printed it and passed it on. All in all this resulted in a substantial amount of responses—more 
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than 100—that ranged beyond people in my department, my university, or my network of 
friends, relatives and acquaintances. In the preliminary phase, participation beyond the survey 
was recruited through the survey on a purely voluntary basis, and from there, was restricted 
further to those who responded to my contact and returned the necessary consent forms, as 
described in the previous section. In the primary phase, participation was solicited by word-of-
mouth via myself and others who had participated in the first phase. Participants and sites of 
recording were dispersed, geographically, across the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
parts of Europe and Scandinavia. The primary language of talk in all cases was English, though 
some interactions featured considerable code-switching or long periods of speech in other 
languages (3).  
The Transcription Process 
Transcription is one of the most crucial parts of discourse analysis. Transcription is the 
process of taking huge amounts of data and making it workable for analysis—to “hold the smoke 
of interaction still for study” (Moerman, 1988, p.3). And yet, transcription itself is both 
theoretical and analytic. The process, materials and representations involved in transcription 
involve choices that are informed by particular perspectives, and lend themselves to particular 
ways of analyzing (Bucholtz, 2007; Ochs, 1979). Working with these sets of data, as well as data 
from prior projects, involves hours of listening, often to the same bit over and over; multiple 
layers and complexities of transcription; making initial analyses; and sometimes even setting 
something aside and coming back to it several weeks later, seeing if the original ways of 
representing and explaining it seem to hold up (Tracy & Mirivel, 2009). Because I approach data 
from interactional and social-relational levels, analysis can involve more “baby-steps” before a 
coherent analysis is drawn up. Looking at different bits from different angles, with different 
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levels of detail in the transcription, and making several such passes, are my ways of 
“triangulating,” if you will, the analytical process. In doing so, I seek to understand a segment 
from many perspectives before I make a decision about which presentation will be most relevant 
to the interactional accomplishment of morality.  
On Data and Empirically Relevant Context 
I am balancing several tensions between differing assumptions and approaches. I have 
pulled together disparate literatures, disparate methodologies, disparate data. I see these tensions 
as productive. The analytical framework of this project is guided by a number of starting 
assumptions and theoretical conceptions, but following GPT, the following analyses are 
empirically based on the situated instances in the data. Also following GPT, the methodological 
approach described above is focused on the identification and evaluation of practices.  
Before moving into the analysis chapters, this section provides an example that demonstrates the 
relevance of these data and method to the project of conceptualizing morality in relationships. 
This sample analysis demonstrates the importance of these data to the aim of the project and 
criteria for representing data and analysis in the subsequent analysis chapters. 
CA scholars have been working with audio-only data for years, data which have yielded a 
number of important claims about interaction. In determining the interactional meaning of any 
given point in a conversation, however, not having access to video can result in difficulties. 
Consider the following example, an excerpt from an audio tape recorded by two young women 
as they chat during a typical visit by Val to Christa’s house: 
Excerpt 1 “At Home” [frn.don04.1.E3.1(audio)]
Val: In eighth grade we had to make a paper mache globe. That was a bitch 1 
Chris: .hh hey we should do that 2 
Val: paper mache globe? 3 
(0.5) 4 
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Chris: We could sell them at a yard sale (1.8) at the flea market you know Mexicans love 5 
  that ki- oh- 6 
(3.0) 7 
Val: No comment (.) r[(acist ass)] 8 
Chris:       [rewind    ] (3.0) dude 9 
Val: My boyfriend doesn’t own a globe shut up 10 
Chris: ((laughs)) but if you made him one I’m sure he’d love it 11 
(1.0) 12 
Val: I don’t think so 13 
(3.0)  14 
Chris: What would he say if you handed him a paper mache globe? 15 
(2.0) 16 
Val: “*I don’t know what ees*” 17 
((laughter)) 18 
Val: “looks like shit” 19 
Chris: No he’d probably jus say “*o:h thank you*” 20 
Val: “*Oh, thanks bayby*” (1.0) “*I lofe it*” ((laughs)) “what the hell is it?”21 
 
 CA and other discourse analysts are fond of versions of the question “why that now?” 
Why, in other words, was some action produced at some particular point in a conversation? We 
might note, for instance, that this conversation is riddled with long pauses. Sometimes referred to 
as the “harbinger of the dispreferred” (Pomerantz, 1984), long pauses can signal problematic 
prior utterances or upcoming dispreferred responses. This conversation seems to have several 
such pauses, and there are certainly elements of the participants’ talk which is problematic 
(Christa makes a questionable remark about Mexicans, only to be reminded that Val’s boyfriend 
is Mexican). However, what cannot be “seen” here is that these interactants are watching 
television during the conversation.  
Engaging in multiple tasks during conversation is common, and friends will often be 
actively watching television programs, or have it on in the background, during casual chats. 
Thus, analysis which does not consider multimodal and nonverbal elements can run into 
problems during analysis. How many of these pauses are signaling a problem? How many are 
due to the participants becoming distracted by something on TV? Is “the television” becoming
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enrolled in the conversation to manage something problematic that is going on? It is hard to tell. 
Without the benefit of clues such as gaze, gesture and physical orientation which would indicate 
where participants’ attentions were directed, it is hard to say for sure what all those pauses mean.  
 The next excerpt illustrates a far less common transcription situation: one in which only 
video is present, with no audio. Similar situations can arise, of course, when audio quality is 
poor. But generally, this kind of analysis—one of video only—does not occur among the 
standard analyses of discourse which generally require talk of some form. It is interesting to 
notice, however, how such an example compares to the more common one just described.  
This excerpt comes from a black-and-white, 30-minute home movie from sometime in 
the late 1930s to early 1940s—when the possibility of a “home movie” was extremely new, and 
audio was not yet available. Over time, home movies have changed a lot. In much of the home 
movie data for this project, which is primarily from the late 1980s onward, it is normal to see the 
camera left on for long periods of time, recording people who are going about their interactional 
business and, at least after the first few minutes or so, not paying much attention to the fact that 
they are being filmed (sometimes not even apparently aware of it). In this period, however, video 
cameras were still quite new, and were treated largely the same as still photography cameras: 
people would stop and pose, or just stand there waving in front of some monument.  
There are times, however, when people are caught in less camera-aware moments: 
walking down sidewalks, moving into place pre-pose, coming out of houses and cars, meeting 
other people. The following series of screen shots is from one such moment in which two men 
are walking toward the camera, and stop to light each other’s cigarettes.  
Excerpt 2 “An Old Home Movie” [fam.new30s.1.E1.1]
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Based on the visual elements alone, one can see that these men talk intermittently throughout the 
interaction. There is some basis to distinguish turn-taking, as we see one man’s mouth moves 
while the other’s stays still until the first man finishes talking, after which point the second 
man’s mouth moves. Other than that, there is little way to tell what they are talking about or what 
kinds of formulations (questions? offers?) they are making, let alone whether their utterances are 
preferred or what actions those utterances might be performing.  
What we are left with, however, is not unanalyzable. First, the sequence of actions: when 
the men first meet each other on the sidewalk, they stop and look at the camera and glance at it 
twice while talking to each other (line 22).  They continue speaking as they begin walking in the 
direction of the camera, after which point they look only at each other, or down (generally at 
what they have in their hands) (lines 23-24). Adam (on the left) pulls a packet of cigarettes out of 
his right pocket (line 25), and Edward reaches toward it, as if to take the cigarette out himself 
(line 26), before withdrawing his hand as it becomes obvious that Adam is going to take the 
cigarette out for him (line 27). Adam hands Edward the cigarette (line 28); Edward puts the 
cigarette to his lips (line 29); Edward removes matches from his own pocket while Adam also 
takes a cigarette out (line 30).  
Then Edward leans in and uses the match to try and light Adam’s cigarette (line 31) 
before lighting another match and attending to his own (line 32). We can tell that Adam’s 
cigarette was not successfully lit the first time because after successfully lighting his own 
cigarette (evidenced by a sudden plume of smoke in line 33), we see Edward lean in again to 
Adam with the second match (line 34). The smoke rises and Adam gives a quick nod to indicate 
that his cigarette is now lit (line 35). They continue walking, and when the camera cuts again, it 
shows them right in front of it, now in a more “performative” mode: Edward playfully adjusts 
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Adam’s tie (line 36) and gives his face a pat (line 37) before they put their arms around each 
other and smile for the camera (line 38). 
What is the meaning of these actions? We can tell right away that these men are attending 
to, and friendly with, one another. They continually orient to one another with gaze, head-
direction, and a turning-in of their shoulders. They display understandings toward one another 
with head shakes and gestures, as when Edward withdrew his hand (repaired his gesture, so to 
speak) once he realized Adam was taking a cigarette out for him. They also display familiarity, 
smiling, nodding animatedly, standing very close to each other, and making frequent physical 
contact. Though the performance at the end of this sequence shows an orientation to the camera, 
it still speaks a lot about their relationship. Edward’s straightening of Adam’s tie is met by Adam 
lifting his chin up, as if allowing Edward to get a better look at him, and this is followed by 
Edward giving him two quick “light slaps” to the face.  
Edward seems to be playing the role of an “older brother” here. Though they may either 
be brothers or close friends, they seem to be intimate and Edward’s actions portray him as 
having a more authoritative relational identity (as the “evaluator” of Adam’s appearance). At the 
end of the sequence, after they smile for the camera, they turn their faces back toward each other 
and Adam says something (line 39), to which Edward thrusts his face toward him with his mouth 
in a tight line, almost in a “mock aggressive” expression (line 40). Even without the benefit of 
sound, there seems to be teasing going on, and this segment of the camerawork ends. In the case 
of this data, there is a lot left out. And yet, on the basis of visual, nonverbal, semiotic 
information, one can still begin to make good hypotheses about who these men are to each other. 
The analyses that follow feature recordings primarily from video, making the task of 
pinning down the cues of relating in some ways easier, though in other ways more complicated. 
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The analyses employ varying levels of detail and contextual information, as was deemed relevant 
to explaining the accomplishment of morality. Chapter four, for example, focuses on very minute 
facial, physical, environmental, verbal and nonverbal details. Thus, that chapter contains very 
detailed transcription and multiple screen shots because such elements are referenced as evidence 
in the analysis. In other chapters, there is sometimes less transcription detail and fewer screen 
shots. In such cases, those details were not referenced in analysis, and thus were removed to 
provide only that which was shown to be relevant both for analytic clarity and other practical 
purposes (length of transcript, size of document file, etc.) (4).  
This section closes the discussion of the discourse analytic perspective and method with 
examples that highlight the potential level of detail at which participant moves may be seen as 
relevant to analysis. This does not mean that these moves are always, nor the only, relevant 
actions. But such details are one way of establishing all that is going on in the scene and all that 
potentially guides interaction; thus, in subsequent analysis chapters, there are often featured 
initial analyses which are less focused on examining morality and more focused on setting the 
interactional, situational, relational, and/or cultural scene.  
The last three chapters covered the theoretical, conceptual and methodological 
foundations of the current project on morality. Chapter one described the aims of the project, its 
importance, the grounded practical theoretical perspective that guides it, and some influential 
theories and ideas which inform it. Chapter two outlined the basis of a communicative 
conception of morality based on research from a range of scholarship and reviewed the practices 
and problems described in those literatures. Chapter two organized these reviews based on the 
key problems discussed in the current project (intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, 
conflict) and ended with examples of practices to demonstrate their relevance to morality. 
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Chapter three discussed the methodological approach of this project, based on discourse analysis 
within a grounded practical theory approach. These chapters have provided reasons, 
perspectives, and methods within which the ensuing analyses unfold.     
The analysis chapters, which make up the bulk of this project, offer the evidence for and 
outcome of the investigation of the concept of morality as a practice. The next five chapters take 
up a different moral “problem” and show the practices by which that problem is constructed and 
confronted in interpersonal interactions. Each analysis chapter begins by specifying the problem 
and its importance to morality in interpersonal relationships, followed by a more detailed review 
of some of the literatures which were mentioned in chapter two. After a brief mention of 
methodological issues specific to that particular problem, the analysis reconstructs the practice of 
and techniques for constructing and managing the problem. Each chapter ends by considering 
some what these reconstructions indicate regarding participants’ situated ideals for the moral 
practices described. These normative ideals for moral practice are returned to in chapter nine.  
Chapter four focuses on the problem of intersubjectivity, probably the underlying 
requirement for any more interaction. Though acknowledging the extent to which 
intersubjectivity constitutes a proto-moral practice, and is thus omnirelevant to all interaction, the 
chapter focuses on examining how intersubjectivity becomes a resource for showing careful 
orientation to close others in friend and family relationships. The problem of intersubjectivity for 
morality involves the way in which the practice can signal or create an occasion of difference, 
disrupting the assumption of an intimately shared world or understanding.  
Chapter five focuses on the problem of intimacy, a practice for doing closeness which is 
based on intersubjectivity, but also characterized by other more complex interactional rituals. 
The chapter focuses on how doing intimacy constructs relationality and relational identities 
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through the management of morally questionable communication. The problem of intimacy for 
morality involves the way in which doing the practice constitutes a dilemma between the comfort 
to engage in morally questionable activities with close others, and the potential damage such 
engagement may cause if it implicates ideological differences.  
Chapter six focuses on the problem of ideology, a practice which both constructs and is 
constructed in intimate interaction, and which is culturally contexted. The chapter focuses on 
how ideology is interactionally achieved to guide relational norms and accomplish culturally 
“good” identities. The problem of ideology for morality involves the way in which ideologies 
can be complex and contradictory, posing difficulties for the continued maintenance of a shared 
relational, cultural moral orientation. 
Chapter seven focuses on the problem of culture, and how cultural practices become 
particularly problematic during intercultural moral encounters. The chapter focuses on how 
culture shapes and is shaped in relationships to manage ideologies associated with cultural 
differences. The problem of culture for morality involves the way in which different cultural 
assumptions, and their potentially different ideologies, are dealt with in close intercultural 
relationships.  
Chapter eight focuses on the problem of conflict, and how moral practices can indicate, 
cause, confront or construct conflict in interpersonal relationships. The chapter focuses on how 
conflict comes to characterize interactions based on moral practices which develop and maintain 
ideological differences. The problem of conflict for morality involves the ways in which it lurks 
in the possibility of difference linked to all moral interactions, and the ways in which it can do 
irreversible damage to relationships.  
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The next chapter, chapter four, begins with intersubjectivity as a moral discursive 
practice. Within the GPT approach, the problem of intersubjectivity is a practical one: given that 
human beings and their subjectivities can never be assumed entirely identical (and almost 
certainly are not), how does one construct shared understandings with others? Chapter four 
situates this question in friend and family interactions to reconstruct intersubjectivity as a moral 
practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Participant confidentiality involved different levels indicated by participants themselves in informed 
consent documents. Most participants requested no more than pseudonyms. Some requested modification 
of screen shots to make their features less recognizable. Others kept out of the camera frame or requested 
not to have scenes in which they appeared in the camera frame made into screen shots.  
4. Some such cases also involved poor or less informative video, or requests by participants for a level of 
identity masking which would have been difficult to do if including particular shots. 
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Chapter 4 
Intersubjectivity: A Fundamental Moral Problem 
Communication scholars across the discipline have tackled the issue of “relating.” From 
interpersonal communication to dialogue studies to phenomenology to communication ethics, the 
relationality of interaction and quality of communication has been a recurrent theme. A discourse 
analytic approach to relating sees interpersonal closeness as the process by which interlocutors 
co-construct mutually oriented relational identities through the coordinated actions of relational 
practices. These practices provide the interactional foundation for participants’ social and 
relational formulations of moral stances, and constitute the first and most basic signal when 
something goes wrong. 
This chapter reconstructs intersubjectivity as a moral discursive practice. Within the 
grounded practical theory approach, the problem of intersubjectivity is a practical one: given that 
human beings and their subjectivities are not identical, how does one construct shared 
understandings with others? This chapter analyzes friend and family interactions to argue that 
intersubjectivity is a means of establishing a shared world. By overcoming difference and 
managing multiple goals and potential problems, participants lay the foundation for closeness 
and make relational conversational identities relevant. Intersubjectivity is a practice inherent in 
social interaction. In this chapter recognition, attention, intelligibility and other-orientation are 
devices which, through verbal actions, nonverbal actions, and interactions with the world and 
objects in it, are marshaled to do the practice of intersubjectivity.   
The problem of intersubjectivity is probably the underlying requirement for any 
interaction. Though intersubjectivity as a proto-moral practice is omnirelevant to all interaction, 
this chapter focuses on intersubjectivity as a resource for showing careful orientation to close 
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others in friend and family relationships. The problem of intersubjectivity for morality involves 
the way in which the practice can signal or create an occasion of difference, disrupting the 
assumption of an intimately shared world or understanding.  
This is the first and most detailed chapter because it sets the scene for subsequent 
chapters by analyzing the morally-inflused basis of interaction in everyday life. Through the 
concept of intersubjectivity, this chapter looks at how fleeting coordinated moves between 
family and friends orient people to one another such that the ideological level of morality—in 
judgments of identity and conduct—are occasioned and possible.  
This chapter analyzes naturally-occurring interaction in family and friend video 
recordings to argue for  intersubjectivity—a basic, interactionally-achieved orientation to the 
other—as a practice for continuously doing, reinforcing and recreating relational commitments 
through displays of interactional commitedness. By engaging in certain practices related to do 
recognition, attention, intelligibility and co-identification, participants enact a culturally and 
relationally local ideology of how to be a good friend or family member. Thus, intersubjectivity 
is a moral discursive practice for the interactional achievement of interpersonal commitment and 
closeness.  
Intersubjectivity is a kind of sharedness, a grasp of the external world and other’s 
“minds.” Rather than a psychological or philosophical problem, intersubjectivity is seen here as a 
practical problem which must routinely be confronted and managed by social actors (Schutz, in 
Heritage, 1984). Such basic sharedness is necessary for the continuation of social interaction. 
Shared understanding (if not agreement) is the minimal requirement to have any kind of 
engagement with others at all. Intersubjectivity is an important social and relational practice 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 146 
 
because it can be used for any interaction in the social world, but also to interact in specialized 
and more deeply committed ways with particular others.  
What makes this a problematic practice is the invisible work that goes into it (which 
flouts the commonplace assumption that sharedness between intimates is natural and easy) and 
the multiple goals to which it attends (making interactional choices sometimes difficult). The 
next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures introduced in 
chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to intersubjectivity. 
The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and managing 
intersubjectivity. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for participants’ 
situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.   
Sharedness: Commitment and Intersubjectivity 
 Intersubjectivity is relevant to interaction and relationships. In a sense it is a practice for 
constructing both. Intersubjectivity is social. The sharedness it constructs is simultaneously part 
of the basic requirement of interaction (there needs to be a minimally shared basis of 
understanding to determine the relevance required in meaningfully undertaking conversation) 
and an order of demonstrating commitment to an interaction and more importantly, to people 
within it (intersubjectivity can be done in different ways to signal greater interest, involvement 
and intimacy with particular conversations and people). This section discusses first the concept 
of relational commitment in interpersonal research, then analyzes interactional commitment 
through the practice of intersubjectivity from an ethnomethodological and discourse analytic 
perspective. 
Interpersonal and Interactional Commitment  
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The study of interpersonal relationships provided one of the first sites or “contexts” for 
research on human communication, and still thrives as an intellectual area of communication 
scholarship today. Romantic relationships are probably among the most numerous of 
interpersonal communication studies, but here I will focus on the kinds of relationships analyzed 
in this chapter: family and friends. As Fitzpatrick and Caughlin (2002) contend, defining a 
relationship is a difficult thing to do in a neutral, scientific manner. Definitions of “family,” for 
instance, are deeply cultural, ideological, and political. Efforts at defining have focused on 
structure (ties of blood and marriage), tasks (e.g. raising children), and intimacy: 
interdependence and commitment. Many theories of friend and family communication combine 
interactional and cognitive perspectives (e.g. Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002). It is common in 
reviews of literature on families to see the family group treated similarly to other “small groups” 
in social scientific research, even using such familiar language as endogenous and exogenous 
variables, inputs, and outputs (Fitzpatrick & Caughlin, 2002).  
Friendship communication studies are often interested in friendship processes and the 
ways in which different variables can impact the friendship over time. For instance, scholars 
have studied the effect of same-sex versus cross-sex friendships on the friendship (Davidson & 
Duberman, 1982), the role of communication values (Burleson, Samter & Lucchetti, 1992), the 
impact of social skills (Burleson, 2003; Burleson & Samter, 1996), interactions with computer 
mediated communication (Parks & Floyd, 1996), and conditions for maintaining friendships 
(Wood, 2009).  
Definitions for “committed” relationships are future-oriented and often rely on the reports 
of relational partners (Adams & Jones, 1999). Often this research focuses on romantic 
relationships (Wood, 2009), though families and friendships, too, are long-term and thus 
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committed relationships. Commitment is sometimes seen as a kind of loyalty. As a concept, 
loyalty has been explored most in literature on responses to arguments, dissatisfaction or decline 
in (often romantic) relationships, where “loyalty” (remaining in the relationship or 
communicating/not communicating so as to preserve it or in the hopes it will improve) is a more 
positive but potentially hopeless strategy in the long term (Rusbult, Johnson & Morrow, 1986; 
Rusbult, Zembrodt & Gunn, 1982). Faithfulness (Simpson, Wilson & Winterheld, 2004) and 
attachment styles (e.g., Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Simpson, 1990; Simpson, Rholes & 
Nelligan, 1992) have also been investigated as concepts relevant to commitment and relational 
satisfaction. 
These interpersonal perspectives on commitment focus on the psychological background 
or processes of individuals, largely in romantic relationships, and how this background or 
cognition leads people to remain in (and honor the rules of) monogamous relationships, or not. 
Though communication is a key interest in such literature, from an interactional perspective, this 
view neglects entirely the way in which discourse constructs commitment as a way of 
constructing the relationship. Interactional perspectives are also more interested in the social than 
the psychological. In the behaviorist and phenomenological approaches for instance of Mead 
(1953) and Schutz (1967), commitment would be formed through social life. To the extent that 
the social world matters to and shapes individuals, commitment underlies the continuing interest 
in, involvement for, and adjustment to others which people routinely make in their everyday 
lives.   
Goffman (1959, 1961, 1967, 1974, 1981) built on this approach in an even more 
interactional way. Rather than talking about the social world in general, Goffman sought to 
outline how it worked, in its moments of occurrence. Goffman (1967) saw interaction as a 
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commitment to the social world. A shared understanding of what is going on (the definition of 
the situation) is necessary for constructing and fitting in to situations. Without this shared 
understanding, situations fall apart. As a corollary to the interpersonal perspective, without a 
shared understanding of the relational situation and the moments that create it, the relationship 
falls apart. 
 According to the proto-morality approach, morality is omnirelevant in the commitment, 
responsibility and accountability people have to those moment-by-moment actions which 
maintain social order and allow interaction to occur (Bergmann, 1998). In the next section I 
review the concept of “intersubjectivity” as a practice for “doing” the sharedness on which 
interactional and interpersonal commitment depends.  
Intersubjectivity 
 “Intersubjectivity” generally refers to the subjectivities or unique identities of people 
interacting with one another. It is associated with phenomenology and dialogue studies—in work 
by Husserl, Schutz, de Beauvoir and Buber, for instance—where it means otherness, inflected in 
various ways by emphases on experience and/or empathy (Buber, 1923; de Beauvior, 1947; 
Husserl, 1973; Schutz, 1967). In ethnomethodology, intersubjectivity is a kind of shared 
intelligibility. Garfinkel (1967) claims that members in social interaction do things that can be 
glossed in a number of ways as “recognizing, using, and producing the orderly ways of cultural 
settings from ‘within’ those settings” (p. 31). For Garfinkel, settings organize activities within 
which members must employ methods for evidencing accountable events with regard to one 
another.   
Schegloff’s 1992 article presents a conversation analytic grounding of intersubjectivity in 
the display of understanding for immediately prior utterances. Schegloff argues that sociological 
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approaches conceptualize intersubjectivity vaguely and unempirically as well as assuming it is 
the meeting of mind-internal “subjectivities” and the extent to which they match. He then 
describes Garfinkel’s (1967) perspective, which moves intersubjectivity out of the mind and into 
the social realm. Schegloff does not entirely agree with Garfinkel’s answer, however, proposing 
that interpretive procedures must and can be grounded in conduct. Schegloff (1992) argues that 
intersubjectivity is woven into the basic structure of conversation, such that particular utterances 
provide relevant ways of responding that do displays of understanding. The resources of 
displaying subjectivity are thus built into the process of interaction. Intersubjectivity need not be 
a phenomenon abstractly socialized, but is observable in the “procedural infrastructure of 
interaction” (p. 1299). 
 In their discussion of Schegloff’s and Garfinkel’s notions of intersubjectivity, Hutchby 
and Wooffitt (1998) describe the difference between their approaches as based in Garfinkel’s 
rejection of classic sociological experiments as having gone “too far” in a sense. Garfinkel ended 
up taking a more phenomenological, hermeneutic route, while Schegloff did not want to say that 
a rigorous study of conduct could not be achieved. Schegloff’s perspective has been important in 
representing the CA treatment of intersubjectivity, though as a topic it has not often been taken 
up as a primary focus. Exceptions include Wilkinson’s (1999) study of aphasiac interaction, and 
Hepburn and Potter’s (2010) work on intersubjectivity and tag questions. The latter is 
particularly relevant. Similarly to Schegloff’s (1992) discussion of third position repair, tag 
questions are a way of checking, affirming, or demonstrating an assumption of mutual 
understanding, one which is afforded by structure (the placement and type of action constituting 
a tag question) but also content (since tag questions can also check for agreement or accuracy 
regarding a topic).  
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 The following analysis presents a grounded practical theoretical discourse analysis of 
friend and family interactions. In this analysis, intersubjectivity is a practice for solving the 
problem of creating a shared world—an omnipresent problem partly because worlds are never 
wholly shared (people do not think or perceive in exactly the same way) and partly because the 
assumption of sharedness in close relationships is utterly assumed and taken as natural. The next 
section begins with a discussion of the methods of analysis, then presents examples of four 
devices for doing intersubjectivity.  
Intersubjectivity as a Moral Discursive Practice 
Based on the previous section (and earlier chapters), the discourse analysis employed in 
this chapter combines elements of ethnomethodological and discursive psychological 
conversation analysis, embodiment and semiotic conversation analysis, and a grounded practical 
theoretical, AIDA-influenced discourse analytic approach that takes account of some 
ethnographic details. Based on this approach, the data studied comprised video recordings of 
family and friend interaction from a range of time periods, geographic regions, recording 
devices, and recording formats (home movies and non-induced naturally occurring interaction).  
The following analysis, most of any in this project, studies closely the entire situation of 
interactional practices, including verbal and nonverbal communication and 
movement/manipulation of objects. Talk is one of many symbolic practices that speakers 
mobilize in accomplishing activities together. Though Schegloff and most CA have traditionally 
focused on talk-in-interaction, sequence, repair and preference—thus intersubjectivity—can be 
accomplishable through, and organizing of, non-discursive turns. Goodwin is an example a 
scholar who takes a highly contextualized approach that brings in the environment, body, 
gesture, objects, and many other aspects into the study of conversation (e.g. Goodwin, 2003a; 
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2003b; 2003c; 2007). Symbolic resources, or what Goodwin calls semiotic media, refer to the 
“heterogeneous array of different kinds of sign vehicles” (2003b, p. 29). For Goodwin, the world 
is filled with potentially relevant data that interactants make use of through bodies, talk, scenic 
phenomena, objects and anything else at hand which can be indexed as meaningful. Heath, 
another scholar who takes a similar approach, refers to this as multimodality (2004, 2010), and 
microethnographers (Streeck, 2002) do similar very close, highly contextual studies of 
interaction.  
Actions that make use of these resources provide the structure that organizes the social, 
cognitive, and physical world through interaction, making it socially meaningful. Though in 
some ways Goodwin’s work is not typical to the classic CA approach, he adheres to many CA 
conventions and shows through his analysis that the context he analyzes is relevant, necessary, 
and interesting to the study of conversational moments. As interpersonal scholars have long 
pointed out, nonverbal and verbal communication are “highly integrated constituents of the total 
communication system” (Burgoon & Hoobler, 2002, p. 240). 
Some Devices 
For presentational purposes, I selected several “case studies” to be used as exemplars in 
reviewing the results of analysis. These cases are indicative of particular patterns observed across 
the data. By transcribing and analyzing video data of friend and family interaction, this chapter 
also displays the importance of non-talk interaction to relating, the ways in which relationships 
provide an ideal site for theorizing moral communication, and the importance of interactional 
accomplishments of other-orientation for a discourse-grounded conception of morality. 
Results of analysis indicate that doing intersubjectivity—attending, recognizing, orienting 
and displaying understandings toward others—is a way of doing closeness. Based on a proto-
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morality approach, this section demonstrates how symbolic resources, including talk, gesture, 
environment and objects, are mobilized to accomplish interlocutors as closely and identifiably 
related. Relevant to a more ideological approach to morality, this section demonstrates how 
intersubjectivity provides an interactional strategy for doing relational committedness. The 
ensuing analyses parallel and extend the results of an earlier work on intersubjectivity (Robles, 
2010). In the next four sections I point out examples of ways in which intersubjectivity can be 
accomplished through recognizing, displaying understanding, attending to, and orienting or 
positioning identities with close others.  
In the following sections I review the results of this analysis by providing examples of 
friend and family interactants engaging in recognition, attention, intelligibility and other-
orientation as devices (to use a Garfinkelian word) for intersubjective practice. I begin by 
describing and defining the device, and provide analysis of a typical example to show how it 
unfolds in use. I then display a second example to describe how its use can accomplish morality 
through an analysis of its method for displaying relational commitment, context-embeddedness 
in cultural or ideological expectations, and potential problems.  
Recognition devices. I use this designation to refer a “basic” form of intersubjectivity: 
the display of awareness that the world, and the people in it, exist. Without displaying this basic 
awareness, speakers are not likely to engage in conversational projects because there would be 
no frame of reference for which to employ such fundamental discursive activities as turn taking. 
This basic awareness then requires recognition of the particular people who are relevant to an 
instance of interaction. Participants must display as relevant the people with whom they engage 
in conversational projects as well as the people who are relevant to those projects. Such displays 
may be accomplished by speaker address or reference and gaze.  
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Excerpt 3 provides an example of the use of gaze as a way of recognizing someone as an 
interactional participant. In this recording during a routine visit by the author and her partner to 
the partner’s family home in Nuneaton England in 2008, the author is standing in the doorway to 
the room, holding the camera, which is aimed at Jenny and her granddaughter, Lizzy. To the 
right of the picture (out of the camera frame), the baby’s mother, Gertie, is attending to the 
interaction between Jenny and Lizzy, while Jenny’s sons Raymond and Jeff are carrying on a 
side-conversation (highlighted). For this analysis, the focus is not on the side conversation.  
Excerpt 3 “The Newtons” [fam.jul08.1.E2.1]
JENNY: [oy↑] 41 
 42 
RAYMOND: [th top] one= 43 
JEFF:  =[n:o:: I mean- how much is that one] 44 
GERTIE:   [(◦I don’t know if she is◦) she says is she]  45 
 46 
GERTIE: smiling I says well .hhh (.) I don’t know if she is or not so I 47 
  don’t know if it’s wind, 48 
JEFF:  [(does it say it’s xxx)] 49 
GERTIE: [but anyway she mo:uthed at him] for a bit  50 
JEFF:  [(xxx xxx xxx)] 51 
GERTIE:  [and she went] ((mimics a smile, 0.3)) she’s definitely 52 
  smiled  53 
RAYMOND: [(this one)] 54 
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GERTIE: [see she’s just smiled at me four times she sa(h)ys(he)] 55 
[11:26 camera moves] 56 
JEFF:  (◦three six eight◦) might be [ten] [11:30 camera moves] 57 
 58 
JENNY:         [Eyh] hey hello:  59 
JEFF:  and it coulda been [nine.] 60 
JENNY:         [(.) e]llo:  61 
(1.0)  62 
JENNY: *canya give grand(mum) a smi:le*  63 
RAYMOND: it’s ten on each side 64 
(1.5)  65 
JENNY: eyh (0.7) *I got a bear for ya* .hh ((breathy voice,  66 
  exaggerated accent)) 67 
 68 
((high-pitched sound, laughter-like))  69 
 70 
 71 
JENNY: yeah I got a bear for ya [11:40 camera zooms to bear TV] 72 
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 73 
JEFF:  [yeah it’s (like a totally different) frame]    74 
                        [11:45 camera zooms out] 75 
 76 
JENNY: [been knitting crazy all we:ek (0.2) I got a be:ar]  77 
JEFF:  I’ve never se[en this design before] 78 
JENNY:           [(b’) you won’t take no notice of it]  79 
JENNY: ↑y’ won’t be ↓bothered with it = 80 
LIZZY: =((small coo sound)) 81 
JENNY:   (0.3) ↑n↓o: (0.5) ↑no you ↑wo:n’t  82 
LIZZY: ((yawns)) 83 
JEFF:  [(have to get xxx)] 84 
JENNY: [owh::] 85 
(1.0) 86 
RAYMOND: suppose it was carbon fiber wasn’t [it] 87 
 88 
JENNY:             [wh](h)ere did she get 89 
  those jea(h)ns fro(h)m= 90 
GERTIE: =I don’t (know) 91 
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JENNY: ((laughs)) she’s go(h)t a be(h)lt o(h)n aoh (.) *oh my 92 
  *goodne[ss ((glottalized)) 93 
GERTIE:  [she’s   gettin (like) too big now so]  94 
 95 
RAYMOND:  [that’s   a nice one there] 96 
GERTIE: ↑some of the other stuff still fits her but it- .hhh she says I 97 
  don’t know (I don’t think)- she has got long legs,  98 
 99 
GERTIE: but (.) [12:07 camera moves] it seems to be on the legs 100 
where th-she’s um- it’s- she’s strugglin= 101 
JENNY: =yeah102 
103 
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Here, Jenny does recognition through eye contact to primarily two people: Lizzy, and 
Gertie. Her attention to Lizzy is not entirely matched, as Lizzy, who is only a few months old 
here, seems not to have learned that one should pay attention to others. The result is that Jenny 
frequently pursues Lizzy’s gaze, ratifying her as a meaningful participant in the conversation, 
even while commenting that Lizzy is unable to appreciate the significance of the bear Jenny has 
recently knitted for her (lines 79-80). Intermittently, Jenny’s gaze turns to Gertie, though for 
most of the conversation, this only occurs when Gertie speaks (e.g. line 46). Only at the end of 
this excerpt, when Jenny asks Gertie a question (line 89), does she open a conversation with 
Gertie.  
This example shows one way of managing recognition in a conversation. Jenny could, for 
example, have only held Lizzy while giving full eye contact to Gertie. Since Gertie is an equal 
regarding her linguistic abilities, this would not have been a strange thing to do. It would have 
been strange, probably, if Jenny had paid full eye contact to Lizzy without ever looking at Gertie, 
even if Jenny had responded to Gertie verbally. This fact points to a cultural difference between 
the use of gaze as a display of commitment. According to Ochs and Shieffelin (2001) (and 
Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986) infants and young children are not given the same interactional roles 
cross-culturally. Many ways of bringing up infants outside England would not involve such 
sustained eye contact, direct addressing of utterances, and dogged pursuit of recognition. This 
does not mean that in other communities, parents are less relationally committed to their 
children. Rather, in certain communities, gaze is one recognition device which interactionally 
achieves commitment to a particular moment, conversation, or project. The patterned use of this 
device over time alongside other intersubjectivity devices sustains its use as a practice for doing 
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relational commitment in a particular context. In this example, Jenny successfully manages the 
problem of recognizing both Lizzy and Gertie in the interaction, demonstrating that one 
difficulty in doing recognition involves the need to sometimes recognize multiple people without 
withdrawing recognition from any one of them. This feat would certainly have been more 
difficult had Lizzy not been an infant.   
The next example demonstrates how this intersubjectivity device can accomplish moral 
practice. This excerpt demonstrates a use of the gaze recognition device for signaling the 
relevance of other persons to an interaction despite their not actively participating in the talk at 
hand. By looking at someone who is not directly involved in a conversation, one (1) can signal 
that person is relevant to the conversation, (2) can indicate that person should contribute to the 
conversation (or can ask them to do so), and/or (3) can comment on the conversation underway 
for that person’s benefit. This excerpt, from a home movie, features several immediate and 
extended members of a family opening presents for a “mass birthday party,” and takes place in 
California during the late 1980s. Jilly (and sometimes Beatrice, her mother, on the right) is the 
only person visible; Mike, Jilly’s husband, and their daughters sit across from her, while Mike’s 
parents and sister are to her left. Mike’s sister’s husband is on the other side of Beatrice. Jilly’s 
father, Jack, is behind the camera, and is standing while he holds it (hence the downward angle). 
Excerpt 4 “The Reynolds” [fam.hols88.1.E5.1] 
 
Beatrice: Oh look at the pretty colo:rs= 104 
Jim:  =unmentionables= ((off camera)) 105 
Jilly:  =O:: 106 
Jim:  we must not mention them ((off camera)) 107 
Beatrice: [o↑o::] 108 
?:  [((giggles))] 109 
Jim:  I look over at Mike here “oh well” 110 
Mike:  It (must be) my birthday ((off camera)) 111 
((laughter)) 112 
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 113 
Jilly:  yeah I guess we're celebrating your birthday too=  114 
 115 
Jack:  =hey (0.5) those'll be a big hit when you're out on the balcony ((off  116 
  camera)) 117 
 118 
Jilly:  ◦y(h)eah◦ 119 
 ((laughter)) 120 
Jilly:  drinking the coffee in the- after you're gone ((points to Mike))= 121 
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  122 
 123 
Beatrice: =that’s right= 124 
Jack:  =yeah right ((laughs)) you watch that UPS stops-  ((behind camera)) 125 
 126 
 127 
Jack:  truck stop now ((laughs)) ((behind camera))128 
129 
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In this excerpt, Jilly, who as the current gift-opener is the focus of the camera, regularly 
shifts her eye contact and gestures to recognize different people in the room and to bring them in 
as relevant to the conversation in some particular way, either to comment on those people, or to 
comment about the conversation to those people. Until line 113, Jilly looks at the gift, even as 
she holds it up to display it to others. As she is the focus of attention, the only other person on 
camera (Beatrice, Jilly’s mother) is looking in the direction of Jilly and the gift, as assumedly 
everyone else in the room is also doing. Even after Jim’s comments, Jilly continues to look at the 
gift, and does not look up until after Mike’s comment (line 111). Then, she looks first down at 
the box into which she is returning the gift, then laughs, then looks in the direction of Mike 
(since he is not on camera, it is not conclusive that she is looking at him, but is a safe guess to 
make given he has just spoken). As she produces the utterance in line 114, she glances at the 
camera, glances back into the box, glances at Mike, then back down as she starts putting the gift 
away (line 118).  
 Jilly’s gaze actions seem largely a response to the situation at this point. She has to attend 
to multiple people, including the camera, and her glances back and forth between the camera, 
Mike, and the gift show an orientation to particular identities as (1) conversationally relevant 
(since Mike became a topic in relation to the gift) and (2) situationally relevant (since this is 
happening “on camera”). When Jack makes his comment (line 116), she glances at him (line 
117), then utters “yeah” (line 118) and looks down again where she is in effect re-wrapping the 
gift. She then makes the joke about drinking coffee on the balcony in this outfit, first glancing at 
Beatrice and making her hand into a “coffee-cup holding” shape (while “swilling” the imaginary 
cup) (line 122). She ends the utterance by focusing attention to Mike and pointing at him while 
saying “you’re” (line 122). The three deictic actions (looking at Mike, saying “you’re,” and 
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pointing) reinforce the idea that he is both a conversational participant and a topic of the 
conversation. Sadly we cannot see Mike’s facial reactions to this hypothetical situation, but 
laughter follows, ratifying the action as a joke.  
 At this point, Jilly shoots a quick glance at Beatrice (line 123), then looks back down at 
the gift before glancing at Jack as he says “stops” (line 125) but gives otherwise no reaction, 
instead again turning attention to the gift as she closes the box on it. No one else attends to or 
laughs at Jack’s comment (though he does; line 128), and the conversational direction changes. 
Jilly’s glance at Beatrice here seems different from the earlier glance during the “coffee” joke. In 
the first instance, her head turns toward Beatrice, her eyes are fully opened, and orientation shifts 
from Beatrice to Mike. In that instance, Beatrice seems to be brought in as a conversational 
participant, perhaps someone who can appreciate the joke, or perhaps as a way of recognizing 
Beatrice, who has not said anything since her last comment on the colors of the gift. Other than a 
quick glance at Jack when he begins speaking (line 124) Beatrice focuses on Jilly, indicating 
involvement in the situation if not in the current conversation. But after Jilly’s comment, which 
she had prefaced by directing it toward Beatrice, Beatrice does say something (“that’s right,” line 
126).  
 Jilly’s second glance at Beatrice, however, is produced differently. Her head turns only 
slightly, and the “glance” is produced out of the corner of her eyes rather than more directly. 
This glance occurs as Beatrice says “right” and seems to simultaneously attend to Beatrice’s 
utterance and the fact that she produced it, while expressing some sort of attitude, to Beatrice, 
about the conversation. It is unclear what the glance means, who/what it is about, or why exactly 
it was produced. But it meaningfully recognizes Beatrice and Beatrice’s part in the interaction.  
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 There are a number of ways we can tell empirically that the people in this interaction are 
a family. They share knowledge of each other’s histories and personal lives. They reference the 
meaningfulness of different interactants to one another. They interpret particular actions and 
objects as having “relational significance,” as when Mike’s father indicates how happy Mike 
should be about Jilly getting lingerie. They show a commitment to the interaction if not the 
content of others’ talk, as when Jilly continues to look at, and respond verbally to, her father 
despite his off-color remarks. And they display commitment toward each others’ participation in 
the total interaction, as when Jilly continually looks at her mother.  
 Recognition is a way of managing who matters to interaction, how much, and in what 
ways. In this situation, there was some trouble regarding Jack’s jokes, which Jilly did not always 
seem to find funny, and which often no one in the room ratified as humorous either. Rather than 
calling Jack out or strongly indicating her displeasure (perhaps because of being on camera, or 
not wanting to “spoil” the occasion), Jilly modifies her recognition. Though continuing to make 
eye contact with Jack, she does not smile at him or respond strongly to many of his later 
comments. Instead, she shifts her attention to Beatrice, recognizing Beatrice continually, and 
indicating a closer intersubjective relationship in that moment. Jack, notably, seems unaware (or 
unadmitting) of the discomfort or lack of humor resulting from his remarks. Rather than noting 
any intersubjective gaps, he carries on with his own projects.  
Recognition is a device for the practice of relational commitment because it can be 
employed interactionally to demonstrate that, interpersonally, participants are responsible for and 
accountable to interacting with one another. The ideologies attached to this interactional dictum 
are many, and not only are they at times named explicitly by participants, but they will be readily 
familiar to most people raised in the U.S. or England. Typical examples include, for instance, 
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“look at me when I’m talking to you” and “don’t walk away from the conversation.” To violate 
the ideology may violate a small interactional rule—thus indicating disregard for an interactional 
instant or disagreement with what someone said—but could also violate the standards of regard 
expected between close relational interlocutors.  
Intelligibility devices. Recognition is a fairly simple device for practicing 
intersubjectivity with others. A higher order device for intersubjectivity is intelligibility or 
understanding. Once there seems to be a world and people in it that are acknowledged as 
important, the particular meanings of interactive parts have to converge in some way. To have 
every turn be completely unintelligible would constantly halt conversation, requiring endless 
repairs and repetitions. The conversational project underway must be comprehensible enough for 
it to be taken up in the next turn, and for the following turn after to display an uptake that 
demonstrates nothing problematic about the prior turn’s uptake of the previous one.  
Intersubjective display of intelligibility can include facial expressions and gesture. The 
next excerpt, which is also from the weekend at the Newton’s, features a later conversation about 
a television program.  
Excerpt 5 “The Newtons” [fam.jul08.1.E3.1]
JENNY: there’s somethin(g/k) on, I told you about it on Thursday 126 
  about the the girl who wanted a baby when she was  127 
  fourteen (0.5) [19:34 camera moves] th whole program was 128 
  done Thursday evenin (.) and she’s convinced now (.) she 129 
  doesn’t want a baby=  130 
RAYMOND: =oh right= 131 
JENNY: =not til she’s at least twenty six 132 
RAYMOND: o↑h 133 
GERTIE: (someone was telling me about) [that] 134 
JENNY:         [yeah] they gave one of 135 
  these dolls  136 
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 137 
JENNY: that was computerized  138 
 139 
RAYMOND: oh yeah 140 
JENNY: to a baby’s (.) full twenty four hour  141 
   142 
(2.0)  143 
JENNY: and uh in the middle of the night she was goin SHUT UP 144 
shu(h) 145 
 146 
GERTIE: [it’s just constant] all the time 147 
JENNY: [just shut up]  148 
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 149 
GERTIE: [◦oh my go:d◦] 150 
JENNY: [I need to] sleep (.) sh↑ut up  151 
 152 
JENNY: n you can’t do that to a baby can ya 153 
LIZZIE: ((wails))  154 
JENNY: no that was it she’s decided (0.5) don’t want one155 
156 
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Jenny’s gestures do work alongside her talk in ways that are not merely emphasizing. 
Instead, her gestures work to make intelligible her building-up of actions in telling a narrative. 
The gestures are not necessary to understand her story, but make their own distinct point. First 
she uses her hands open and low in her lap (line 137) to represent a “doll.” This gesture seems to 
emphasize the relationship between the doll and its representation of a real baby. When 
mentioning “computerized” Jenny makes a twisting gesture with her hands (line 139) indicating 
movement. Computerized thus means to some extent “motorized” or mechanical. The doll is not 
just any doll that looks like a baby, but has some sort of baby-function built into it. It is not clear 
whether the baby moves or just makes noises, but it does something baby-like, and her motions, 
which move from open in her lap to tilted, make it seem as if the imagined doll could lie down 
and sit up.  
Subsequently, Jenny moves her hands so that the top hand crosses the other while the 
bottom hand moves opposite, and then her hands move back into the original perpendicular 
position (line 142). Her hands in once sense represent a kind of cycle (the full 24-hour) and also 
represent the baby doll as an object meant to be interacted with insofar as they build on her 
previous symbolic presentation of “doll.” The participants in the conversation must be able to see 
her gestures as intelligible in their description of a special kind of doll that is supposed to be 
similar in ways to a real baby. This is an important part of her story which is moving toward an 
assessment.  
In lines 145, 148 and 151, Jenny mimics the response to the baby doll with vivid facial 
expressions, a loud, repeated proclamation of “shut up” and a dramatic arm gesture which cuts 
across several times as if to “shoo” away, or even hit, something. Her prior gestures must have 
been intelligible for participants to understand what is going on. Without knowing that babies cry 
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in the night, and that a baby doll computerized to act as a baby would also cry in the night, the 
dramatization of responses to a doll’s actions would be overt. Instead, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the girl in the narrative is experiencing something that a real mother would. Gertie 
shows her understanding and agreement by chiming in with the assessments (lines 146, 149). 
Because Gertie responds to inferences that can be made by Jenny’s gestures rather than to the 
straightforward content of the story, she displays an intersubjective understanding in her talk that 
agrees with the joint discursive and symbolic presentation made by Jenny.  
Nonverbal communication, including gesture, conveys important interactional meanings. 
It can be responded to separately from verbal content or actions. Jenny’s use of the quotative 
“goin” is not as unambiguous as “said” for reproducing an action, but when she says one “can’t 
do that to a baby,” she makes clear that the “shut ups” and hitting motions in earlier lines were 
not hypothetical, imagined, or thought reactions to the crying mechanical baby. This, in the end, 
is what is commented on and assessed—not the thought that a crying baby will drive one slightly 
mad (that is acknowledged by Gertie, and unproblematically accepted) but that there is a 
physical (and perhaps verbal) reaction which is proscribed. In other words, one must not 
communicate by word or deed one’s frustration toward a crying infant. A cultural ideology is at 
play which determines what elements of the story are assessed negatively.  
But there is also a cultural concept for how to enact stories with others. Here, gesture is a 
relevant simultaneous turn. It is done to be meaningful to participants, and it is expected that 
participants will treat it as meaningful. A person’s gestures will be taken as directed toward 
conversational participants—the verbal cannot occlude them. And gesture can mediate 
problematic aspects of verbal comments (as well as vice versa), as when someone states “I would 
kill you if you ever did that,” but smiles while saying so. Intelligibility is can be a way of doing a 
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shared (moral) orientation, of creating the conversational context for interlocutors to, without 
saying it, agree on the assessment of right and wrong in the story. In the next excerpt from a 
group of friends watching television, lack of gaze and sustained interaction with an object rather 
than others holds a “questionable” position for a large part of the interaction. During this 
sequence, the television is on and is close to the camera, so quieter speech was not transcribable. 
The camera is placed by the television set. Ben is on the left side of the couch, Alex on the right, 
and Carrie is right of Alex and not in the camera frame.  
Excerpt 6 “Hanging Out” [frn.rdm10.2.E3.1]
Ben: a satellite shot of Colorado cuz it was a perfectly clear day 240 
 241 
Ben:  [( )] 242 
Carrie: [( )] ((off camera)) 243 
Ben: everywhere and you can see these like  244 
 245 
Ben:  ( ) 246 
Carrie: yeah apparently (it stretched) to Kansas ((off camera)) 247 
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Jana: like it was eerie I was at the grocery store? And I walked out and I’m like this is248 
 like a weird colored cloud comin in= 249 
Alex: [yeah] 250 
Carrie: [yeah] 251 
Jana: and it was like kind of just like a reddish tin[ge 252 
Alex:       [yeah] it was (like that huh) 253 
Jana: yeah when the lights ( ) outside I was like this isn’t normal 254 
  255 
(1.0) 256 
Alex: ( ) 257 
Jana: yeah 258 
Alex: ( ) 259 
(4.0) 260 
Alex: hey ((to the dog)) 261 
(1.0) 262 
Ben: check that out 263 
 264 
Ben: ( ) (0.5) ( ) 265 
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  266 
(2.0)  267 
Jana: eerie (0.5) wow that far268 
269 
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In this excerpt, three friends sit on a couch watching television, while a fourth friend 
stands near the camera and television (and is not on camera). Ben is discussing a strange “sky” 
phenomenon in which an oddly-colored cloud had appeared following a series of fires in the 
area. He mentions that it was captured on satellite (line 240), and Carrie mentions that it 
stretched all the way to Kansas (line 247). The “uncertain” object here is Ben’s cell phone, which 
he picks up as he is describing the satellite shot (line 241). He has previously passed the cell 
phone around to show a picture of something having to do with the fires, and it seems safe to 
assume that he is going to use the phone in a similar manner. However, he doesn’t explain the 
use of the phone, and since people often use their phones for a variety of non-interactionally 
relevant purposes within an interaction, the purpose of his using the phone could go either way. 
He spends several moments (lines 241-264) looking at the phone. Is he texting? Checking 
messages? Reading emails? It is unclear, and he does not work to attend to the conversation 
occurring around him except that his body is still angled toward the other people in the room.  
It isn’t until line 264 that Ben passes the phone, signaling previously (line 264) that he’s 
found something he wants to share which relates to the ongoing conversation. It is only at this 
point that it is certain he was using the phone for an interactionally-relevant purpose rather than 
attending to something or someone else. The use of cell phones is ambiguous and depending on 
the situation, people may be called out for using a cell phone during interaction if its use is 
suspected to be external to the conversation. The fact that Ben’s friends do not call him out for 
looking at his cell phone indicates a few possibilities: (1) his use of the cell phone for extra-
interactional activities is deemed acceptable; (2) it likely based on prior interactions that he is 
using the cell phone relevantly to the conversation; or (3) the cultural expectation of focusing full 
attention on conversational participants may be starting to relax.  
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 Intelligibility devices show understanding in interaction. Participants are held responsible 
for making themselves understandable, and for following others as well signaling when such 
following necessitates repair. In the case above, the cultural and relational demands of 
recognizing and attending to (more on attention below) others also involves expectations 
regarding intelligibility. As an outsider, it is unclear whether Ben is “following” the 
conversation, since he is not employing other devices. But since the others do not seek 
acknowledgement that he is following, it seems safe to assume that in this instance, they 
assumed (or hoped) that what he was doing would prove, eventually, to be relevant—and itself 
followable.  
Eventually Ben’s actions were made intelligible, but they needn’t have been. The 
complexity of interaction makes intelligibility difficult. Interaction often involves more than the 
people—it involves technology such as phones and televisions, objects such as food or books, 
and encounters that demand multiple intersubjectivities. Maintaining intersubjectivity with others 
takes place in a chaotic world filled with distractions and side-actions. In the next section I 
discuss attention, which can involve the use of objects as devices to display (or not, as the case 
could have been here) engagement in complex interaction. 
Attentional devices. Attention-orientation includes more explicit attentional devices that 
build on recognition and intelligibility, and which are primarily engaged in sustaining multi-turn 
orientation to other subjectivities. Attention brings together recognition and intelligibility to 
implicate identities and interlocutor expectations in how interaction involves others.  
What is interesting about attention is that it can be done through the use of objects. If one 
wishes to display attention to another, why not do so solely through the means of gaze, or 
“following” connectives such as “uh huh,” “yeah,” “really?” and “m hm”? Instead, people 
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commonly use aspects of the world around them to show attention to particular people and 
conversational projects. Rather than being a distraction, context outside the immediate talk gets 
relevantly drawn into conversation on a regular basis through object reference and manipulation. 
This excerpt is the same as excerpt 3, but this time, I focus on Raymond and Jeff’s side 
conversation about bicycles in a magazine.  
Excerpt 7 “The Newtons” [fam.jul08.1.E2.1]
JENNY: [oy↑] 153 
RAYMOND: [th top] one= 154 
 155 
JEFF:  =[n:o:: I mean- how much is that  one] 156 
GERTIE:   [(◦I don’t know if she is◦) she   says is she]  157 
GERTIE: smiling I says well .hhh (.) I don’t know if she is or not so I 158 
  don’t know if it’s wind, 159 
JEFF:  [(does it say it’s xxx)] 160 
 161 
GERTIE: [but anyway she mo:uthed at him] for a bit  162 
JEFF:  [(xxx xxx xxx)] 163 
GERTIE:  [and she went] ((mimics a smile, 0.3)) she’s definitely 164 
  smiled  165 
RAYMOND: [(this one)] 166 
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 167 
GERTIE: [see she’s just smiled at me four times she sa(h)ys(he)] 168 
[11:26   camera moves] 169 
JEFF:  (◦three six eight◦) might be [ten] [11:30 camera moves] 170 
JENNY:           [Eyh] hey hello:  171 
JEFF:  and it coulda been [nine.] 172 
JENNY:         [(.) e]llo:  173 
(1.0)  174 
JENNY: *canya give grand(mum) a smi:le*  175 
 176 
RAYMOND: it’s ten on each side 177 
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 178 
(1.5)  179 
JENNY: eyh (0.7) *I got a bear for ya* .hh ((breathy voice,  180 
  exaggerated accent)) 181 
((high-pitched sound, laughter-like))  182 
JENNY: yeah I got a bear for ya [11:40 camera zooms to bear] 183 
JEFF:        [yeah it’s (like a totally different) 184 
  frame]   [11:45 camera zooms out] 185 
JENNY: [been knitting crazy all we:ek (0.2) I got a be:ar]  186 
JEFF:  I’ve never se[en this design before] 187 
JENNY:           [(b’) you won’t take no notice of it]  188 
JENNY: ↑y’ won’t be ↓bothered with it = 189 
LIZZY: =((small coo sound)) 190 
JENNY:   (0.3) ↑n↓o: (0.5) ↑no you ↑wo:n’t  191 
LIZZY: ((yawns)) 192 
JEFF:  [(have to get xxx)] 193 
JENNY: [owh::] 194 
(1.0) 195 
RAYMOND: suppose it was carbon fiber wasn’t [it] 196 
JENNY:             [wh](h)ere did she get 197 
  those jea(h)ns fro(h)m= 198 
GERTIE: =I don’t (know) 199 
JENNY: ((laughs)) she’s go(h)t a be(h)lt o(h)n aoh (.) *oh my 200 
  *goodne[ss ((glottalized)) 201 
GERTIE:         202 
   [she’s gettin (like) too big now so]  203 
 204 
RAYMOND:  [that’s  a nice one there] 205 
 206 
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 207 
GERTIE: ↑some of the other stuff still fits her but it- .hhh she says I 208 
  don’t know (I don’t think)- she has got long legs, 209 
210 
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In this excerpt, Raymond uses the magazine as an attentional device. Objects can often be 
used to communicate to people. For example, listening to music or reading a book on a bus is a 
signal not to communicate, and attempting to do so can be an accountable offense. Here, 
however, Raymond uses the magazine in a different, indeed opposite, way, to maintain the 
interaction he is having with his brother across the room. Throughout the conversation, he shows 
he is continuing to attend to Jeff. In line 155, Raymond holds the magazine up to ask for 
clarification about a bike Jeff has mentioned as having seen in the magazine before Raymond 
started looking at it. Jeff repairs what he had asked before about the bike (not wanting Raymond 
to identify it, but rather identify the size of some part on it), and offers a candidate answer 
(lines156, 160) as Raymond turns the magazine back to himself (line 161).  
It is notable that when Raymond turns the magazine back to himself, he does not lower it 
into his lap, but continues to hold it up, signaling that it is still functioning as maintaining his 
attention to Jeff. In lines 166-167, Raymond checks again, again turning the magazine back to 
Jeff, and Jeff responds with more guesses (lines 170, 172), prompting Raymond to once again 
turn the magazine back to himself to check (line 176). The magazine is positioned as the source 
of information, allowing Raymond to “correct” Jeff’s incorrect guesses in a preferred manner 
(line 177) and holding up the page that displays this information (line 178) as if allowing Jeff to 
check it himself. As Raymond and Jeff continue to comment on the bikes, Raymond holds up the 
magazine so the relevant page faces Jeff, but angles his head so that he, too, can see it (line 207). 
This rather awkward position creates a situation in which Jeff and Raymond are looking at, and 
commenting on, the bikes “together” despite the fact that they are seated on opposite ends of the 
room. The magazine in this excerpt serves, therefore, as an attentional device through which Jeff 
and Raymond can attend to one another through the practice of looking at the magazine.  
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Attention can be given in different ways. In different situations, attention need not be given in 
these ways. In other cultural contexts, it may not be necessary to show sustained interaction so 
“obviously.” Attention is one way of indicating that one cares to continue interacting. Its display 
even in the absence of explicit attention-seeking (in the excerpt just discussed, Jeff does not 
actively pursue Raymond’s attention) is an even stronger indication of interest in being 
conversationally involved. While objects can complicate intersubjectivity practice, here, an 
object was able to be repurposed to maintain intersubjectivity. In the next excerpt, one from the 
Reynolds’ a few years later at a Christmas gathering, a different kind of object takes on a similar 
use. The person holding the camera is unknown during this recording. Samantha and her 
grandfather, Jack, are in the frame. Beatrice, Samantha’s grandmother and Jack’s wife, is the 
right, out of the frame. JR twice passes through the frame, and, Lisa, Samantha and JR’s other 
grandmother, also appears on the staircase behind Jack in the background.   
Excerpt 8 “The Reynolds” [fam.hols94.1.E8.1]
Mike:  o: that looks like popcorn ((off camera)) 210 
(1.0) 211 
 212 
Beatrice: o:: (is it little) (.) bites? ((off camera)) 213 
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  214 
Beatrice: oh it’s a little (bag) how cute ((off camera)) 215 
 216 
Samantha: (for you) 217 
 218 
Jack:  oh really? For goodness sakes 219 
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  220 
Jack:  well look at that 221 
Samantha: (it’s for you) 222 
223 
 224 
 225 
Jack:  ah look it this is for 226 
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 227 
Jack:  you  228 
 229 
Jack:  and JR 230 
  231 
(0.5) 232 
Jack:  also 233 
 234 
Jack:  see and Benny 235 
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 236 
Jack:  so you know there’s dog bones in there 237 
238 
239 
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In this interaction, Jack uses a large can (presumably of popcorn) to pursue attention from 
his granddaughter, Samantha. Samantha and her sister (JR) have been distributing Christmas 
gifts, and Samantha looks at the tin on the ground, then picks it up as Mike makes his guess 
about what is inside (line 210). Samantha then orients to Jack by walking the tin over to him, 
standing next to him, and displaying the top of it, where the label for whom it is intended is 
affixed. As they are both looking at the tin (line 212) Beatrice, her grandmother, speaks (line 
213) and Samantha looks in her direction (214) before she and Jack return to looking at the tin, 
and it is clear in line 216 that Beatrice is carrying on a conversation with someone else, and is no 
longer noted in the rest of the sequence between Jack and Samantha.  
Jack takes his glasses out of his coat pocket, indicating that there is some question about 
who the tin is for (line 217), and Samantha holds the tin out to him. Samantha says something 
(line 218) and Jack responds on line 219 by putting on his glasses. His utterance in line 220 
seems to indicate that Samantha was telling him that the gift was his, which makes sense, as she 
appears to be trying to give it to him while consulting with him about who the gift is really for. 
This prompts Samantha to hold out the tin (line 221), since Jack seems to have acknowledged it 
is his, but after he takes it she does a head-stretched-out “looking” expression, as if to continue 
checking (line 222). Jack continues to exhibit disbelief or surprise (“well look at that” in line 
223) and Samantha again asserts the tin is his (224). It is hard to hear what exactly she says, but 
this seems confirmed by her pointing gesture and subsequent turning away, as if her job is done 
(line 225).  
However, Jack is not finished. As she is turning away, Jack starts to speak (line 226), and 
Samantha stops moving and shifts toward him slightly, though she does not turn all the way back 
toward him (line 227). As Jack continues speaking, particularly with the word “you” (line 228) 
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which indicates he is addressing her and not the room, Samantha still does not turn back, but she 
continues to stand close by (line 227). When Jack finishes his utterance that the tin is for her and 
her sister, Samantha finally turns her head back in his direction (line 230-231). Jack responds to 
her attention with a little shake of the tin (line 231) as if to give a clue about what is inside, but 
Samantha shakes her head and starts to move away again. It seems as if she is not taking Jack’s 
assertion seriously.  
Jack once again addresses her as she starts to leave him, however, by mentioning “and 
Benny” (line 235), which is the name of his dog. At this Samantha turns back again, and Jack 
looks up from the tin, where apparently he was “reading” all these other people for whom the tin 
was intended. Once Jack has her attention again, he makes the joke that there are dog bones 
inside (line 237). At this Samantha smiles and tilts her head (line 238), then finally moves away 
and out of the conversation with Jack. 
Throughout this interaction, Jack uses references to and indications of the tin to pursue 
interaction with Samantha. At the beginning of the conversation, Samantha seemed to orient to 
the tin and was not moving away. This seemed to indicate some confusion about whether the tin 
was really meant for Jack. Jack at first attends to this co-orientation to the tin, and the reasons for 
it, ratifying the confusing element by switching his glasses so as to read the label on the tin. Once 
he’s seen the label, Samantha seems satisfied and tries to move away several times, but Jack 
continues to question the label and keep the interaction going.  
Every time Samantha tries to leave, Jack once again references the tin and maintains her 
attention. At the end we find the purpose of this was a teasing one, which confirms Samantha’s 
earlier reaction to Jack’s insistence that the tin was for her and her sister as well, which she 
seemed to treat as a joke. This seems to imply a history between these two, as Samantha guessed 
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that Jack was joking before he got to the punchline. Jack uses the tin as a device for pursuing 
Samantha’s attention and her participation in an extended interaction.    
Attention here has a meaning far more relationally significant than merely “paying 
attention to the current interaction.” To pursue someone’s attention in such an extended way, for 
seemingly no other reason than to make a small joke, indicates a certain extent to which people 
interact for interaction’s sake, indeed, for the sake of interacting with that person. Jokes have a 
reason to be told which is already highly social, but also relational. There are cultural rules for 
what jokes are appropriate for telling with whom, and how joking should unfold. Problems of 
course arise, as when a joke is told which turns out to be inappropriate. And here, for instance, 
Jack almost loses the floor for his joke due to Samantha’s continued attempts to leave. The 
object, however, provides the means to pursue a particular other’s interactional attention despite 
whatever other actions are occurring.  
Thus a person’s identity is deemed important to the other person, through interacting for 
the sake of interaction itself. Intersubjectivity is accomplished in a particular way, overcoming 
the larger situation (passing out gifts) in order to establish a special kind of occasion-internal 
interaction which is just between Jack and Samantha (though watched by the camera, these 
participants seem unaware of it). Jack’s use of the interesting object, the tin of potentially 
delicious popcorn, remedies the trouble of Samantha’s desire to disengage. The next section 
builds on this connection between intersubjectivity and relationality to show how people 
interactionally position themselves with regard to the particular relational identities of others.  
Co-identification devices. This intersubjectivity device has to do with the way in which 
conversational participants identify with one another, in ways that would not be done with 
strangers or acquaintances. This idea is not too far afield from Burke’s (1950) notion of 
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“identification,” in which the perception of similarity based on almost any criterion (physical 
appearance, interests, beliefs, practices) can identify one individual with another individual or 
group. The genesis of this concept in discourse analysis is that people often acquire special 
modes of interactional accountability based on a meaning of “the relationship” which is made 
relevant to conversational projects. Even without “the relationship” becoming a topic, then, 
participants will nonetheless index the relationship in their talk and other symbolic-discursive 
actions.  
Intersubjectivity thus is not only about interaction, but about how identities in relation to 
one another are relevant to interaction. By engaging in practices such as working together, 
disattending to criticism, doing “the mundane,” side conversing, displaying intimate knowledge, 
and reporting the particular other’s speech, people will continuously achieve “doing being 
related” or “doing being intimate.”  The following excerpt occurs after a Thanksgiving dinner 
among the Reynolds family during which the author (as a much younger person) is filming her 
father Mike, and Mike’s mother Lisa, cleaning up after dinner in the kitchen.  
Excerpt 9 “The Reynolds” [fam.hols93.1.E7.1] 
 269 
Lisa:  I have an old fashioned (.) meat grinder 270 
Mike:  m: (1.0) *hi↑i* 271 
JR:  ((giggles)) 272 
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  273 
(4.0) 274 
 275 
Mike:  oh g(h)od this thing better not (.) leak (.) all over the place 276 
(2.0) 277 
 278 
Lisa:  (that’s the wrong one/bag) 279 
Mike:  I tied it 280 
Lisa:  well you U↑NTIE it  281 
Mike:  I didn’t wanna have to do that 282 
(5.0) 283 
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 284 
Mike:  I have an extreme sinus condition right now= 285 
Lisa:  =I can hear that286 
 
In the opening sequence, Mike and his mother have already been engaged in cleaning up 
for the past fifteen minutes. Throughout, they have been largely silent, and do not do “attending” 
in many of the ways already mentioned. Instead, they work “side-by-side” instead of “toward 
each other,” seemingly mutually oriented to the task rather than oriented to each other. After 
Mike asks about the ground meat he is cleaning up, Lisa gives an explanation (line 270), and 
then Mike notices they are on camera, producing the exaggerated “hi” (line 271) which is 
followed by the camera person’s giggles (line 272). Mike and Lisa continue to work back-to-
back (line 273), then Mike announces a problem: he has put some leftovers in a plastic bag, but 
is worried it might leak (line 276).  
Mike walks over to where Lisa is cutting up pecan pie and displays the bag of food to her 
(line 278). Lisa announces that the problem is Mike’s, indicating that he has chosen the wrong 
sort of bag to put the food in (line 279). Mike gives an account (line 280) which Lisa indicates is 
unsatisfactory by doing a demand in a markedly louder voice, coming almost to a shout on the 
word “untie” (line 281). Mike retorts as he walks away (line 282), but the next scene shows him 
withdrawing a new bag from a drawer as the two assume the previous back-to-back positions 
(line 284). Seconds later, Mike abruptly changes topic (line 285). 
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Throughout this exchange, Mike and Lisa move easily around each other in the kitchen, 
saying very little and indicating through gesture, eye movement, and head movement what each 
other should do. As with employees at a restaurant, for instance, they have clearly done this task 
together so many times that there are no explanations necessary. All is not perfect, however, as 
one discovers when Mike makes the error of choosing an inappropriate bag in which to put 
leftovers. This causes a ritual sequence of criticism-account-command-complaint-compliance 
which is typical of parent-child and sibling relationships: someone in a higher position criticizes 
someone in a lower position; the lower person attempts an explanation; the explanation is 
ignored and a correction of the error is demanded; the demand is met with a complaint, but is 
nonetheless complied with.  
Another point of interest in this interaction is the fact that the problematic episode is 
completely ignored by the next topic, and is never brought up again throughout the cleaning-up 
process. The event is treated as “small.” It is not relevant to future interactions. With people who 
are not as close or who are close as friends, criticism-sequences can cause discomfort because 
the relationship is assumed to be equal; with parents and children, the relationship is assumed to 
be unequal, and the parent is legitimized in taking a higher relational position.  A state of 
“normal interacting” is reasserted, turning the conversation to Mike’s head cold. One way of 
doing closeness is by ignoring problems as unexceptional, while attending to very small matters 
as worth talking about. This is a way of doing “the mundane” or routine (Schegloff, 1986) life of 
relating, which usually consists of discussing fairly trifling events.  
There are many ways of showing someone is familiar and close to another. One is more 
explicit. There are rituals of closeness: saying “I love you,” giving gifts and compliments, 
hugging, kissing, displaying photographs, sharing stories. But there are also implicit ways of 
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showing closeness. Refraining from such rituals, in a sense, can communicate “we don’t need to 
say/do it, we know it so deeply.” Doing “nothing special” is a way of showing the normality of 
interacting with another, which requires familiarity. These are all cultural, as well as dependent 
on particular relationships.  
In this interaction, a potentially moral problem arises. One might call this problem 
“misunderstanding” (Mike did not understand the kind of bag he was supposed to use) but given 
that it is ambiguous what Mike’s instructions beforehand were regarding the clean-up, this 
problem could also be “not paying attention,” “not listening,” “not following through on orders.” 
Thus, Mike and Lisa experience a brief intersubjective break. Their orientation to each other is 
disrupted by the lack of sharedness on particulars of the actions in which they are involved. Their 
particular ways of relating to each other reestablishes order by immediately correcting the error 
and moving on.  
The following examples are more explicit, perhaps because they show how people 
display particular important relationships amidst a backdrop of other kinds of relationships. The 
next series of fragments features a group of friends, who also consist of three pairs of married or 
romantic couples, talking while eating dinner together. Throughout the interaction, people get up 
and move around intermittently as they finish the meal at different times and leave to do dishes, 
get seconds, use the restroom, etc. There are several occasions of co-orientation, particularly 
between the couples, which is marked in a personal way as “within” the rest of the ongoing 
interaction. Here, I present two examples. John, Jim, and Jim’s wife Nicky are seated on the far 
side of the table. Mary is across from them, with her back to the camera. Mary’s partner Jane is 
off camera to the right. John’s wife Nicole is off camera on a nearby couch. The camera itself is 
sitting on a counter.  
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Excerpt 10 “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E4.1]
Nicky:  this stick is giving me problems 287 
 288 
Nora:  I can’t believe how much trouble you have with this this whole time it’s 289 
  awesome= 290 
Mary:  =no one else is struggling 291 
((laughter))  292 
 293 
Jim:  ( ) 294 
 295 
John:  just put it in your mouth and be done with it 296 
((laughter)) 297 
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 298 
 
In this fragment, Nicky announces her difficulty with a stick she is supposed to be using 
to eat her Thai dinner with. As everyone teases her, Jim, her husband, looks at the stick but 
makes no comment. Throughout Nicky laughs (e.g. line 293), displaying her amusement and 
seeming to be comfortable in the role of being teased. Instead of orienting to Nicky’s problems 
with the stick, Jim notices she has some food around her mouth and makes a comment (line 294) 
before pointing out the issue (line 295) to which Nicky responds by dabbing her mouth (line 
295). John then makes a double entendre-like comment, similar to many which have been made 
throughout the night, and in her laughter, Nicky drops the napkin (line 298). This is followed by 
her leaning over to retrieve the napkin, and as she does, she places her hand on Jim’s arm after 
looking at him (line 298).  
In this sequence, Nicky and Jim orient to each other in ways that are different from how 
they orient to others. They do “side-interacting” in which they open small interaction-internal 
sequences meant only for the two of them, separated from the sequence which was ongoing 
(Jefferson, 1982). These are often quite intimate, as when Jim comments on food around Nicky’s 
mouth, and when Nicky puts her hand on Jim’s arm as she gets her napkin (there appears to be 
no fear she is falling, so the touch seems to have more than a meaning of “steadying” herself). 
This is one way of displaying that people are in a close relationship of a different type than those 
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around them—in other words, Jim and Nicky relate to each other in a different way than they do 
to the others in the room, who are their friends rather than romantic partners.  
Through eye contact, intimate noticings, and side interactions, Jim and Nicky co-orient in 
a way that establishes a unique relating within the setting of general friendly, joking interaction. 
They sustain a different sense of commitment to each other, simultaneously, while continuing to 
participate as friends with the others. Co-orientation through side-interaction devices comprises 
the intersubjective practice for creating an orientation-within-an orientation. This shift in 
participation (Goffman, 1981) is an intersubjective shift that demonstrates a different form and 
extent of relationality with a particular person. As in so many examples related thus far, 
participants can cue different relationships with particular others within the same general 
interactional event. The next example re-focuses on friendship relationships, and how those are 
highlighted against the romantic relationships that also exist. This fragment comes from near the 
end of the dinner. Mary asks Jim what he’s brought for dessert. John, who is a much closer 
friend to Mary than Jim is, takes advantage of a comment by Jim to display his friendship with 
Mary.  
Excerpt 11 “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E5.1]
Mary:  so what did you bring for dessert (0.5) since it’s not [( )] 299 
Jim:  [chocolate mousse-] chocolate mousse cake 300 
Mary:  ( ) yes= 301 
Jim:  =it’s- it looks good 302 
Mary:  it sounds good 303 
(0.5) 304 
Jim:  it’s big 305 
(0.5) 306 
Mary:  o↑o:: 307 
[((laughter))] 308 
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 309 
Mary:  [( )] 310 
 311 
John:   [( ) ((laughing))] 312 
Nicky:  walked into that one baby 313 
  314 
((laughter)) 315 
John:  Mary’s like “that’s great (.) I don’t care” 316 
  317 
((laughter))318 
319 
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In this interaction, Mary treats Jim’s comment of “it’s big” (line 305) as another one of 
the typical double entendres that has been occurring throughout the dinner by giving an 
exaggerated reaction (line 307). Whether Jim meant it this way is unclear—he expresses a kind 
of chagrin, and everyone around him treats it as though it were an accident, with John shaking 
his head and patting Jim’s arm (lines 309, 311) and Jim’s wife Nicky stating that he “walked into 
that one” (line 313). John then builds on Jim’s faux pas by making it particularly consequential 
because, in addition to being a sexual reference he should have been aware of, it is also treated as 
a heterosexual reference which is given to a woman who identifies as lesbian. John calls this out 
by “speaking for” Mary in line 316: he reports a thought or hypothetical utterance that Mary 
might say in response to Jim saying “it’s big.”  
This response (line 316), accompanied by a dramatic nonverbal enactment (line 317), 
implies that Jim’s utterance was inappropriate especially for Mary. John on the other hand 
positions himself as knowing Mary well enough to guess how she would react to the situation if 
Jim’s utterance actually had been referring to a male sexual organ (as seems to be the reference). 
Thus, John’s display of, and apparent comfort with, the intimate knowledge of Mary’s sexual 
identity (and the supposed distaste toward men that this identity assumedly implies) becomes 
grounds for him to display, for the purpose of humor, a righteous indignation on her behalf 
toward being prey to inappropriate heterosexual references. This indignation is exaggerated 
through nonverbal performances (lines 309, 311, 317) and culminates in John’s performance “as 
Mary.” To speak for another is a strong form of co-identification, in which the interlocutor feels 
close enough to another to be legitimized in speaking on that other’s behalf, and indicates 
(though whether Mary would confirm it is unclear) a strong form of intersubjective relation 
between John and Mary.  
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Commitment is not only displayed to the committed other, but for various others. In more 
explicit or public social and cultural contexts, commitment is displayed through a number of 
special markers: wedding rings, references to “my partner,” photographs displayed on a desk, 
changing one’s last name, telling shared stories, etc. In more private contexts where multiple 
others appear, co-orientation devices in gesture and talk can manage different types and strengths 
of closeness with the different participants. This is to some extent always a delicate negotiation. 
It is eminently possible to display too much closeness to one person for another’s liking; to show 
too little closeness to someone who expected it; to take liberties with closeness; to demonstrate 
closeness in an inappropriate situation; etc. In this situation, intersubjectivity was practiced for 
demonstrating closeness and doing humor, and though it is not strongly ratified by Mary (she 
could have said “exactly” or reinforced John’s comment), it is neither treated as problematic. 
Through the devices described, for the most part, intersubjectivity was practiced without 
too many serious problems arising. And yet the potential for conflict was imminent throughout. 
Gaze may be overt or withheld, signaling dissatisfaction with a prior utterance, or a person’s 
typical way of responding. Gestures may acquire different meanings to different people. 
Attentional pursuit may be ignored, or misinterpreted. Co-orientation may alienate. Displaying 
commitment is a delicate business, and intersubjectivity must be carefully managed to do it well.  
Intersubjectivity as Moral Relational Practice 
 This chapter presented a number of devices which can be used to accomplish 
intersubjectivity between interlocutors. Intersubjectivity is perhaps the least minimal requirement 
for conversation, and can likely be shown as a practice that occurs across contexts where people 
have to interact with one another. When, where and how intersubjectivity is practiced, however, 
will be contextually bound. Here, I have demonstrated how intersubjectivity can be used in doing 
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intimacy and commitment in interaction, a higher level of commitment than in interactions 
between strangers or casual acquaintances. The consequences of not holding up one’s end of the 
interactional bargain is harsher for people who share a special co-oriented identity with one 
another, one achieved over long periods of time and based in intersubjective care.  
In these examples, the problem of intersubjectivity was largely successfully overcome. 
Sometimes troubles did intrude, and intersubjectivity was threatened. But devices such as 
recognition, intelligibility, attention and orientation were employed to maintain the sharedness of 
interactional projects and the ongoing situations they constructed. Efforts to maintain 
intersubjectivity with close others are treated as consequential when those efforts fail (or perhaps 
were not taken in the first place). In the example of Mike and Lisa, Lisa’s emotional display (the 
shouted criticism) seems harsh given Mike’s relatively small error. The extent to which family 
members expect certain actions to be performed in certain ways depends on the hierarchy of the 
family. It is difficult to imagine, for example, Mike having the same response to Lisa. Lisa’s 
reaction displays an analysis of Mike’s error-admission as consequential given her 
intersubjective expectations. As Francis and Hester (2004) note in an ethnomethodological 
analysis of family interactions, “talk may be both recipient designed and grounded in locally 
relevant categorical entitlements” (p. 72). Intersubjectivity is a practice for organizing different 
people’s commitments to one another. When some action signals a commitment as potentially 
unshared, intersubjectivity becomes a moral problem.  
 In line with a grounded practical theory approach, this chapter described practices 
participants have for dealing with potentially problematic interactional and ideological situations 
having to do with intersubjectivity practice. Though in all of the cases here there were no serious 
troubles, the withholding of recognition, intelligibility displays, attention or other-orientation 
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could be disturbing in a moment, and devastating over time. The achievement of interactionally 
“successful” discursive moral practices in these cases implicates an idea for an ideal version of 
this practice—a theory of what constitutes “moral communication” in this setting. Though 
participants would likely espouse norms for intersubjectivity practices such as “you should pay 
attention to me when I’m talking to you” or “can you tell me whether I’m making sense or not?” 
there nonetheless exist many tacit norms at work. For example, one might be articulated as “it’s 
okay to pay less attention to me if you have a cute baby in your arms.” Furthermore, the 
assumption of sharedness seems to be stronger for people in closer relationships, as when Lisa’s 
criticism of Mike treats a fairly small error as requiring a strong response. These considerations 
are returned to in chapter nine.  
This chapter has worked at specifying the practices that achieve different situated forms 
of intersubjectivity and some of their interactional and interpersonal meanings. The analyses 
provide evidence for the argument that intersubjectivity overcomes the problems of difference 
regarding interactional projects by working to constructed a shared interactional and 
interpersonal world. Through the course of the next several chapters, I will build on the 
implications of the empirical results reviewed in order to move toward what constitutes moral 
communication across these instances.  
Chapter four reconstructed “intersubjectivity” as a collection of practices for doing the 
foundation of morality based on an assumption of sharedness. Intersubjectivity is practiced by 
people in all sorts of relationships to one another. The next chapter, chapter five, discusses 
intimacy as a moral discursive practice. Intimacy involves close relationships. Furthermore, 
intimate relationships themselves can be quite different, and affect how morality is expected to 
unfold. The next chapter looks at intimacy particularly within families and friends, but also 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  201 
 
between romantic partners. Within the GPT approach, the problem of intimacy involves a 
dilemma regarding the danger of engaging in questionable moral practices with close others. 
Chapter five analyzes this dilemma in friend and family interactions to reconstruct intimacy as a 
moral practice.  
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Chapter 5 
The Dilemma of Intimacy in Close Relationships 
The link between relationships and morals is in some ways an obvious one. Values, 
beliefs, and attitudes about how people should treat each other and what a relationship should be 
like are part of what shapes and transforms relationships over time (Burleson, 2003). To “relate” 
intimately with another is to implicate consequential but often unspoken “contracts” between 
people, for example, what to do about secrets, how to react to mutual friends’ criticism of a non-
present friend, how to frame problems and arguments, when to apologize and when to forgive, 
expected duties and responsibilities, and how to do aligning and agreement. 
This chapter discusses intimacy as a moral discursive practice. Within the GPT approach, 
the problem of intimacy is a dilemma involving the simultaneous ease and danger of engaging in 
questionable moral practices with close others. Based on an analysis of this dilemma in friend 
and family interactions, this chapter argues that an assumption of shared understanding with 
regard to the stable moralities of close others is in tension with the moral questionableness of 
certain moral practices which can reveal fundamental differences. Based on particular actions 
and topics which implicate the identity of the speaker as well as the identities of others, intimacy 
requires careful management of the potential for moral judgments.  
This chapter focuses on the problem of intimacy, a practice for doing closeness based on 
intersubjectivity and more complex communicative activities. This chapter looks at intimacy as a 
practice which constructs relationality and relational identities through the management of 
morally questionable communication. The problem of intimacy for morality involves the way in 
which doing the practice constitutes a dilemma between the comfort to engage in morally 
questionable activities with close others, and the potential damage such engagement may cause if 
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it implicates ideological differences. Intimacy is partly built out of intersubjectivity, but is also a 
different way of interacting that provides a different context for morality. It is not exactly a 
requirement for morality, but is a requirement for the analysis of morality as an interpersonal 
achievement in close relationships.   
Morality and intimacy are inextricably bound in complex and sometimes contradictory 
ways. On one hand, people seem less likely to discuss moral concepts in a personal way with less 
close others. Being close seems to imply a comfort level that makes certain activities and topics 
easier to bring up. On the other hand, the implications of these activities and topics are far more 
consequential for close friends and family than for acquaintances. Closeness in relationships 
seems to create interactionally-achieved ideological dilemmas between the ease of participating 
in morally-implicative interactions, and the consequentiality those interactions can have for the 
committed relationship. This chapter considers social rituals and management of moral topics in 
which participants engage and how the handling of communicated moralities constitutes the 
management of a kind of openness and closedness dilemma. It may be easier for close friends 
and family to engage in moral practices, but the way in which they are engaged matters more. 
This creates a tension in which the management of morality in interaction becomes especially 
salient, and potentially threatening.  
The next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures 
introduced in chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to 
intimacy. The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and 
managing intimacy. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for 
participants’ situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.   
Closeness: Relationality and Intimacy 
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 In the last chapter, closeness was implicated by the underlying requirement of a shared 
interactional and interpersonal world. Intersubjectivity is the most important basis for social 
interaction to have any kind of sense (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). This chapter builds on that by 
looking at close relationships in which intersubjectivity is assumed, and intimacy becomes the 
problem (though in practice these actions are mutually constitutive). Intimacy involves 
relational-level sets of practices which are identifiable by participants and implicate certain 
forms of communication not possible in distant relationships. In this section I discuss 
relationality as implicating identities and commitment in relationships, and the following section 
focuses on intimacy as a practice. 
Relationality: Identity and Relationships 
The last chapter discussed commitment as an interactional and interpersonal construct 
achieved in its most fundamental form through intersubjectivity practices. Commitment is 
strongly linked to intimacy, or displays of closeness. Together, these concepts comprise what is 
often deemed to be a significant relationship. Research on intimacy has also focused primarily on 
romantic relationships, though not exclusively. The enduring Uncertainty Reduction Theory 
(Berger & Calabrese, 1975), for example, is one way of explaining how people in many stages of 
different kinds of relationships increase intimacy through the decrease of uncertainty. Relational 
dialectics (Baxter, 1988; Baxter & Montgomery, 1996; Baxter, 2004b; Montgomery & Baxter, 
1998) is another approach that describes some discourses of intimacy (that partners should spend 
a lot of time together, disclose personal information, and develop routines) and how those turn 
out to be only one-sided components of relational tensions with other, competing discourses.  
Relational dialectics, developed by Baxter and Montgomery (1996) and later Baxter and 
others (e.g., Baxter, 2004a, 2004b; Baxter & Braithwaite, 2002; Baxter & West, 2003; 
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Braithwaite & Baxter, 1995), is an interpersonal theory for describing common tensions 
experienced by those in close relationships. Though it has focused on romantic relationships, the 
theory is not inapplicable to other close relationships, such as friends and families. Based on the 
dialogue work of Bakhtin (1981, 1986), relational dialectics posits that people in close 
relationships experience competing needs which are dilemmatic (attention to one need withdraws 
attention to the other). The interplay of these tensions can take place between a couple, within 
each person, or by both in different situations. The tensions can never be resolved—only 
managed.  
Relationships involve people’s identities with and for each other. “Identity” has long 
been a focus of study in sociology and psychology, as well as communication approaches 
influenced by these disciplines. In interpersonal research, which has been heavily influenced by 
psychology especially in its inception, “identity” is associated with particular traits such as 
demographic information, cultural background, ethnicity, age and gender; cognitive dispositions 
such as complexity, control, authoritarianism, emotion and intelligence; social-personal qualities 
such as self esteem, humor, self-monitoring; communicative tendencies such as 
argumentativeness and competence; and relational characteristics such as attachment styles 
(Daly, 2002). 
Much of sociology that was more quantitative took a similar approach, but other areas of 
sociology—such as symbolic interactionism and narrative theory—as well as communication 
studies influenced by qualitative sociology and social theory, went a different route. Identities 
were seen as fluid and accomplished in interaction. Goffman’s approach is particularly relevant 
to a sociological perspective on identity, and as a scholar who has influenced numerous 
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communication studies (including work in interpersonal communication and Language and 
Social Interaction) Goffman’s conceptualizations of “identity” are particularly relevant. 
Goffman does not often use the term “identity” in his work, but much of what he has 
written deals with identity. For Goffman, identity is always social. In considering the 
presentation of self, for example, Goffman (1959) situates the idea of “selves” in interaction. By 
seeking to find out about others, he proposes, people develop a “definition of the situation” 
which guides their actions, tells them what to expect from that person, and constitutes the “what 
is going on here” into which interactants then fit themselves. Goffman takes an empirical 
approach by asserting that “what people are really like” can only be ascertained by what people 
say and do—their actions and expressions. People also act toward each other as if this were the 
case, and thus work to display a particular sense of self—one appropriate to the most desirable 
definition of the situation at the moment, for instance. For Goffman, the mechanism of this other-
oriented display of self is facework (Goffman, 1967). Facework is the management of one’s own, 
and another’s, face—a positive image of one’s identity.  
Throughout his work, Goffman tackles a number of different kinds of “identities”—staff 
and patients in a mental institution (1961), “normals” and “stigmatized” individuals (1963), and 
callers and call takers in radio (1981). Throughout, he treats identities almost as placeholders: 
that in a given situation, people will take on the identities, the roles, needed to accomplish a 
particular definition of the situation. This is particularly the case for organized settings, such as 
for teams in organizations, but it extends loosely to other areas of everyday life. “Facework” has 
been an influential way of conceptualizing identities as a kind of self-in-relation-to-others.  
Discourse approaches in communication scholarship have taken an ongoing interest in 
identity, some drawing on Goffman, some not (De Fina, Schiffrin & Bamberg, 2006).  
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Conversation analysis (CA), on the other hand, is an approach that has long been wary of 
considering identity. Because CA scholars seek to ground any analyst observations in the talk 
structure itself, “naming” identities and relationships as a researcher is considered somewhat 
suspect, akin to imposing an interpretation that may not be there. Other people doing CA and 
CA-influenced, ethnomethodological work have worked to show that interlocutors do attend to 
such categories. “Identity” is thus treated as a construct used in talk to achieve interactional goals 
(Antaki & Widdicombe, 2008).  
The CA perspective is a specific kind of discourse analysis approach. Other approaches 
do not take the same route to getting at the meanings of interaction. For instance, discursive 
psychology (Potter, 1996) has developed into two strands—one more CA-like, the other more 
rhetorically oriented—both of which seek to ground “psychological” attributions in discourse. 
Such attributions may refer to morally-inflected concepts such as motive and intention, 
personality traits, character, and mental states (“being morally conflicted,” for instance) as well 
as to relationships such as “my brother,” “your friend,” “a conscientious colleague,” “a good 
father.” 
“Identity” is looked at differently by, and taken up as a recurrent theme of, the work of 
action implicative discourse analysis (AIDA) (Tracy, 1995, 2004). AIDA has studied such 
identity through such phenomena as facework at schoolboard meetings (e.g., Tracy, 2008c; 
Tracy & Durfy, 2007; Tracy & Muller, 2001) and questioning in court appeals (Tracy, 2009a). 
Unlike CA approaches, AIDA takes an approach associated with the concept of “identity-work” 
and assumes that identities are an important part of everyday talk: talk shapes the identities 
people are presumed to have, and identities people are presumed to have shape how their talk is 
interpreted (Tracy, 2002). As an approach that is ethnographically informed, AIDA makes close 
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study of the institutional sites for which it was designed, requiring various methods of gathering 
the history, background, identities, situations and “scenes” contextually relevant to the focal 
discursive practices that occur at the site. Though not as strongly ethnographic as an ethnography 
of communication approach (which itself includes a range of ethnographic depth: Carbaugh, 
2007), AIDA nonetheless seeks to situate the practices it studies in a context—a quite different 
approach than that of CA.  
In Bucholtz and Hall (2004), identity from a linguistic anthropological perspective is 
comprised of practices and negotiations of sameness and difference, indexed through language 
and ideologically infused. In Bucholtz and Hall’s (2005) sociolinguistic framework for 
understanding identity, they distinguish five principles of identity: (1) it is the product rather than 
source of linguistic and semiotic practices (so is social-cultural, not internal-psychological); (2) it 
encompasses demographic categories, interactionally specific stances and participant roles, and 
ethnographic cultural positions; (3) identities can be indexed through labels, implicatures, 
stances, styles, linguistic structures and/or systems; (4) identities are relationally constructed 
through the relationship between self and other; and (5) identity can be intentional, habitual, and 
unconscious: negotiated with others, perceived and represented by others, and ideological. 
There are many different ways of defining and understanding identity. As indicated by 
the different categories studied in interpersonal research, identities can be divided up a number 
of ways and can include many different aspects of individual’s personal, social and cultural lives. 
This analysis focuses on identities that are salient in people’s orientations to particular others, but 
other ways of conceiving identities, it turns out, are not easily separable from relationally-
oriented identities. This means, then, that there is something special about closely-related 
identities which gives interactions greater moral weight. If the comfort to speak freely is 
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particularly in tension with the damage that speaking freely can cause to the closeness of people 
in close relationships, then it is worth considering exactly what identity is, and why certain 
relationships of identity experience such tensions in moral interactions. The next section focuses 
more on intimacy, or the creation of closeness among and between identities, as the site of 
analysis in this chapter and as a problem for morality. 
Intimacy 
In her discussion of an emotionally-charged internet listserv discussion, Fitch (1999) 
discussed how interactional participants construct relational codes, culturally appropriate systems 
of meaning which draw on cultural premises about relationships and their norms for interaction, 
as a way of doing intimacy. Intimacy is not taken to be an internal process or feeling, but a 
visible marker of a “close relationship” which is communicated through culturally intelligible 
practices.  
Baxter (& Montgomery, 1996) describes the most common tensions in intimate 
relationships as dilemmas between autonomy and connectedness, openness and closedness, and 
spontaneity and predictability. The dilemma between feeling very intimate with another, and yet 
maintaining one’s individuality, for instance, is compatible with the autonomy-connectedness 
dilemma. This chapter focuses on a number of intimacy dilemmas created by participation in 
moral practices. These dilemmas are similar to the openness-closedness dilemma, in which 
people want to share or engage in certain ways with their close other, and yet too much sharing 
can reveal information which is potentially threatening to the relationship. In each of the 
dilemmas presented in this analysis, interactants must balance the ease with which morality can 
be enacted with the heavier consequences of problematic misenactments. Thus, as Fitch’s (1999) 
comments suggested, the dilemmas of intimacy are not treated as emotional or psychological 
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dilemmas (as in an intrapersonal struggle for what one “wants”) but are made visible in 
discursive choices.  
This chapter assumes that the dilemmas just described—which might be labeled 
emotional, interpersonal, or relational dilemmas—are also ideological dilemmas (Billig, Condor, 
Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988) which index cultural assumptions regarding how 
people should be with one another. However, since this work is situated in discursive approach, 
these dilemmas are always, in a sense, also, and constituted by, interactional dilemmas (Tracy & 
Ashcraft, 2001)—dilemmas regarding what actions to take in talk.  
This chapter deals with the relational level of problems discussed so far, for example, 
how to show closeness with a friend by divulging gossip without being seen by one’s friends “as 
a gossip.” This chapter will also deal with the ideological level of problems, the ways in which 
these moral practices reflect and recreate cultural ideas about how to be a good person, a good 
friend, a good daughter. This chapter also submits, however, that managing these problems is a 
moral practice itself, achieved through the interactional dilemmas inherent in moral practices. To 
engage in moral practice is to confront the commitment, consequentiality, ideology and 
conflictual differences between and within participants, relationships, and cultural contexts.  
This chapter proposes that relating is a moral interactive process in which upgrading 
judgments of persons and actions is co-constitutive with doing closeness between people who 
could be identified as “related” or in a friendly relationship—in other words, people who are 
intimate. In addition to intersubjectivity practices discussed in chapter four, which accomplish 
the fundamental structure of relating through recognition, intelligibility, attention and 
identification, particular communication events or rituals, as well as topics, can be used to 
manage relational closeness. In participating in morally-relevant rituals and handling moral 
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topics, participants indicate their relationship in different ways. Through the course of 
conversation, people will negotiate their values particularly in relation to one another.  
This poses a problem for interactants that is unique in comparison to the way in which 
strangers interact. Among strangers, moral accountability and judgment is handled quite 
carefully, but even when it is not, the consequences are not great. You may feel the sting of a 
snub at the symphony ticket counter long enough to complain about it to someone else, but it 
would never hurt as much as hurtful words from a loved one. Even among strangers who do 
confront clashing ideologies and openly disagree with one another, the effect is different. As 
Tracy (1997) notes, it is not the case that arguments over ideas are not tied at all to persons. But 
there is a sense in which such arguments are not as personal. Strangers arguing in a debate, or 
even colleagues arguing in an academic forum, encounter dilemmas when handling moral issues 
such as beliefs, opinions, and judgments. But only in extreme cases do such dilemmas have the 
potential to threaten the relationship itself.  
Morality is linked to the ways in which people perform intimate relational identities with 
one another. Thus to deal with an ideological dilemma is to deal with a relational dilemma. And 
to deal with an ideological or relational dilemma is to deal with an interactional dilemma. This 
chapter analyzes the practices with which people construct intimacy through the negotiation of 
appropriateness for engaging in moral practices. 
Such practices are multiple, and have been described elsewhere (see chapter two). I will 
discuss such practices and cues of intimacy in the next section also, which asks the question, 
what does intimacy look like empirically? If commitment is defined as the communication of 
intimacy over time (or at least, the communication of intimacy in a future-oriented way), is there 
any sense in which it can be pinned down in interaction? The common criticism from a discourse 
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analytic perspective is that interpersonal research does not ground relationships in empirical, 
discursive data. Though different interpersonal scholars have urged a more discursive approach 
to interpersonal communication (e.g. Beavin Bavelas, Kenwood & Phillips, 2002; Jacobs, 2002), 
there has not been a strong attempt to pin down “relating” in actual discourse. On the other hand, 
there has also not been much work in discourse analysis, particularly among conversation 
analysts, to consider the role of identities and relationships in interaction, particularly regarding 
how they are accomplished through contextual and non-talk practices.  
 According to Bergmann (1998), a more social approach to morality looks at how moral 
concepts (ideological, cultural notions such as “fairness” or “goodness”) are shaped and 
managed in interaction. In the ensuing analysis, such concepts and their construction are ways of 
indicating intimacy between people in close relationships who have particular identities for and 
with one another. The next section begins with a discussion of method, presents an example to 
highlight the practices of intimacy, then shows how morally questionable practices can be ways 
of managing relational closeness.  
Intimacy as a Moral Discursive Practice 
 This view of morality in talk is compatible with the previous discussion of identity and 
relating, in that communicative events can be analyzed as meaningful to speakers in addition to 
being structurally meaningful. In other words, speaker assignations and analysts’ reconstructions 
of what speakers are doing and who speakers are being are reasonable moves to make given that, 
from a GPT and AIDA perspective, the goal is to formulate improvable practices. The next 
section begins with an overview of empirically grounding relationship differences around moral 
concepts, then points out moments of morally-sensitive interaction between close friends and 
family members. While the management of these events is a way of constituting a close 
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relationship, the problem of dealing with the dilemma that close relationships create for moral 
interaction gets handled in different ways. The choices participants make in confronting 
dilemmas in moral interaction provide insight into how relational contexts inform discursive 
practices.  
The work of which this chapter is a part has proposed that morality is more consequential 
for committed relationships. If morality is interactionally achieved through particular discursive 
practices, then that means that such practices matter in a fundamental way. The apparent ease of 
engaging in moral practices with another is itself a morally judgable activity built on the 
expectation of shared understandings between friends and family. Assumedly, one can criticize 
more openly; gossip more freely. And yet to engage in these practices reveals potential 
differences of understanding between friends, different enactments of ideologies about what a 
person should be like and what that means for their communicative comportment. This makes 
such engagements tricky. Granted, it is probably easy to imagine that a small or even not-so-
small moment of nastiness between loved ones can be easily moved past—but how people treat 
the potential for conflict is a matter for a later chapter. Here, I discuss how the consequentiality 
of moral practice in a close, committed relationship implicates an interpersonal dilemma. 
 The relational context in the analyses in these sections constitutes close friendships, 
families, and romantic partners. These relationships achieve their closeness based on the 
practices discussed in chapter four—practices of intersubjectivity and other-orientedness which 
they perform for one another, and others around them. But this closeness and sense of 
commitment is also achieved through doing social actions together, including moral practices. In 
the next section I discuss what the difference between non-close and close friends “looks” like in 
the process of engaging moral practice for the purposes of making clear, empirically, the 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  214 
 
relational basis which I will describe in more detail in the ensuing analysis. After that, the 
following section reviews particular moral practices and how they play out among friends and 
family members, particularly regarding how the danger of doing morality is balanced against the 
ideological risk.  
Intimacy-Relevant Cues and Morality 
This section begins with an illustrative example that builds on the examples of 
commitment as intersubjective morality practice discussed in chapter four. Rather than obtaining 
information about intimacy through relational partners’ self-reports or analysts’ knowledge of 
the participants’ relationship status, a discourse analytic approach seeks to ground what it means 
to be “close” in empirical data. If two people consider themselves to be in a close relationship, 
then their talk must orient as such. What are the “signs” of closeness? In this section I present a 
comparison of two sets of friends, one pair merely friendly acquaintances, the other pair close 
friends for several years, to present some of the features that make certain friendships 
empirically closer than others. Though these data involve morally-freighted topics in some sense, 
the focus in this initial analysis is to ground intimacy rather than to consider explicitly its link to 
morality, which is taken up in subsequent analyses in this chapter.  
 This section analyzes two “assigned” videos created by undergraduate students at a 
Midwest university to make the point that even in this rather “unnatural” recording context, 
participants display cues that indicate how close they are to one another. The assignment was to 
introduce themselves (as one might do in any ordinary conversation), watch a short YouTube 
video about technological advances, and discuss attitudes toward technology and its impact on 
society as positive or negative. Students were to record 30-40 minutes by audio or audio/video. 
Communicative actions, topical choices, displays of common knowledge and adherence to “the 
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assignment” are all ways in which these two “teams” do different kinds of relating to one 
another. The first series of fragments demonstrates different changes in conversation across the 
recording. 
Excerpt 12 Fragment 1 “Team A” [frn.assigs09.1.E2.1]
 1 
Laura:  that we rely too much on it= 2 
Maggie: =definitely rely too much on technology (.) and how= 3 
Laura:  =yeah like (0.5) we expect it to work no matter what all the time and when 4 
  it doesn’t5 
 
Excerpt 11 Fragment 2  
 
Laura: we have so many cameras out in our public that like I think it’s an av-6 
you’re caught on average (.) on camera eight times a day 7 
 8 
Maggie: that is (.) ridiculous= 9 
Laura:  =yeah but in a way I mean it’s also [a good-] 10 
Maggie:              [it’s a] good 11 
Laura:  [thing] 12 
Maggie: [cuz you] can like catch= 13 
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 14 
Laura:  =Amber alert and catching like you know if [kids are kidnapped 15 
Maggie:       [criminals] exactly16 
 
Excerpt 11 Fragment 3  
 
 17 
Maggie: if we can figure out things that’s awesome but at the same time it’s like (.) 18 
  n:o this- this shouldn’t be allowed because it’s like=  19 
Laura:  =◦yeah◦=  20 
 21 
Maggie: =invading all that (.) I don’t know 22 
Laura:  right 23 
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 24 
Maggie: it definitely- there’s so many problems when it comes to it 25 
 
 The conversation between the women in Team A—Maggie and Laura—is typical of a 
number of audio and video recordings received by the author upon completion of the assignment, 
and is also typical of the audio and video recordings donated to the author upon the completion 
of the course. It demonstrates a familiar pattern, beginning with introductions and a marked self-
consciousness toward being recording; continuing with a more casual attitude as the conversation 
becomes more relaxed and the camera becomes less of a conversation piece; and encountering 
moments of awkwardness when participants run out of things to say for a moment, check the 
time, and realize they need to keep talking, at which point there is a return to the earlier self-
consciousness.  
 Maggie and Laura largely stick to the topic and employ a loose “interview-style” format, 
going back and forth and asking each other questions about various technology-related issues 
and how they are or are not problematic. In their responses, Maggie and Laura are careful about 
how they answer questions that seem to seek sensitive information or which are about potentially 
sensitive topics. In fact, most of the time they frame their opinions in terms of cultural 
orientations, for example, “people wouldn’t know what to do without technology” and “there are 
pros and cons to both side” or “a lot of people say x”—references to general opinions in the 
society rather than ones that are closely tied to their personal opinions. Even when discussing 
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their own dependence on technology, the way into this conversation was achieved with a more 
general discussion about the society’s dependence on technology.  
 Across the discussion, Maggie and Laura work to align themselves with one another, and 
avoid disagreements. They constantly agree on subjects brought up, and on subjects which they 
seem to have slightly different orientations, they manage to avoid addressing the disagreement 
directly or discussing it in depth. Toward the beginning of the assignment, they are angled 
toward each other but facing the camera, and glance at the camera frequently. Fragment 1 shows 
them displaying strong agreement with each other (lines 3 and 4, “yeah” and “definitely”) with 
no pauses between turns. Fragment 2 shows a typical instance in which agreement was even 
more marked, and here they display stronger orientation to one another (lines 8, 14) and overlap 
in a cooperative fashion that reinforces their agreement (lines 10-16). 
 After a rather ironic five-minute break during which Laura takes a call on her cell phone, 
the conversation continues roughly where it ended, and continues also to be largely agreeing. In 
fact there is only one moment where a slight difference in alignment seems to be expressed. Just 
before fragment 3, Laura had brought up the role of technology in people’s lives as being linked 
to surveillance, but having good reasons. She describes for instance the idea of listening in on 
people’s cell phone conversations for terrorist activities as being an invasion of privacy on one 
hand, but also notes that she doesn’t say anything over the phone that she would mind others 
hearing. This positions her as trying to be fair to the situation.  
Maggie begins by agreeing (line 18), but makes it clear that the invasion of privacy 
continues to trouble her (lines 18-19, 22, 25). Laura responds to these comments with “yeah” and 
“right” (lines 20, 23), but notably, her responses do not display the same enthusiastic agreement 
as others. Here, “yeah” and “right” seem to function more as continuers, or markers of having 
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understood what Maggie is saying, rather than outright agreement. They are produced in a lower 
tone of voice and Laura looks down at the table as she produces them (lines 21, 24). 
This recording shows an example of two people who do not appear to be close. They do 
not know each other’s opinions beforehand, and are careful about displaying their opinions, 
choosing instead to talk about topics in reference to larger social issues. They do not seem to 
share information about each other’s personal lives (Laura’s explanation of who was calling her 
during the cell break assumes no prior knowledge) and make no references to shared pasts or 
upcoming events. Problematic and morally-inflected topics are handled impersonally and are co-
constructed to maximize agreement, while similar topics that seem to contain disagreement are 
managed so as to avoid any outright conflict. Though friendly acquaintances such as these two 
women can be animated and talk about a number of consequential moral topics, they do so in a 
particular way that does not accomplish close relating, but instead manages interpersonal 
distance. 
Excerpt 13 “Team B” [frn.assigs09.2.E4.1]
Julie: senior year I went to prom with Hank 26 
Anna: ((snorts)) didn’t you guys like ditch each other afterwards 27 
Julie: yeah then we ended up running into each other at like King Soopers 28 
Anna: oh:: 29 
 30 
Julie: and he was so pissed cuz I told him I couldn’t like go out afterwards an ((sharp31 
 inhalation)) 32 
Anna: [whoopsie 33 
Julie: [who:: yeah] I don’t think he was [very happy 34 
Anna:          [sma:ll world] 35 
Julie: he didn’t talk to me for like a year after that [((laughs)) 36 
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Anna:       [wo] 37 
Julie: I finally started talking to him after like high school ended ((laughs)) 38 
 39 
Anna: that’s so funny (.) well it didn’t really sound like you guys wanted to go with each40 
 other anyway you guys were just going 41 
Julie: we di- yeah we went because he asked me before we broke up a:nd  42 
Anna: oh:: 43 
 44 
Julie: I did- I didn’t- I wanted to go with Matt (.) cuz I was dating Matt at the time= 45 
Anna: =yeah  46 
Julie: and= 47 
Anna: =but Matt was in Wyoming 48 
Julie: no he wasn’t (.) I hung out with him after= 49 
Anna: =that’s right= 50 
Julie: =after prom ((laughs)) and that’s why I told Hank I think that I couldn’t go out 51 
((laughter)) 52 
 53 
Anna: that’s e(h)vil= 54 
Julie: =I know (0.5) and then the year after I went with Matt to prom and I wanted to go55 
 with Taylor cuz I was dating Taylor 56 
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 57 
Julie: I never went with the person I was dating58 
59 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  222 
 
 
 
 The Team B pair—Julie and Anna—have an interaction which is markedly different from 
that of Team A, but still follows a noticeable pattern across the data. Rather than beginning with 
introductions, they jump right into talking after saying their names (making their introductions to 
the camera rather than to each other). They mention the assignment topic, but quickly move on to 
other things. They don’t run out of things to talk about, and they don’t seem to censor their 
conversation. There is less self-consciousness, and their conversations move very quickly with 
very few pauses. 
 Julie and Anna cover many topics, all of which relate to their personal lives. The format 
of their conversation is casual, as might occur between friends who were talking as they usually 
would, without a camera recording them. The only difference is that like Team A, they are 
angled toward the camera, and glance at it intermittently. They discuss several problematic 
instances in their lives, and react expressively to them. Throughout, they make references to 
personal details in each other’s lives, seeming to share knowledge about past events in high 
school, information about each other’s family members, references to mutual known persons, 
and an understanding of each other’s daily activities. They frequently co-construct prior 
experiences together and make agreeing assessments toward those experiences. They also make 
eye contact much more often, gesture toward each other, and even turn their heads entirely. 
Despite the fact that they are seated, if anything, more directly facing the camera than Team A, 
their orientation seems to be much more toward each other.  
 In this excerpt, Anna and Julie discuss Julie’s prom-related mishaps in which, twice in a 
row, she ended up going to a prom with an ex-boyfriend after she’d already started seeing 
someone new, and the problems that this caused. Both Julie and Anna orient to Julie’s behavior 
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as questionable—not so much because she went to the prom with people she didn’t want to go 
with, but because at least in the first place, she lied to the person she had gone with so that she 
could spend time with her current boyfriend after the prom. At first, this specific reason for the 
lie is not known. When Anna recalls that they ditched each other (line 27), it still seems as if 
both could be held accountable for their actions. Anna’s response of “ohh” (line 29) and her 
exaggerated, open-mouthed expression (line 30) is in response to the fact that they were both 
“caught out” being around town when both had left each other after the prom. That this is the 
interpretation by Anna is strengthened when Anna makes the comment that it is a “small world” 
(line 35), indicating that it was an unfortunate accident.  
 Julie goes on to explain in various ways that Hank was not happy about this incident 
(lines 31, 34, 36), however, which provides a clue that the “ditching” was perhaps more one-
sided than Anna had assumed. Anna at first still orients to the situation as an error rather than 
caused by Julie (line 33) and she continues this assessment by making a sound of surprise that 
Hank apparently held the incident against Julie for so long (line 37). Anna attempts to formulate 
explicitly what she’s been assuming in lines 40-41—that both Julie and Hank had ditched each 
other, and thus Hank’s continued anger is “funny” (line 40) and perhaps unfair. 
 It is only at Julie’s explanation in line 42 that Anna realizes what the situation was, and 
that Hank actually did not ditch Julie, but Julie lied to Hank to ditch him, making the problem 
more one-sided than it had seemed. Anna shows her acknowledgement of this news by again 
remarking “ohhh” and making another dramatic facial expression (lines 43-44). Julie continues 
giving an account of the situation, which is that she really wanted to go with her current 
boyfriend, but was stuck with the old one because he’d asked her to prom before they broke up 
(line 45). Anna continues to provide possible ways of downgrading Julie’s fault, however, 
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suggesting that the current boyfriend was not around during prom anyway (line 48), but Julie 
admits then that Matt was in town, and in fact, that was why she’d lied to Hank about going out 
after prom (lines 49, 51). Both laugh at the incident (lines 52-53), but Anna’s comment “that’s 
evil” (line 54) and Julie’s immediate agreement (“I know” line 55) shows they both recognize it 
was not a nice thing to do.  
 One way of doing closeness is to assume the best interpretations of the other’s actions. In 
this excerpt, Anna continually interprets Julie’s narrative in a way that is forgiving and face-
attentive to Julie. Anna’s reactions are situated within a humorous frame through her laughter, 
and her exaggerated facial responses show a lack of seriousness in her assessments of Julie’s 
behavior. Thus, even when she does finally acknowledge Julie’s fault for the problematic 
situation and labels it as a bad act (“that’s evil”), her assessment is not heard as being critical of 
Julie because she has already worked to define the situation as a humorous one rather than one 
worthy of serious judgment. Julie appears to experience little discomfort at revealing her bad 
actions to Anna, and this strengthens the sense of reciprocity between them: Julie trusts Anna not 
to judge her too harshly, and in return, Anna withholds judgment and only provides it in an 
acceptable frame.  
 There was once a disagreement in a class of mine over whether close friends were more 
comfortable arguing, or less so. One student insisted friends are more comfortable arguing 
because they know the other person does not “really mean it” if the insults start flying. Another 
student claimed friends are less comfortable arguing because they do not want to start a fight that 
could ruin the friendship. Clearly, what the fight is about and the kind of friendship being 
constructed will impact which orientation to argument is truer. But it does seem to be the case 
that closer friends will bring up and deal with possibly “taboo” topics in different ways. 
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Interactions between casual friends and friendly acquaintances in the assignment described 
above followed a different pattern than interactions between closer friends. Comparing these 
different ways of interacting in the context of a relatively stable assignment format reveals some 
of the ways that friends signal closeness to one another. This comparison also points out how the 
ways in which moral topics can be sensitive among closer friends, and some strategies that 
friends have for dealing with that.  
 Closer relationships are more morally consequential because ideology is more relevant. 
Fundamental beliefs can matter in brief moments between strangers, but they matter a lot more 
when people have a commitment to and assumed future with one another. One way of achieving 
closeness is in engaging in activities, including moral practices, together. These sharings 
constitute social and cultural rituals for affirming the relational identities of people in close 
relationship. However, such sharings must be balanced because dealing with ideology is risky. 
Perhaps even more difficult is the difference between how ideology is enacted, and the local 
assumptions about ideologies themselves. This analysis takes ideology to be a discursive 
enactment, something which is interactionally achieved, oriented to by participants, and namable 
by analysts. Participants, however, may (and often do) see ideologies as fixed and permanent; as 
part of a person’s unchangeable character; and, when different, as irreconcilable. These 
assumptions are part of what guides people to manage their moral practices so carefully with 
their loved ones.  
Moral Discursive Practices and their Dilemmas 
 This chapter uses discourse analysis in a grounded practical theory perspective to identify 
a kind of intimacy practice which is highly problematic: the engagement of morally questionable 
interaction. This analysis draws on discourse, relational and cultural context to make sense of the 
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ways in which participants treat morally-charged actions such as gossip and sex as 
unproblematic or troubling, and the underlying dilemmas they confront in enacting such actions. 
One way to study morality is to begin by considering what kinds of communicative activities 
feature “moralizing” elements—situations in which people hold each other accountable, judge 
one another’s actions, and evaluate each other’s characters. In this analysis I discuss four of such 
activities which were discussed in chapter two. This section in particular focuses on two ways of 
looking at what people do in their communication. One focuses on the notion of “ritual,” from 
Goffman (1967)—how people cooperatively conduct particular and recognizable communicative 
forms—while the other focuses on conversational topics: the “what” about which people talk. 
Conceiving of a communication activity in terms of ritual draws attention to the patterned 
communicative forms people engage in, and for which are prescribed particular practices that 
make up the ritual.  
In this section I review three forms of moral practice which involve interactional 
accomplishments of commitment, ideology and difference or sameness. The first form of moral 
practice has to do with particular social actions which have moral consequences due to their 
being face-threatening in a relationship-implicative, ideological way. Such actions, some of 
which were described in chapter two, include complaining, criticizing, threatening and insulting. 
These were grouped in chapter two under the heading “judgments” because they revolve around 
the joint actions of assessing and accounting. The second form of moral practice has to do with 
degradation rituals, also discussed in chapter two, such as gossip. These were also grouped under 
“judgments” in chapter two as complex practices for enacting total and damaging character 
assessments.  
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  227 
 
The third form of moral practice involves the use of morally-weighty topics in talk. This 
was labeled “morally-implicative topics” and is considered part of the cluster of moral practice 
related to language and metadiscourse. These are not quite the same as “taboo topics” (Baxter & 
Wilmot, 1985) which are considered off-limit conversations in romantic relationships (such as 
talking about the relationship ending).  
The examples discussed previously involved a set of friendly classmates, and a set of 
close friends. The subsequent examples also feature families and romantic couples. Though 
intimacy sometimes looks the same among them, some of the rules turn out to be different for 
moral practices in different relationships. In each section I begin by describing the category of 
practice and giving examples. I then discuss one particular practice and how it plays out in 
interaction. I follow with a comparative analysis in a different setting. 
Accounts and account demands. Account and account demands include any actions that 
involve addressing a problematic issue, identity, or action. “Reproaching” or criticizing is one 
way in which people question each other’s actions. Reproaching is a kind of activity that takes 
place around the question of what people do and how those doings are appropriate or not. This 
kind of assessment of a person’s actions can occur with regard to many kinds of activities. In the 
following excerpt, it occurs in relation to how much two friends are expected to know about each 
other. The friends in this example have been closer to each other than to any other non-family or 
non-romantic others in their lives for about five years at the time of the recording. In this 
situation, JR is driving while Amelia holds the video camera. They are driving aimlessly down 
the California coast and talk on a number of random topics throughout the more than hour long 
recording.  
Excerpt 14 “Around the Bay” [frn.vis05.3.E4.1]
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Amelia: I saw this movie once about um (.) inbred cannibals (.) chasing (.)  59 
  ((laughs)) Eliza Dushku (.) through like the forest 60 
JR:  oh my g(h)od 61 
(0.5) 62 
Amelia: yeah (.) they were pretty scary looking they ate her friends? 63 
JR:  oh= 64 
Amelia: =yeah= 65 
JR:  =that sounds like a good movie d’you know what it was called 66 
Amelia:  I think it was called wrong turn 67 
JR:   68 
Amelia: you might enjoy it 69 
JR:  I probably would 70 
Amelia: ((laughs)) I don’t know I don’t know if you’re really into like really really 71 
  bad horror movies 72 
(0.5) 73 
JR:  um (.) sorry d- do you know me? 74 
Amelia: ((laughs)) well I know you like some good horror movies 75 
JR:  yeah but I like bad ones [too] 76 
Amelia:       [oh] okay 77 
JR:   I’ve seen some awful ones 78 
 
One way in which good friends are held accountable for proving their closeness is by 
remembering particulars about the other’s life. If demonstrating a knowledge of someone’s past, 
family, preferences and personalities can be a way of getting closer to someone, then a 
relationship already assumed to be close would assume such demonstrations would occur. When 
there is an error, it will likely be called out. Among strangers or acquaintances it is not unusual to 
experience this forgetfulness, and the “calling out” occurs unproblematically, if at all. But the 
closer people are, the more delicate the situation becomes.  
The choice made by the reproacher in this exchange is that the reproach is not given 
directly. Amelia has mentioned a horror film she saw recently, and her presentation of it conveys 
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a semi-ridiculing stance. She laughs while describing it (line 60) and the facts she mentions 
about the film are the most “extreme” ones (“inbred cannibals” “ate her friends” lines 59, 63), 
skipping straight to what is notable about the film and skipping over any of the plot or characters. 
She also mentions the name of the actress, which may indicate the common notion that actors’ 
names alone can sometimes imply the quality of a film. JR displays that she is following 
Amelia’s utterances (line 68). Her first verbal response seems to be in agreement with the 
assessment of the funny-bad quality of the film (“oh my god,” produced with laughter, line 61), 
but in line 66 she says “that sounds like a good movie,” which seems to contradict the prior 
assessment. Amelia’s comment of “you might enjoy it” (line 69) is produced with rising 
intonation gradually over “you might” and falling intonation over “enjoy it,” giving the sense 
that it is neither an incredulous nor affirming statement, but fairly neutral.   
Once JR reaffirms that it sounds good to her—that indeed she “probably would” enjoy it 
(line 70)—Amelia laughs and once again tries to point out what had previously seemed clear 
between the two, which is that this is actually a “really really bad horror movie” (lines 71-72). At 
this, there is a brief pause and JR replies “um, sorry, do you know me?” This is not an 
information-seeking question, but one that is meant to be rhetorical and prefer agreement; that it 
does so, and that it is obvious Amelia does know JR, makes it clear that the content of the 
question (Amelia knowing JR) is being contrasted with the inconsistent prior behavior by 
Amelia. What this utterance is really saying is “you should know me, so you should know what 
my preferences are.” 
Amelia and JR have to manage the problem that arises when one of them makes an 
accountable mistake about the other. Amelia’s response to the complaint emphasizes her seeing 
JR as someone with good taste (“I know you look some good horror movies,” line 75), thus 
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providing a compliment in exchange for the error. JR, rather than pursuing the issue, after 
explicitly stating her preference for all horror movies (“I like bad ones too” line 76), moves on to 
discuss particular ones she has seen. By not attempting to provide an account, Amelia’s 
orientation displays her as having a generally positive view of JR, even if that view is so positive 
it becomes inaccurate. JR’s response admits the “badness” of the horror movies she likes and 
glides over Amelia’s error with humor and a change of subject.  
If the closeness of a friendship is indexed by references to shared pasts, events, 
preferences, opinions, etc., then one way of spotting what counts as closeness is when one friend 
“fails to perceive” or “makes an error” regarding something the other assumes is common 
knowledge. Since this action indicates a discrepancy, it is held accountable by participants for 
whom that shared background matters: such actions will be “called out.” This calling out 
critiques the other person for not having known what was expected to be common knowledge. In 
choosing how to call out and how to respond to a calling-out, friends must deal with the 
consequences of addressing their expectations of one another.  
The practice of reproaching in this instance is a practice for checking in on someone’s 
commitment. To accuse someone of not knowing their best friend very well, even in a joking 
way, is a sort of test. The accused can only provide an account or, as Amelia did, offer a 
potentially incorrect but flattering reason for the error. To over-address the error (with profuse 
apologies, for instance) would probably come across as alienating. As Planalp (1999) notes, 
many of the emotional reactions which would be appropriate with strangers are insulting to close 
relationships; close relationships involve forgiving quickly for matters deemed small. On the 
other hand, to act as if the error itself were of no consequence at all would perhaps not, in a 
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single instance, matter much; but it is the pattern of such behavior, and the situated evidence of 
such patterns, which point to a more disturbing lack of care for the relationship in general.  
The doing of the reproach also involves a dilemma. Bringing up the error can be 
threatening because it points to a problem and challenges the face of the other person. Ways of 
describing this in talk include “making a big deal out of nothing” or “making mountains out of 
molehills.” However, to let it passed unnoticed would potentially perpetuate the error and make 
it more of a problem in the long run. One can imagine a fictitious scenario in which in the future, 
Amelia makes scathing remarks about people who watch bad horror films, and this could be 
hurtful. It sounds like a small instance, but the form of the action could easily enact morality in a 
critical version of the situation. This is the dilemma involved in deciding when to share 
something (or remind someone of something assumed to be shared): is it important enough to 
share? Will it be relevant to the relationship? What problems could arise if it does not become 
common knowledge? 
If relationships are situated accomplishments, then threats to relationships are also. The 
assumption underlying the interaction described in this example is namable by participants with 
descriptions such as “friends should know each other’s preferences” or “my best friend knows 
everything about me” or “my friends keep track of what matters to me.” These sayings are 
culturally-bound ideologies of friendship in the U.S. context in which these friends were raised.  
In the next excerpt, the criticism that occurs in a family interaction and is not explicitly 
about the relationship between the interactants, but functions to enact the relationship based on 
how the people respond to one another. The interactants are an elderly mother, Lisa, and her 
adult son, Mike. They are cleaning up after Thanksgiving. It is the late 1980s in the U.S. This 
example was also discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Excerpt 15 “The Reynolds” [fam.hols93.1.E7.1] 
Mike:  oh g(h)od this thing better not (.) leak (.) all over the place 79 
(2.0) 80 
 81 
Lisa:  (that’s the wrong one) 82 
Mike:  I tied it 83 
Lisa:  well you U↑NTIE it  84 
Mike:  I didn’t wanna have to do that 85 
(5.0) 86 
 87 
Mike:  I have an extreme sinus condition right now= 88 
Lisa:  =I can hear that89 
90 
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In this interaction, Mike and Lisa are co-oriented in a particular way through the 
criticizing ritual they enact. Lisa’s authority as taking the role of the “criticizer” regarding 
Mike’s actions in relation to a simple domestic task implicates her assumption that she has the 
right to criticize. People who live together do criticize each other for household tasks, even if 
they are friendly roommates or romantic partners. For instance, roommates and couples will 
criticize the other’s failure to do something (dishes, taking out the trash, cleaning up a room, 
etc.). This references expectations for who should do what in the house—a contract generally 
based on equality (the criticizer has “moral authority” because the other person has failed to hold 
up their end of the bargain). When people criticize how the other does a specific action—
methods of cleaning, for instance, or cooking procedures, etc.—it implies a different kind of 
authority, not one based on “you haven’t contributed equally,” but one based on “you haven’t 
done X correctly.” The authority lies in the criticizer’s ability or experience, as a kind of 
“expert.” If the criticizer is not clearly an authority on the matter, the criticized person will 
almost certainly give a rebuttal.  
The problem with dealing with this kind of criticism, then, is whether to acknowledge the 
validity of the critique (which puts one in a subordinate social position, if temporarily) and if 
failing to acknowledge it, whether to give criticism back or to provide an account. It is easy to 
get caught in a cycle of criticism if both parties see themselves as reasonable, and it is even 
easier if there are “stores” of complaints garnered over time and waiting at the ready. 
Acknowledging such complaints and keeping the conversation from being too hurtful is not an 
easy task. 
But that does not happen in this case. When Lisa criticizes Mike’s choice of storing 
leftovers (line 82), she positions herself as an authority on the matter, and Mike does not 
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disagree—he gives, instead, an account for why he did what he did (line 83). Accounts are given 
because the person called to provide them recognizes that something problematic has occurred 
which requires an explanation. If that were not recognized, the criticism, or the need to account 
itself, would be challenged. Because Mike does not do this, and in fact follows Lisa’s 
instructions to rectify his error (line 87), he shows that he accepts her authority. Though their 
criticizing ritual takes a disagreeing form, it actually upholds the nature of their relationship 
rather than questioning it. This is probably why it is immediately diffused and transitions to the 
topic of Mike’s head cold.  
Though Mike is a grown man and can probably store food well enough, he is in Lisa’s 
kitchen and he is, at the end of the day, Lisa’s son. She has more experience than he in most 
matters, including this one. Mike’s choice not to whine about the situation, and his choice to 
comply with the request even as he gives an account, manages the tension of giving the account, 
which could have been an excuse not to comply. By avoiding raising Lisa’s ire, Mike avoids the 
kind of conversation common among parents and children in which a parent questions a child’s 
actions and the child argues about the parent’s right to do so. This interaction would be unlikely 
among most friends. 
The ideology of “respecting one’s elders” cues a number of interactional practices which 
are assumed to do so in U.S. (and other) cultural contexts. In this context, for instance, it would 
be reasonable for Mike to give an account. He is an adult after all, with experience living on his 
own. There is perhaps a gendered expectation at play, since women are expected to be experts in 
the kitchen over men, but there was not enough empirical evidence in this data to make the claim 
for this particular pair of people. Here, it seems to be the case that Mike follows the cliché of 
“mother knows best.” His complaint in respond to her criticism is more an admittance of fault 
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than a challenge to her. The flare-up of emotional negativity, indicated by Lisa’s sharp tone and 
Mike’s complaining response, is quickly passed by in order to re-engage in the mundane 
interactional sequence already in progress. The potential for there to be a problem is quickly 
addressed and then side-stepped. Lisa’s dilemma of criticizing at the expense of hurting or 
causing an argument with her son is a possible one, but is managed here, as is Mike’s dilemma of 
complying respectfully while still maintaining his own sense of autonomy. If he feels hurt by the 
comment, he has chosen not to share it—an action which could cause an argument. The next 
section discusses even more complicated, multiply-moral rituals for practicing morality with 
others.  
Complex identity degradation. There are various institutionalized ways to question 
people’s conduct and identities in society. Gossip is a kind of highly informal, distributed means 
of status degradation which, depending on its impact, can have serious consequences for the 
identity of the gossiped-about person. However, gossiping is an extremely threatening act for the 
people who engage in it as well. Bergmann (1993) claims gossiping is “like a moral balancing 
act” (p. 149). Gossip is socially satisfying and widely practiced despite (or Bergmann would say 
because of) its complex orientation as both an enactment of moral indignation, and as a morally 
suspect activity in itself. The examples in the following section take up different angles on 
gossip, demonstrating how difficult it is to pin down in interaction. The following example is a 
version of “light” gossip, in that it mocks the abilities of various people’s mothers to cook, but 
does so in a way that is not too threatening. The situation is a dinner party, and involves a 
number of friends comprised of sets of romantic partners. All of the romantic partners are either 
married or long-term committed, while the friendships are of varying lengths, from several years 
to a couple of years. This dinner occurs in the U.S. in 2010.  
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Excerpt 1g “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E3.1]
Jane: you should go visit my parents for a while 157 
((laughter)) 158 
Nora: let Maya cook for me?= 159 
Jane: =let my mom cook? There won’t be any [flavor at all  160 
Mary:          [and it’ll all] be burnt 161 
John: she’ll cook that flavor right out 162 
Nora: and it’ll all be [( ) 163 
Jim: [( )] are you? Is that the same house? 164 
 165 
Nora: your mom? My mom has never bothered to cook she does so bad 166 
John: I don’t know why they even bother to put a kitchen in that house 167 
. 168 
. (31 seconds omitted)) 169 
. 170 
John: I remember when I first came over to their house they didn’t know which knob171 
 was for the baking and which for the stove= 172 
Mary: =are you kidding?173 
  
 Gossiping about people who are close to you can be tricky. There is a limit to what is 
considered appropriate to joke, complain, or talk about. Bergmann (1993) notes that the 
“secrecy” around telling mutual friends about another friend’s actions must be managed 
delicately so as to avoid being seen as disloyal. Gossip always retains a flavor of saying things 
one might not say to another’s face, at least in the case of other, less close persons being able to 
hear it. Would Maya be okay with Jane, her daughter, criticizing her cooking? Possibly. But 
would Maya be okay with Jane criticizing her cooking in front of others? More likely not. Thus, 
this constitutes gossip, and the interactants must deal with the “balancing act” of threatening 
their parents’ faces without appearing too tainted of character to one another.  
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In this excerpt, the couples make fun of mothers who cannot cook—though “parents” are 
referenced throughout (line 157, 164, 170), until toward the end of the conversation, the focus is 
particularly on the lack of cooking skills among the mothers, perhaps as this seems to be 
somehow more “unexpected” given the traditional cultural assumption that mothers are good 
cooks. Nora has been explaining that her recent illness leaves her unable to eat food with any 
kind of flavor, and Jane jokes that Nora should visit her parents (line 157). Nora references the 
shared friendship she has with Jane by providing the name of Jane’s mother (line 159), and Jane 
and Mary, who are partners and both know Jane’s mother well, collaboratively produce the 
assessment that Maya’s cooking is flavorless and burnt (lines 160-161). John and Nora, partners 
and longtime friends of Mary and Jane, participate as well, demonstrating that they have been 
subjected to Maya’s cooking.  
 Jim and Nicky have not been friends with the other couples as long, but Jim finds an 
intersection by referencing Nicky’s parents (pointing to Nicky and asking Jane if they share the 
same house) (lines 164-165). Nora joins in by indicating her mother is a terrible cook as well, 
and John indicates his knowledge of this with his comment in line 167. This is followed by an 
extended discussion of a particular stove in the house of Nora’s parents—a stove that is both 25 
years old, but so fresh and clean it appears never to have been used. The conversation returns to 
this indicating what bad cooks Nora’s parents are in lines 171-172 and this points out further that 
both parents are so bad or uninterested in cooking that they do not know how to use their own 
stove.  
 In this interaction, participants display their closeness to one another through knowledge 
of each other’s lives, particularly having to do with family and cooking skills. The format is 
implicative of gossip because it involves familiar but non-present third parties who are criticized. 
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This cannot exactly become centrally an example of gossip, however, because slandering 
someone’s mother is not a nice thing to do—so it stays safely in the realm of humor without 
venturing too far into the moral implications, though moral implications hover around the edges 
in people’s calling out of the mothers, as well as during the omitted portion when Nicky asks 
Nora whether she was fed properly as a child, and Nora admits they ate out a lot. Thus, once 
again, couching a morally suspect activity in a humorous frame lets participants divulge in 
potentially blameworthy ways without that activity becoming a blameworthy one in its own 
right.  
 Thus, it seems that the problem of doing gossip can be mitigated if the gossip occurs in a 
joking frame and the matter of gossip is not too “nasty.” The sharing of potentially sensitive 
information about a third party can proceed with little problem. This seems to manage the 
dilemma of doing gossip in some sense, but what about in situations where the gossip material is 
far more damaging? The next excerpt is more strikingly moral, but is off-center of typical gossip 
because the gossip subject is not very familiar to the gossip participants. This example takes 
place among a group of friends who have been close for over a year. Brought together through 
their love of rock-climbing, they live in Colorado and in this situation are watching television 
and eating dinner together. The camera is on top of the television. Anna is on the left, Carrie on 
the right. Janna starts off on the left off camera, but move into the frame.  
Excerpt 17 “Hanging Out” [frn.rdm10.3.E2.1]
Carrie: So there’s- not my immediate neighbor but the one in another apartment down174 
 from me? (0.5) I don’t know what the fuck they do but 175 
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 176 
the only time you see her she’s either in her robe or wrapped in a blanket? Sitting177 
 outside their door passing out cigarettes= 178 
Anna: =wo::w 179 
Carrie: ((shakes head)) I don’t know (.) I think your theory is that they do a lot of drugs180 
 right= 181 
Janna: =yeah182 
183 
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 What is gossip? The “prototype” case is one in which the subject of gossip is known to 
gossip producers and gossip recipients (because that makes the information about that person all 
the more consequential and interesting); and when the information conveyed is either negative, 
or one which the subject of gossip may not want shared with others. Gossip, then, consists often 
of either secrets, or behavior that can be seen as inappropriate or bad in its social context. There 
are variations outside this typical case which nonetheless make up a large proportion of gossip. 
Celebrity gossip, for instance, involves people not known personally to gossip participants, but 
known by reputation (and note how gossip columns and magazines do work hard to make 
celebrities seem “knowable” and “familiar”—publishing mundane photographs of their everyday 
lives, interviews, facts about their lives, etc.). Gossip can also involve people who are not well 
known to any of the participants, but who are potentially “knowable,” as is the case in the 
excerpt just discussed. This sequence prompts further gossip-production from another 
participant, then works its way back to the people who live near Carrie, and Carrie mentions that 
she thinks she’s seen the woman dressed “twice” in the several months she’s lived there. Another 
participant responds by saying “she was between clients,” a reference to her being a prostitute, 
which leads to further speculations (who the man is who lives with her—a porn 
cinematographer? etc.). The initial sequence above, however, is the first mention, is unsolicited, 
and does not appear to be linked to anything that came before it except that cigarettes were 
mentioned.  
 Though not typical, this excerpt nonetheless is a case of gossip. It involves someone 
familiar at least by sight to two of the participants (Carrie and Janna) and is produced as if it will 
be meaningful in some way—which it apparently it is, as the “news” of the gossip is met with a 
“wow” by Anna (line 179). It involves strange and potentially transgressive behavior (never 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY  241 
 
being dressed, passing out cigarettes) related by evidence of direct observation (she is “seen” to 
do this, lines 177-178). The fact that the gossip yields other, similar stories and engenders 
negative speculation about other “morally suspect” elements of the woman’s character (drug use, 
prostitution) also marks it as gossip. In displaying shock, indignation, incredulity and a mocking 
stance toward the gossip subject, these friends align themselves as certain kinds of people in 
contrast to the woman being described. By unreflectively maligning her and showing no 
hesitation or discomfort when doing so, they create a shared perspective, showing comfort with 
making these assessments—a comfort that comes from knowing the assessments will not be 
questioned or criticized.  
 As Bergmann (1993) notes, producing gossip is a potentially undermining activity for the 
gossip-producer. One does not want to be seen “as a gossip,” and careful work is done to avoid 
that label: testing interlocutors for the possible reception of the news (i.e. with questions, “did 
you hear about Jane?”); and providing enough detail to be seen not to be making it up, but not so 
much detail as to have come by the information “actively.” Here, Carrie does little of that work, 
showing that gossip seems to be a regular feature of her and her friends’ lives. Gossip and 
gossip-like activities are certainly regular features of the nearly two-hours of video recording of 
their interactions during a night of hanging out, watching television, and eating dinner. Gossip 
functions in one way as a method of establishing a group’s cohesiveness and values by 
contrasting them with those of other persons or groups.  
The danger of gossip is that it can threaten the group as well. To gossip about others 
implies the potential for gossip to occur within the group. And perhaps more immediately, to 
gossip is to show one’s ideas about what makes others “bad.” If anyone in the group were to feel 
sympathetic to the gossip subject, or to identify with their maligned actions, it would create a 
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problem. Here, no one defends the gossip subject. People jump in and contrast themselves with 
her instead. This indicates that if anyone is sympathetic, they have chosen not to say so. Friends 
may feel safer about disagreeing with one another, but to what extent? Some moral topics and 
activities may preclude addressing possible disagreement. For any one member to challenge the 
gossip subject’s reconstruction here, or the gossip activity in general, would be extremely 
threatening to the participants in the gossip and to the safety of the challenger’s place in their 
circle.  
It seems then that another way to manage the double-edged sword of gossip is, if the 
information is highly damaging or negative, is to make sure it is not about someone close or 
well-known to the group. In all of the data analyzed for this project, there were no outright cases 
of open discussion of highly negative gossip material regarding well-known identities with close 
others. If gossip about known others were quite negative, it was couched so indirectly that it was 
not empirically analyzable—which represents another response to the dilemma of gossip: if the 
material is damaging and the person is known, be as indirect as possible. The next section 
considers more closely topics that revolve around “sinful” activities, many kinds of which have 
already been mentioned, particularly those which are related to sex. In these cases, talking about 
sex may be done through various activities and rituals described here and in chapter two, but the 
focus is on the way in which “sex” is topicalized to manage relational closeness, and the 
problems that arise in this management.  
Sex topicalization. The idea of “sin talk” is that it revolves around particular significant 
and morally implicative topics associated with classic “bad behavior” or at least indicative of the 
possibility of bad behavior. In other words, people “having sex” can be an unproblematic topic, 
but is often only brought up when there is some problematic aspect of it that violates perceived 
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social norms (the age of the people having sex, the relationship of the people, the relationship 
status of the people, the kind of sex being had, the situations in which it is had, etc. tend to be of 
questionable appropriateness). The bringing up of such topics is not just about a social critique, 
but is also intricately tied to the relationship of the people discussing them.  
One aspect of being close with someone is that talking about such topics can be easier, 
particularly in privacy. In the recording of the friends in “Around the Bay,” the excerpt discussed 
at the onset of this section, face-threatening and taboo topics are brought up on a regular basis, 
especially when Amelia is playing “mock documentary filmmaker” and asks questions such as, 
“so JR, why are you so stupid?” or “What was your first sexual experience?” or makes random 
stance-evoking utterances such as “I don’t like watching blowjobs” and “they really should just 
blur out the penises in porn.” These kinds of unmitigated, directly-formulated and sometimes 
“extreme” topics are handled in particular ways among people who are close. Among people 
who are not close, they would be treated differently, or perhaps not brought up at all. 
 The topicalization of sexuality can occur around particular events, as in a story; actions or 
comments; objects; and many other interactional resources. In the next excerpt, discussed also in 
chapter four, family members celebrating a mass birthday bring up sexually-tinged topics 
regarding a gift of underwear. The family, including extended members, all sit in a circle and 
watch each other open gifts. This event takes place in the U.S. in the late 1980s.  
Excerpt 18 “The Reynolds” [fam.hols88.1.E5.1]
Beatrice: Oh look at the pretty colo:rs= 182 
Jim:  =unmentionables= 183 
Jilly:  =O:: 184 
Jim:  we must not mention them 185 
Beatrice: [o↑o::] 186 
?:  [((giggles))] 187 
Jim:  I look over at Mike here “oh well” 188 
Mike:  It (must be) my birthday 189 
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((laughter)) 190 
Jilly:  yeah I guess we're celebrating your birthday too=  191 
Jack:  =hey (0.5) those'll be a big hit when you're out on the balcony 192 
Jilly:  ◦y(h)eah◦ 193 
  194 
((laughter)) 195 
Jilly:  drinking the coffee in the- after you're gone ((points to Mike))= 196 
197 
 198 
Beatrice: =that’s right= 199 
Jack:  =yeah right ((laughs)) you watch that UPS stops- truck stop now 200 
((laughs))201 
 
The problem with bringing up the sex among family members is that so many people in 
the interaction are related in different ways. In this situation, for example, there are married 
couples, parents and children, and siblings. Bringing up sex in relation to one of them will cause 
difficulties depending on the identity of that person and her relationships to the others present.   
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This interaction features a brief sequence that stands out from what came before, and 
what comes after. As indicated by Beatrice’s utterance, Beatrice and Jilly had been commenting 
on the gifts Jilly was unwrapping, largely amidst the usual “ooing” and “ahhing” that 
accompanies gift receiving. With Jim’s comment at line 183, the topic of conversation is shifted 
to the nature of the gift, which is that it is a flowery-lacy negligee sort of underwear. This leads 
to commenting on the implications and possible consequences of such a gift. Afterward, the 
conversation shifts to being about where the underwear was purchased, and there is a discussion 
of the difference between Victoria’s Secret and Frederick’s of Hollywood. 
 During this interaction, there are several references, verbal and nonverbal, to the ways in 
which different present persons are implicated in the talk underway. Jim’s reference to his son 
Mike, for instance, indicates a relationship between Mike and Jilly, such that the gift for Jilly 
(being a “sexy” one) is also a gift for Mike, which Mike ratifies explicitly (line 189) and Jilly 
makes even more explicit (line 192). The implications of the gift for Jilly and Mike are then 
moved away from focusing on their relationship as husband and wife, and instead toward the 
consequences of the gift for Jilly in situations not involving her husband. Jack, who is Jilly’s 
father and who holds the camera, brings in the idea of other people potentially seeing Jilly in this 
outfit as she stands out on the balcony of her house. Though a gift of underwear need not have 
been especially remarked on (they are from Jilly’s sister-in-law, rather than for example Jilly’s 
husband or some less appropriate person such as her father or father-in-law), almost 
immediately, the sexual nature of the gift becomes a topic.  
The first person who brings this up simultaneously proffers the topic, but claims not to be 
doing so, calling them “unmentionables” (line 183) and then explicitly unpacking that to say “we 
must not mention them” (line 185)—when of course, that is exactly what he is doing. Jim, who is 
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Jilly’s father-in-law, then directs this topic into what might be a “suitable” arena by implicating 
Mike and Jilly’s relationship (as husband and wife) and speaking on Mike’s behalf of the 
positive nature of Jilly’s receiving the gift (line 188). For Jim to bring up the topic of Jilly and 
the gift of underwear as sexual in nature has the potential to be problematic, but he mitigates his 
own connection to bringing up the topic by disclaiming doing so (“we must not mention them”) 
and by directing the focus of the comment toward his son, Jilly’s husband.  
Mike and Jilly play along with this joke, in which Mike says it must be his birthday too 
(an ordinary kind of response to a wife’s getting a birthday gift that implicates his own 
enjoyment), and Jilly comments that this is in fact explicitly the case (because it really is his 
birthday) (line 191). The conversation could have ended there, diffused in the sexuality of its 
nature or at least safely in the context of a husband-wife relationship, but Jack changes the 
course of things with his comment. His comment (line 192) re-invokes the sexual nature of the 
gift (that it would be titillating to see Jilly in it for outsiders—literally, “a big hit”) and presents it 
in the context of Jilly being out on her balcony, in her underwear. Jilly at first seems unwilling to 
join along with this joke, as she looks down at the gift, putting it away, and answers “yeah” in a 
markedly quieter tone, though with a soft laugh (lines 193-194).  
When Jilly does decide to pick up the joke, she directs her own extension of it toward her 
mother, Beatrice, who has not joined in on the jokes previously, and whose first comment on the 
gift was safely regarding its “colors” and not what it was or what it could be for (line 182). Jilly 
makes explicit the implication that the gift is not in this context for Mike’s benefit as she outright 
states that Mike would have gone to work by then. She paints a picture of herself as nonchalantly 
going out to the balcony to drink coffee, and she acts out this fact, making it central to the image, 
and not mentioning the fact of wearing the underwear, though that is implied (line 196). It is 
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unclear exactly what this utterance is doing, but that she directs it to Mike and to Beatrice rather 
than Jack, her father, who brought it up, is interesting. She offers the story for Beatrice first to 
comment on (which Beatrice does in line 198), then moves the context back to being between 
her and Mike, though in a negative and rather teasing sense.  
Jilly’s glance at Beatrice after this comment is also interesting (line 197). The glance 
seems to be making an assessment on the conversation for Beatrice, as the quickness of this 
glance, and its being produced subtly (in the eyes and smile rather than with accompanying 
verbal or nonverbal information), makes it seem not to be for the room in general. The fact that it 
is through more narrow eyes indicates a negative assessment, or at least not straightforwardly 
positive, despite the smile. What the assessment is about is unclear: her and Mike’s relationship? 
Jack’s comments? The direction of the conversation in general? Her own participation in Jack’s 
comments? But it conveys a withdrawal from the conversation and the line it has taken, 
“stepping back” in a way to relate to Beatrice rather than relating as a participant to the room and 
the talk therein.  
Jack’s next comment once again re-invokes the gift’s sexual nature in a “naughty” 
context, however, continuing to focus on the reaction of strangers, and people who are not Mike, 
to seeing Jilly “in” the gift (e.g. the UPS truck driver). Jack is the only one who laughs at this 
comment (twice, line 199), and after making it, the conversation redirects into one about where 
the gift was purchased and the implications of that. Interestingly, even in that conversation, the 
sexually-explicit nature of the gift is softened by identifying it as a Victoria’s Secret purchase: 
various participants comment on the banality of purchasing underwear from Victoria’s Secret 
versus purchasing underwear from Frederick’s of Hollywood, which is identified as a sort of 
“porn shop.” Thus, there is an interesting tension between commenting on the sexual nature of 
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Jilly’s gift, but placing the sexual nature in an appropriate context. Jack in particular, but also 
others, move the gift’s status in and out of the appropriate context.  
The “appropriate” context for a gift that implicates, however indirectly, Jilly and Mike’s 
sexual relationship, will be different for different people. It could be the case, for instance, that 
Jack is more comfortable contemplating and bringing up Jilly’s sexuality as being for stranger-
voyeurs, who could not do anything about it (she’s up in a balcony on the second floor, after all), 
than he is with the idea of Jilly’s sexuality in relation to her husband, which though morally 
ratified indexes actual sex rather than mere looking. This is in tension with the appropriateness 
identified by other conversational participants, which is that it’s okay for Jilly to have sexy 
underwear as long as the sexiness is relegated to the context of her marriage. Even when Jilly 
herself jokes about being in underwear on the balcony, and mentions that Mike is “gone” for that 
hypothetical scenario, she nonetheless brings him in as a focal person who might care about that. 
She also acts out the coffee cup rather than playing up the underwear component, and glances in 
a slightly-negatively assessing matter at Beatrice who, as her mother and lesser participant in all 
this sex-relevant talk, becomes a sort of “moral authority.”  
Bringing up Jilly’s sexuality, even implicitly, is a delicate task. Her father-in-law, for 
instance, cannot do so without seeming implicitly in competition with his son. He avoids this 
problem by making the comment in the guise of its “not being a comment” (“unmentionable”) 
and directs the focus toward his son, Mike. Jilly’s husband can make such comments, but it 
would be inappropriate to do so explicitly—he comments instead by referencing a commonplace 
regarding married couples and lingerie gifts. All of these comments are safe for the selves and 
particular others, but they threaten, to some extent, Beatrice and Jack’s ability to see their 
daughter as an innocent girl. Beatrice just avoids the issue altogether, while Jack avoids the 
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sexuality of his daughter with her husband by creating a more general kind of “sexiness” that is 
voyeuristic, but also highly improbable. Though he keeps it in this improbable joking realm, his 
comments are treated variously as inappropriate. Jilly manages being the center of this attention 
by variously playing along, ignoring, mitigating, and aligning (with her mother).  
There are multiple dilemmas regarding the topic of sex in families which are 
demonstrated here, but would likely not be treated as problematic, or as problematic in the same 
way, among friends. In one sense, sex is unproblematic when it is referenced as an activity 
between a married couple, perhaps especially one with children (though having those children in 
the room at the same time probably makes it harder to mention). On the other hand, one would 
not want to discuss a sexual relationship explicitly among other family members, such as parents 
and siblings of the couple in question, as are attendant in this example. One way of managing 
this is to make it indirect. Jim does this by referring to the “unmentionables” as a way of 
bringing them up. “Unmentionables” is a kind of metadiscursive device that comments 
reflexively on the questionable nature of a topic, while drawing attention to it. Another way to do 
this is to frame it as a joke, but as demonstrated with Jack’s lack of total success in this account, 
humor is not a foolproof method.  
The next excerpt, also about sex, is done in a more direct way. Whether this is because 
the participants have been drinking, are mainly friends rather than family (though friends 
composed of committed and married couples), or because there are no children present (as in the 
prior case), the sexuality and the idea of people literally having sex is referenced without being 
treated as problematic.
1 
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Excerpt 19 “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E2.1]
Nora: and then when I went by to get my blood drawn today they said ◦are you sure200 
 you’re not pregnant◦? So you know what I did?= 201 
John: what= 202 
Nora: =I went by the pharmacy and I bought a fucking pregnancy test and I took it today203 
 and it was negative? ((laughs)) 204 
Mary: wow if you were pregnant [that would be wild] 205 
Jim:          [( )] 206 
John: yeah 207 
Nora: there is no way it would be like g(h)od had done something to me 208 
Mary: ((laughs)) 209 
Jane: to punish you 210 
Nora: yeah for all that premarital sex we had 211 
((laughter)) 212 
John: we were just practicing213 
 
In this excerpt, again, the conversation revolves around sex and sex-implicative topics 
(pregnancy). Nora has been feeling ill, and a comment by doctors when she had her blood tested 
(lines 200-201) compels her to get a pregnancy test. Her frustration is indicated by an upgrader 
(the expletive “fucking” line 203), demonstrating her anger at even the thought that she might be 
pregnant. Thus, where in a different situation (one in which Nora were hoping to have children, 
or perhaps even seeking to do so) Nora might respond with hope or excitement, here it is treated 
as “bad news.” Her announcement that the test was negative is followed by laughter, perhaps 
indicating relief (line 204), and Mary emphasizes the shocking nature of the possibility of 
pregnancy (line 205): “wow if you were pregnant that would be wild.”  
Though Mary’s comment emphasizes Nora’s opinions, it also manages the difficulty of 
being too extreme (by saying for instance “that would be terrible”), which is a safe move to make 
given Nora may one day want a child. Since Mary and Nora are close, Mary would not want 
Nora to remember such a comment at that point in the possible future. Thus, one problem that 
arises right away in this conversation is around the norm that married people have children. The 
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interactants who are close demonstrate their knowledge of each other’s views, while not “going 
to far” by saying things they could be held accountable for later.  
Because pregnancy makes sex relevant, and because the dinner in this example was so 
characterized by sexually explicit jokes, it is not surprising that this conversation, too, takes that 
turn. After John, Nora’s husband, chimes in positively toward the negative assessment of a 
possible pregnancy (“yeah” line 207), Nora continues to make explicit the negative nature of 
pregnancy for her by jokingly indicating it would be a punishment from God (line 208). Jane 
labels this implication explicitly (“to punish you” line 210) and at that point Nora references a 
possible reason for the punishment (“all that premarital sex we had” line 211).  
Everyone laughs at this confession, one which is slightly shocking because of its content 
and directness, but at the same time not very shocking because waiting for marriage to have sex 
is perhaps not as widespread a practice as it once was. John then comes in and ends the 
conversation with an account for the offense, “we were just practicing” (line 213). This too is an 
interesting move, an agreement with the confession as it were, and at the same time a rather 
“fake” excuse for the act from the invoked perspective of someone who believes in God and sees 
premarital sex as sinful and worthy of punishment.  
Attitudes toward sex and religion are incredibly sensitive for people who do not know 
each other very well. Here, that is not the case. The fact that this mention (one of many sexually 
explicit conversations) is treated by the friends as amusing rather than awkward or 
uncomfortable has a number of possible causes. One is the amount of wine that’s been drunk at 
that point, which may ease discomfort even amongst people who do not know each other well. 
That seems like it can be in part responsible for the fact that the topic is talked about, but other 
explanations better account for the more specific utterances produced in response to the 
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comments made throughout this exchange. For instance, it is true that Nora’s obvious treatment 
of the possible pregnancy as negative cues a response that recognizes it as such, but that Mary’s 
response builds on that by adding her own assessment (“that would be wild” line 205) implies 
that Mary is familiar with Nora’s perspective. Perhaps they have known each other long enough 
so that Mary already knows Nora’s stance on the matter.  
We also see John and Nora indicating their shared perspective toward pregnancy when 
John agrees with Mary’s assessment (line 207). When Nora brings up the moral orientation—the 
idea of being punished by God for inappropriate sexual contact—John joins in on the joke and 
extends it, simultaneously displaying comfort with the topic, an understanding of Nora’s attitude 
toward pregnancy as punishment, and the willingness to play along with the “religious” frame 
that Nora has introduced. His comment at the end simultaneously is within that religious frame, 
but also comments on it by offering an account for the questionable behavior that would not be 
acceptable for someone who actually existed within the frame. He acknowledges that he and 
Nora are not within the frame, and that whatever their spiritual background, they know each 
other well enough to know that they do not share a serious belief in a God that would punish 
them for premarital sex. That they are comfortable joking in this way with their friends shows an 
assumption that no one else present has that belief, and the fact that no one treats the joke as 
problematic seems to ratify that assumption.  
The relational context is an important one when considering to what extent moral 
practices will become dilemmatic. Here, for example, the romantic couples are situated among a 
group of friends rather than family, which makes a difference compared to the previous example 
with the lingerie. Furthermore, there has already been established an interactional pattern of 
sexually explicit jokes throughout the night—so the situational context is also favorable. 
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Culturally speaking, sex is not considered a taboo topic among friends except in certain social, 
political, generational or religious groups in the U.S. If anything, sex is considered a “safer” 
topic than religion or politics, though here the seemingly-safe mention of religion points to 
another shared frame among the friends.  
Talking about sex can be delicate even for close friends, however, because it can become 
that much more uncomfortable if the conversation “crosses the line” (even if that line were rather 
far off). The next excerpt is from the same dinner and among the same people, but here occurs a 
brief moment during which the appropriateness of a sexual comment must be negotiated.  
Excerpt 20 “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E4.2]
Jane: Jim and Nicky were in the kitchen? And I heard Nicky whisper (1.5) “◦fuck me◦” 214 
(0.5) 215 
 216 
John: ha 217 
Jane: ((laughs)) 218 
Nicky: what? 219 
Jane: when you were in there= 220 
Nicky: =m:= 221 
Jane: =she was tryin to yank the= 222 
John: =classic Jane taking things out of context 223 
Nora: she’s trying to get people in trouble 224 
((laughter)) 225 
Nicky: no I think I looked at this 226 
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 227 
And said “fuck me” cuz it’s almost empty 228 
Jane: but all I heard- all I heard was= 229 
John: =then she went and poured some more 230 
((laughter)) 231 
Nicky: che::ers 232 
 233 
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 This excerpt contains a fairly typical point in bringing up a sexually explicit topic for 
humorous purposes, but in this case, it falls flat. Rather than performing a double entendre or as 
the participants refer to this practice, “talking dirty” or being “in the gutter,” Jane makes a 
reference that is formulated as an actual event that took place, complete with reported speech 
(line 214).  This is met with a moment of silence (line 215), then Nicky does a laughing face, but 
without producing laughter, while John remarks “ha” (line 217) but does not actually laugh. Jane 
laughs at 218, and finally Nicky asks “what” at line 219. Rather than admitting to the act in a 
humorous way, and validating it as a funny conversational topic, Nicky puts the comment in a 
questionable light by not remembering its occurrence. Jane then tries to explain the situation, and 
John and Nora head off a problematic clash of accounts by indicating Jane took the comment out 
of context and is just being a troublemaker (lines 223-224).  
Among family, sexual comments seem to need more delicate handling. In this group of 
friends, sexual comments are usually taken in stride, but in this case, calling out a sexual act in 
this explicit a fashion is deemed too face-threatening. Jane has enacted the same sexually-explicit 
personality as the rest of them, but her comfort at doing so has crossed a boundary. She refuses 
throughout, however, to take back what she said or acknowledge that she has crossed a 
boundary. This leaves the face-saving up to the others in the group. John and Nora’s indication 
that Jane took the comment out of context provides a potential account of the situation for Nicky. 
Nicky then is tasked with coming up with such an account. She could have mentioned anything 
that might save her own face, since the others seem inclined to side with her anyway, but she 
makes an interesting move that provides an account that saves both her face and Jane’s.  
Nicky presents a case for misunderstanding on Jane’s part, rather than a deliberate taking-
out-of-context (removing the need for the “troublemaker” label). Nicky picks up the bottle and 
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re-enacts the same quoted utterance, “fuck me,” but in a way that changes and potentially repairs 
its meaning. In the first reconstruction, the stress was on the word “fuck,” which colloquially is a 
request for sex. In the second reconstruction, the stress is on the “me,” which colloquially is an 
expression of dismay. She thus indicates that she said what Jane heard, but it was an expression 
of disappointment due to the wine being almost gone (line 228). Jane attempts to regain her 
ground by providing her (possibly mistaken) interpretation (line 129) but John cuts her off by 
bringing attention back to the “actual” newly-constructed and deemed acceptable act, which 
focuses on Nicky’s wanting a drink, not wanting sex (line 230). Nicky gives a mock toast to this 
(line 232) and the conversation redirects.  
Though these friends have talked about sex nearly constantly throughout the almost 30 
minutes of dinner, this particular sexual comment is not taken in the same way as that of every 
other. The lack of laughter, Nicky’s uncertainty, the proposal that Jane is mistaken, Nicky’s 
discovery of an account for the error, and everyone’s ratifying of the topic shift (and ignoring of 
Jane’s attempt to bring the conversation back to her interpretation) all indicate that Jane’s 
comment crossed a line. There is thus a limit to how explicit or in what circumstances people can 
discuss sex amongst friends, and this example provides a way in which that is managed when 
someone exceeds the limit. A more relaxed moral atmosphere among close friends is not the 
same as being able to “say anything.” Though Jane does not understand, or is too stubborn to 
withdraw her error, the others in the party make choices that save as much face for all of them as 
possible and keep the interaction light-hearted.  
 Part of the dilemma of discursively enacting morality is that it cues contradictory norms 
in the cultural and social context. Often such norms are tacit; and always, such norms are 
interactionally negotiated. Here, the situational context is already one of ribald humor. Sex is 
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considered a fairly free topic for discussion. However, such explicit mention of sex, or perhaps 
the mention in the context of a kitchen interaction in someone’s house, proved to cross the line 
from playful to face-threatening. How can one negotiate situations in which competing 
ideologies include “we’re close enough to talk about sex” and “don’t talk about me asking for 
sex in your house, even as a joke” can exist simultaneously?  
Moral Dilemmas: Ideological, Interactional, Interpersonal 
In the examples given above, ideologies are interactional enactments—and ideological 
dilemmas thus are instantiated as interactional dilemmas. But furthermore, these are relational, 
interpersonal dilemmas. As Baxter (1988, 2004a, 2004b) notes, the emotional and personal needs 
accompanying increasingly close relationships is a dialectic of competing impulses. These 
impulses are in a sense ideological in the ways I have described. The openness-closedness 
dilemma can be situated in cultural expectations that “if we’re close, I can tell you everything” 
versus “if I tell you some things, you might not like it, and turn on me.” But these impulses are 
also interactional. Do you participate in the moral practice, or not? If you do, how do you do it? 
If you anticipate or encounter potential trouble, how can it be dealt with? 
From a grounded practical theory perspective, the results of investigating these questions 
indicate some of the techniques participants have for doing moral practice as well as dealing with 
its troubles and dilemmas. It has been demonstrated that different relational, situational and 
cultural contexts may guide the local ideals for these practices. Because, however, moral 
practices involve sometimes contradictory, dilemmatic ideals (“such as tell me everything/don’t 
tell me everything”), they must be worked out in context through different communication 
strategies. Thus, one important implication from this chapter for an ideal of moral 
communication involves the need to confront situations in which situated ideals conflict.  
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In these examples, humor emerged as a common way of treating potentially troublesome 
moral practices. It did not, however, always work well. One nice thing about being close with 
someone is that “awkward moments” become fewer and fewer. But when they do arise, they tend 
to indicate possible problems. They are a “red flag” for the tensions, contradictions and 
dilemmas which lurk among close committed relationships. Troubles that arise when managing 
the dilemma of morality for intimacy show a difference between unspoken assumptions 
regarding what is okay to talk about. The sharedness assumed between close others may not 
correspond enough to say “whatever one pleases.” These concerns for intimacy are returned to in 
chapter nine.  
In the next chapter, such tensions, contradictions and dilemmas prove to exist not only 
among couples who presumably share an ideological orientation together, but also within 
supposedly homogenous cultural contexts. Chapter five reconstructed “intimacy” as a collection 
of practices for doing morality through close relating. The next chapter, chapter six, discusses 
ideology as a moral discursive practice. Based on a GPT approach the relevant question about 
ideology is, how do people manage ideology and its contradictions in practical conduct? Chapter 
six analyzes the problem of enacting ideology and dealing with its differences in ostensibly 
culturally homogenous friend and family interactions to reconstruct ideology as a moral practice.  
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Chapter 6 
Ideology as a Problematic Moral Achievement 
The life of relationships is not isolable from their situatedness in particular events, places, 
times, histories—in other words, relationships are contextualized. Participants index cultural 
contexts and societal norms in their talk, interactionally achieving relational commitment and 
cultural ideologies. When people enact relationships, they do so embedded in a background of 
tacit assumptions about what constitutes a relationship, how one should be “done,” and the role 
of communication in this process. As interactants implicate the morality of their relationships 
with one another, they also implicate the sociocultural expectations in which their relationship is 
enacted.  
This chapter discusses ideology as a cultural moral discursive practice. Based on a GPT 
approach a relevant question is, how do people manage ideology and its contradictions in 
practical conduct? This chapter analyzes the problem of enacting ideology and dealing with its 
differences in ostensibly culturally homogenous friend and family interactions to argue that 
ideologies are morally problematic and contradictory in close relationships. Though people who 
share culture (through religious, regional, linguistic, political or other practices) assume 
sharedness on ideological assumptions, the complexity and contradictions of ideologies within 
and between social groups can cause problems when differences arise.  
“Ideology” is on the level of morality in which interaction/intersubjectivity, 
relationships/intimacy, and cultural context come together. Ideologies can be interpersonal or 
cultural, about interactional choices or beliefs and values. In this chapter, I focus on ideologies as 
rhetorical, indicating the ways in which moral interaction involves different enactments within 
cultural contexts which are assumed to be shared. In such contexts, difference is generally 
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attributed to choices rather than to societal patterns, which are invisible where they are assumed 
to be shared.  
This chapter focuses on the problem of ideology, a practice which is relational and 
cultural. This chapter examines how ideology interactionally achieves relational norms and 
accomplishes culturally “good” identities. The problem of ideology for morality involves the 
way in which ideologies can be complex and contradictory, posing difficulties for the continued 
maintenance of a shared relational and cultural moral orientation. 
Moral discursive practices must confront the tacit contradictions inherent in cultural 
ideology through interaction. In each of the following cases, people who share cultural 
community expectations find those norms in conflict with other expectations or more local, 
relational norms. In dealing with these contradictions, participants negotiate the meaning of their 
relational identity and how it is situated in cultural moral contexts. This chapter looks at ideology 
as a cultural phenomenon which is interactionally achieved in relationship settings through 
particular moral discursive practices. Though a cultural approach can lead an ethnographer to see 
what is ostensibly a “same” culture as sharing ideologies and the norms those ideologies create, 
this chapter explores the contradictions inherent in the ideologies of what appear to be 
homogenous cultural contexts.  
The next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures 
introduced in chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to 
ideology. The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and 
managing ideology. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for 
participants’ situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.   
Moral Discourses: Relationships and Ideology 
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 Relationships are guided by cultural ideologies of what they should be like. As Fitch 
(1998) posits, relationships are guided by interpersonal ideologies, ideas about relationships, 
communication, and their appropriateness. The next section discusses relationships as enacted in 
communities. The following section discusses how this implicates ideologies and “relational 
ideals” (Fitch, 1998). 
Relationships: Relationality and Culture 
There is a long and rich history of studying the role of culture in interpersonal 
communication. Similar cultural values have been looked at as a foundation for romantic 
relationships (Gudykunst, 1985). Concepts such as emotion and facework in interpersonal 
relationships have been considered taking culture into account (Burleson, 2003; Ting-Toomey, 
1994). Cultural perspectives consider to varying degrees the role of norms, interpersonal 
expectations and/or interactional problems that highlight the ways in which culture in 
interpersonal communication can be morally inflected.  
The study of culture and interpersonal relationships is sometimes connected to, but not 
quite the same thing as, the concept of a “relational culture,” a private transaction of attitudes and 
expectations that constitute the life of a particular relationship (Wood, 1982). There is research 
that indicates that relationship cultures and cultural norms of context in which the relationship 
exists are mutually informing (e.g., Harding, 2007; Moore, Laflin & Weis, 1996; Straus, 1976). 
As Fogel (1993) notes, there is a cultural component to relationships and a relational component 
to culture: “cultures are relational and embodied, expressed as the actions and products of the 
participants” (p. 6). Culture provides tools and means—forms of narratives, histories of 
communities, linguistic resources and social expectations—with which people formulate 
relationships.  
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According to Streeck (2002), a concept of culture that focuses on “symbols and 
meanings” (p. 322) requires an attention to language. Communication Accommodation Theory 
(Giles, Coupland, N., & Coupland, J., 1991) is an example of an interpersonal intercultural 
communication theory interested in how people’s particular verbal and nonverbal strategies 
indicate convergence or divergence in communication styles (and thus affiliation or disaffiliation 
between conversational partners). Streeck (2002), however, focuses on reviewing more 
discourse-focused methdologies—ethnography of communication, microethnography, and 
conversation analysis—as most appropriate for analyzing cultural productions through attention 
to language.  
 Discourse approaches focus on the uniqueness of language in culturally situated instances 
of social interaction. Bucholtz and Hall’s (2008) sociocultural linguistics, for instance, 
emphasizes ethnographic grounding and honoring of participant perspectives. Other approaches 
focus on the role of politeness and interactional or linguistic norms (Kasper, 1997), construction 
of identity (Ochs, 1993), cultural models (Kiesling, 2003), style (Tannen, 1981), rituals (Katriel, 
1990), framing (Tannen, 1993), and power (Eades, 2005). In each case, discourse analysis forms 
the basis of making claims about the unique cultural aspect of communication.  
 The ethnography of communication is perhaps the most culturally-focused discourse 
analytic approach within language and social interaction and in discourse studies in the 
communication field. Studies in the ethnography of communication have looked at interactions 
in, for example, Hungarian (Boromisza-Habashi 2007a, 2007b, 2010a, 2010b), U.S. American 
(Carbaugh, 1988), Finnish (Berry & Carbaugh, 2004; Carbaugh, Berry & Nurmikari-Berry, 
2006; Carbaugh & Poutiainen, 2000; Poutiainen, 2009), Blackfeet (Carbaugh & Rudnick, 2006), 
Indian (Hastings, 2001), teen (LaGrande & Milburn, 2003), hip-hop (McLeod, 1999), Puerto 
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Rican (Milburn 2000, 2002), and organizational/community settings (Milburn, Kenefick & 
Lambert, 2006; Morgan, 2007). In analyzing these settings, ethnographers of communication 
describe cultural-specific communicative practices—rituals, speech acts, concepts, definitions, 
etc.—and systematically unpack their use in situated instances (Carbaugh, 2010). In order to 
rigorously situate the study of people’s communicative practices, ethnographers of 
communication create a detailed record of field notes, recordings, and interviews, and interpret 
their meaningfulness.  
 Fitch (e.g. 1994, 1998, 1999, 2003) is an example of an interpersonal scholar who also 
takes a cultural, ethnographic approach and attends to details of talk. As Fitch notes in her 1998 
book, most interpersonal research emphasizes (perhaps over-emphasizes) the role of individual 
agency. Fitch’s book shifts that focus to a more social and cultural perspective by analyzing daily 
interactional practices in interpersonal relationships as cultural practices. Fitch asserts that 
concepts of personhood, relationships and communication are the symbolic underpinnings of 
interpersonal practices. Culture and talk are inseparable because cultural concepts of personhood, 
relationships and communication are both reflected in and constituted by discourse.  
 Wood (1993) asserted that culture matters for relationships, but most studies of 
interpersonal relationships do not take a cultural perspective. This section discussed how 
relationships are cultural enactments, and how culture is a discursive practice. The next section 
continues this discussion by focusing in ideology as the cultural practice of creating shared 
communicative ideas for how to conduct relationships.  
Ideology 
An important aspect of Fitch’s work relevant to this chapter is that she discusses the often 
invisible premises that underlie communicative acts (1998). Culture is built of beliefs, and 
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beliefs are not always spoken—sometimes they are even unspeakable. In this section I discuss 
the background of assumptions that guide cultural interaction. As discussed in chapter two, 
“ideology” has many meanings. Baxter (2004a, 2004b), for instance, conceptualized ideologies 
as ideas of what makes people attracted to each other, how people in relationships should act, 
and what good relationships are like. Ideologies are indeed ideas, but they are not single ideas—
they are a web or system of relationships between ideas and the world, between symbols and 
materials (Bakhtin, 1981).  
Ideologies are cultural. Similar to Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of doxa, ideologies are 
often enduring, unexamined, and unspoken. They often are not said because they are taken for 
granted as not needing to be said (like Fitch’s “persuadables”: 2003). Ideologies are, however, 
discursive. On one hand, ideologies do get spoken. Sometimes they are spoken for rhetorical 
purposes. Other times they are spoken because something goes wrong. And they have common 
formulations, idioms and clichés, “discourses of” which give people the vocabulary, though 
often not necessarily the reflective resources, to talk about them (they may be accused of 
“sounding good” but not “saying anything”). On the other hand, ideologies are not merely 
reflected in talk or shaping of talk. Discourse also constructs ideologies. Ideologies are, in a 
sense, names for practical interactional choices. They are large, ambiguous, assumedly-shared 
ideals which are invoked to give meaning, sense, reasons and morals to practical conduct in 
everyday life.  
Ideologies are everyday occurrences. Ideologies are inherently normative, and thus 
involve cultural moral ideas which are shaped by and shaped in talk (Bergmann, 1998). From a 
grounded practical theory approach, ideologies are problematic because they are assumed to be 
shared, particularly in apparently-homogenous cultural contexts, and yet are often not shared, or 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 265 
 
 
contain inherent contradictions and dilemmas for practice. In the next section I discuss some of 
the issues related to analyzing ideology and culture, then offer case studies of ideologies in 
action. 
Ideology as a Moral Discursive Practice 
 In Streeck’s (2002) review of cultural research, he discusses the importance of the 
symbolic role of culture, how culture is indicated by and created in patterns of interaction, and 
the ways in which culture configures processes of personality and emotion. Streeck draws on 
both Geertz (1973) and Bruner (1990) to describe an anthropological approach to culture, seeing 
it as both a context, and a mode of participation that gives meaning to experiences. The meaning 
of culture, Streeck (2002) notes, is a difficult one. Interpersonal communication, as a cultural 
achievement, is always local and general at the same time. The challenge is both where to 
analyze, and what to count. The materiality of culture is an aspect Streeck claims has been 
largely neglected in human communication research. As mentioned in chapter one, I join notions 
of practice, indexicality, ideology, materiality, and rhetoric to capture the kinds of “stuff” this 
analysis recognizes as cultural. In this section, I discuss how culture is analyzable in talk. 
Culture in interaction can be ambiguous and fleeting. Spotting it often requires a theory 
of culture before the empirical looking, which is why some conversation analysts find cultural 
analysis a troublingly non-inductive practice. On the other hand, to ignore cultural aspects in 
interaction entirely also seems remiss. Sometimes analytical sense cannot be made of interaction 
without some understanding of a history or context—of the relationship, of the situation, of the 
people involved and the background assumptions that guide their uptake of one another’s 
utterances.  
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 Since then it seems equally problematic to ignore culture in favor of the structure of talk-
in-interaction as to account for talk with the imposition of cultural assumptions, I propose the 
best way to check one’s assumptions of where the explanatory power lies is by doing a bit of 
both. Moerman (1988) tackles both ends of the spectrum of analysis by joining conversation 
analysis and ethnography in a study of Thai culture. Moerman combines a sequential, 
interactional analysis of turns-at-talk, faithful to conversation analytic principles and 
vocabularies, with an in-depth understanding of local participant meanings. As Moerman points 
out, to speak the appropriately next utterance does not explain an interactional account “all-or-
none, now-and-forever” (p. 46). To focus only utterances and their uptake masks the ways in 
which talk is problematic for people in a social and cultural sense. On the other hand, to ignore 
the organization of talk is to ignore the “managed quality” of daily life (p. 120).  
The analysis in this chapter focuses on culture in ways the previous chapters did not, but 
that does not mean other chapters took no note of culture. Discussions of local vocabularies and 
ideas about the moral practices and their norms which were provided in chapters four and five 
were based partly in participants’ interviews or the author’s background in the cultural context, 
but were largely noted through the concept of indexicality. Developed in part by Garfinkel 
(1967), indexicality refers to the ways in which symbolic actions point to, or reference, other 
meanings outside the action itself. There are grammatical constructions where this is the case, for 
example, the word “there” means almost nothing without some sort of physical, discourse or 
social context. This kind of indexicality is known as “deixis.” But indexings of cultural 
meanings, expectations or categories are more complicated. They often require interpretation, 
and difficult analytical decisions must be made regarding to what extent an indexed cultural 
concept is really “relevant” to the talk at hand. 
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One way to think of indexicality is to consider much of what people say to be shorthand 
abbreviations for something more complex. This is what Bakhtin (1981) meant when he said 
everything uttered is “ideological.” A single utterance can stand in for a world of assumptions, 
situations, beliefs and dicta. This is similar to the connection Tracy (2002) makes when she 
discusses the cultural perspective in communication research, in which interpersonal ideologies 
are what provide the logic for speech codes. In the analyses in this chapter, ideologies situated in 
cultural context offer the tacit reasoning that guides moral discursive practices. For example, 
friend A might make a comment which, based on its uptake, friend B seemed to find face-
threatening or disaligning. If friend A then rapidly supplies a number of compliments, preferred 
actions and well-received comments, then some analytical decisions have to be made regarding 
an explanation for this sequence.  
One could take an equilibrium view, for instance, that friends must always maintain a 
state of equality and neutrality, such that apparent negative actions are balanced by positive ones, 
or even vice versa. One could take a relational view, in that friends want to make each other 
happy, and if a friend ends up doing something insulting, then it must be “taken back” or “made 
up for” in some way. One could take a sequential interactional view that dispreferred actions 
require work to get the conversation back on track in the direction in which it was originally 
headed. But all of these “perspectives” on the situation could be variable according to cultural 
contexts, or explained by known or discovered norms of a cultural context. This chapter’s 
analysis discusses to what extent moral discursive practices are both guided by and locally 
enacting cultural ideologies based on how the apparent best explanation for the interaction fits 
with available ethnographic background on the context.  
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The ensuing analysis works to provide ethnographic background, but not to assume that 
this background is relevant to or informing of participants’ interactions at all times. Just as, 
sometimes, silence is not problematic (one does occasionally stop speaking to chew food, check 
a cell phone for messages, change a television channel, etc.), not all aspects of a relationship’s 
history, genders, and cultural context will be bearing upon their talk all of the time. Analysis that 
is sensitive to these aspects of social life must seek one or the other when troublesomely evasive 
conversational events occur. The next section draws on video recordings of naturally occurring 
interaction, participant interviews, field notes and site-based research to provide discourse data 
and ethnographic detail. 
Cultural moral norms can be particularly hidden for people who share a cultural 
orientation—who were socialized, implicitly, into a way of life that has become second nature. 
The following examples feature such situations. These analyses cover a series of cases set in 
particular fairly homogenous cultural contexts. In each situation, I begin with some background 
on the cultural context based on interviews, field notes, personal or ethnographic experience, and 
research. 
This chapter considers two cases: one in the context of an English family, the other in the 
context of a set of friends in the U.S.  Each case considers how participants conceptualize 
morality in communicative instances, and in what situations norm-driven assumptions can lead 
to interactional and relational trouble. The chapter ends with a discussion of how culture is 
morally problematic in interaction. 
The Case of an English Family 
I begin analysis of culture in interaction by starting with a fairly bounded, paradigmatic 
case of a single ethnically homogenous family from a particular region. Discourse analyses are 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 269 
 
 
drawn from two hours of video data that occurred during routine visits in 2008 and 2010. Other 
data include seven hours of audio recordings collected between 2006 and 2010, interviews with 
family members, field notes from routine visits spanning two weeks between 2008 and 2009, and 
observations made in the course of knowing the participants through a relationship with one of 
them.  
The Newtons are from the a small market town in Midlands of England, an industrial, 
working-class region to which they can trace ancestors of both sides of the family back at least 
three generations. Work on British culture encompasses a number of perspectives which I will 
just touch on here. One issue involves the difficulty of the national “English” identity versus the 
political “British” identity and how people conceptualize their own culture as being one or the 
other (Langlands, 1999). Overwhelmingly, people who live in England and who identify as 
Caucasian prefer to call themselves “English.” Other work has focused on media creations of a 
British identity associated with particular practices and geographic landscapes (fox hunting, 
green fields, hedgerows) (Wallwork & Dixon, 2004). Critical studies have investigated Britain’s 
troubled history as an empire and the lingering ways in which British culture still contrasts itself 
with non-British (nonwhite) “others,” particularly those who were historically part of the empire 
and who comprise a large portion of the British population today (Colley, 1992).  
Fox’s (2004) anthropological investigation of English culture provides a more situated, 
albeit popularized, account of what life is like in England. Fox notes that certain conversational 
codes exist among the English which have been noted over the last two hundred years. 
Beginning conversation with talk about the weather, for instance, is one such code. Fox claims it 
is a way of easing into conversation for a people who have a “natural reserve”—whether that is 
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the reason for it, weather talk is ubiquitous in conversational openings in England, and this fact is 
sometimes noted ironically by English people during its production. 
Fox refers to this and other ritual English topics as “grooming talk,” the equivalent of 
apes picking fleas off one another. Others include greeting rituals, for instance “how do you do,” 
which is pronounced with no rising intonation and generally is repeated back to the person (“how 
do you do,” “how do you do”). One I have noticed in the Midlands and Southeast parts of 
England is the question “you alright?” This one does tend to require an answer of sorts. It is 
interesting because to a U.S. American, it sounds like a question of concern, but actually in this 
context it means roughly the same thing as “how are you?” Fox (2004) notes that greetings and 
conversational topic-starters are produced badly—awkwardly—by someone as a display of 
typical English identification. Being too “smooth” in a conversational encounter would be 
considered “unEnglish.” 
But the most pervasive element of talk in Britain, according to Fox (2004) and certainly 
echoed in U.S. stereotypes about the English, is the role of humor. To people in the U.S., English 
humor is sometimes unfathomable. As Fox notes, there are occasional patriotic attempts in 
England to somehow “prove” that English humor is distinct (and superior) to humor in other 
locations, particularly regarding the use of wit and irony. Fox asserts that English humor may be 
distinct in some ways—certainly people within and without England tend to think so—but that 
the real point of interest is the incredibly high value that English people place on humor. 
According to Fox, humor is rarely constrained to certain “appropriate” contexts in England, but 
runs through (or potentially runs through) any talk occasion. In fact, if there is a proscription on 
talk, Fox claims it is on being too earnest, too solemn. Other noted features of English humor 
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include understatement and self-deprecation. According to Fox, in class-conscious England, 
humor may be the only aspect of being English that crosses class barriers. 
As soon as an English person speaks, her or his class will be revealed (Fox, 2004). Class 
is identified with particular regions in England as well as socioeconomic status. Large cities, for 
instance, contain a mix of “classes,” and their dialects will reveal them to any English listener. 
But anything outside of the larger cities, excepting certain “posh” beach/vacation towns, is seen 
as rural or working class, and thus the speech varieties of that area are associated with class as 
well as the region.  In terms of defining the British Midlands as a speech community, the data on 
the particular area in this case are unfortunately sparse. The dialects of Britain are famously 
numerous and not all of them have been studied in detail. Though the dialect of the largest city in 
the area has been studied a great deal, it is nonetheless distinct from that of the Newtons’ 
hometown.  
Known variations which are typical to the region and to the lower classes include accent, 
vowel pronunciation, certain consonant clusters, and particular words and phrases. The accent 
bears little resemblance to the standard Received Pronunciation known by U.S. consumers of 
British media. Though the dialect lacks rhoticity (the “R” sound at the end of r-ending words) 
like most British dialects, it is peppered with glottal stops (e.g., bu-er instead of butter) as in 
Northern dialects, and has very different vowels. For example, the “u” in words such as “cup” 
and “cut” is pronounced like the “oo” in U.S. standard English words such as “foot” and “stood.” 
There also exist (though vanishing) substitutions, such as replacing “th” with a “v” or “f” sound 
(“brover” instead of “brother”) or “g” with “k” (“somethink” or “somefink” instead of 
“something”) (Fox, 2004; Trudgill, 1982).  
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There are differences in grammatical constructions and particular vocabularies as well. A 
notable one which is common to most places outside the south of England and which is also 
associated with lower class speech involves use of indirect pronouns and possessives. It is 
common, for example, for people to drop prepositions, resulting in utterances such as “give it 
me” and “she gave it me.” People also often use “me” in place of the possessive “my,” as in “I 
lost me hat.” Finally, the use of “dove” or “love” as a term of endearment for women is largely 
considered a southern encroachment, and the traditional phrase, particularly in the working class, 
is “ducks.” A common way of requesting one’s wife to pass the salt using this moniker plus the 
nonstandard possessive, then, would be “could you pass the salt, me ducks?” Other markers of 
the region allegedly shared by lower class speakers is saying “toilet” instead of “loo” or 
“lavatory,” requesting someone repeat something with “pardon?” rather than “sorry?”, using 
“serviette” for “napkin,” and referring to an evening meal as “tea” rather than “dinner” or 
“supper” (Fox, 2004; Trudgill, 1982; Field notes, 2010).  
This dialect, like many in mostly working-class, non-southern towns, is not valued. But 
in private interactions among close friends and family, it is present. Unfortunately, there is little 
discourse analytic work on talk in this setting. Most of the discourse studies that feature English 
or British contexts are of media or political arenas (e.g., Bell & Garrett, 1998; Hutchby, 1996). 
Many of these studies take a critical discourse perspective rather than an ethnographic one, and 
thus investigate the speech of powerful elites rather than that of ordinary people (e.g., 
Fairclough, 2001; van Dijk, 2001).  
With this background on the area, its speech variety, and characteristics of “Englishness,” 
I will now turn to a brief history of the participants. Carl, in his late 50s, received a strict, 
religious, Victorian-style upbringing, worked most of his life in trade (construction) and skilled 
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labor (woodworking, ironworks), and later as a teacher of these skills to teenagers with 
developmental disabilities. He married twice, with one son from his first marriage who lives in 
Australia, and two sons from his second marriage to Jenny. Jenny, in her mid-50s, was raised in 
the next town over from where the couple currently lives. From a very poor background, she 
never completed her secondary degree (high school equivalent), instead helping to raise her 
sisters and assist her ailing mother. Later she became a nurse, the occupation she still holds more 
than 30 years later. This background is relevant because it shows the fairly traditional 
background of the family which, despite their movement into a more middle class lifestyle 
during Carl and Jenny’s marriage, still demonstrates a retention of local class-guided speech 
codes. 
Their sons have followed markedly different paths. The eldest, Jim, in his early 30s, took 
the more traditional route by working in industry, marrying, having a daughter, and living local. 
The younger son, Raymond, in his late-20s, was at this time completing his PhD in London. The 
entire family is very close, and their home reflects the interests and skills of the men in the 
family. Though Jenny and Carl have lived in two houses in the town since their marriage (only a 
few blocks apart, at that), they have lived in their current residence for about 20 years. Since 
moving in, Carl has engaged in a number of construction projects: building a shed, adding a 
room, etc. Much of the furniture and décor, even some toys that are still displayed in the boys’ 
old bedrooms, were created by Carl and other (male) members of his family. Thus the physical 
space they inhabit is a testament to the family background in construction and skilled labor. But 
a preoccupation with newer technologies also is evident, as the house contains several electronic 
devices: radios, computers, television sets, not all of which are operational, many of which 
clutter Carl’s office.  
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Despite the fact that Jenny has worked as long as Carl has, the couple largely occupies 
traditional gender roles. Jenny is mainly responsible for the cleanliness of the house and the 
cooking, despite the fact that she works more hours than Carl, and even during a short period of 
time in which Carl had retired. Jim’s family is similar, in that his wife Gertie quit her job when 
she got pregnant, and is now firmly a housewife with no apparent desire to return to work. Jim 
does, however, share to some measure the responsibilities of caring for their daughter, Lizzy, 
when he is home. These facts are the most relevant to the analysis below. 
The interactional patterns of the family display some of the background mentioned above 
through a particular interactional frame, one which is also associated with their English 
background: humor. As mentioned above, Fox (2004) claims that humor is pervasive in British 
life. Whether this is true or not, it is undoubtedly pervasive in the Newtons’ everyday 
interactions. Humor is a way of bringing up complaints, smoothing out troubles, reconnecting 
after being apart, indicating concern, commenting on situations, and accomplishing many other 
communicative actions.   
National identity, like any identity, is accomplished through routine practices which are 
patterned to be associated with “being x” (Hester & Housley, 2002). The achievement and 
indexing of cultural ideals—ideologies—is a way of reinforcing shared culture. However, 
ideologies can conflict within a culture. This causes trouble because it makes visible the 
differences between people who seem to share an identification. The examples discussed in this 
analysis implicate a number of moral cultural assumptions at play. It is not simply the case that 
their interactions are merely a reflection of the family’s English working-and-middle class 
background. Their interactions have also been patterned within their family over the years so that 
the cultural implications are also tied up with their relational histories. As Gordon (2009) notes 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 275 
 
 
in her work on repetition, intertextuality and framing in a family study, “family” is an interactive 
construction situated in patterns of talk. The example discussed is a case study of such 
interactional patterns, though other examples are provided to give further evidence to the pattern. 
In this scene, the author is holding the camera, and moves it between Carl and Jenny, sometimes 
widening the angle to capture as much of both of them as possible (though this was difficult 
because of the placement of people in the room). Raymond is off camera, to the right of Jenny. 
Excerpt 21 “The Newtons” [fam.jul08.1.E4.1]
Carl: I never get any ‘elp washing up 1 
 2 
 3 
JR: mm 4 
Jenny: wha- what ‘ave you done today Carl?  5 
Carl: well- 6 
 7 
Jenny: you haven’t done nothing today except talk to Peter (.) talk to Roy Parker 8 
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Carl: I’ve been researchin on the internet all day. Sometimes it does- in fact it does take9 
 a lot of time 10 
Jenny: ((exaggerated yawn))  11 
JR: mm 12 
Jenny: exactly. ( ) 13 
Carl: and then I lie on the settee for maybe an hour. Or two? 14 
((laughter)) 15 
Carl: well I have to get up cuz it gives me neck ache 16 
Jenny: well that does it 17 
 18 
Carl: well I’m saving meself cuz at the moment Jim doesn’t need me to do his working.19 
 I’m working exclusively for Raymond20 
  
In this excerpt, Carl complains about not getting help washing up (doing dishes) (line 1). 
The complaint is given to JR rather than anyone who might be relevant to the complaint (such as 
his sons or wife), and thus is done indirectly. However, it is explicit enough that it begs a 
response of some sort, especially as JR, the conversational partner being addressed, does not give 
one. Jenny’s response (line 4) challenges Carl’s right to make the complaint. That she does not 
allow Carl to respond to this initial challenge, answering the question for him (line 7, “done 
nothing”) indicates she does not feel Carl’s complaint is valid. Here two situated norms can be 
identified. One assumes equality of family chores and the notion of interdependence, that people 
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should help one another. Based on this ideology, the critique of having to wash up all the time, 
with no help, is a valid one. However, another norm at work has to do with situating household 
chores in a larger context. Jenny has been working all day. Carl at this time was retired. In this 
case, then, there is a norm that it is reasonable to expect one person to do more chores at home if 
the other is doing more work out of the home.  
This norm has a long basis in the traditional separation of gender roles: women were 
expected to stay at home and take care of the house, and men to do the work outside of the 
house. It was not considered fair to expect men to do housework at home because they had been 
out doing “work-work” all day. During the weekend of this filming (five days), “washing up” is 
just one of many references to the reversal of gender roles. Earlier, for instance, Jenny complains 
about how every morning she leaves the vacuum out as a hint for Carl to vacuum, and every day 
when she comes home she finds it in exactly the same place. In that case, as in this one and 
others, Carl’s response to Jenny’s taking on a different gender role is the same: he jokes about it. 
In that instance, he complains about how annoying it is to trip on the vacuum every day. His 
complaint is not “real,” but a joking way of acknowledging Jenny’s rightness without 
acknowledging his fault.  
Other similar occurrences have occurred across the audio and video data gathered on the 
family during 2008 and 2010 (and a recent visit in December of 2010 had proven that these 
instances continue to be recycled, sometimes almost word-for-word). In these instances, the 
problem is opened with a complaint. Jenny is often the one who does this, usually making a 
reference to Carl’s lack of effort or completion regarding a household task. Sometimes, however, 
Carl will mention something—for example in one case he mentioned that the laundry was in the 
way in the kitchen (washing and drying machines in England often are found in the kitchen). In 
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response to this noticing, which makes the business of laundry relevant to Jenny, Jenny in turn 
asked Carl why he had not done anything about it. Since there was no way for Carl to concede 
Jenny’s point without acknowledging his own fault, nor argue with Jenny without seeming to 
explicitly treat her in a “housewife” role, Carl could only make a joke in response. Thus, in this 
case, the competing ideologies of fairness in the home constituted an ideological, and 
interactional, dilemma.  
In the case of washing up shown in the excerpt, Carl jokes while accepting Jenny’s point 
as well: he gives a not-real complaint about how long it takes to research on the internet (lines 8-
9), which as in the case of tripping over the vacuum, is clearly not a good reason to have not 
done, or to complain about, the household tasks Jenny keeps trying to assign to him. Carl goes on 
to give several such complaints about his life at home (lying down, getting a neck ache; lines 
13,15) and his turning the situation into a humorous one provides an opening for him to 
transition to a new topic without being held accountable to the old one.  
This interaction serves to maintain the status quo of the family roles. On one hand, it 
indexes the family’s past of who did what. Though previously Jenny and Carl both worked, 
Jenny was still consistently responsible for cooking, cleaning house, washing up, doing laundry, 
etc. Now that Carl has even less to do than Jenny, that expectation remains. Carl resists 
household tasks and complains about the ones he does get even though they continue to be much 
smaller responsibilities than Jenny’s. He acknowledges Jenny’s point of view regarding the norm 
of fairness and equal tasks, but he resists her point of view based on the gendered expectations 
within which he was raised. A local fairness norm is thus in conflict with a cultural gender norm. 
Carl’s use of humor functions to acknowledge Jenny’s rightness and stave off her counter-
critiques for the time being, shifts the conversation and takes the seriousness of the question of 
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his responsibility “off the radar.” This recreates the family’s identity in which Jenny’s role 
remains the same as it has always been.  
The meaning of this interaction is manifold to the participants. It is simultaneously a 
judgment ritual, dealing with criticism and accounts; some light-hearted teasing; a serious issue; 
and a problematic event. The norms for doing domesticity seem to conflict in this and other 
instances. Humor is used to frame all of the interactions around this ongoing issue, such that it is 
never treated as a very serious one. And there is no evidence, also, that it is treated as serious 
gender issue by the participants—locally, its codes appear guided by an ideology of fairness. 
Present in many cultural contexts in the West at least, fairness guides many of people’s espoused 
constraints on particular actions. But the fairness expected of relational partners in the home may 
not line up with traditional expectations of men and women in the community.  
Indexing in families is complex because as Gordon (2009) notes, talk contains 
intertextual references to interactional instances in the family’s history—this is woven through 
indexical references to culture. Repetition is a way of maintaining certain family beliefs, 
practices, myths, and problems (Gordon, 2009; Tannen, 2007). By participating in cultural 
expectations for family member roles and duties, families enact their private identity while 
positioning themselves in relation to local notions of family. Because family norms and larger 
community ideologies do not always match entirely—or in cases in which tensions exist between 
private norms and public discourses—problems will inevitably arise. Family norms can 
incorporate the multiple ideologies of the culture in which they live. Often families are 
constructed of multiple ideologies, not necessarily spoken individually by members, but shared 
and negotiated between (and within) all of them differently across time (Baxter, 2006). 
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Because conflicting ideologies are backgrounded in “shared” cultures, they are negotiated 
in the moment through other available resources, such as particular topics (household chores, 
work). In the case of this family, complaints and criticisms became a moral discursive practice 
for raising a fairness issue, while humor was used as the primary method for working out which 
moralities the family would orient to for that moment. Though cultural moralities related to 
gender roles and work values are not specific only to British life, they are contextualized in a 
British setting and managed through the particularly ubiquitous British strategy of humor.  
This analysis is a particularly “family-like” situation. The particular pattern over many 
years around domestic chores is not common among friends. The next analysis again concerns a 
group of people, this time friends, who encounter different kinds of situations around gender and 
work in different ways. These friends were born or raised from a young age in the same town. As 
with this example, the existence of differing and contradictory ideologies around work, 
relationships and identity prove problematic for the practice of morality.  
The Case of U.S. American Friends 
Studies have demonstrated the phenomenon in which people of Caucasian background 
see themselves as “having no culture” and resist ethnic labeling (e.g., Bucholtz, 2001; Thurlow, 
2003). The culture of such people is often taken to be representative of the U.S. majority, and is 
associated with being middle class and living in the suburbs. In this analysis I discuss an 
example of a group of friends within this category to consider how they negotiate cultural 
expectations of education, gender and work in a time in which those expectations are in flux. 
Data come from field notes, interviews, and eight hours of audio and video data recorded in 
2005, 2008 and 2010. 
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The group of friends consists of a core group of six men, and a rotating group of various 
others as well as romantic partners. The town they live in is a small, largely suburban, largely 
white middle class town in the San Francisco Bay Area. They were raised, and still live, in the 
“downtown” area, which is associated with lower middle class and working class people, 
subsidized housing, and greater incidences of juvenile delinquency. Serious crimes are rare, and 
when they occur, are attributed to these lower class neighborhoods or the influx of “outsiders,” 
largely Latinos and African Americans, moving in or visiting to cause trouble from the 
neighboring poorer and much more ethnically diverse town. Despite the lower class perception 
of the area, the standard of living is in reality far higher than even that of the neighboring city. 
 Elementary schools are abundant in this little town—there are five total—and restrict 
enrollment to their immediate neighborhoods; thus the elementary schools reflect the background 
of the people in the area, and are largely homogenously composed of those people. However, all 
of these students are fed into only one middle school, and then one high school, creating a 
significant mixing by the time people graduate. Interestingly, however, high school students for 
the most part associate strongly with their neighborhoods and the elementary schools where they 
first met. This results in social groups that form around class-based backgrounds in addition to 
particular hobbies, interests and activities that bring people together in high school. Though the 
differences between the classes are not huge—housing is costly throughout the area—the small 
differences in student backgrounds are marked in the high school.   
 The high school’s institutional ideology drives at a white, upper class, education-oriented 
ideal. Students are encouraged almost immediately, through counselors and countless practice 
SAT tests, to think of college as an inevitable next step. From sophomore year, Advanced 
Placement classes separate the academically excellent from the mediocre—supposedly. And, 
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also from the second year, students who regularly underperform or exhibit behavioral problems 
are transported to the continuation school. Every step of the way, an institutional rule serves to 
separate those who fit within the school’s discourse, and those who do not.  
The six men all attended the high school and were subject to the discourse of education 
and liberal perspective on gender roles. These men, however, face tensions between their own 
gendered norms and the norms espoused by parents and community members of their town. 
These men have come to reject the role of “organized” education, take up working class 
occupations and values, and date significantly younger women whose anti-feminist orientations 
align with the maintenance of this way of life.  
 All of the men in this group stayed at the main town high school, meaning they never did 
poorly enough or misbehaved enough to be sent to the continuation school, though all graduated 
with GPAs below 1.7. Throughout the end of high school, all articulated desires to go to college 
and find good jobs which were consistent with the orientation of their school and the middle 
class background of their parents. There are some notable differences, however, between these 
young men and other men and women who espoused the same goals. First, these men did not do 
well in school and were never admitted to an Advanced Placement course. Second, they did not 
participate in school activities such as sports, clubs, music or drama. And third, they identified 
throughout high school with a “punk” ethos that was distrustful of conformity and authority.  
 Subsequently, these young men also did not do similar things as their classmates after 
high school. One never attempted to go to college. Two started in a four-year university but 
eventually dropped out. Three have been in and out of community colleges, but have never 
moved onto a four-year university and rarely complete their semesters at the community college. 
All of them, regardless of where they moved after high school, eventually returned to their 
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hometown and have been there at least six years. All of them are either currently unemployed or 
work in industry or local service jobs. All have worked several jobs in succession, sometimes 
several simultaneously, and between jobs have moved back in with their parents due to the high 
cost of living in the area.  
 These men constitute a contradiction. On one hand, they are raised in liberal, white, 
middle class neighborhoods (even if they live in lower class sections of them) where they receive 
the same education, are encouraged to value that education, and receive the same gendered 
discourses as others in their community. There has been research (e.g. Archer & Hutchings, 
2000) which indicates that these discourses are less successful among ethnically diverse, lower 
class high school students—that not only do such groups not achieve the ideals presented to 
them, but that even if they espouse those ideals initially, eventually they will adopt a 
counterrhetoric, constructing their own ideologies. Interestingly, however, most of the men in the 
larger group, and in this immediate group of six individuals, are white; and though they were 
raised in the perceived “lower class” sections of the downtown area, they are significantly better-
off than those living in poorer neighboring cities. For all intents and purposes, despite having the 
“right” background and receiving the same education and support (at least to begin with) as 
others in their high school, these men did not end up enacting the portrait of success with which 
they were presented by the liberal educational ideologies of their town and school.  
These men, for various complicated reasons, find themselves unable to live within those 
discourses, unable to work within those frames. Instead, they develop their own frame in which 
they form a working-class enclave within a middle class background in which labor and 
toughness is valued over white collar jobs and education. Their large circle of friendly 
acquaintances, as well as their girlfriends, support this frame; and the attitudes of friends and 
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girlfriends are valued by the men much more strongly than the admonitions of their parents. In 
their interactions, they enact conservative, working-class, masculine-centered identities that 
favor the status quo lifestyle they have achieved in which having freedom and being tough is 
more important than education or financial stability. 
 The excerpts below demonstrate how the men in this community deal with perceived 
threats to their interpersonal norms from the cultural norms espoused by their communities. The 
first excerpt deals with the value of work and the importance of freedom. The second excerpt 
features attitudes toward masculinity. In the third excerpt, two of the men and their girlfriends 
collaboratively produce an anti-feminist stance that affirms their orientations toward traditional 
gender roles.  
Excerpt 22 “Six Men” [frn.vis05.2.E3.1(audio)]
Jon:  Hey I just got a new job= 69 
JR:  =oh yeah? 70 
Darren: washin dishes 71 
Jon:  washing dishes yeah at that new restaurant on second (.) have you been 72 
  there?= 73 
JR:  =no 74 
Jon:  not the best job but (.) it’s pretty laid back 75 
Alex:  [except when you have to wake up in the morning] 76 
Darren: [except when you sleep in and [the boss calls you] ((laughs)) 77 
Jon:       [except- yeah- ha ha but- but-] 78 
JR:  oh no 79 
Jon:  it was fine my boss is cool (.) I don’t have a lot of hours right now which 80 
  kind of  sucks but (.) I mean I like the time to myself but I need the money 81 
Darren: that’s why I love my job I have the whole day to myself [and my job] 82 
Alex:                 [and your] job 83 
  makes hella money 84 
JR:  but you get off so late (.) I never see you anymore (.) I just can’t wait until 85 
  two am these days (.) gettin old= 86 
Darren: =that and I’m usually sleeping until the afternoon 87 
(1.0) 88 
JR:  these tiny windows of opportunity 89 
Alex:  I’m thinkin of quittin my job (.) even though I’m broke 90 
JR:  I thought you liked that job 91 
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Alex:  at first yeah (0.5) now I’m gettin called at the time I mean it’s good money 92 
  and it was sweet when it was like hunnerd dollars for a Sunday or  93 
  somethin but (.) too much work ((laughs))94 
  
In this excerpt, which occurs a year and a half after graduating high school, three friends 
from the group are sitting around Jon’s living room, listening to music and talking. Jon makes an 
announcement (line 69), clearly meant for JR as everyone else knows about it. This turns the 
conversation to work. Jon had previously been unemployed for several months, so getting a job 
is particularly newsworthy. This prompts others to talk about work, Darren mentioning his job at 
a recycling plant (line 81), where he works from late in the evening until early the next morning, 
and Alex mentioning possibly quitting his job, which is with a construction agency (painting 
houses) (line 90). In these references, money and freedom are prominent themes. Having a job is 
seen as better than not having one, but not having a job is seen as better than having a restrictive 
job (e.g., lines 92-94).  
There is little effort here to downplay the types of jobs the men have, though these jobs 
were not the ones toward which their educations were aimed, and are not culturally high-status 
jobs. Instead, the jobs are evaluated based on their ability to pay a lot and provide freedom and a 
good working atmosphere. However, playing up the positive sides to these jobs could be a 
performance for JR, who at that time had just returned from getting her MA. Or such 
performances could be implicitly contrasted with associations of typical “business jobs” where 
people have to dress up, stay in an office, and don’t necessarily have flexible working hours or 
much free time.  
The next excerpt features an interesting contrast of talk around notions of masculinity. In 
the first fragment, Jon relates the story of a friend JR has not met, Casey, and Casey’s various 
accomplishments. Shortly after, an impromptu “drag” performance prompts multiple displays of 
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gender. The two fragments here occur during a party where the main group of friends (the “six 
men”) are gathered, with the author, in chairs around a coffee table. Others are in the kitchen, 
and a couple are on a sofa by the television set.  
Excerpt 23 Fragment 1 “Six Men” [frn.vis05.2.E3.2]
Jon:  have you met Casey 94 
JR:  m (.) I don’t think so  95 
Darren: you’ve met Casey 96 
Jon:  she hasn’t 97 
Owen:  he’s a high schooler 98 
Jon:  yeah (.) but he’s the toughest fucking high schooler you’ve ever- 99 
Owen:  [oh yeah I wasn’t saying]  100 
Alex:  [that guy is huge] 101 
Jon:  he’s bigger than Marvin 102 
JR:  wo (.) how old is he? 103 
Dan:  he’s like (.) f(h)[ifteen] 104 
Jon:     [fifteen] (.) yeah 105 
JR:  is he coming here? Tonight I mean 106 
Jon:  I don’t know (.) yeah people are so scared [of him] 107 
Darren:              [which is] so ironic- 108 
Jon:  he’s like an actual punk Mohawk leather jacket everything 109 
Dan:  there’s reason to be scared 110 
Frank:  I heard he curbed someone 111 
Owen:  [no::] 112 
Alex:  [fuck] no that’s- I’ve never heard that= 113 
Frank:  =well I heard something= 114 
Craig:  =what that he put a guy in a coma?= 115 
Darren: [oh:: shit] 116 
Jon:  [seriously?] 117 
Dan:  [(I heard that)] 118 
Jon:  well- well what I know is he cracked one of Tim Cleeve’s teeth 119 
Darren: yeah (.) Bill told me that 120 
Jon:  Tim said some shit about his sister (.) Casey’s little sister 121 
Darren: yeah that’s the thing about Casey he’s not just like (.) like= 122 
Craig:  =(like) just kicking ass like some baboon 123 
Jon:  right (.) but he’s hella strong and he looks scary as hell 124 
Darren: yeah but he’s the nicest guy that’s the thing= 125 
Craig:  =what a sweetie ((laughs)) 126 
Alex:  just don’t cross him127 
 
Excerpt 23 Fragment 2 “Six Men” 
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Taylor: [slap his ass again] 128 
JR:  [((laughing))] 129 
Alex:  ( ) be and then a fuck- oh:: (.) damn brother= 130 
Sara:  =that’s disturbing 131 
Alex:  problems 132 
Darren: I have no problems (.) I can get any man I want 133 
 134 
JR:  [((laughing))] 135 
Craig:  oh:: fuck 136 
JR:  wow 137 
Alex:  that man is very secure [with himself (I’m just saying)] 138 
Craig:       [( )                                          ]139 
 
Excerpt 23 Fragment 3 “Six Men”  
 
Alex:  He:y fucker quit grabbin my titties (.) that’s sexual harassment I took a 139 
  training class= 140 
Dan:  =I didn’t (.) hey her ass- her ass is two words fucker= 141 
Darren: =that’s [right] 142 
Dan:   [her   ](.) ass 143 
Alex:  I swear to god (.) (it fuckin fit) I need to keep drinkin 144 
JR:  ((laughs)) 145 
Georgia: hey I have another outfit who else wants to be dressed as a [girl] 146 
Craig:                   [how] does that 147 
  feel comin from a man 148 
Alex:  like I should be able to ( ) 149 
. 150 
.  ((4.0 seconds of unintelligible overlap deleted)) 151 
. 152 
Georgia: please will you be dressed like a girl? 153 
Craig:  I don’t mind at all 154 
(2.0) 155 
Alex:  you want some baby how you doin boy how you do::in:: 156 
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 157 
JR:  ((laughs)) 158 
159 
 
 
 In the first of these fragments from a party, various people use the identity of Casey to 
work out what an “ideal” man is like: scary, large, tough, skilled at fighting (lines 99, 101-102, 
107, 109), but not “a baboon” or someone who just goes around beating people up (121-127). 
Revealed here is a kind of “ideology of honor” similar to that found among the men of 
Teamsterville in Philipsen’s study (1975). To fight on behalf of someone else is considered the 
best reason to fight; and fighting is considered a reasonable response to insults directed toward 
self, but particularly toward friends, family or romantic partners. These masculinity values are 
not shared by the men’s larger communities or families, but have been constructed by these men 
to form a distinctive identity with one another. Though the stereotypical masculine performances 
prohibit certain characteristics of closeness such as displays of affection, it is clear from the 
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collaborative talk practices, the large body of common knowledge, and the shared orientations 
toward gender and work that these men are in fact very close friends.  
 This celebration of “tough” masculinity is contrasted only a few minutes later when a 
young woman who lives at the house convinces Darren to dress in her clothes. In the second 
fragment, Darren has just emerged in drag and there is an explosion of teasing. The negative 
element of the teasing (swearing at the situation, claiming it is disturbing and that Darren has 
“problems”) (lines 130-132) are turned around by Darren himself. He reframes the allegation that 
he has “problems” (i.e. gender problems, mental problems) by asserting he can get any man he 
wants (line 133) and then mock-attacking Craig (line 134). Thus the meaning of “problems” is 
demonstrated in relation to sexual prowess. But it takes on a different meaning as well, in which 
Darren has no problems with his known identity as a heterosexual male. Alex picks up on this 
meaning in line 138.  
 This tension between how to display masculinity emerges out of changing and competing 
cultural ideologies. In the past, and among more conservative working class men, the way to 
show masculinity was to ridicule anything female or homosexual-male. Clearly the men are 
orienting to that tradition here. But there is a new ideology regarding homophobia in the U.S., 
which is that to display too much discomfort toward homosexuality is considered a sign that one 
is “closeted” or insecure in one’s own masculinity. That ideology, simultaneously, is at work 
here, and perhaps because of it, Alex and Craig eventually join in. 
 Between fragments two and three, Darren is convinced to sit on Dan’s lap alongside 
Dan’s girlfriend (he is referred to as “Dan’s new bitch” and someone else shouts “Dan’s got two 
bitches!”). Then another guest at the party picks Darren up and there are shouts of “take him 
across the doorstep!” This is followed by a break in the film, and upon return, Alex has also 
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dressed up in women’s clothing (fragment three). Fragment three continues the invocations of 
various gender roles that occurred in between the fragments, which espouses a dominant stance 
of men and masculinity toward women and femininity. By taking on a feminine persona, Darren 
becomes a “bitch”; Alex’s mock claims of sexual harassment are ridiculed (139-143). None of 
the small minority of women (only three out of the whole crowd) treats these comments as 
unusual or responds to them at all.  
 In the last part of fragment three, Craig too agrees to be dressed like a girl, and the 
utterance “I don’t mind at all” (line 154) again is a way if displaying masculinity by being 
agreeable to dressing more “feminine.” Since dressing in drag here serves to (1) ridicule 
femininity, (2) display one’s security with one’s own masculinity, and (3) allows the men to 
show more of their clearly masculine bodies, it becomes a safe activity, and might in fact be 
taken as face-threatening for someone who protested, refused to dressed up, or was openly 
uncomfortable. In fact, the only person at the party who displays some discomfort is significantly 
older (by 15 years) than the rest of the people there, and thus could be said to be more affected 
by an older ideology of how to display masculinity. He is notably silent during the previous 
“shows” and when Alex picks him up and “comes on to” him (lines 156-157), he puts up with it, 
but makes no response, and his tense reaction seems to be one of waiting for it to end. In line 
159, when Alex finally lets him go, he kicks at Alex as he walks back into the kitchen.  
 In the next example, traditional attitudes toward men and women are also constructed, 
this time through disparaging feminism and performing the expectation that a woman’s role is to 
take care of her man. This excerpt takes place three years later, at Jon’s house. Jon and Darren, 
by this time in their late 20s, and their girlfriends, who are in their late teens and who are also 
sisters, are watching a film when JR comes to visit. After the film they all end up playing a card 
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game called “Apples to Apples.” In this game there are red cards with nouns and gerunds listed, 
and green cards with adjectives listed. The red card is placed face up with the noun/gerund and 
the other players pick the adjective they think best describes the noun. At the beginning of this 
excerpt, a game has just ended, and Georgia is going through red cards, making up her own 
adjectives, and trying to get people to guess what the noun on the card is.  
Excerpt 24 “Six Men” [frn.vis08.4.E1.1(audio)]
Georgia: oh this one’s (0.5) okay how about man hating bitch? 160 
Darren: Hilary Clinton? 161 
Nancy:  what is it? ((Georgia shows her the card)) oh ((laughs))  162 
Jon:  what is it? 163 
Nancy:  feminist= 164 
Georgia: =oh you’re not a feminist are you? 165 
JR:  n- uh I don’t think I’d call myself that no 166 
Georgia: so stupid (.) ugly women 167 
Darren: like I said (.) Hilary Clinton 168 
Jon:  smoke break?  169 
(5.0) ((Jon and Darren go outside, Georgia shuffles the cards)) 170 
Georgia: it’s amazing how much laundry I have to do this weekend (.) I’m doing 171 
  Jon’s too (1.0) if I didn’t do it he would wear the same shit over and over 172 
Nancy:  yeah I do Darren’s laundry his shit gets so dirty from his job= 173 
Georgia: =oh yeah (0.5) when Jon has a gig it’s the same thing 174 
Nancy:  somehow I end up cooking most of the time [too] 175 
Georgia:       [yeah] and Jon is a good cook 176 
  actually but it’s like (.) he’ll just have cheetos or something (.) and  177 
  there is never anything in this house= 178 
JR:  =yeah [it’s always been like that] 179 
Nancy:   [I’m pretty sure Darren] wouldn’t eat at all if it wasn’t for me (.) 180 
  god knows how he made it this far  181 
Georgia: oh my god I know ((Nancy and Georgia laugh))182 
183 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 292 
 
 
 
 This excerpt begins with Georgia coming up with the not-quite-an-adjective “man hating 
bitch” as a descriptive (in this case alleged synonym) of the noun, “feminist,” which is on the 
card she is holding (line 160). This joke is not produced as if it were going to offend anyone, 
until Georgia realizes JR is there (whom she doesn’t know well) and thus checks in to make sure 
JR is not a feminist (line 165). Various other descriptors are also attributed to feminism and 
feminists and to the supposed negative qualities of feminists (e.g., “stupid,” “ugly women,” 
“Hilary Clinton”) (lines 167-168). As in the prior examples, this enactment secures the 
traditional gender orientations in the group. This is discussed in terms of romantic relationships 
by Georgia and Nancy, who are sisters, in lines 171-182. They go through a litany of non-serious 
complaints about their boyfriends (Jon and Darren) who are out having a smoke break. These 
complaints are produced almost as a “one upping” ritual, with each young woman going back 
and forth trying to prove how much more devotedly each cares for her boyfriend. By dressing 
these boasts up as complaints, they are able to show pride toward their nearly wife-status 
domestic duties as a way of showing the level of commitment in their relationships. As sisters, 
they compete in a small way while aligning in values. As romantic partners of the two men and 
friends of the group, they also support the conservative orientations toward gender which are 
displayed over and over again by their boyfriends and the larger group of men which whom they 
spend most of their time.  
The interactions above featured various tacit stances being displayed against the 
discourses within which the men were raised. These stances acknowledge but do not confront the 
assumptions of education, gender and work dominant in their community. Though their 
interactions contained an outsider (the author) who could be said to represent that community 
and its ideals of success, and perhaps thus prompted these performances, it is not necessarily the 
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case that these enactments would never have happened. Doing social identity is often in part 
achieved by contrasting one’s identity with that of an explicit or unnamed other in order to “do” 
the boundaries of the group (Bailey, 2000a).  
The meanings of these interactions are largely about group identity. Group identity can be 
achieved in many ways, but here, moral discursive practices seem to serve to interactionally 
achieve a conservative, working-class ethos of masculinity. The men follow codes of conduct 
and communication designed to enact themselves in fairly stereotypical ways at times, but also in 
ways that are perceived as authentic and real. Doing these identity enactments strengthens their 
sense of closeness with one another and reinforces the morality of their communicative behavior. 
Nonetheless, problems arise, from other potential ideologies existing in their community and 
cultural context, from the presence of outsiders to their group, and from changes occurring in 
their society.  
 The two cases described here featured people from more or less similar backgrounds. 
These people live or have lived in a particular place. They share common activities and values. 
And yet, their lives are not all harmony. Contradictions arise which must be interpersonally 
managed to achieve a particular relationship identity. Competing ideologies within communities 
and cultural orientations were interactionally negotiated through humor, accounts, and gender 
displays. These moral interactions were accomplished in slightly different ways between the 
family and friend situations. For example, in the family interaction, gender roles were largely 
tacit, forming the basis of people’s judgments of one another’s behavior. In the friend 
interaction, gender was more explicitly a topic, related to entertainment and employed as a way 
to negotiate identities with one another. In the next section, I summarize these analytic results 
and discuss their implications.  
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The Cultural Context of Moral Practice 
Cultural ideologies abound in society. They are communicated through family, media, 
and networks of friends, coworkers, romantic partners, acquaintances. These ideologies do not 
exist prior to, or above, interaction. Instead, they are interactionally achieved as conversational 
participants go about their daily lives, performed and ratified into continued existence. Even 
small moves such as when to smile at someone, the games one plays, and the best way to turn a 
person down for lunch are ways of recreating ideology in a local situation. Moral discursive 
practices—actions, rituals, ways of talking, language—are a technique for instantiating ideology 
as well as confronting its problems. In the examples discussed above, ideological themes—
around how to be a good housemate, a good husband or wife, a good man, a good girlfriend, a 
good communicator—proved interactionally problematic because the ideologies around these 
notions are not homogenous even when the “culture” appears to be shared.  
This lack of homogeneity brings up the point about the intersection of morality and 
difference, which will be developed further in the next two chapters. To preview, as Bakhtin 
(1981) noted, language and the world it creates is not unitary, but heteroglossic, a dynamic 
interplay of voices and ideologies in tension with one another. This is true about cultural 
backgrounds, situations, relationships and individuals; it is true about interaction, and 
interaction’s accomplishment of these things. And yet, the achievement of commonality and 
sharedness, of group identity, or some minimal convergence of interaction, is a significant factor 
in human life. Thus, the difference involved in ideology has the potential to produce anxiety, and 
moral practice is in part seeking to manage that anxiety even as it creates that anxiety.  
Though the cultural contexts examined here were prima facie uncomplicated, culture is 
indeed a complex concept which encompasses many contradictions. As Streeck (2002) points 
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out, the enduring association between culture and particular groups or geographic locations is a 
problematic one. It leads to assumptions of discrete, clear boundaries, homogenous groups, and 
abstract histories that essentialize and oversimplify people’s practices and identities. However, 
empirical studies of culture largely focus on particular groups of people in particular places. 
Because cultural approaches are so tied to an ethnographic methodology, and because 
ethnography is generally site-based, studies of culture do tend to study something that appears to 
echo was Streeck and others have cautioned against. My point in bringing up this tricky 
relationship between theorizing culture and practicing the research of it is that the delineation 
between “cultural communication” and “intercultural communication” is no longer clear at all, if 
it ever was. Thus the problem of ideology is also a problem of culture, but the problem of culture 
is often obscured unless culture becomes saliently different (as in the next chapter). 
From a grounded practical theory approach, the results of this chapter indicate some of 
the cultural problems which can arise in the joint process of interactionally creating a “moral” 
situation. Participants engaged in a number of strategies, such as humor and facework, in order to 
reconcile the competing cultural ideologies being worked out in interaction. In doing these 
strategies, certain ideals for the practice were revealed, including the idea that practices should 
accomplish harmony in a social or familial group—the upshot of this being largely an orientation 
toward maintaining the (apparently positive) “status quo” rather than engaging in conflict or 
challenging routines. This brings up a couple of difficulties in theorizing moral communication: 
(1) that ideals for a practice may themselves conflict, and (2) that where ideals do not conflict, 
they may be damaging in the long run for relationships. These issues are returned to in chapter 
nine. 
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Chapter six reconstructed “ideology” as a collection of practices for doing morality based 
on an ideal of shared moral orientations. The next chapter, chapter seven, discusses culture as a 
moral discursive practice in intercultural communication. From the perspective of GPT, culture 
and intercultural contact involves explicit confrontations with expected differences which are 
assumed to need managing to (re)construct a shared relational orientation. Chapter seven 
analyzes the problem enacting culture in intercultural friend and family interactions to 
reconstruct culture as a moral practice.  
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Chapter 7 
The Trouble with Culture for Doing Morality 
Culture is, to some extent, composed of “intercultures.” Groups come into conflict. 
Romantic couples find themselves at odds with their communities. Friends raised in the same 
town clash over ethnically marked but morally invisible backgrounds. When people who index 
themselves as culturally similar engage in communicative practices, they work out tensions so as 
to render them as coherent and non-conflicting as possible. People of course will have 
differences in particular communities, but in close relationships, such communities (religious, 
political, etc.) are shared or assumed to be shared—people refer to “my community,” “our 
community” (Schotter, 1993) and rarely “one of my communities.” This reinforces the notion of 
a strong relational identity situated in a common culture. But among close people whose cultural 
differences are more clearly marked, different strategies must be employed, ones which manage 
the ways in which contradictory moral values in participants’ backgrounds can potentially 
damage the shared relationship of those participants.  
This chapter discusses culture as a moral discursive practice. From the perspective of 
GPT, culture and intercultural contact involve explicit confrontations with expected differences 
that must be managed to construct a shared relational orientation. Chapter seven analyzes the 
problem of enacting culture in intercultural friend and family interactions to argue that 
intercultural interactions make salient cultural ideologies in a way that offers different 
management techniques than in situations where culture appears more obviously shared. To 
relegate the potential difference implied in intercultural relationships, friends and families work 
to align and signal a unique “shared” culture based on overlapping or merged ideologies.  
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This chapter focuses on the problem of culture, particularly of intercultural moral 
intraction. In this chapter, ideologies are more saliently attributed to cultural backgrounds or 
patterns of speaking and being rather than orienting to invisible unshared ideologies. A 
difference is noted, commented on, and/or acted on. The chapter analyzes how cultural 
differences and the assumedly different ideologies associated with them shape and are shaped in 
relational interaction. The problem of culture for morality involves the way in which different 
cultural assumptions, and their potentially different ideologies, are dealt with in close 
intercultural relationships.  
This chapter focuses on intercultural families and friendships and the ways in which 
different cultural ideologies are interactionally achieved in moral practice. Intercultural 
relationships can encounter different ideologies and include different notions of what moral 
practices are for and how they should be done. In the last few chapters, I have mentioned how 
the concept of “difference” can be problematic for enacting morality in interpersonal 
relationships. Some of these differences may be situational or relational, as when a private 
conversation in a car occasions more explicit moral talk than would occur among family. 
Chapter five, for example, looked at how talking about sex was sanctioned in some situations 
and not in others; and for certain relationships, but not others. Some of these differences may be 
cultural, with different expectations regarding giving others attention or enacting appropriate 
gender roles. Chapter four for instance looked at fairly Western notions of how to do good 
intersubjectivity in a family, while chapter six examined local situations where contradictory 
cultural gender norms had to be dealt with. In all of these situations, problems could always 
arise. 
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The next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures 
introduced in chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to 
culture. The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and 
managing culture. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for participants’ 
situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.   
Morality as Cultural Practice 
 Chapter six discussed cultural practices as ideological. This chapter continues that theme, 
but focuses more explicitly on saliently “intercultural” interactions where people’s identifications 
with different cultures are marked. The following sections begin with a review of intercultural 
and cultural research, then review the link between culture and ideology as an intercultural 
problem. 
Intercultural Interaction and Cultural Practice 
Interpersonal research has explored numerous avenues regarding intercultural 
relationships, including that of intercultural difference as a barrier to uncertainty reduction 
(Gudykunst, 1985), and comparing interpersonal relationships cross-culturally (Gudykunst, 
Ting-Toomey & Nishida, 1996). Interpersonal relationships which are themselves intercultural 
have also been investigated (Ting-Toomey & Korzenny, 1991), and studies of cultural, 
intercultural and cross-cultural communication theories have been developed which seek to 
explain the effects of culture on group outcomes and effectiveness, identity, adaptation, face, 
standpoint, and competence (Gudykunst, 2003). All of these perspectives consider to varying 
degrees the role of norms, interpersonal expectations and/or interactional problems that highlight 
the ways in which culture in interpersonal communication can be morally inflected. 
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Discourse approaches to culture include interactional sociolinguistics (Gumperz, 1982), 
ethnography of speaking and communication (Gumperz & Hymes, 1972), anthropological 
linguistics/linguistic anthropology (Duranti, 1997), and sociocultural linguistics (Bucholtz & 
Hall, 2008). These perspectives focus on slightly different kinds of social interaction. The 
ethnography of speaking, for instance, was designed for obtaining a rich portrait of a particular 
cultural setting through the SPEAKING acronym (Scene/Setting, Participants, Ends, Act 
sequence, Key, Instrumentalities, Norms, Genre). Interactional sociolinguistics, on the other 
hand, was more focused on intercultural encounters and the contextualization cues which 
implicated participants’ attributions of cultural identity to one another (Gumperz, 1982). These 
two approaches also indicate the uneven focus on problems in studies of culture, in which 
intracultural research is less likely to focus on problems than intercultural research. 
Goffman (1974) presented numerous potential problems for people who do not share the 
same frame. As mentioned in chapter two, framing practices are analyzeable as cultural 
practices, local community ways of seeing situations in a certain way. Thus, if two people from 
two different cultures or ways-of-framing come together, trouble can arise. In order for people to 
adjust their actions to one another and see the situation as intelligible, there must be an 
intersubjective overlap (see chapter four) and ability to comprehend the signals (Bateson, 1972). 
 From a grounded practical theory perspective, then, intercultural contact poses potential 
problems for people in close relationships, where what might otherwise be called 
“misunderstanding” can create serious consequences where relational sharedness is assumed. 
The next section further discusses the problem of culture and its relationship to ideology.  
Ideology and (Inter)culture 
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 As discussed in chapter six, ideologies are situated accomplishments. They are labels for 
and ways of making sense of interactional practices. Moral practices are thus ways of doing 
ideology. Cultural practices which involve morality—raising a child to be a “good” member of 
society, for example—may themselves be based on competing ideologies, but are complicated 
further when cultures are seen as different. Different relational ideals can exist for families and 
friends. Fitch (1998) notes for example in her study of Colombian relationships that Colombians 
have an ideology of “connectedness,” that people’s identities are actually formed of the bonds 
they have with everyone else. This ideology can clash in practice with a more individualistic one 
that might be found among many U.S. Americans.  
In the last chapter, ideologies were rarely indexed directly because they were tacit, 
assumed to be consistent and compatible. In this chapter, ideologies may not be explicitly talked 
about, but are pointed out more clearly in metadiscursive moves which, as Fitch (1998) 
mentions, are one way in which people indicate their unspoken premises about interpersonal 
ideologies. The examples in the ensuing analysis are often not of the paradigm “two different 
cultures.” As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and in chapter six, cultures are multiple, 
and involve different extents of participation. The next chapter discusses some methodological 
issues, then presents case studies of complex intercultural interactions.  
Culture as a Moral Discursive Practice 
In the previous chapter, I described several ways of conceptualizing culture—as practice, 
as material, as ideological, as rhetorical—and how it might be “seen” as indexed in discourse. I 
employ this conceptualization alongside that analytic approach in this chapter in an analysis of 
increasingly culturally complex situations. The situations present, most obviously, “intercultural” 
communication. Yet at the same time, none of these cases involve people who have completely 
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separate, never-overlapping cultural orientations. And when it comes to moralities—norms of 
how to be and how to act—each of the cases presented share certain values.  
This has implications for analysis. In some ways, it makes analysis easier. People who 
have some unshared cultural elements tend to be more sensitive to differences and reflexive 
about culture in their talk with others. On the other hand, because elements of culture and norms 
are shared, it is sometimes difficult to say exactly when one culture is being indexed versus 
another. The following analyses account for these difficulties in two ways. First, indexings of 
culture are situated within the relationship. Orientations to cultural difference are presumed to 
manage differences within the relationship. Ignoring differences and focusing on agreed-to 
relationship norms without attention to culture are presumed to construct a shared sense of 
culture.  
Second, instances of accounting are treated as relevant to the perception of a cultural 
difference when such accounts reference general rather than personal norms. For example, in one 
of the following examples, a young woman discusses ethnicity in relation to physical 
appearance. Her accounts, which seek to minimize the face-threat of her statements, reflect a 
sensitivity to an American cultural norm of being “blind” to ethnic difference. Thus, her 
construction of self in relation to her friend indexes a cultural difference based on ethnicity, and 
a cultural sameness based on the expectation that people should not care about ethnic difference. 
Thus, in all cases, culture is seen as relevant when participants treat it as such, but because such 
treatments may be highly implicit, cultural background is needed to unpack the precise cultural 
resources which are drawn upon and proffered as relevant to interactional projects.  
The following analytic examples include a Finnish-American family in Finland and two 
sets of white and Asian American friends in the U.S. The first example, as in the last chapter, 
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involves a family, and also takes place in a particular region. However, it proves more complex 
because the family consists of people with numerous backgrounds who have lived, worked and 
traveled in a variety of places. These analyses highlight some of the intercultural problems that 
arise as friends and families seek to construct shared ideologies.   
The Case of a Finnish-American Family 
 This case is slightly more complicated than of the family discussed in the first example of 
chapter six. This example portrays the Bantry family of Mina and Albert, two college-educated 
individuals in their mid-30s who have two children, aged five and seven. Mina was born and 
raised in Finland, and Albert was born and raised in California. Both Buddhists, they met in 
India while Mina was doing research for her MA degree and Albert was on a personal 
pilgrimage. Data include a week’s worth of observation and field notes, interviews with Albert 
and Mina and a mutual friend, and more than three hours of video recording. 
The place where this family currently lives is on an island in the dense archipelago of 
southwest Finland. The municipality in which the family lives is tiny—less than nine inhabitants 
per kilometer—but the island they live on is especially empty: their community elementary 
school is about the size of a modest barn. Despite the small size, the highest standard of living is 
in the southwest. And almost everyone in Finland has a “summerhome” in the archipelagos 
which they visit in the summer, and everyone gets the entire month of July for vacation (the 
better to visit the summerhome, presumably).  
Finland is a country in which most people exhibit strong ties to a national, historic 
identity—many are familiar with old customs, practices, folklore and traditional artifacts, and 
many identify with the idyllic country even if they live in the city most of the year. According to 
Hakli (1999), this is due to the widespread campaign on behalf of political leaders to develop a 
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unique Finnish identity, separate from Sweden and Russia, which occurred in the 19th and 20th 
century. But despite this widespread orientation with and understanding of larger discourses 
about Finnishness, the concept of a local Finnish “identity” is, according to Ollila (1998), a 
relatively recent one, only notable since the 1960s. In other words, people did not explicitly in 
their everyday lives “claim” being Finnish or talk about people’s Finnishness.  
Nowadays, however, such talk is far fairly common. According to an interview with 
Mina, Finnish people are aware of behavioral and communicative differences (or stereotypes), 
particularly based on the east-west distinction. Western Finnish, for instance, are seen as more 
reserved and less expressive. Mina told what she called a “common joke” of the region, in which 
she remarked, “if you see a man laughing, smiling and saying hello to everyone, Finnish people 
will tell you he must be either drunk, insane, or American.” This notion of the “stoic Finn” is 
reflected in discourse research on Finnish communicative styles (Berry & Carbaugh, 2006; 
Carbaugh, Berry & Nurmikari-Berry, 2004; Wilkins, 2005). 
There is a sizeable body of discourse analytic work in Finland, though as with the British 
example, it tends to be more critical and/or more oriented toward political and media talk (e.g., 
Pietikäinen, 2000, 2003; Pietikäinen & Dufva, 2006; Vaara & Tienari, 2002). Conversation 
analytic work also exists, deconstructing turn-taking and sequence in Finnish conversations (e.g., 
Ogden, 2001, 2004). The body of work within the ethnography of communication has 
demonstrated Finnish communicative styles as being oriented toward matter-of-factness in public 
and civic interactions (Wilkins, 2005), and demonstrative of the value of “quietude” (Berry & 
Carbaugh, 2006; Carbaugh, Berry & Nurmikari-Berry, 2004). 
 This background on Finland is meant to give a picture of the setting of the family, but the 
identity of the family is more complex because their backgrounds are not straightforwardly 
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Finnish. Though Mina was born and raised there, she has also travelled extensively, identifies 
strongly with California, and is Buddhist, which is not a common religion in Finland. Albert, 
though he has spent time in Finland and can speak some Finnish, was raised in a very liberal 
California town by “hippy” parents. Also Buddhist, he is much more open and expressive of his 
spiritual views. Their children, born each on a different continent, are bilingual in English and 
Finnish. Because Albert’s Finnish is still not as good as his English, often he and the children 
will converse in English, while the children and their mother converse in Finnish. Mina and 
Albert also mainly speak to each other in English. Thus, though this family lives in a particular 
region, they bring together many different backgrounds and cultural orientations. 
Their history is also an extremely mobile one. After spending several weeks together in 
India, Albert joined Mina in Finland and they married and had their daughter, Tina. Once Mina 
finished her degree, and since Albert during this time had been unable to find work in Finland, 
they decided to move to the U.S. They lived on the east coast for a couple years, where their son 
Ivan was born, then moved to California, where Mina worked at an elementary school and Albert 
worked in technology in a beach community. After a year they moved back to Finland, where 
they have lived in the same region in which Mina grew up for the last year and a half. Albert 
works in technology support from home and Mina has taken up various jobs related to the local 
church and works as a geriatric nurse. She also volunteers with a musical group and is often in 
the process of choreographing local performances for herself and Tina.  
 Mina and Albert’s home is heavily influenced by their Buddhist beliefs. They follow 
Feng Shui principles in their decoration, and there are numerous Buddhist icons and framed 
pictures of the Dalai Lama throughout the house. The primary color of the house is white, and it 
is extremely airy and sunny, with large windows that offer a view of the ocean on one side, and 
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forest on the other. Both Mina and Albert see themselves as raising their children in a Buddhist-
influenced “American” style rather than a Finnish one. Albert enjoys living in Finland, but does 
not culturally identify with it. Mina’s attitude is mixed, sometimes critical of her homeland, other 
times strongly identifying. She positions herself as an insider-outsider, claiming to be able to 
comment more easily than others on the cultural assumptions of Finland.  
In the family’s interactions, they work to negotiate the complexity of their cultural 
orientations and the meanings this has for their communicative practices, particularly in “finding 
their place” in Finland and raising their children. The use of English and Finnish, and code-
switching between them, become strategies for formulating identity alongside explicit 
discussions of culture (Hyrkstedt & Kalaja, 1998; Poplack, Wheeler & Westwood, 1987; 
Taavitsainen & Pahta, 2003). The two examples analyzed below display fragments of instances 
in which the family (1) tries to constitute its cultural identity and (2) manages the communicative 
practices of disciplining their children within the tension of American and Finish communicative 
norms.  
Excerpt 25“The Bantrys” [fam.frn.vac10.1.E2.1]
Albert:  Jan had to wait til nine to start so I was just talking to Mom (.) before (.) 32 
  she had- 33 
 34 
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but um (.) Ivan has (0.5) a card ((kisses Tina)) for Ivan (.) waiting for him 35 
(.) on the computer ((sets Tina down)) 36 
Mina:  will you take this to JR? ((to Tina)) 37 
. 38 
.  (18 seconds deleted) 39 
. 40 
Tina:  ((in Finnish)) 41 
Mina:  ((in Finish)) 42 
  43 
(2.0) 44 
Tina:  ((in Finnish))= 45 
Mina:  =((in Finnish)) 46 
Tina:  ((in Finnish)) 47 
Albert:  you wanna see the email Ivan? (1.0) you’re gonna see a birthday card= 48 
Mina:  he’s- needs to eat his candy first Ivan please sit down and finish your 49 
  candy 50 
(3.0) 51 
 
 
 This excerpt takes place during dessert. Mina, Tina and Ivan, plus Mina’s visiting friend 
from California, have been eating dinner. Albert during this time was supposed to get a 
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conference call from work, and was in his office. While everyone is eating candy, Albert comes 
out and mentions to Mina that his call was delayed, but in the meantime his mother (who still 
lives in California) had been speaking with him and informed him that she’d emailed Ivan a 
birthday card (he was turning five the next day) (lines 32-35). During this sequence, Tina gets up 
from the table, puts her arms up to Albert (line 34), is lifted to get a kiss, and is put back down. 
Mina does not respond to Albert, instead directing Tina give a candy to JR, who is not present at 
the table. The elapsed time features JR and Tina discussing the candy while Mina asks Albert 
questions about the party they are having for Ivan the next day.  
 When Tina returns to the table, she immediately begins speaking with her mother in 
Finnish, and her mother responds, also in Finnish (lines 41-42). Interestingly, during this talk 
interchange, Mina also engages in an interaction with Albert in which Albert shows her 
something related to his work (line 43). During the two seconds following, the Finnish talk 
ceases while the nonverbal interaction between Mina and Albert continues. Tina then starts up a 
conversation with her mother in Finnish again (lines 45-47) and at the end of this exchange, 
Albert turns to Ivan asks if he wants to see the email (line 48). Mina immediately disagrees with 
this invitation (line 48), directing her utterance first at Albert, then at Ivan, who had begun to 
leave the table as Albert was inviting him away (line 49). In the three seconds that elapse, Albert 
walks into the kitchen and, as Ivan turns back to the table, Mina makes a circular motion with her 
hand (line 50) that further encourages Ivan to turn all the way back into the table.  
 This interaction features a particular pattern of language use and code-switching. For 
requests and orders initiated by Mina toward her children, English is the language of choice. This 
is the case here, in lines 37 and 49. When Finnish conversations are initiated by the children, 
Mina’s responses are in Finish, as in lines 41-42 and 45-46. Only if the children’s first pair parts 
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are followed by orders or requests from Mina will she switch to English (not shown in this 
example). Furthermore, Mina will initiate other kinds of actions with her children in Finnish, for 
example, asking questions (indicated by the particle “ko”). Unless giving an order, if Albert 
addresses the children in English, and Mina follows with an utterance, it will be in English (line 
49 follows Albert addressing Ivan and contains an order). If the children initiate talk in English, 
however, Mina’s responses seem equally likely to be in English as in Finnish (or at least, the 
author could distinguish no pattern).  
 Notably also, there are rarely side conversations in the family, though such conversations 
could easily occur. For example, here, Albert waits until an appropriate transition relevance place 
in Mina and Tina’s Finnish talk to speak to Ivan, even though he is addressing Ivan and not 
them. Though this happens far more often than not, it is not entirely clear why. Perhaps Albert 
understood the Finnish and heard it as partly addressed to him; or Albert was listening to see if 
he could understand and whether it did apply to him; or Albert could not understand, but did not 
want to chance being rude; or Albert wanted Mina and Tina to be part of his interaction with 
Ivan. Regardless of the specific reason, the accomplishment of doing this regularly creates 
“whole family” interactions in which everyone hears what everyone else says, regardless of the 
language or how well they understand it.  
 These language practices create the sense of the family as managing both American, 
English-speaking identities and Finnish identities. Because most of the family is fluent in English 
and Finnish, they employ them differently for different purposes. Those purposes, however, are 
also culturally mixed. Finnish association with reservedness and self-discipline extends to their 
child-raising practices, which are stricter than the more American style that Mina and Albert 
employ. Finnish people do not pay attention to their children in the same ways as Americans. 
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Thus, it is interesting for instance that Mina tends to use the Finnish language for more American 
orientations to her children (eliciting narratives, for instance—showing interesting in their 
opinions and personal lives) while using English to accomplish a more “Finnish” style of 
parenting associated with discipline and directives. However, this disciplining is not only 
accomplished in the language of the typical American style, but also in a communicative style 
that is less direct, as in the example below.  
Excerpt 26 “The Bantrys” [fam.frn.vac10.1.E3.2]
Mina:  and now I have such a different perspective after being he:re? and (.) how 50 
  (.) you know I'm- I'm- I'm not even a person- I don't take easily things 51 
  personally I don’t I just (don’t do it because) (I don’t need) to take it? And 52 
  I don't- I don’t- I just (think) that people their own little (.) worlds (in their 53 
  minds) ( ) (because) whatever it just- in their mind it's hard when you 54 
  work in a place where people are actually mean?= 55 
Kathryn: =of course it is 56 
Mina:  It’s just- even if you- you think that you're a duck and the water is just 57 
  gonna roll off of your back you know you’re gonna swim through it [( ) 58 
  it's like] 59 
Tina:                         [( )         60 
Mina:  please (.) go to your room 61 
 62 
Tina:  I like it (here)  63 
Mina:  =Tina= 64 
Tina:  =(in Finnish)= 65 
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 66 
Mina:  go to your room (.) Tina go to your room  67 
Tina:  (I think I have to be) here 68 
Mina:  Tin- okay  69 
(2.0)  70 
 71 
Mina:  you can't think and write there when (you/we)'re talking sweetie  72 
Tina:  I can 73 
Mina:  ( ) (0.8) (I really do miss the school) (.) (a lot) 74 
Kathryn: m hm 75 
Mina:  ( ) I just- you know it- it- (.) of course it's- it’s cultural also? But (0.8) i- it 76 
  felt so good I remember the day you know that Hanna came to visit? And 77 
  then uh Mrs. Rose- Tina go to your room if you can't do what you are 78 
  supposed to do  79 
Tina:  What? 80 
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Mina:  Just go to your room now 81 
Tina:  I'm thinking  82 
 83 
Mina:  and I'm talking  84 
Tina:  I’m thinking and you’re talking85 
 
 This interaction occurs after dinner and dessert. Albert has retired to the office to take his 
conference call and then do some work, and the children were playing in their room. Mina takes 
this time to talk to her friend, Kathryn, who worked with her in California. Over the course of 
their more than 30-minute conversation, Mina continually returns to the theme of how different 
her life is in Finland and how she is having trouble adjusting to the difference in her work 
environment. The conversation is a fairly serious one, with Mina mainly narrating her feelings of 
uncertainty and discontent, and Kathryn being fairly quiet and listening. However, during this 
conversation, Tina appears and interjects on a regular basis. Her questions are small and non-
urgent, and her continued desire to be a presence in the interaction indicates that she just wants to 
be around. However, Mina’s directions to get Tina out of the interaction indicate she wishes the 
conversation to be a more private one.  
 Before the excerpt above, Tina had already appeared four times, and each time, Mina 
made a suggestion that would take Tina out of the room—looking for things, making things, etc., 
having to do with a gift she wished Kathryn to convey back to California for a former teacher. 
However, as Tina keeps reappearing, and it becomes more and more difficult to coax her away, 
Mina becomes less patient. In line 66 she reaches across the table entreatingly as she finally does 
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away with the pretenses and asks Tina to go to her room. When Tina continues to resist this 
request (lines 63, 68, 73) Mina at first becomes more firm (line 67, “go to your room,” with each 
word enunciated), then acquiesces, (line 69) but demonstrates frustration with a sigh and pulling 
back of her hair (line 70). She makes a second attempt in line 72, then in lines 78 and 81 repeats 
the directive that Tina go to her room, with which Tina finally complies (line 85). 
 Throughout these attempts, Mina’s language in almost every case is extremely indirect. 
In the first case she prefaces the directive “go to your room” with “please” (line 61). Her next 
directive (line 67) is the most direct, with the phrase “go to your room” repeated twice and 
upgraded with emphasis on the recycling, but following Tina’s reply, she repairs a possible next 
directive and gives in (line 69). Her next attempt is even more indirect than the first, putting her 
suggestion that Tina go to another room in the context that it would be easier for Tina, and 
adding “sweetie” at the end (line 72). But after Tina’s reply Mina makes no response at all, 
carrying on the conversation until she interrupts herself in line 78. Again she says “go to your 
room” but adds the qualifier “if” Tina cannot do what she is supposed to (assumedly, be quiet or 
not be a distraction). Finally in line 80 she is direct again (“just go to your room now”) but the 
seriousness of the directive is still not attended to by Tina, who resists even as she starts to leave 
(line 82), and mimics her and her mother’s prior utterances in a sing-song voice as she 
disappears from the frame (line 85).  
 Here, Mina enacts a more American style of parenting through her indirect directives 
which is very different from what is presumed to occur in Finnish families—in fact, the Finnish 
are known for being some of the most direct speakers in general, and this extends to disciplining 
children (Berry & Carbaugh, 2006; Carbaugh & Berry, 2001; Carbaugh, Berry & Nurmikari-
Berry, 2004; Wilkins, 2005). On numerous other occasions, both Mina and Albert enact this style 
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of parenting in which the children are encouraged to talk about their feelings and participate as 
equal conversational partners even while being remonstrated for particular behaviors. In this 
case, Mina’s desire to speak only among adults—an expectation that would be normal in 
Finland, and certainly an expectation that is interpersonally understandable given her topic of 
talk—conflicted with her desire to enact the role of an attentive mother.  
 In the U.S. it is more common for parents to act as Mina did, and display attentiveness 
and an almost-equal regard even in the face of unreasonable or annoying behavior. Of course, 
this is probably in part because Mina may have recognized that even if Tina’s behavior is 
annoying to Mina, from Tina’s perspective, Tina just wants to be a part of the interaction and 
does not understand her mother’s need for privacy. Also involved is Mina’s Buddhist beliefs. 
Being Buddhist brings its own contradictions in the world of parenting. On one hand, Buddhism 
is compatible with a Finnish approach to parenting through its emphasis on “nonattachment,” a 
principle that claims attachment causes desire and desire causes loss. This would result in a more 
“distanced” parenting approach. On the other hand, Buddhism also promotes avoiding anger and 
control, which are emotions/impulses often associated, if not with parenting, at least with the 
communicative actions associated with disciplining an unruly child. Instead, a person is urged to 
be compassionate and “let things go.”  
 Throughout this interaction, Mina intersperses her attempts to get Tina to leave with the 
conversation she continues to have with Kathryn which, interestingly, revolves around cultural 
notions. She contrasts the positive experience in California with her negative experiences in 
Finland, demonstrating her own identity as “between cultures.” Because she balances her own 
experience growing up in Finland, her identification with California, and her Buddhist beliefs, 
she is simultaneously adept at linguistically formulating her relationship to these frames, but 
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unaware of the ways in which their unspoken assumptions become contradictory, as 
demonstrated in her discursive practices.  
This not only poses potential problems for Mina when disciplining and interacting with 
her children, but also with her husband. Recall for example that Albert in the first excerpt invites 
Ivan away from the table. Though a small action in that instance, it is part of a pattern of actions 
through which Albert displays himself as “relaxed.” Mina may be an intercultural “person,” but 
Albert’s cultural practices are more consistent, and he displays almost no evidence of strictness. 
During the entire week, he did not raise his voice, dole out punishments, or offer up rules to the 
children. Instead, he approached problems in an almost “therapeutic” way, trying to get the 
children to “talk about” why they were behaving in manner x. Mina thus seems to be more 
conflicted because in part she does similar actions as Albert, but is also influenced by the strict 
Finnish ideal of “asiallinen,” a direct, blunt speech code (Berry & Carbaugh, 2006; Carbaugh, 
Berry & Nurmikari-Berry, 2004; Wilkins, 2005). Though only very small instances of 
disagreement arose between Mina and Albert related to discipline, there were enough instances 
to show that differences do exist, and that intercultural ideologies are a problem for the both of 
them as well as Mina and the children. 
 The excerpts above demonstrated small slices in a larger pattern during which the 
Bantrys used language to construct their family identity through language, and engaged in 
indirect forms of disciplining to raise their children within a frame more oriented to American 
and Buddhist approaches than a typical Finnish approach. These actions demonstrate how people 
with multiple cultural orientations manage their identity and communication in the face of 
problems of differing norms and expectations. Mina works to achieve intelligible interactions 
with her children, and constructs her own intercultural ideologies in practice.  
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The sense of “togetherness” is of a different order for families—Mina and Albert are 
conscious and deliberate about at least of the cultural choices they make with regard to their lives 
and their children. Friends, however, coordinate in a different way. Cultural differences may not 
be remarked upon as explicitly or thought about as reflectively as in a family (or in romantic 
partnerships). The next examples feature cases of Asian American and white American friends in 
which their different cultural ideologies cause potential problems in interaction. 
The Case of Two Asian American Friendships 
This section features two cases from different communities of Asian Americans as they 
interact with their white friends in largely white communities. The first case looks at the 
experience of a half white, half Japanese young woman and her interactions with two different 
white female friends. Data include ten hours of audio and video recordings over the past six 
years as well as participant interviews in 2010. The second case looks at the experience of a 
“Hapa” girl—half white, half Japanese, raised in Hawaii—and how she negotiates her marriage 
to a white man and the ethnic culture of their unborn child in constructing her relationship for a 
white female friend (the author). Data include eight hours of audio and video recordings over the 
past five years, a two-hour home movie (the wedding) from 2006, and an interview in 2010.  
 First, I consider the example of Christa. Christa was born to a Caucasian father and 
Japanese mother. She was raised in predominantly white, middle class, small Bay Area town. 
Though she was not raised in a Japanese setting, she did make trips to visit Japanese relatives in 
their hometown of Kyoto on a yearly basis. Throughout her life, she was also extremely close to 
her mother. She spent far more time with her mother than with friends throughout high school, 
and had no plan to move away from home for college (she planned to attend a community 
college). Her mother would often excuse her from school so they could spend even more time 
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together. Christa’s father was an ex-Vietnam veteran and did not work, and her mother did not 
work either. They lived off of her father’s disability pay, and her mother’s family’s money. Yet 
Christina spent little time with her father, and he was often away from the house doing the 
shopping, visiting his friends, or out at the shooting range.  
Japanese culture has been studied from a number of perspectives which have investigated 
the role of imagery and heroes/villains in folklore (e.g., Benedict, 2005; Buruma, 1984; Gorer, 
1943); Japan’s political and cultural history, particularly in relation to China (e.g., Varley, 1977); 
and its pop culture, especially in media and games in the U.S. (e.g., Iwabuchi, 2002). Portrayals 
and attitudes toward Japanese culture indicate contradictions between Japanese pop culture, 
which tends to be flashy and expressive, and classical portrayals of Japanese people as stoic and 
controlled.  
Work in intercultural and cross-cultural communication indicates that Japanese 
communication is distinct in terms of its style and use in social interaction, whether Japanese 
speakers are speaking their own language or English (Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, 
Nishida, Kim & Heyman, 1996; Maynard, 1997; Wetzel, 1988). Japanese communicative style is 
often seen as highly indirect and “powerless,” associated with the style of U.S. women (Wetzel, 
1988), and consistent with Japanese location in a “high context culture” (Gudykunst et al., 1996) 
and with many prevailing attitudes in the U.S. toward indirect speech (Wetzel, 1988).  
Discourse work on Japanese includes conversation analytic studies which look at overlap, 
turn projection, narrative, and linguistic details (e.g., Hayashi, 1988; Lerner & Tagaki, 1999; 
Mori, 2002; Park, 1998; Tanaka, 2000). This work demonstrates some differences in uses of 
interaction structures between Japanese and U.S. English. More ethnographic work has focused 
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primarily on kinship, status terms, the role of authority, and pronoun use (e.g., Cook, 1999; 
Ervin-Tripp, 1964; Fischer, 1964). 
There has been considerable criticism in the way in which Japanese and U.S. culture are 
often contrasted, even when such contrasts have good intentions, such as in educational research. 
Kubota (1999) for instance challenges the dichotomy in education between U.S. and Japanese 
communication and learning, and Lebra’s (2000) work on Japanese “self” suggests that within 
Japan, academics are resisting Western notions of “personality” as central to self-concept. 
Throughout these analyses so far I have indicated that perceptions of cultural differences may not 
be innate, but do figure in people’s interactions as interpretive schemata. Thus, part of enacting a 
Japanese style in the U.S. has as much (or more) to do with how it might be perceived as “more 
Japanese” by non-Japanese Americans as it has to do with how Japanese and Japanese 
Americans might interact socially with one another. In making sense of culture, interactants may 
draw on potentially incorrect or exaggerated notions of culture. That they enact such 
representation should not be taken as a direct correspondence to what the culture is “really” like.  
With that background in mind, I return to Christa’s story. During Christa’s first year at 
the community college, her mother was diagnosed with brain cancer, and three months later, she 
was dead. The event devastated Christa. She became more interested in her mother’s life story, 
her family’s history, and her Japanese background during the time following her mother’s death. 
But regardless of these explicit displays of a cultural orientation, Christa’s incredible closeness to 
her mother during her mother’s life contributed to her taking a much more Japanese style of 
interacting with her friends, despite the fact that she is not a fluent speaker of Japanese. Her 
mother raised her very strictly, and was explicit about instilling values in her daughter which 
were located in a tradition based in her own upbringing in Kyoto.  
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The excerpts below feature conversations in which Christa engages in a particular style of 
interacting with two different white female friends. In each case, different cultural values 
underlying talk creates interactional trouble. Specifically, in the first excerpt fragments, a U.S. 
American orientation toward “openness” clashes with Christa’s orientation toward politeness and 
avoiding disagreement. In the second excerpt, discomfort around insults and compliments are 
managed through humor to avoid taking the conversation in a serious direction.  
Excerpt 27 “Christa” [frn.vis08.2.E1.1(audio)]
Jill:   ((coughs)) (0.5) ((coughs again)) (0.5) gave me a mean look 83 
Christa:  No I didn’t I went (1.5) a concerned look, and you went “HUA” (( )like)  84 
((laughter)) 85 
Christa:  It was a concerned look, it was a (.5) “*I hope you feel better soon (.2) my 86 
  dear friend*”87 
 
This is a case in which context is not just complicated, but almost essential—and yet, it is 
also rather opaque. In this example, the physical context turns out to be just as relevant as the 
relational context. Jill accuses Christa of giving her a “mean look” when she coughs (line 83). 
Christa then narrates her own version of the events and provides a reinterpretation of the “look” 
she gave Jill (line 84). However, Christa’s self-presentation is not entirely “authentic.” Her 
mimicry of Jill’s cough seems to indicate she is not quite as sympathetic as she makes herself out 
to be (line 84), and her phrasing of the “look” as a quote which seems slightly over-the-top (lines 
86-87) also demonstrates a hint of insincerity.  
Coupland (2004) discusses apparent inauthenticity through stylization as an 
authenticating act. Christa’s performance of her “look” in line 84 is definitely stylized: she says 
it in a sing-song voice which is not her own, and uses sappy language which is directly at odds 
with her personality (she is not in the slightest disposed toward openly displaying affection). She 
seems to demonstrate metapragmatic awareness of the mismatch between what she says and 
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what the people around her know about her, since she makes fun of herself as well as the others 
in a way that acknowledges this. The fact that people are at her house is also relevant. Prior to 
this visit, Jill had mentioned to the author that she was sick and that she was anxious about going 
to Christa’s house. Christa is a bit of a germophobe, and Jill was already anticipating that Christa 
would resent her presence because of her being ill. This could explain Jill’s sensitivity to 
Christa’s facial expression, and may also indicate why Christa’s actual intention seems to be 
ambiguous (since she insists she was not giving the mean look, but does so within a mocking 
performance). 
This interaction can be interpreted on different levels. On one level, Christa’s reaction to 
Jill’s accusation reframes the interaction so that it becomes a discussion about the “look” rather 
than a discussion about whether Christa is resentful of a sick person at her house. But on another 
level, it also reframes the interpretation of the situation as being about Christa’s personality 
rather than about the actual expression on her face: the use of reported speech displays Christa’s 
stance toward herself. Thus there is an element of layeredness to the situation in which each 
interpretation or lamination (Goffman, 1974) diffuses a possibly conflictual element in the 
previous one.  
This example is illustrative of Christa’s identification with a particular interactional style, 
and the nature of the relationship between Christa and Jill. Many of the values that Christa 
identifies within herself as “Japanese traits” are ones she learned from her mother—most 
relevantly here, cleanliness and emotional restraint. Christa’s insistence on a clean, germ-free 
environment is well-acknowledged by her friends and herself, and is something of a running joke 
between them. Similarly, her lack of demonstration of affection is known and commented on 
regularly. For a while, it was accepted that if Christa threw a small painful object at you, or 
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poked you with her finger on the knee or shoulder, it should be interpreted as a demonstration of 
affection. Though in many ways Christa, who has been raised entirely in the United States and 
has been to Japan only for summers during her childhood, might be considered thoroughly 
“Western” in her behavior and preferences, she nonetheless performs what she and others take to 
be a more Japanese style of interacting.  
One example of the interpersonal distance already mentioned is demonstration of 
affection, which is extremely rare and, when it occurs, is joked about immediately afterward. 
Another example is aversion to conflict. Jill and Christa have known each other for a very long 
time, and are intimate friends, but they have gone through periods of not speaking for months at 
a time due to conflict. The pattern is always the same: Christa does something to upset Jill; Jill 
tries to talk to her about it; Christa ignores Jill for a few months; they resume their friendship as 
if nothing happened. Because of this pattern in their relationship, potential conflicts must be 
managed carefully. The function of performance in such situations is crucial. Though Jill is not 
willing to confront Christa on her possible resentment of having a sick person in her house, Jill is 
willing to be direct with her accusation of the “mean look.” The value in the U.S. of 
acknowledging problems and “talking things out” is clearly espoused, and yet Americans are 
sometimes also seen as avoiding conflict (Blum-Kulka, 1997). In acknowledging a potential 
conflict, but indirectly, Jill is attentive to different ideologies within U.S. culture, but Christa’s 
even stronger inclination to avoid conflict takes control of the way the interaction could have 
gone. 
Upon Christa, then, is placed the burden of dispensing with the criticism in such a way 
that avoids conflict. She cannot, however, merely pretend there is no basis for Jill’s reaction, 
since this kind of behavior is typical of little instances that have led to their brief separations in 
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the past. She has to acknowledge Jill’s feelings, and her own feelings on which Jill’s reaction 
was based, without acquiescing to the full validity of Jill’s reaction, which might validate an 
ensuing argument or future conflict. Christa’s performance exaggerates and parodies Jill’s 
cough, her own facial expression, and an interpretation of what her expression meant. She makes 
fun of her own flaws through parody, and downplays Jill’s “flaw” (the illness) through obvious 
exaggeration. Thus she legitimizes their mutual understanding of each other, but negates the 
possibility for serious discussion about whether she resents having a sick person in her house. 
Performance becomes a way of carefully displaying, or sometimes hiding, the self. This is not 
necessarily an intention on the part of Christa, but something that has evolved out of her 
interactions with people as well as her cultural background. In certain specific moments, 
maintaining interactional distance becomes necessary, and performance and humor are Christa’s 
typical responses in such situations.  
By using reported speech in non-standard ways, Christa separates the content of what she 
says from her own claims of that content as “truth,” presenting it in such a way that she cannot 
be held accountable for its misinterpretation or misrepresentation. This very indirect way of 
communicating occurs in almost every interaction of possible conflict between herself and a 
friend during this and other recordings. Using reported speech in a non-standard, indirect, 
performative way appears to do the work of reaffirming the positive nature of this friendship in a 
way that is jokingly insulting, toward self and other, but does so in an “inauthentic” way that in 
fact avoids “real” conflict. The next excerpt presents another example in which humor is used to 
manage orientations to conflict.  
Excerpt 28“Christa” [frn.don04.1.E2.1(audio)]
Val: oh look billowy ((laughs)) 88 
Chris: dude you so reminded me [of 89 
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Val:          [I look like the marshmallow guy 90 
Chris: ((laughs)) the- marashin?- not maraschino (1.0) martian man? No 91 
(1.5) 92 
Val: Michelin man? 93 
Chris: yeah the Michelin man 94 
(1.0) 95 
Val: you sayin I’m fat (.) [like the 96 
Chris:            [no I’m- 97 
Val: Michelin man? 98 
Chris: I’m saying your pants are billowing in such a wuh- [w- 99 
Val:                  [(fuck you) string bean 100 
Chris: ((laughs)) I was saying your pants were billowing in such a way that it reminded101 
 me of aMichelin man 102 
Val: ((laughs)) 103 
Chris: you’re a string bean 104 
(1.0) 105 
Val: alright Olive Oil ((laughs)) 106 
Chris: all these rude comments *you bea[utiful blond bombshell* 107 
Val:            [(well I don’t) look like the] Michelin man 108 
Chris: I said your pants were billowing >in such a way< 109 
(2.0) 110 
Val: *in such a way* 111 
Chris: I just spit all over my lip ((laughs)) 112 
(2.0) 113 
Chris: ((coughs)) 114 
Val: *alright then Catherine Zeta Jones*115 
 
In this excerpt, Christa interacts with another close friend, raised in the same town, but 
who is not close to Jill (thus Christa tends to hang out with each of them separately). In this 
interaction, both girls are watching television when a potential conflict emerges. It does not have 
the feel of a very serious possible fight. When Val accuses Christa of calling her “fat” (line 96) it 
is after (1) Val herself pointed out the “billowy” pants she was wearing (line 88), and (2) Val had 
compared herself to the “marshmallow guy” (line 90). Thus, even as Christa was trying to make 
a comparison between Val and the Michelin man (a commercial cartoon character), Val was 
already making fun of herself along similar lines. The fact that Val laughs after the “fat” 
reference could be either her acknowledgement that she is not seriously attributing such an 
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assessment to Christa, or that she is uncomfortable with her own joke and the possible 
associations that could be made between herself and “being fat.”  
As Christa works to distance herself even from the possibility of such a statement, Val 
then moves in to make a negative assessment of Christa as too skinny (“string bean” line 100) 
and compares her to Olive Oil (a skinny Popeye cartoon character) (line 106). Amidst accounts 
and teasing insults, another strategy for diffusing the seriousness of weight issues involves giving 
compliments (lines 107, 115) that refer to one another as “beautiful” or compare each other to 
celebrities, albeit in a joking tone. Throughout the interaction, Christa and Val display a shared 
knowledge of cultural information regarding television characters and people. On the other hand, 
Val’s pursuit of an account for the implication of being fat clashes with Christa’s avoidance of 
being connected to a criticism and thus a possible conflict or discomfort between them. 
Interestingly, though Val and Christa were both raised in the same white town, both have 
strong ties to a heritage outside the U.S. Christa’s, as mentioned, is to Japan; Val’s is to Finland, 
where her family is from. Val speaks about as much Finnish as Christa does Japanese, but both 
have at least one parent born outside the U.S., have made frequent visits to the family homeland, 
and identify with their non-U.S. cultural backgrounds (bringing it up as a conversational topic, 
labeling their background or ethnic identity, claiming to be “acting like” a typical native of the 
region, etc.). In Finland, being direct is valued, whereas in Japan, being indirect and saving face 
is valued. In this interaction, Val pursues the implications of Christa’s comments directly, while 
Christa tries to avoid those implications and any possible conflict.  
There is another way, however, in which Christa and Val’s backgrounds overlap, which 
is in terms of interpersonal distance. In Finland, as in Japan, there is an emphasis on restraint, 
and a proscription against being overly demonstrative toward intimates. In this interaction, both 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 325 
 
 
participants use humor to maintain this interpersonal distance even through accomplishing the 
different means of engaging directly and indirectly with the potential face-threats. These friends 
demonstrate their connection to one another through humor, keeping their interactions positive 
without having to deal with negative or positive displays toward each other. Though this would 
not be a strange sort of interaction among any set of friends, it is characteristic when comparing 
their interactions with each other to those with others; furthermore, Christa and Val are 
conscious and explicit of labeling their communication practices in cultural ways, though the 
examples above do not show such explicit markers.  
Christa’s interactions with Jill are quite different from her interactions with Val. With 
both friends, Christa is not demonstrably affectionate or open about feelings and conflict. Her 
criticisms will be indirect and her attitude toward conflict one of avoidance. With Jill, this causes 
trouble when Jill wants to address conflict—as mentioned, this is proven by their pattern of 
argumentation, and shown in the instance described in which Jill calls Christa out and Christa 
avoids making the complaint. With Val, Christa’s behavior is similar, but because of Val’s 
different interactional norms, their potential arguments play out differently. Val is even more 
likely than Jill to call out implications and pursue an account or complaint, but like Christa, is 
also not interested in engaging in serious talk and sharing feelings; thus, Val’s pursuits are 
always occurring in a teasing frame which Christa finds acceptable. Perhaps this is why Val and 
Christa, though they have not been friends for as long as Val and Jill, have had far fewer “fights” 
in their friendships. 
In the cases above, tacit cultural assumptions around openness, directness and 
confrontation caused possible moments of interactional trouble between friends. In the first 
excerpt, cultural orientations were not shared despite the two women having grown up together 
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in the same town. In the second excerpt, again both women grew up together, and again came 
from different family backgrounds, but shared a complex orientation toward directness and 
seriousness that was managed through a shared frame of humor. In these conversations, 
assumptions of how best to deal with problems between friends were linked to different cultural 
norms about how friends should treat one another. These cases were slightly different from the 
family intereaction described previously, in which “you do your thing and I do mine” would be 
unlikely to work, and the occurrence of an argument would be more consequential.  
The next example is of a conversation between a Hapa woman, Amelia, and her female 
friend, JR, regarding Amelia’s marital choice and pregnancy. Amelia, like Christa in the 
previous example, has a Caucasian father and Japanese mother. However, Amelia was born and 
raised in Oahu, Hawaii. Her upbringing included an infusion of Hawaiian and Japanese 
educational values. The schools she attended were private and college-driven, and were 
predominantly composed of people with varying degrees of Hawaiian and Japanese ancestry. 
High school students were encouraged to attend prestigious colleges on the “mainland,” which 
Amelia did.  
Oahu is the most populous island in Hawaii and a top tourist destination. The town where 
Amelia grew us was once agricultural, but is now primarily residential. It is surrounded by 
bamboo forests and contains three golf courses. It is a diverse and also upper middle class area, 
and the private school of the town is prestigious and expensive. Amelia’s mother was a nurse 
most of her life and her father was a medical pathologist. Amelia provided part of the evidence 
of their being well off by citing the fact that her parents owned matching Lexus cars.  
Amelia and her younger brother were steeped in Japanese and Hawaiian culture from a 
young age due to the schools they attended and her mother’s closeness to the Japanese side of the 
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family. Amelia’s maternal grandparents, while alive, were regular visitors. After Amelia moved 
to California to pursue her college degree, she interacted regularly with family in the area, 
including her mother’s sisters, cousins and their families. Amelia identifies herself as Hapa, a 
Hawaiian term referring to someone of mixed Asian background, mixed Hawaiian background, 
or half-white. She dated a Hapa man from her hometown for four years, but eventually ended up 
marrying a man who was white and a California native.  
In April of 2010, Amelia discovered she was pregnant with a son, Jules, who has since 
been born in December 2010. Pregnancy was a recurrent topic of Amelia’s conversations with 
friends up to the point of discovering her pregnancy. Her family, including her husband, were all 
pressuring her to have a child before she reached 30—her family because stillbirth was common 
among the older women in her family, her husband because he was eager to start a family. 
Amelia expressed ambivalence about when to have a child (she was obtaining a degree in 
nursing during this time) but at the same time was deeply concerned that if she waited too long, 
her mother might die before the child got to know her mother well. She was worried not only 
about the potential child not knowing its grandmother, but also being separated from the 
grandmother’s Japanese background. Once she discovered she was pregnant, these worries were 
discursively transformed within the context of actually having the child. In this excerpt during a 
telephone conversation with the author, she discusses her concerns about Jules’s possible lack of 
connection to Japanese culture.  
Excerpt 29 “Amelia” [frn.calls08.1.E1.1(audio)]
Amelia: I just don’t know- it’s really stupid of [me] 116 
JR:       [((breathy laugh))] 117 
Amelia: ((laughs)) I know (1.0) .hh I just- what if he doesn’t look Japanese at all= 118 
JR:  =the baby= 119 
Amelia: =yeah  120 
(0.5) 121 
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JR:  hm: 122 
Amelia: I just- I just really want him to identify with my mom you know? Like- I 123 
  don’t know- I want them to be close (.) I want him to appreciate her= 124 
JR:  =of co:urse 125 
(1.0) 126 
Amelia: It almost feels (1.0) .hh like I’m doing a disservice to my heritage or 127 
  something if I have this totally white baby= 128 
JR:  =yeah= 129 
Amelia: =like it’s a slap in the face to the family I mean (.) it just becomes more 130 
and more-you know every time- because I want to the family I create to 131 
look like the family I’m from 132 
JR:  hm 133 
Amelia: but I’m half white and Alan’s like totally white= 134 
JR:  =((laughs))= 135 
Amelia: and so my baby might be so (.) I don’t know= 136 
JR:  =diluted? 137 
Amelia: that sounds pretty terrible 138 
((laughter)) 139 
(2.0) 140 
Amelia: .hh anyway141 
142 
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Amelia initiates her potentially problematic concerns about her child’s ethnicity with a 
disclaimer (that what she’s about to say is “stupid”) in line 116. She does considerable work to 
frame her worries about having a baby that looks “totally white” (line 128) and “not Japanese at 
all” (line 118) within the context of honoring her mother and her mother’s family. In doing so 
she works to mitigate the possible face threat toward JR (who looks white), and possibly her 
husband Alan, as well as manage the contradiction between talking about ethnicity and living in 
a country that for many years espoused being “colorblind” in response a history of racial tension. 
In the U.S. it is common to find people using terms such as “culture,” “color” and “ethnic” as 
euphemisms to avoid talking about physical racial characteristics (i.e. the city was “ethnic,” 
“colorful,” “cultural”). Because Amelia is not doing that, she opens herself up to criticism 
because she implies a distinction between how white and Japanese people “look.” 
Through the metadiscursive disclaimer of her opening, and the subsequent family-
oriented accounts throughout, Amelia admits something that seems to be difficult, which is that 
“looking Japanese” matters to her. By framing this value as an homage to her mother, and 
finishing with another metadiscursive comment (“that sounds pretty terrible” line 138) in 
response to JR’s reference to “diluted,” Amelia explicitly aligns culture with the physical display 
of an ethnic background, while trying to mitigate the potentially problematic nature of this claim 
for her friend and in relation to the ideologies of culture in the U.S.  
 In this example, one friend was presented with a dilemma: how to voice her concerns 
about maintaining the ethnicity of her cultural lineage, while keeping her conversational partner 
from perceiving this as face-threatening and keeping her comments from violating too harshly a 
U.S. cultural dictum of color blindness. Her handling of this dilemma employed metadiscursive 
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comments in order to provide a frame that would not prove face-threatening to JR, and would 
also maintain Amelia’s own face.  
 The examples which have been analyzed in this chapter are in some ways very different. 
One important difference involves the ways in which culture is brought in. In the case of the 
Finnish-American family, culture is an everyday part of their lives as they struggle to make a 
home in Finland, each person finding ways in which they fit in and ways in which they do not. 
Their references to culture are explicit, yet some of their cultural styles are not remarked on, but 
managed in ways that attempt to discursively “fit” cultural ideals of, for instance, parenting 
together. In the case of the friends, culture was sometimes explicitly marked, as when Amelia 
discussed the appearance of her child with metadiscursive disclaimers. And in other cases among 
the friends, culture was part of what made sense of the friends’ responses to one another given 
detailed knowledge of their personal histories and friendship over long periods of time.  
In these analyses I have presented examples of interpersonal relationships in family and 
friendship contexts. In each case, the people who were involved participated in different shared 
and unshared cultural orientations toward relational norms. From parenting practices to conflict 
avoidance, interactants engaged in various strategies designed to circumvent threats to the 
relationship which emerged out of complex contrasting tacit ideologies. Metadiscursive 
comments, such as Mina’s criticisms of Tina’s communicative behavior and Amelia’s comments 
on the topic she has brought up regarding her unborn son, were joined with a number of others—
including humor, mitigation, and face-saving—to manage different cultural ideologies and the 
problems they could have caused in these interactions.  
Moral Orientations in Intercultural Relationships 
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In Philipsen’s recent work (2009), he discusses “culture” as something which people 
must confront and come to terms with. In people’s everyday lives, they are more likely than not 
to encounter cultural differences, ones both obvious, and so invisible that precisely what is going 
on can be hard to pinpoint. When people make negative assessments of others based on tacit 
cultural differences, they often frame those differences based on their own moral interactional 
standards (Bailey, 2000a). The situation is more complicated for family and friends who share 
some values, but may run into trouble when assuming they share them all.  
According to Tracy and Ashcraft (2001), dilemmas can be both ideological and 
interactional. A dilemma refers to a case in which two options, neither of which is a perfect 
solution nor can be accomplished practically with equal success, arise from a single situation. 
Ideological dilemmas, for instance, might occur when two norms relevant to a certain situation 
conflict, as with freedom of speech and anti-hate speech. Interactional dilemmas emerge from 
talk situations, such as when you have to be direct enough to break up with someone, but indirect 
enough to spare their feelings. Cultural contexts of interaction provide a link between these 
dilemmas. Within cultures, norms often cause problems for each other, and among different 
cultures, different norms can exist for the same context. These dilemmas are both a cause of, and 
constituted by, the interactions which make norms relevant. By studying interactional dilemmas 
in discourse, one can begin to see the spaces in which participants orient to cultural ideological 
dilemmas in practical ways.  
The examples in these last two chapters presented a variety of cases, assembled with 
varying quantities of data and ethnographic detail, and concerning varyingly complicated 
intersections of cultural and interpersonal identities. Geographic regions, ethnicities, genders, 
classes, and languages rarely lined up neatly. And yet, conversational participants do orient to 
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these cultural categories and aspects of identity as they orient to one another. Contextualization 
cues, though highly implicit in the surface action of utterances (Gumperz, 1982), reveal people 
working out their intercultural differences and treating those differences as meaningful. Whether 
among family or friends, sharing backgrounds or not, participants’ talk demonstrated cultural 
concepts of relationships and communication to be relevant to and occasionally problematic for 
instances of interaction. Cultural differences seem to be more saliently problematic and in need 
of addressing in moral practice. Because close relationships assume sharedness, an ideal of 
intercultural relationships involves discovering or creating ideological overlap.  
Because relationships are infused with potentially problematic moral accountabilities—in 
intersubjectivity, ritual enactment, handling sensitive topics and enacting cultural orientations—
conflict is always potentially imminent. In chapter four, intersubjectivity practices were 
demonstrated as the underlying foundation for accomplishing closeness in relationships. People 
are held accountable to this responsibility to attend to others, and to mis-perform in that 
responsibility can cause serious problems in a relationship, where people’s identities are invested 
in their ways of orienting to one another. Based on grounded practical theory, this chapter has 
discussed in further detail aspects of a communicative concept of morality, demonstrating the 
intersection between consequential moral practices for commitment and ideology amidst cultural 
difference. It identified moral discursive practices, problems that can arise, and participants’ 
strategies for managing those problems. It demonstrated that any theory of “moral 
communication” would have to account for differences between cultural contexts as well as 
within them. This consideration is returned to in chapter nine. 
Chapter seven reconstructed “culture” as a collection of practices for doing morality in a 
way which was salient in intercultural interactions. The next chapter, chapter eight, discusses 
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conflict as a moral discursive practice. Within the GPT approach, conflict is a practice linked to 
the prospect of ideological difference, and thus morally relevant in interactional practices. 
Chapter eight analyzes the problem of constructing ideological difference in a case study of one 
family’s interactions to reconstruct conflict as a moral practice.  
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Chapter 8 
Conflicted Consequences of Moral Interaction 
In his study of Korean immigrant storeowners and African American customers in Los 
Angeles, Bailey (2000a) examined the ways in which divergent patterns of communication in 
service encounters served to locally enact conflict. By achieving cultural difference and claiming 
moral difference, these ethnic groups constituted and maintained their boundaries of identity. In 
this chapter, I examine a similar case on a smaller scale, a case in which the enactment of 
ideological difference constitutes a conflict within a family over the course of nearly 30 years. 
This chapter discusses conflict as a moral discursive practice. Within the GPT approach, 
conflict is a practice linked to the prospect of ideological difference, and thus morally relevant in 
interactional practices. This chapter analyzes the problem of constructing ideological difference 
in a case study of one family’s interactions to argue that difference can be employed to create 
distance in interpersonal relationships. Since interaction requires some form of sharedness 
(chapter four) while intimacy requires even more (chapter five), intimate families, friendships 
and romantic relationships generally work to coordinate their actions, views, and communicated 
identities. Thus, to emphasize differences is to construct ideologically-grounded conflict which 
erodes the sense of a relationship as minimally coordinated.  
Conflict is not something accomplished all by itself in a moment, but is characterized by 
the accumulation of instances of disagreement, dispreference, disalignment, and argument. 
Conflict also provides a good case study of the ways in which intersubjectivity, ideology and 
culture can come together in contexts of intimacy, and the ways in which differences exist and 
are drawn on in interpersonal interactions. Emphasizing ideological differences through moral 
practice is a way of accomplishing conflict over time.  
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Chapter eight investigates the problem of conflict, and how moral practices can indicate, 
cause, confront or construct conflict in interpersonal relationships. The chapter focuses on how 
conflict as a moral practice for developing and maintaining ideological differences. The problem 
of conflict for morality involves the ways in which it lurks in the possibility of difference linked 
to all moral interactions, and the ways in which it can do irreversible damage to relationships.  
The interactional achievement of morality involves an orientation to difference—in other 
words, that ideology, or the constellations of ideas about right and wrong in societies, always 
involves multiple and conflicting values and norms. Drawn from three decades of home movie 
and video research in a U.S. family, this chapter’s analysis examines the moral discursive 
practices that constitute a dilemma for the parents regarding the raising of their children. In the 
management of this dilemma, each parent emphasizes their differing ideologies and diverges in 
their enactments of “being a good parent” with regard to the moral value of “fairness.”  
The next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures 
introduced in chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to 
conflict. The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and 
managing conflict. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for participants’ 
situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.   
Difference: Ideology and Conflict 
 In the last few chapters, intersubjectivity and ideology have emerged as two parts of the 
same interactional process, and key problems for morality. If morality requires care and 
commitment, intersubjectivity must exist for interaction itself to exist and for intimacy to be built 
up. Ideology provides the logic of cultural practices for forging intimate relationships and 
maintaining them over time. In this chapter, the danger of difference emerges as a counterpart to 
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the sharedness upon which participants assume their relationship depends. The next section 
discusses conflict and how it emerges out of relational dilemmas. The following section 
discusses conflict as an interactional, discursive practice for highlighting difference.  
Difference and Communication 
In finding moments where interpersonal tensions are visible, relational dialectics (Baxter, 
1988, 2004a, 2004b) work has tended to focus on self reports of relationships, or “turning points” 
that are likely to elicit reports of experiencing certainty or uncertainty, expression or 
nonexpression, and autonomy or connectedness. In addition to these studies being focused on 
major life events, there is the added difference that most relational dialectics work looks at 
reconstructed memories of dialectical tensions rather than demonstrating the working out of such 
tensions discursively. Furthermore, relational dialects conceives of tensions as competing 
emotional needs, whereas this work investigates the ways in which particular moral values and 
interactional expectations can be inherently dilemmatic—offering contradictory possibilities for 
action.  
Though relational dialectics can lead to or be symptomatic of interpersonal conflict, the 
kinds of dilemmas I am exploring are in some ways more actively conflictual because there is 
often no successful way to manage them, whereas there are a variety of better and worse ways to 
manage dialectical tensions. Segmentation, for instance, is a way of compartmentalizing 
competing needs, for example, spending time together on weekends and spending time with 
friends on weekdays as a method of “splitting up” when to be close and when to be autonomous. 
This would not work in the same way if the very methods by which people achieve closeness can 
be the same methods that could potentially drive them apart.  
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 337 
 
 
Relational dialectics is in many ways similar to the notion of ideological dilemmas 
(Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988)—broader social values for which 
attending strongly to one can compromise attention to another, i.e., expertise/equality. Such 
dilemmas result from reflection about U.S. society, similar to the way in which Baxter’s (1988, 
2004a, 2004b) relational dialectics result from reflections about relationships. These are different 
from what Tracy and Ashcraft (2001) called “interactional dilemmas,” which are derived 
inductively. What is interesting about moral interaction is that it combines both of these kinds of 
dilemmas. Situated problems in interaction involve the local enactment of more abstract cultural 
values as well as the discursive questions of what to say when and how in such a way as to 
manage morality in a moment. As such, moral dilemmas have the potential to cause conflict at 
multiple levels. Indeed, conflict—like identity/commitment and culture/ideology—is a 
dimension of morality in discourse.  
For the most part, conflict is assumed to arise out of the diversity of human experience 
(Roloff & Soule, 2004). Conflict involves incompatibilities between individuals based on 
principles, behaviors and attitudes, and transgressions. Conflicts revolve around different issues, 
are tied to particular kinds of relationships in particular contexts, and involve different 
participant conflict perceptions, management styles, and argumentative patterns. As Mortensen 
(2006) notes, conflict is tied to people’s identities, values, and ways of acting and talking. 
Moments of disagreement or problematic interaction can easily become conflict because such 
moments implicate important and deeply-held facets of people’s lives—who they are, what they 
believe. In interaction, Morstensen claims, people often employ self-defeating means of dealing 
with conflicts by for example being defensive, employing harsh criticism, making errors about 
others’ intent, failing to empathize, and using verbal abuse. Hocker and Wilmot (1995) suggest 
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that in the U.S., the metaphorical association of conflict with war has resulted in an almost 
entirely negative way of viewing conflict.  
Conflict is bound up in the studies of the so-called “dark side” of interpersonal 
relationships (Cupach & Spitzberg, 1994). Communication incompetence (Spitzberg, 1994), 
hurtful messages (Vangelisti, 1994), deception (O’Hair & Cody, 1994), and transgression (Metts, 
1994) are linked to negative outcomes such as destructive interactional patterns (Wilder & 
Collins, 1994) and physical and psychological abuse (Marshall, 1994). As Spitzberg and Cupach 
point out in their volume, the “dark side” is not only negative. Conflict can be healthy. However, 
this does not change the fact that it is often treated negatively by participants. Conflict, even if 
healthy, normal, and even ultimately positive, has the potential to cause pain or at least trouble. 
The closer the relationship, the more conflict can hurt, and the greater its consequences can be.  
I have mentioned that part of the purpose of this chapter is to understand more subtle 
ways in which conflict participants orient to conflict—whether they seek to avoid or confront it.  
Roloff and Soule (2004) note that conflict is not always expressed. Individuals may withhold 
complaints. Other efforts at avoiding conflict involve withdrawing from conflicted interactions 
or directing complaints toward superficial matters. Work on responses to possible or actual 
conflict has described various attitudes toward conflict, styles of engaging (or not) in conflict, 
and tactics employed within a conflict (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974; Rusbult, Zembrodt & Gunn, 
1982; Sillars, 1980; Straus, 1990). As Roloff and Soule (2004) notice, these studies do not focus 
on particular tactics or situated responses in conflict that can be coded.  
There is a strong link between the enactment of morality in interaction, and the potential 
for conflict. The intensity of a moral comment, the performance of certain moralities over time, 
and orientations to conflict across people’s lives can impact a relationship in significant ways. 
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Most interpersonal research on conflict in relationships has measured certain kinds or styles of 
conflict engagement and then compared that to relationship ending potential (i.e. divorce) or 
partners’ self reported thoughts of that potential. There has been little work that looks at how 
conflict shapes relationships over time through particular ways of interacting. The link to 
identities and values makes conflict morally pertinent. The extent to which conflict is expressed 
or not also affects interactions and relationships. Just because conflict is possible or even 
indicated does not mean it will actually “erupt” into an argument. Conflict has to be engaged.  
Hocker and Wilmot (1995) describe people in conversation as having multiple goals 
related to the interaction, their identities, the content of talk, the relationship, and how conflict 
processes should go. Since any of these goals could be complex, different or even contradictory, 
conflict is possible in many ways. Thomas and Kilmann’s (1974) conflict styles scale describes 
various orientations to conflict: avoidance, collaboration, competition, compromise, and 
accommodation. As Hocker and Wilmot (1995) point out, however, these individual styles do 
not account for changing communication processes over time, nor the dynamics that occur 
between styles when individuals are in interaction.  
According to Simmel (1904) conflict is necessary, valuable, and interwoven into the 
social nature of humans and their differences. Baxter (2007), too, notes that conflict is not 
necessarily negative. Difference itself is creative and generative, and need not be threatening. 
However, where the creation of conflict emphasizes ideological differences, it becomes moral 
and highly consequential. Over time, this consequentiality can become a process of rebirth, or a 
process of dissolution (Baxter, 1984). As consequential, conflicts of ideological difference bring 
relationships to the brink of their possibilities, possibly resulting in revitalizing or improving 
them, but at the risk of destroying them permanently.  
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 From a grounded practical theory perspective, the investigation of this chapter yields a 
focus on how conflict can be morally problematic for relationships. Thus the example discussed 
in the analysis presents a case in which conflict proves destructive. Before that, however, the 
next section turns to more discursive approaches to conflict. 
Conflict  
 According to Jacquemet (1999), most cultural approaches to communication have 
focused on how discourse coordinates the shared practices that make up a community rather than 
looking at conflict. When conflict was analyzed, it was often attributed to “breakdowns” or 
misunderstanding. Jacquemet urges researchers to look at ways in which conflict is not just 
misunderstanding, but involves difference and struggles for power (see also Cameron, 1998). 
This analysis takes the views of Grimshaw (1990) and Bailey (2000) that conflict can be a 
rhetorical practice for accomplishing difference.  
 Grimshaw (1990) sees conflict as a social process which is accomplished and managed, 
rather than as a result of error or misunderstanding. “Conflict talk” is the name he gives to 
practices which involve sociolinguistic devices for constructing conversations as being 
“conflict.” Studies in his edited collection include investigations of arguments and constructions 
of difference and dominance (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1990; O’Donnell, 1990). 
 Bailey (2000a, 2004) also sees conflict as constructed through interaction. In a discussion 
of misunderstanding (2004), he begins by noting how instances of misunderstanding threaten 
intersubjectivity, and are thus interactionally important. He then moves however to describe how 
misunderstandings may not merely be “errors” of miscommunication, but actually instances of 
larger conflict based on serious differences. In his study of the negative attributions Korean 
retailers and African American customers make about each other regarding service encounters, 
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Bailey (2000a) proposed that their service encounters accomplished local, discursive enactments 
of preexisting conflict. By emphasizing social differences and attributing negative intentions and 
behaviors to one another, the problematic service encounters were not examples of 
miscommunication, but constructions of divergent communication styles which emphasized, 
labeled, and blamed “difference.” 
 In the following analysis, the problematic interactions in a family, particularly between a 
husband and wife, serve as local enactments of a larger conflict regarding basic ideological 
differences between them. By emphasizing rather than converging on their moral practices, these 
relational partners disaligned from one another and deconstructed the sense of sharedness on 
which intimacy relies. In the next section I begin with some methodological comments, then 
present the results of the analysis of this case study.   
Conflict as a Moral Discursive Practice 
 The moral implications of relating can easily trigger problems and potential conflict, and 
conflict itself carries relational and identity implications. The ways in which relational partners 
confront problems through conflict—or through avoiding conflict—is part of the process of 
constituting a relationship and its moral demands over time. In this section I discuss how conflict 
is visible in interaction. The following section then discusses a case study concerning examples 
of conflict potential in a family’s interactions over time. 
From a discursive perspective, identifying conflict is not the sole task of an analyst who 
decides whether or not participants are “in” or “having” a conflict. Instead, the goal is to focus 
on how participants themselves act as if they were referencing, confronting, avoiding or 
managing conflict through their participation in morally contentious moments. If conflict is 
being engaged in a particular instance, oftentimes participants will employ a metadiscursive 
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vocabulary for talking about that, for example, “we're having this argument because,” “why are 
we fighting about this?” “I disagree with that,” or “let's not continue quarreling about it.” Some 
vocabularies can indirectly reference conflict by mentioning associated or contrasted activities or 
modes of interaction, such as “can't we talk about this rationally?” or “there's no need to bite my 
head off.” 
Similar vocabularies may be used when talking about former conflicts (“remember the 
last fight we had?”), seeking to avoid a potentially imminent conflict (“let's not get into this right 
now”), or telling conflict stories to third parties (“we had quite an argument last week”). But 
quite often, participants among people who are nonconfrontational, and particularly when being 
recorded, will indicate conflict is far more subtle ways. Emotional displays in tone of voice, for 
instance, can give off hostile, angry, frustrated or annoyed stances. The presence of shouting, 
growling, frowning, furrowed eyebrows or flushed skin can also indicate conflict. Certain speech 
acts—criticizing, blaming, accusing, insulting, demanding—can cue conflicted situations; so can 
long silences, dispreferred responses, and turn-taking patterns.  
Spotting moments in which participants indirectly indicate conflict is not the same thing 
as identifying what the conflict is or what those indications mean for the conflict. As Bateson 
(1974) points out, communication is a system of interrelated participants, actions, objects and 
environments in which a clear causal link is hard to point out. Bateson calls the assignation of 
cause and effects to particular people, events and situations “punctuation.” As grammatical 
punctuation breaks a flow of words into a meaningful sentence, this form of punctuation 
organizes the chaotic streams of experience into logical relationships. Watzlawick, Beavin & 
Jackson (1967) build on this notion in their example of demand-withdrawal sequences in which 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 343 
 
 
one person demands and the other withdraws, with each attributing their action as being caused 
by the action of the other person.  
Because of this complexity inherent in interaction, it can be difficult to ascertain, when an 
action cues conflict, whether that action is a cause, result, symptom, etc. of conflict, and whether 
the “conflict” participants have in mind is in the past, present, future, or even shared between 
them. As to how people deal with conflict and conflict possibilities in their talk, this analysis 
does seek to determine whether in their conflict cueings, people are avoiding, confronting, or 
managing conflict; and whether such conflict is one which is or even can be expressed.  
Case Study of Conflict Management in a Family 
This section analyzes home video data from a single family comprising a little less than 
50 hours of data from videos filmed across nearly 30 years. Though the data are home movies, 
and thus depict people who are aware and self-conscious of being filmed, there are nonetheless 
definite patterns that emerge regarding how to deal with potentially conflictual, morally-charged 
interactions. 
The presence of negatively-emoted disagreement and disalignment through divergent 
moral practices, despite these being captured on film, is indicative of the presence of conflict of 
some sort in this family. Furthermore, the constant and repeated patterns of interaction, as well 
participants’ espoused ideas of what they are doing, indicate very different interactional 
achievements regarding a parent’s role in creating fairness for their children. Though the data 
feature several recurring interactions with extended family members, the focus of analysis is a 
family of six: mother, Jilly; father, Mike; daughters JR and Samantha; and sons Abraham and 
Dennis. The analysis focuses on divergent patterns of moral practice between the parents, but 
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demonstrates how these practices are participated in and ratified to differing extents by their 
children as well. 
The issues discussed in this analysis have to do with the concept of fairness as it relates to 
child-raising as a moral practice, particularly through vigilance in parenting. One goal of 
parenting is to raise a “good person,” someone who will learn as a child the communicative 
behaviors which will “do moral character” in their later adult life. In the U.S., fairness and 
equality is a value and a problem, evinced by the ongoing social, legal and policy controversies 
related to fostering a fair society without “rigging” the game so as to create a contrived equality. 
Affirmative action is an example of an issue that, for some people, is about evening an inherently 
unequal playing field, while for others, it gives certain people unfair advantages. As a social and 
cultural issue relevant to U.S. history as well as to people’s everyday lives, fairness and equality 
constitute an “ideological dilemma” (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 
1988). 
This dilemma is also a relational one (e.g., Baxter, 2004b). In a family context, dealing 
with this dilemma is at the heart of parenting practices. Creating fairness in an inherently unfair 
situation—for instance, evening the playing field between an older and younger brother—
requires a far more involved parenting approach than just letting children learn a more 
individualized notion of fairness for themselves. This is conceptualized in this analysis as a sort 
of “hand-on/hands-off” dilemma in doing parenting. Thus, this dilemma is also an interactional 
one (Tracy & Ashcraft, 2001). The dilemma for this family involves situated moral practices 
which deal with questions of what behavior should be monitored, how it should be monitored, 
and for what ends.   
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In chapter seven, one family with a husband and wife from different backgrounds faced 
different notions of the appropriateness of controlling children. A similar problem arises in the 
examples here. Though the parents are both from the U.S., their different ideologies regarding 
fairness involve different notions of how interactionally involved they should be in monitoring 
and controlling their children's behavior. Thus, different family members, and particularly Jilly 
and Mike, engage in different moral practices around the raising of the youngest family 
members, Abraham and Dennis.  
Parenting activities are often likely to be cast in a moral light. The decisions one makes 
with regard to children are considered highly consequential for that child's life and livelihood. As 
Ochs and Kremer-Sadlik (2007) point out, morality is a family practice: families inculcate, 
socialize, and teach certain ways of being as right or wrong. But like so many difficult and 
complex moral activities, there is no one right way to do parenting. Making everyone happy can 
be at odds with letting them learn certain life lessons. In the following examples, conflict is 
imminent in both kinds of situations, but particularly where being a hands-on parent and being a 
hands-off parent come into conflict.  
 Parenting is a delicate balancing act between explicit teaching and letting children learn 
from experience. In the examples below, each parent takes a different orientation to this dilemma 
which becomes more marked over time. This “hands-on/hands-off” dilemma is in some ways 
similar to the relational dialectic tension of autonomy v. connectedness, and demonstrates a more 
private, family-level version, to some extent, of a collective v. individual dilemma (Baxter, 
2004b). On one hand, being a family is about being close and connected, doing things together, 
being engaged, playing a large role in each other's lives, etc. Part of this is norm involves 
establishing equality and fairness among all parties. On the other hand, particularly in societies 
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like the U.S., individualism and self-sufficiency is strongly valued. Creating fairness in a 
“naturally unfair” situation violates the norm that values individual ability.  
In the examples below, a hands-on/hands-off dilemma is apparent, particularly between 
the parents, regarding monitoring their children's behavior with regard to issues of safety, 
behavior, and fairness. Over time, this difference becomes increasingly marked, and is taken up 
in different ways by the older children as they too take on parenting roles with their younger 
brothers.  
The pattern of the problem of fairness is apparent even before the sons’ births. For 
example, in home movies from the 1980s, most of the content of the videos revolves around 
special events (as home movies often do) including birthday, holidays, and special trips. The 
birthdays and holidays are notable for this analysis in revealing the careful work that all family 
members, even extended ones, put into the only children of the family at that point. The 
daughters of Mike and Jilly always had the same number of gifts, always matching. They were 
also consistently given gifts during other people’s birthday occasions. During this time period it 
is hard to tell the difference between Mike and Jilly’s orientation to raising their daughters 
“fairly,” but it is apparent that equality is valued as a sort of “kindness” not afforded adults, that 
is, Mike would not get a gift if it were his daughter Sam’s birthday, but she would get a gift if it 
were his. This only occurs while the daughters are quite young, up to the age of eight or so. 
After that point, the interactional achievement of a situation as “fair” or “unfair” becomes 
visible during the daughters’ interactions among themselves. In several videos between 1994 and 
2000—when the daughters were in age around 11 or 12 up to 18—there occur instances of 
arguments over fairness on tape which indicates that this is a tension already present among the 
children, separate from their interactions with their parents. The first example illustrates the 
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problem of fairness regarding some Easter candy. In this case, there was a large basket, shared 
by the daughters, containing candy in which there was two of everything. Based on the prior 
expectations, in which the daughters always received the same sorts of items in equal measure, 
the older daughter assumes ownership outside any “claiming” of the candy. However, her 
younger sister takes advantage of the lack of explicit ownership to eat both of a particular candy 
type (a candy “ring”) and refuses to admit this as a problematic action—after all, the candy was 
left available to anyone who could take it, and was never “claimed.” In this video JR is holding 
the camera aimed at Samantha, while their little brother Abraham appears intermittently in the 
background, but does not directly participate.  
Excerpt 30 “Stealing” [fam.evts98.18.E3.1]
JR: Oh you have one of those rings where’s mine 61 
Sam: doh know (1.0) you didn’t get one 62 
JR: I got one 63 
(1.0) 64 
Sam: Is cherry? 65 
JR: Yeah 66 
Sam: Did you ever eat it? 67 
JR: y- no 68 
Sam: Was it in a basket? 69 
JR: I don’t know (.) what basket 70 
Sam: The basket (.) next to the cupboards 71 
JR: n- u:h 72 
Sam: I’m not pointin over there= 73 
JR: =uh I don’t know 74 
(1.0) 75 
Sam: I think it was 76 
 77 
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JR: Was that one yours- I mean m↑ine? 78 
(1.0) 79 
Sam: I believe so= 80 
JR: =is it m↑ine? then why’d you eat it did you already eat yours (.) huh?  81 
(1.0)  82 
Sam: I didn’t know 83 
JR: Oh yeah you already ate yours and you didn’t know 84 
(1.0) 85 
Sam: I didn’t know it was yours (.) I have this stuff on my [tee::th] 86 
JR:        [who’d] you think it was? 87 
(2.0)  88 
JR: You’re dumb.89 
90 
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 In this exchange, JR slowly comes to realize that Sam is eating JR’s candy. As soon as JR 
mentions that she should have a candy (“mine” line 78) Sam tries to pass it off as if JR did not 
get one. This opens up the first possible scenario, which is that there was only one candy of this 
type available, and that Sam is eating the only one. Sam begins a question and answer sequence 
that seems designed to elicit whether JR truly had her own candy and whether she knew where 
the candy was (lines 65-71). When JR admits she is not sure where the candy actually was (line 
74), Sam admits that JR’s candy (line 76) was in fact in the basket, and holds up the ring on her 
own finger, smiling (line 77). JR suddenly realizes (line 78) that Sam is currently eating JR’s 
candy, and Sam admits that it appears to be true without admitting so directly (line 80).  
 JR accuses Sam of a wrongdoing directly when she points out the fact that if Sam already 
had one, she should have known the other was not for her (line 81), but Sam continues to act as if 
the presence of two candies did not necessarily mean one was set aside for JR (“I didn’t know” 
line 83). JR makes the error in this claim of not knowing more explicit by mentioning again that 
if Sam ate one, and there was another in the basket, she should have known it was not hers (line 
84), but Sam continues to claim not knowing and tries to change the subject (line 86). JR calls 
Sam out again (line 87) and finally insults her (“you’re dumb” line 89).  
 In families with more than one child—particularly two children close in age—it is typical 
for there to be “two of everything” in an effort to establish fairness. However, this fact is not 
always explicitly discussed, and here Sam seems to have exploited the unstated assumption in 
order to get more candy for herself. JR continues throughout the exchange to reference (but not 
explicitly state) the assumption that if there are two of a candy, and two people, then each person 
should get a candy; while Sam continuously pretends not to know of this assumption, and avoids 
even looking at JR through most of the interaction (lines 77, 82, 88).  
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The conflict possibility in this excerpt is continuously referenced but never fully realized. 
There is a dilemma of sharing and ownership, of fairness and equal access, which creates a 
problem on both sides: how to indicate that “stealing” is even possible in a situation where 
distribution is unstated and sharing is valued; and how to avoid being labeled a “thief” when one 
has clearly violated a norm. JR could have displayed more anger or demanded something in 
return (whether an apology or another candy); Sam could have apologized or offered something. 
Neither person does this. JR’s lack of explicitness or intensity in her indignation, and Sam’s 
determination not to fully engage JR’s accusations, seem in this situation to diffuse the conflict. 
It is difficult to pursue conflict when one person treats it as nonexistent; and the lack of 
seriousness in the accusation, as in the previous example, keeps the accusation from needing to 
be taken seriously. This appears to be a conflict tactic that works, though perhaps only 
temporarily. It also constitutes the way in which the sisters deal with one another. Sam has 
already apparently learned that she will probably not be held strongly responsible for her actions 
by JR, and JR demonstrates that at least in this level of offense, she is not willing to push for an 
apology (or even a strong acknowledgement).  
Accusations are similar in conflict potential to criticisms—they can be, in a sense, the 
same speech act, where an accusation is doing criticism, or a criticism is doing an accusation. 
The potential for conflict in such situations is high, because most people do not want to “agree” 
with being responsible for a criticizable or accusable offense. In many cases among the data for 
this family, criticisms could only be accomplished indirectly, and through this indirect 
management, sustained or serious conflicts were avoided. In this section, an accusation served a 
different purpose, but was not accomplished within a very serious frame, and thus conflict itself 
did not have to be dealt with very seriously. It seems to be the case that certain kinds of 
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dilemmas lend themselves more easily to avoidable conflicts. In situations where the line 
between individual and family ownership is blurred, “stealing” appears to be a less serious 
offense, or at least, need not be treated as serious.  
This is not the only case, by any means, where a similar situation occurs. Though it arises 
commonly between the sisters, it happens in the larger family context as well. In another instance 
from about a year earlier, the family receives a Christmas gift of chocolate-covered pretzels, 
which proves to be an unexpectedly popular delight for the family. The large bag is left out in the 
kitchen because it becomes so popular that people are always eating it. It is also, however, left 
low enough for Abraham, a two year old at this point, to reach it—and Abraham makes no 
attempt to control how much he eats. We hear Jilly mention at one point on tape that he should 
not eat them all, but no attempt is actually made to remove the bag, or provide consequences to 
Abraham when he does not listen to the request (it is phrased as a request rather than an order). 
Later on in the video, Samantha discovers that the bag is completely empty, and confronts Jilly 
about Abraham having eaten all of the pretzels. Jilly treats the situation as unproblematic, and 
Sam ends up sighing and walks away.  
The rest of the examples in this analysis focus on the parenting practices (by Mike and 
Jilly, but also Sam and JR) toward the youngest members of the family, Abraham and Dennis. It 
is in these interactions that the dilemma emerges and becomes conflicted among the family. In 
the early years of Abraham’s birth, “safety” is the theme most prevalent regarding how closely to 
monitor, or become physically involved, in the children’s behavior. Abraham was born 11 years 
after Mike and Jilly’s daughters, and so most of the first three years of his life are the subject of 
video recording—there are literally multiple tapes, hours long each, devoted to following him 
around the house. Even at this stage, Jilly’s “hands-off” approach is apparent. She does not tell 
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Abraham what to do or what not to do. The videos take on an almost anthropological feel. 
Scenes include, for instance, Abraham pulling everything out of the refrigerator, emptying a 
cupboard, removing silverware from a dishwasher, and going through his sisters’ things.  
Throughout such instances, Jilly merely records and does not intervene. But this could be 
part of her style of creating the videos, as a sort of “objective” record. In later videos with other 
family members, Jilly’s hands-off approach becomes more apparent. Common scenes at this 
stage revolve around Abraham moving toward dangerous arenas (e.g. tops of stairs, a hot stove) 
or putting odd things in his mouth (e.g. Styrofoam, plants). In each of such cases, Jilly, if 
recording, merely records, and if not recording, does nothing until Mike orders her to do so. As 
Abraham gets older, and after his little brother is born, a slightly different pattern emerges and 
extends from dangerous to “bad” behavior. If a child does something deemed inappropriate, and 
Mike and Jilly are present, Mike will be the first to comment. Jilly only comments if her 
daughters also comment, and sometimes not even then. If Jilly is alone, she comments but takes 
no action. Over time, if Mike comments, and Jilly either comments or does not but (which is 
almost always) does nothing, Mike will often step in. Later on, he steps in even without Jilly’s 
comments. Thus, the pattern changes over time.  
During the first couple years of Abraham’s and Dennis’s lives, the disciplining action 
ends with verbal comments which are directed toward the boys, but don’t make strong demands. 
For example, in one scene, Abraham pushes Dennis, who falls over. Jilly says nothing; Mike 
criticizes the action (“don’t do that”), but otherwise makes no move. Even after Dennis starts 
crying, no one disciplines or comments on Abraham’s actions. Thus, at this stage, Mike and 
Jilly’s actions regarding the children’s behavior are not markedly different, except that Mike is 
quicker to take verbal disciplinary action. 
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Over time, however, things shift. When Jilly is alone, she continues the same strategy of 
not intervening: she criticizes, but takes no action. As Jilly is a stay-at-home-mom at this point, 
there are several videos in which she is alone with the children. When one of the children 
engages in unsafe or bad behavior, she comments (with phrases such as “don’t do that,” “that’s 
not nice,” “no hitting,” or “stay near me”) but very rarely physically intervenes, never provides 
possible consequences (such as if you do x you will be punished in manner y) and never doles 
out any consequences when bad behavior is continued.  
The next example demonstrates a typical example of the ways in which problematic child 
behavior is controlled in a hands-off style when Jilly is alone, and takes place when Abraham 
and Dennis are about four and two years old, respectively. Jilly is filming the house, which is 
filled with boxes as they are about to move. She comes across Abraham and Dennis watching 
television in their room, and notices that Abraham is holding a double popsicle.  
Excerpt 31 “Food in the Room” [fam.evts99.19.E6.1]
Jilly:  Don’t set those d↑own  (.) caught you 90 
  in here 91 
Abraham: Big one  92 
Jilly: (two big popsicles) this room’s clean you shouldn’t have food in here at 93 
all (1.0) why do I keep sayin the same stuff94 
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This instance is quite normal across the recordings whenever Jilly is alone with one or 
both children and comes across or is witness to “bad” behavior. In this instance one can tell by 
Jilly’s reaction to the popsicle that having the popsicle in the room is not allowed, perhaps not 
ever, or perhaps because the house is clean and they are moving soon—it is difficult to tell. Jilly 
gives an order related to keeping the room clean rather than having the popsicles there in the first 
place (line 90). She also points out that she has “caught” the bad action. Abraham avoids 
acknowledging he has done anything wrong by commenting on the popsicle itself and waving it 
around (line 92). Jilly then further explains the problem with having popsicles in the room (line 
93) and as she walks away, comments on the fact that she’s said this before (line 94). She is 
clearly annoyed that she keeps repeating her requests and that these requests are not followed, 
but is unwilling to take action besides the verbal acknowledgement of such violations.  
On the other hand, when the family is all together, multiple people will often criticize 
and/or discipline the children, while Jilly continues not to get involved. Thus, Sam and JR end up 
taking the more hands-on approach which begins to be developed over time, while Jilly becomes 
increasingly hands-off. This pattern becomes stronger as years pass. The next example shows an 
instance in which the hands-off approach is challenged by Jilly’s husband. This example takes 
place in the same time frame as the prior example. 
Excerpt 32 “Sand in the Bag” [fam.evts99.19.E3.3]
Mike:  Oh:: (.) I didn’t want him get- gettin his sandy hands into that sweetie 94 
Jilly:  Is it ( )?= 95 
Mike:  =ye:s (.) that ruins that whole bag 96 
Abraham: ((screams)) 97 
Mike:  Now that whole damn bag’s gonna be sand 98 
Abraham: [( )] ((shouting)) 99 
JR:  [( )] 100 
Mike:  That’s why I was (saying)= 101 
Jilly:  =I’m sorry 102 
JR:  It’s not that bad (.) they’re not that sandy= 103 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 355 
 
 
Mike:  =a:lright (.) okay (0.5) I’ll take your word for it I guess104 
105 
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 In this example, Mike complains about Dennis’s putting his sandy hands into a pretzel 
bag (they are at the beach). His complaint makes it clear that he was expecting the sandy bag to 
be a potential problem and that he also expected Jilly would exhibit the proper control to keep 
the situation from arising. In lines 94 and 101, he refers in the past tense to this desire and to 
some prior action, which seems to indicate he had either complained about this possibility before 
or perhaps had even recruited Jilly in ensuring the problem would not occur. Jilly acknowledges 
that she was held responsible for this action, and even seems to accept this responsibility, in line 
102. Mike’s complaints make it clear that he expects the children’s behavior to be monitored, if 
not by him then by Jilly—perhaps even preferably by Jilly. This latter point seems validated by 
the fact that several scenes such as this feature Mike criticizing Jilly for failing to be vigilant 
enough about one thing or another regarding Abraham and Dennis’s behavior. Perhaps because 
Jilly exhibits so little monitoring or vigilance more and more over the years, it seems the case 
that Mike and the daughters tend to turn to her when the children are acting up, treating her 
uninvolvement as problematic.  
 The examples so far have demonstrated a few notable patterns. One is that Jilly typically 
employs a hand-off approach with intervening in the behavior of, and disciplining, the children. 
Though she occasionally comments on bad behavior, and presumably has given the children 
directives regarding certain kinds of actions, she otherwise does not become directly involved. 
Mike, on the other hand, seems to expect more direct involvement. He is often the first to 
comment on the children’s behavior when present, and criticizes Jilly or orders her to become 
more involved if it seems the children are doing or have done something wrong. Over time, 
Mike’s way of handling the children seems to become the norm, and is adopted by the other 
immediate family members, Mike and Jilly’s older daughters. In the following example, which 
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takes place shortly before the prior ones, Mike and Jilly’s older daughters, JR and Sam, are about 
seventeen and fifteen respectively. In this instance, it is Dennis’s second birthday, and both 
Abraham and Dennis are acting up a bit as the rest of the family tries to set the table and prepare 
the cake (they have just sung “happy birthday”).  
Excerpt 33 “Birthday Cake” [fam.evts98.17.E4.1]
Abraham: Happy birthday poop you (0.5) happy birthday super poop  105 
Mike:  Super poop? no:: none of that stuff=  106 
Sam:  =wait (.) wait Dennis= 107 
Abraham: =( ) [( )] ((shouting)) 108 
Sam:        [SH::] (. ) would you cut it out- wait= 109 
Jilly:  =wait a second Dennis we’re gonna cut you a [piece] 110 
Sam:         [>wait] wait wait wait wait 111 
  wait wait wait [wait<] 112 
Jilly:      [w↑ait] wait wait= 113 
Sam:  =that’s not all for you 114 
(2.0)  115 
Abraham: I’m takin the cap off (.) what do you think I’m doin (.) just takin the  116 
[cap off] 117 
JR:  [where’s the] cake cutter mommy 118 
Jilly:  I don’t have a cake cutter= 119 
Sam:  =Dennis stop it 120 
JR:  Don’t you have an old one we can use? 121 
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Jilly:  No 122 
Sam:  Wait 123 
JR:  Red? Maybe that’s Gramma 124 
Jilly:  Uh uh 125 
 126 
Jilly:  That’s gramma I don’t have one 127 
(4.0) ((Dennis tapping spoon)) 128 
Sam:  He’s rippin up the cake 129 
((Dennis throws spoon on floor)) 130 
Sam:  DENNIS= 131 
JR:  =what’d you do that for (.) punk (.) this 132 
get your head 133 
to the table lick (3.0) you puppy you134 
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 This example demonstrates that Jilly only speaks to control Dennis’s behavior once 
others in the family have identified it as problematic (line 110). Jilly does not make a comment at 
Abraham’s references to “poop” (line 105); Mike, as usual, does comment (line 106) and 
furthermore, physically interacts with Abraham, though in a teasing way. After Mike leaves, 
however, the other children of the family display a similar orientation to Abraham and Dennis’s 
behavior, not just verbalizing criticisms, but physically intervening. Jilly makes no comment 
when Dennis starts putting his finger into the cake, even though Jilly is watching him the closest 
(with the camera, even). Instead, Sam (107, 109, 111, 114, 120, 123) continuously tries to stop 
Dennis’s attempts to eat the cake with his hands before it has been cut. Sam also is the one who 
orders Abraham to stop shouting (line 109). Jilly does tell Dennis to wait (lines 110, 113) but 
only after Sam has made that request twice (lines 107, 109).  
 In line 115, Sam continues taking the majority of the control over the children’s behavior 
by taking the milk away from Abraham, who protests the need for such action in lines 116-117. 
While JR and Jilly start a side conversation, Sam continues to order Dennis to stop trying to eat 
the cake (lines 120, 123) and finally moves the cake out of reach in line 126. Dennis responds by 
picking up a spoon and beating it on the table (line 128). Sam directs a criticism about Dennis’s 
behavior to Jilly in line 129 demonstrating that, like Mike perhaps, she expects Jilly to be more 
in charge of the children’s behavior. But even when Dennis throws his spoon on the floor (line 
130), Jilly continues to maintain silence. Instead, Sam shouts Dennis’s name, and JR also 
exhibits a highly physical, engaged style by addressing Dennis, pointing to the blob of chocolate 
he created by banging the cakey spoon on the table, and grabbing his head to indicate he should 
put his head to the table and lick up the mess (lines 132-134). 
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 This example shows, again, a typical evolution on the pattern of involvement in 
controlling behavior. If Mike had been there, he likely would have taken a very active role in 
verbally and physically directing Abraham and Dennis. Instead, since he leaves the room, Sam 
and JR take on this role, with Jilly, as usual, having limited involvement. This happens in many 
other instances, including ones in which Jilly is not filming. In these instances, there are 
moments of what are possibly “demonstrations” of conflict. Emotionally marked criticisms, 
upgraders, sharp tones, criticisms and complaints mark these interactions as becoming more 
problematic over time as the interactional moral practices for achieving them diverge. For 
several years though, Jilly seems to largely accept this and does not respond; but nor does she 
change her own behavior. The next example shows how this pattern begins to have a negative 
effect over time. In this case, the level of “control” is more directly related to establishing 
fairness rather than disciplining.  
In the next excerpt, a year later, Abraham and Dennis are Easter egg hunting in their 
backyard. Almost immediately, Abraham is finding eggs all over the place, while Dennis follows 
him around, not seeming to realize this tactic is not going to get any eggs for himself. The boys’ 
parents encounter the dilemma of whether to ensure the boys have equal numbers of eggs, and 
how to do so. Mike and the other children, particularly Sam, become actively involved in trying 
to ensure equality in the number of eggs for each child, but Jilly, though she participates, 
espouses a different ethic. In the video JR is filming, Dennis and Abraham are in and out of the 
frame, and Sam moves into the frame once when she helps Dennis find an egg. Mike and Jilly 
are off camera.  
Excerpt 34 “Easter Egg Hunt” [fam.evts99.20.E5.2]
Sam:  Get some Dennis get some 133 
(2.5) 134 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 361 
 
 
Sam:  Hurry Dennis l↑ook look for [eggs] 135 
Mike:                         [Go] on 136 
Jilly:                         [>(they’re not just)<] here 137 
JR:  Don’t get all of em Abraham 138 
Abraham: ((shouts)) 139 
(1.0) 140 
Jilly:  ( ) [( )] 141 
Sam:       [Don’t] just follow Abraham Dennis 142 
Mike:  ( ) 143 
Jilly:  WHAT (.) They’re everywhere yes 144 
Mike:  Send him over here then (.) so he’s not following Abraham= 145 
Dennis: =I’ve got one 146 
(0.5) 147 
Jilly:  He got one 148 
Mike:  [Dennis] 149 
Sam:  [come over] here 150 
Mike:  Dennis over here 151 
Sam:  Dennis come here 152 
Mike:  Over here 153 
Sam:  Don’t just follow Abraham 154 
Mike: Over here (.) over here Dennis over here (.) look around look 155 
[everywhere] 156 
Jilly:   [He got] (.) one g(h)ood boy 157 
Mike:  Dennis 158 
Jilly:  Leave im alone he’s got to do it 159 
Abraham: I’m doin fi:ne (.) my basket [(is full)] 160 
Mike:              [Come on Dennis] 161 
Jilly:              [Keep lookin oka::y]= 162 
Mike:  =Look in the planter 163 
Sam:  (here’s) an egg  164 
(3.0) 165 
Sam:  [Good job] 166 
JR:  [Good job] Dennis 167 
(1.0) 168 
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Sam:  go over there look around  169 
(4.0) 170 
Mike:  Dennis 171 
JR:  the screen’s showing like neon colors 172 
Abraham: ah HA (.) an egg= 173 
Mike:  =give one of those to him174 
 
 In this situation, Dennis’s inability to find eggs (or even to look very hard for them) 
causes distress among the adults. Dennis and Abraham, being close in age, had already at this 
time exhibited strong competitiveness toward each other. Thus the idea of fairness, a value 
common among most non-hierarchically oriented families, becomes grounded in a kind of 
“absolute” equality in which everyone should get the same amount and same quality of things. 
This was demonstrated as a tension for Sam and JR in the first excerpt, but in that case the 
conflict was avoided because the expectations remained tacit. Here, it becomes immediately 
obvious that there is a lack of equality between the brothers, and the ideal of fairness thus 
becomes explicit.  
Sam identifies this problem first, urging Dennis on (lines 133, 135), and JR even directs a 
comment to Abraham (line 138) indicating he, too, should be thinking about his brother and 
perhaps “holding back” from picking up all the eggs he can find. In lines 136 and 143 Mike 
demonstrates an increase in worry from sounding frustrated to openly complaining about the 
situation and, based on Jilly’s response (a shout and irritated account in line 144), seems to 
blame her for what’s happening.  
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 All—except Jilly—continue to take charge of Dennis’s efforts and try to direct him 
toward eggs, in one case even finding an egg for him (lines 150-155, 164). Jilly’s only 
contribution during this time is to point out when Dennis finds one on his own (line 157) and she 
praises Dennis for the accomplishment. After Mike again says Dennis’s name, Jilly makes 
explicit her expectation that “he’s got to do it” (line 159). She directly states her own preference 
that Dennis should be left alone, and implied in that statement is that he should be left alone even 
if it means he ends up with fewer eggs. Notably, however, no one in the family pays attention. 
After Mike’s and Jilly’s next turns (lines 161-162) which are encouraging but not necessarily 
directive, Mike reasserts the pattern in which Dennis is “helped” to find eggs rather than finding 
them on his own (line 163). Mike even upgrades this practice when, after Abraham finds another 
egg next to Dennis (line 173), Mike directs Abraham to give the egg to Dennis (line 174).  
 This case is almost a micro-example of the larger pattern that develops in the family 
interactions, as caught on video, between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s. The moral practice 
of ensuring fairness is done differently, and diverges to be done more and more differently, over 
time; concomitantly, the disagreement and disalignment between Mike and Jilly also increases 
over time. The pattern also becomes more noticeable to participants over time, with more explicit 
references to the conflicting moral values of fairness versus independence. The Easter egg hunt 
is a prime example because it is in some sense a competitive game, but other similar instances in 
the videos include (1) again, gifts and their equal amounts and qualities, (2) other games, such as 
Monopoly, or spontaneous “running races” between the brothers, and (3) the extent to which 
Mike in particular “does things for” the sons. Examples of the last arise for instance when the 
boys get a new game or toy, and Mike plays the game or builds the toy for them. A few instances 
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even show him physically taking one of his son’s hands and putting it on the buttons that make 
the toy work.  
 In the short period of time demonstrated with these examples, Mike and Jilly’s different 
styles, interactional choices and apparently differing ideological approaches to parenting 
diverged. Though there are only a few videos following the example described, all of them 
feature further situations, similar to this one, and marked by emotional, negative responses which 
could be characterized as criticizing, bickering, or “snapping.” That their differences were not 
discussed, explained, accounted for, mutually-oriented or adjusted in any way but apart indicates 
that an unaddressed conflict was at work.  
A couple years after the Easter egg hunt, Mike and Jilly divorced. It is not suggested that 
the hands-on/hands-off dilemma caused their divorce, but that divergent communication is a way 
of showing a lack of shared orientation, and thus a lack of commitment to the same goals. And 
after the divorce, perhaps because there was no longer a need to adjust to each other, Mike and 
Jilly’s approaches continued to evolve in opposite directions and become more explicit. Jilly, for 
instance, was minimal in her approach to making Abraham and Dennis do their schoolwork. She 
would help them when requested, but otherwise indicated it was up to them to do what they 
needed to do, and if they did not do so, they would suffer the consequences at school (having 
poor grades, getting in trouble, etc.). Mike, on the other hand, would do homework with 
Abraham and Dennis every night that he had the kids (which was every other week), and would 
not allow anything else to occur (even dinner) until the work was finished. He was at times 
overly involved, going so far as to do parts of the work for his children. He was also in constant 
meetings with members of the children’s school, while Jilly left it up to the kids whether they 
were to fail a class or not—and sometimes they did.  
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 The following excerpts take place about seven years after the divorce, and demonstrate 
how the patterns of orientation to fairness have become more different and more explicit. At this 
point Abraham and Dennis are about 16 and 14. In the first excerpt, Mike discusses with JR (the 
children are not present) his concern about the idea of fairness. Over the years, Abraham and 
Dennis’s competitiveness increased until it was common for Dennis to throw elaborate tantrums 
because he often could not keep up in certain games with his brother. Though at the time of these 
recordings (2009-2010) that tendency had abated, it was nonetheless still present enough to 
continue to worry Mike. Here, he discusses Dennis’s temper after relating a recent incident in 
which Dennis had stalked off after a game with Abraham and refused to eat dinner.  
Excerpt 35 “Dennis’s Temper” [fam.nov09.1.E1.1(audio)]
Mike: he’s a little better than= 175 
JR: =yeah than before= 176 
Mike: =but he still gets (.) just (.) livid sometimes 177 
(1.0) 178 
JR: yeah (.) he’s at that age 179 
Mike: I try to tell Abraham you know ju::st let im (.) just back off for a minute 180 
JR: yeah 181 
Mike: but Abraham’s like me 182 
JR: can’t ease up? (0.5) even for a good cause= 183 
Mike: =no:: not at all (1.0) I just want em to be happy= 184 
JR: =of course185 
 
 
 Here, Mike constructs the “problem” of Dennis’s temper (line 177) as being due to the 
fact that Abraham does not ever “back off” or let Dennis win at things once in a while (line 180). 
Mike equates the result of letting Dennis win once in a while with “happiness” (line 184). Here 
Mike presents himself as actively worried and involved in the inequity between Abraham’s skills 
and Dennis’s apparent lack thereof. Mike presents himself as “telling” Abraham to back off (line 
180) as an example of his efforts to create a greater if artificial fairness between the brothers, one 
in which they are more equally “good” at the same things. Thus, even years later, Mike continues 
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to employ intense levels of involvement with his sons’ behavior and to show distress even at 
fairly mild incidents of “unhappy” (tempermental) behavior.  
 The next example takes place during the same time, but here the boys are with Jilly and 
her parents, camping. In this interaction, the family members have been painting, and now are 
going to have a contest in which each person votes by “secret ballot” for their favorite painting.  
Excerpt 36 “Painting Contest” [fam.sum10.2.E1.1]
Dennis: so do we get like (.) categories like (.) best- you know what[ever] 186 
Jilly:                     [no::] 187 
Grampa:         [no no] that 188 
  defeats  the whole idea of a contest 189 
Abraham: yeah the winner wins= 190 
Jilly:  =you can’t have everyone be a winner 191 
Grampa: not like in the schools ((laughs)) 192 
Dennis: oh okay right 193 
Jilly:  yeah ((laughs)) 194 
Grampa: this is a real contest 195 
Jilly:  none of that (.) crap 196 
Grampa: no preferential treatment here 197 
Jilly:  you can’t have all winners 198 
Gramma: oh ((laughs)) 199 
JR:  I still need a ballot 200 
. 201 
. ((2.0 minutes deleted)) 202 
. 203 
JR:  Wait- do- we get to vote fer (1.0) just one right now?= 204 
Abraham: =just one= 205 
Jilly:  =just one= 206 
JR:  =[oh] 207 
Dennis:    [and] it can’t be [yours] 208 
Jilly:          [( )     ] 209 
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Grampa: wh- .hh  210 
JR:  I thought we were gonna have first second and third= 211 
Grampa: =well= 212 
Gramma: =yeah and then- whoever gets the most one would be (.) first second and 213 
  third= 214 
JR:  =ah::= 215 
Gramma: =that’s how it works out 216 
JR:  oh::217 
218 
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 In this example there is an explicit reference to the idea of making things “fair” as being 
letting everyone “win.” In line 186, Dennis tries to find out if there are different categories in 
which a person can win. Since there aren’t that many “contestants” this seems to cue that many 
people (if not all) could “win” given the right categories, and Jilly and Grampa pick up on this 
implied meaning right away, emphatically disagreeing with it (lines 187-188). Abraham and Jilly 
reinforce the implication of this disagreement by pointing out that the concept of winning is in 
conflict with having more than one winner (lines 190-191). Grampa (line 192) then draws out 
another implication by contrasting the family notion of what it means to win with the one the 
boys might encounter at school. This implication is that in school, in an effort not to upset 
children, teachers might “rig” a situation so that everyone wins. This is a typical complaint made 
of “liberal” education and comes in a category of complaints about being politically correct or 
hindering free speech in supposed efforts to keep from offending others. Grampa and Jilly 
continue to reinforce the idea of “one winner” calling it a “real contest” (line 195) and equating 
anything else with “crap” or “preferential treatment” (lines 196-197). 
 After a couple minutes of dealing with ballots, JR cues the value of “one winner” again 
by asking about how many get voted for (line 204). The camera is on Grampa, who makes a 
series of faces and some noises indicating something like indignation or surprise at the question. 
JR seems to understand the implied criticism that may be coming as she repairs her earlier 
question to be specifically about second and third place rather than about different categories of 
first (line 211). Gramma (lines 213, 215) explains that that does not need to be voted on, but will 
be worked out by how many votes each person gets in the first place. Ironically, there ends up 
being a three-way tie. But it is considered unproblematic, perhaps, because it was accomplished 
in the right (loosely democratic) manner.  
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 Jilly and Mike were raised in very different ways. Jilly’s parents were strongly 
conservative Republican, Mike’s liberal Democrat. This is not to say that these political beliefs 
actually caused, alone, Jilly’s and Mike’s different approaches to raising their children. Rather, 
there are particular ideas about how to be morally good which cue different ways of achieving 
goodness—ways of achieving that line up with, for instance, ways to parent, political beliefs, and 
other espoused and enacted methods of managing interactional dilemmas. One sees this 
connection being made when in excerpt 13 Grampa and Jilly reference political stances 
(regarding education, preferential treatment) in the context of designing an informal painting 
contest.  
This is also consistent with Lakoff’s (2002) work on different “cognitions” of liberals and 
conservatives, with the liberal perspective being oriented to nurturing while the conservative one 
is oriented to strictness. This difference is also presented as a moral one, based on different 
ideologies of the meaning of authority and intervention for the creation of a “good family” 
(which for Lakoff provides the metaphor, and thus sense-making, for a good government). 
Lakoff associated the “strict” with the father and the “nurturing” with the mother, though these 
associations, as in this case, can be reversed.  
In interaction, people orient to particular ideologies associated with the cultural and 
relational meanings for their discursive choices. Part of the construction of a relationship as one 
that shares—or does not share—moral values is about continually achieving in interaction the 
sense that people are acting within coherent moralities. Thus, people work in their relationships 
to reaffirm that their values are consistent and reasonable. This requires work because difference 
is always present. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, even in assumedly shared situations, 
differences and contradictions and dilemmas exist.  
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This occurs in the case of Jilly and her parents, for instance, in maintaining similarities 
between political and personal espoused values as a way of showing that they all share a 
coherent moral orientation. In the case of Jilly and Mike, each person wanted to be “fair” but had 
different ideas of how to do so. Mike’s idea of fairness was about ensuring everyone had the 
same amount of “stuff” whereas Jilly’s was more about independence and achieving things on 
one’s own. Thus, Mike’s moral practices revolved around high involvement, physical 
interaction, close monitoring of behavior, and intervention; while Jilly’s revolved around 
maintaining distance and chiming in now and then with verbal comments. Like the issue of 
ownership discussed in the first excerpt (being collectively or individually oriented with regard 
to ownership), ensuring fairness constitutes a dilemma. The more one tries to make everything 
equal, the more some people end up losing out. In the case of the Easter egg hunt, for instance, 
Abraham ends up not being able to keep all of his eggs, while Dennis attains his through outside 
help.  
 In these examples, the dilemmas of how to parent were not able to be easily avoided. 
Though in the moment of recording, at least, the conflicts inherent in such dilemmas were not 
engaged in a sustained way (there was never an outright extended argument, at least on film), 
their occurrence over time proved consequential for the relationship between the parents of the 
family. Over time, concurrent with not dealing with the difference in parenting styles, the 
practices each person employed for dealing with parenting evolved in separate directions, further 
and further apart. By the time the parents had divorced, and years after, their approaches to 
raising their children had become markedly different and were associated with very different 
values. Their different moral practices for child-raising were employed for different interactional 
accomplishments of the ideology of fairness.  
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In this chapter, I analyzed a long-standing dilemma in a family and examined (1) how it 
implicated conflict, (2) how it was responded to, and (3) its impact on interaction over time. 
Dilemmas—like the dialectical tensions described by Baxter (2004a, 2004b)—can only be 
managed, not resolved. This analysis provided examples of a kind of conflict that, for this 
family, could not be satisfactorily managed, let alone attempt a resolution. In fact, by 
consistently maintaining and then by diverging their parenting styles, the parents in this family 
constructed their differences more and more starkly—in a sense, ensuring that resolution would 
never occur.  
Morality and Conflict 
In this case study, conflict over different parenting styles proved hard to avoid and made 
an impact on the family over time. There was little attempt made by either parent to adjust their 
style to the other, though in earlier videos Mike’s style seemed more similar to Jilly’s. Even in a 
short period of a couple years, however, the styles grew further and further apart. The lack of an 
attempt to reconcile these competing ideas about how to raise the children both constructs and is 
indicative of the way in which Mike and Jilly accomplish their relationship in moments of 
interactional morality.  
In this family, a problematic orientation to conflict arising from a dilemma was 
exacerbated, with each parent using their own style in more marked ways. The evolution of 
increased difference led to more and more severe conflict potential, none of which were engaged 
with directly or aimed at resolution. In the end, the parents divorced.  It is impossible to say 
whether the parents’ differing approach to parenting, and avoidance of conflict, caused their 
eventual divorce—but certainly, these enactments with regard to morality and conflict 
constructed a way of interacting that must have proven incompatible over time, perhaps 
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alongside other ways of interacting not captured in the home movies or to be noted in future 
analyses.  
Conflict is a moral practice which designates the most immediate and explicit threat of 
morality for relationships. Conflict is forced to address the possibility of difference and involves 
either constructing sharedness, or emphasizing difference. To construct some level of sharedness 
is to construct the continuation of the relationship, to demonstrate that there is sufficient overlap 
of intersubjectivity, intimacy, and ideology to go on. To emphasize difference is to challenge the 
relationship itself, not necessarily “consciously,” but as an action produced over time.  
This chapter presented some of the dilemmas of parenting, and the ways in which 
participants in the family chose to construct different and opposing practices rather than seeking 
to manage those tensions. This phenomenon is similar to what Bateson (1972) called 
“schismogenesis”—the creation of struggle or conflict based on the interaction between people 
or groups and the ways in which they respond to one another. This study indicates that an ideal 
of moral communication would not necessarily avoid conflict, but that conflict would be 
managed in a different way. Rather than emphasizing difference, convergence would be sought 
and practiced. This notion is returned to in chapter nine.  
Chapter eight reconstructed “conflict” as a collection of practices for challenging 
sharedness and constructing difference in the interactional achievement of ideology. Chapter 
eight is the final analysis chapter in this project. In a sense, it represents the culmination of many 
of the ideas brought forth in the previous four analysis chapters. Chapter four discussed the 
problem of intersubjectivity as one in which a shared world is a minimal requirement for 
interaction, and an assumption for intimacy. Chapter five discussed how intimacy can be 
problematic for participating in morally questionable actions. Chapter six discussed ideologies 
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and their contradictions as unspoken and thus problematic for the relational sharedness of people 
operating in an ostensibly shared culture. Chapter seven discussed how different ideologies are 
more salient for intercultural relationships. And this chapter brought these arguments together to 
show how moral practices for intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology and culture can be employed 
for emphasizing difference in conflict. The next chapter, chapter nine, takes up some 
implications of these analyses to formulate considerations for an ideal of moral communication 
as a practice. 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 374 
 
 
Chapter 9 
Moral Communication: Toward Ideals of Practice 
 If morality is a practice, how is it to be done well? 
 The problems discussed in this project are serious ones with relational and ultimately 
community consequences. Such problems are inherent to human beings and interaction—as so 
many (Goffman, Garfinkel, Burke and others) have noted, humans and interaction are moral. 
Moral situations are confronted on a daily basis, by all people, and must be managed 
communicatively. Morality involves ways of dealing with difference. It is not necessarily the 
case that differences are always negative or cause for conflict. But differences are not simple or 
straightforward. Differences pose problems for understanding. Differences can threaten 
closeness. Differences can seem misguided, wrong, malicious. Differences make coming 
together, in everything from service encounters to marriage, a challenge.    
This work has advanced the concept of morality as a practice. The project had two 
primary purposes. One purpose was investigate the problems and practices of morality, based in 
a particular communicative perspective (chapter one), drawing from literatures from across the 
communication field (chapter two), derived from a discourse analytic approach (chapter three) 
and grounded in empirical data (chapters four through eight). Another purpose was to work 
toward developing a grounded practical theory of moral communication which explains 
normative ideals for moral discursive practices. This chapter begins with a summary of the 
analysis, discusses some implications for “moral communication” as an ideal of moral practice, 
and situates these conclusions with regard to previous work on similar topics. Following that, 
limitations and directions for future research are discussed.  
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 The analysis of this project covered five chapters related to intersubjectivity, intimacy, 
ideology, culture, and conflict. These chapters involve problems involved in doing morality. 
Intersubjectivity represents the most fundamental basis on which morality relies, and is tied to 
the assumption that humans are, in a sense, human—intelligible, comprehensible, and “real.” 
Intimacy constitutes the way in which morality is worked out in relational contexts and through 
relational practices in terms of closeness and distance of people to one another. Ideology is as the 
heart of how people construct shared morality together, and the ways in which no cultural 
context is homogenous, but is riddled with contradictory ideologies which must be managed so 
as to create a sense of common ground. Culture involves the ways in which salient differences 
are associated with certain kinds of people, places and perspectives. And conflict is a sort of 
long-term practice which is deeply tied to the way in which morality is confronted and managed 
in relationships. 
 In each chapter, participants engaged in different practices for working out their morality 
to and with one another, and for dealing with the inherent and inevitable troubles which 
differences make for moral interactions. Intersubjectivity involved challenges and practices 
designed for orienting to others in conversation and ensuring that interaction could and would 
unfold in an orderly, jointly-accomplished socially-meaningful manner. Intimacy presented the 
particular ways of doing intersubjectivity which would accomplish closeness, and the particular 
new moral challenges associated with closer relationships. Ideology described the ways in which 
people make choices with regard to their moral actions, and how the cultural and “different” 
nature of those choices are occluded in part by the assumption of a shared cultural and 
ideological background. Culture indexed how practices associated with different cultural 
contexts were noticed, referenced or enacted to accomplish different moral norms for how to be a 
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good friend or family member. And conflict demonstrated how these things come together and 
cause problems, and in particular emphasized the role of difference in moral interaction. 
Chapter four argued that intersubjectivity is a means of establishing a shared world. By 
overcoming difference and managing multiple goals and potential problems, participants lay the 
foundation for closeness and make relational conversational identities relevant. Recognition is 
one way of accomplishing intersubjectivity by demonstrating awareness of others as relevant 
identifiable humans involved in the interaction. Recognition attributes personhood and 
interactability to actors in a social scene—a situation that can become complex as more actors 
participate in different ways, for example, displaying recognition to a baby while conversing 
with a fellow adult.  
Intelligibility refers to the comprehensibility of utterances, people and situations, and is 
the basic mechanism of sense-making. Utterances and turns are assumed to have relevant 
meaning which is sought if not made apparent. Next and subsequent turns which signal problems 
with interpretation demonstrate an intersubjective break, as when prolonged misunderstandings 
occur. Attention sustains intersubjectivity across turns for the purpose of developing sequences 
of action. Attention involves complex social meanings regarding the participants maintaining 
their interactions. Attention is a procedure for participating in interaction, and signals 
commitments both to the interaction, and the people within it. Other-orientation is a way of 
marking particular identities in a special way within situations. Intersubjectivity can thus be 
accomplished in different forms or to different levels of intimacy for certain but not other people 
in an interaction.  
Chapter five argued that an assumption of shared understanding with regard to the stable 
moralities of close others is in tension with the moral questionableness of certain moral practices 
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which can reveal fundamental differences. Certain practices for moral interaction (judgments, 
gossip, taboo topics) can have negative implications for participants’ identities. Among close 
others, there is an unspoken assumption that the other is basically a “good person.” Standards for 
goodness, however, are tacit and based on complex ideologies, which may not be perfectly 
shared in a relationship. Therefore, there is a dilemma between feeling safe to participate in 
morally questionable practices, and potentially stepping outside the expectations of the other and 
thus losing face. Gossip, for example, involves harsh judgments of others, but is seen as morally 
suspect as an activity. Thus it has negative face implications not just for the subject of gossip, but 
also for the producer of gossip and (if ratified as an activity) for the receiver of gossip as well.  
Chapter six argued that even within apparently shared cultures, ideologies are morally 
problematic and contradictory in close relationships. Shared ways of doing and expressing are 
based not just on relational coordination, but on the practices taken as commonsense in a 
community. Because commonsense notions of how and why things are done can and often are 
contradictory, they always run the risk of creating an interactional dilemma. For example, 
complaints and threats assert certain action “rights” in families (Hepburn, 2010). If in an 
example of a mother and adult son such rights are afforded by one ideology (for example, 
“mothers can tell children what to do”) but removed by another (“men can tell women what to 
do”) then there arises not just a clash of ideologies, but a clash goals and actions. 
Chapter seven argued that intercultural interactions make salient cultural ideologies in a 
way that offers different management techniques than in situations where culture appears more 
obviously shared. The “difference” of ideologies where culture is assumed to be shared are 
silent, ignored, or not attributed to ideology. The difference of ideology in intercultural 
interaction is often, on the other hand, taken as a given even where it is not the case. In 
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intercultural relationships, participants are often reflexive about ideological differences, and are 
more likely to engage in metadiscourse about them. However, there is more palpable work 
needed to construct a sense of sharedness in a situation where difference is notable and 
practically present.  
Chapter eight argued that difference creates distance in interpersonal relationships 
through divergent moral practices. If moral practices construct ideology through interactional 
choices, then the lining-up of ideology is intersubjectively and intimately relevant. If ideologies 
do not match—if interaction seems to aim at different sorts of actions and goals—then the 
sharedness and closeness of a relationships is called into question. Working to maintain 
sharedness in the face of always-possible difference is a characteristic of (and practice for) 
relationships which are experienced as a “we,” as a unit in itself rather than a fleeting dance of 
individuals. Work that creates, emphasizes and maintains difference, on the other hand, is a way 
of interactionally achieving troubled relationships whose conflict leads to disengagement.  
 Each of these chapters identified tensions, troubles and dilemmas which relate to a central 
problem with moral practice: difference. The human mind is unknown and, for many, 
unknowable. In discourse analysis it is not treated as relevant because it is not practically 
empirical. It is, however, a meaningful communicative concept. We care about what others are 
like. Kinds of persons matter to us. We are disturbed by actions that seem unimaginably wrong, 
and cheered by those which affirm what we think is right. We assume that we do not need to 
explain our every action, that the words we use will make sense to one another. And the closer 
we are to someone, the greater that expectation is.  
 The next section discusses the implications of the analytical arguments and their evidence 
regarding moral problems. A key part of these implications involves illustrating how they are 
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relevant to developing a grounded practical theory of “moral communication” as an ideal for 
moral practice. The sections thereafter discuss the limitations and future directions of this 
project.  
Implications 
 Morality has been asserted in this work as a practice—a common, dispersed, performed 
and problematic practice which matters in different ways to different sorts of relationships. 
“Morality” as a term for situations created through participant interactions describes different 
kinds of situations as well. “Judgment,” for instance, can be moral. In some conversation 
analysis, ethnomethodology and discursive psychology, for instance, interaction is 
omnirelevantly moral because it always requires commitment, responsibility, and accountability. 
For this project, however, “morality” is better ascribed to situations where judgment implicates 
fundamental ideological differences between people in close relationships.  
 Ideology refers to the practices which construct systems of belief about the world, people, 
their relationships and their communication. Intersubjectivity is a practice for establishing and 
maintaining the sense of sharedness required of participants to interact meaningfully with one 
another. In ethnomethodology, it is part of the means by which participants practically construct 
sense with one another in their everyday conduct. But intersubjectivity is also ideological. There 
are assumptions—cultural premises—that govern its practice.  
As Goffman’s work suggests, there will be a meaning to any situation which has to be 
arrived at. Sometimes there will be clues in a situation’s form (classroom expectations versus 
party expectations) but often a definition of the situation must be primarily worked out among 
people as they seek the appropriate actions. The clues to what the situation is and what to do in it 
depend on the community. U.S. colleges are often lenient about eating in classrooms, while 
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Japanese colleges usually assume eating would remove attention and thus constitute an 
intersubjective break. Thence, an ideology: “respect,” and hence, a rule: “do not eat in 
classrooms.” Attendant on the rule is the unspoken system of reasoning: eating in classrooms is 
disrespectful (Stakhnevich, 2002). 
 Intimacy, too, has its own ideological basis. It too is culturally and historically situated. 
In the Victorian era, “restraint” was a moral ideology which governed public interactions. 
Nowadays it seems commonsense that hand-holding provides a communicative marker of 
romantic closeness, but in Victorian England, it would have been far too explicit (let alone 
kissing in public) (Chase & Levenson, 2000). And in other points in the West’s pasts, as well as 
in many Eastern countries, holding hands demonstrated friendship, and not a sexual relationship. 
It also matters differently for different relationships (it seems normal to hold your father’s hand 
as a toddler, odd as a teenager). Ideologies provide ways of knowing who is what to whom, and 
based on what criteria. Depending on the situation, intimacy can be demonstrated with 
something as demonstrative as an embrace, as subtle as a glance.  
The ideologies described in this work are not only interpersonal (insofar as they can 
apply to societies and individuals) but in this case, they are relevant to interpersonal 
relationships, and thus made, in situated interaction “about” relationships. Much work in 
ideology has been Marxist-influenced critical scholarship. There is undoubtedly room for such 
criticisms in the work here, and some of that has been pointed to. Ideologies can be used to 
explain why certain people should dominate others, or why certain actions are suitable for one 
person and not for another. But ideologies can also be used to accomplish shared beliefs about 
the right and wrong which are not just not negative, but downright encouraging. Where troubles 
arise is when ideologies are enacted or used to explain in an unproblematic way, as if they were 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 381 
 
 
natural or as if everyone should know how they need to be accomplished. Also tricky is the 
relationship between ideologies which conflict, and the dilemmas they can cause. The 
assumption of sharedness may be the basis of relating, but it is also a conceit which requires 
some modicum of blindness to accept. By employing grounded practical theory and illuminating 
some of the work people do to practice morality, this project aims to make assumptions visible 
so that they may be reflected on.  
The idea of morality as a practice does not contradict the current research on morality 
undertaken in LSI and across communication, indeed, in many areas it is already asserted as an 
everyday, mundane practice (Stokoe & Edwards, 2011). Nonetheless, even practice orientations 
to morality do not always grapple with the varied and important work on morality across the 
field. For example, cultural and relational ideological approaches to morality often fail to 
appreciate the ways in which morality is accomplished in interaction, while proto-morality 
approaches tend to eschew the cultural and relational ideological practices at work in moral 
interaction. Focusing on interpersonal communication research attends to values and beliefs but 
not interaction; focusing on discourse analytic research attends to interaction but less to values 
and beliefs. 
Heritage (2010) notes that all interaction is normative: it has expectations. Heritage also 
maintains an attitude of deep suspicion toward all discourse analysis that purports to know 
participants’ motives or intentions, what their “conscious” strategies aim for. But there is no 
need, as an analyst, to worry about what people really think about or want from interaction. 
Participants respond to each other as if they do have minds, feelings, motives, intents, and 
specific goals. Participants regularly reproduce social expectations without naming them 
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explicitly. The work of interpersonal communication research is relevant to discourse analysts in 
the same way that social psychology is relevant to discursive psychologists. 
Finally, the idea of “difference” as a key problem in morality has not been fully grappled 
with in current literature. Difference is certainly mentioned repeatedly in relation to conflict, and 
especially moral conflict. But the ways in which difference makes morality relevant even in the 
most basic practices of intersubjectivity suggests something far more pervasive and important 
about the ontology of studies of morality. Much of the genesis of social science research today 
owes its lineage to the Enlightenment. Though modern writers have criticized the faith in reason 
and order which characterized Enlightenment inquiry (i.e. Weber, Habermas: Habermas, 1985) 
most writers of the modern and now postmodern era engage in fairly Enlightenment-guided 
ideals of research: how does x work? How is it rational, orderly? How does conflict signal a 
departure from the norm? How can we reach consensus through reasoned arguments? 
The approach of this project sees such orderliness as an accomplishment in the face of 
chaos. Difference is not the exception, but the norm. Consensus is not possible or even moral. As 
such, it is not that difference is problematic in itself, but that difference is problematic in the 
context of sharedness, where sharedness is both the ideal, and the status quo assumption of close 
relationships. As it occupies both that which is “good” and that which is “normal,” it is indeed a 
formidable ideal with which to contend. This is not, of course, to say that sharedness is bad 
either. In fact, it is the foundation of social life. “Difference” however, rather than being seen as 
a problem or an opposite of sharedness, could much better be seen as its counterpart, as 
necessary, practical, and valuable. What is problematic is not always what is wrong. 
Throughout these analyses, I have mentioned some of the participants’ local 
vocabularies, ideals, and norms for doing the moral discursive practices herein described. In this 
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chapter I bring these and other implications of analysis together to discuss potential ideals of 
“moral communication.” The purpose of these considerations is to discuss important possible 
ideals which would offer flexible means for participants and analysts to reflect on and investigate 
the norms and ideals which guide moral practices.  
Normative Ideals of Moral Practice in Interpersonal Relationships 
Difference emerges as the key problematic confronted by morality. Moral practices seem 
to be designed, in fact, precisely to deal with this problem in everyday life. Intersubjectivity, for 
example, has to construct enough overlap so that people can accomplish all the little things that 
make up social existence—telephone calls and restaurant orders and drugstore purchases, even 
crossing the street at a busy intersection. If meaning is social, then it must approximate some 
shared intelligibility; meaning cannot be purely internal and private, or acting with others would 
be difficult, if not impossible. Thus, intersubjectivity is a problem because it cannot be fully 
accomplished. Instead, intersubjectivity practices are designed to overcome differences in 
understanding so that interaction can unfold.  
Intimacy builds on intersubjectivity—practices for the latter can be ways of 
accomplishing the former—but they are done in different ways, and signal a close relationship 
(whereas intersubjectivity is needed for any interaction, intimacy is desired for special 
interactions between people who have some level of relational commitment). Through particular 
patterned and marked actions, people seek and build “closeness” with one another. But the 
differences involved here are in a sense even more troubling. Problems with intersubjectivity and 
intimacy where closeness is desired do not just signal a break in understanding, but signal 
distance. Distance is associated with not wanting to be close, or with not sharing the same 
meanings of closeness. It is more consequential and involves more complex rituals for 
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overcoming it. A break in intersubjectivity may be repaired with small effort, but a break in 
intimacy creates a potential gulf between people that requires more, and different, levels of 
practice. The intimacy level of practice makes relevant the relationship of interactants because 
the interactants themselves will key it as being so. 
Intersubjectivity, as mentioned, rarely becomes a topic of participant talk unless it goes 
wrong. And it is rarely thematized as a moral problem because it occurs at the level of actions—
something difficult to identify as a participant, though it is certainly accomplished easily enough 
most of the time. Intimacy is slightly more complex because it requires a relational component. It 
brings people’s identities relevantly to light, and makes up a class of procedures for doing 
relationships with others. Though based on intersubjectivity practices, intimacy practices also 
provide participants with ways of talking that are about the relationship, and not just about 
general social expectations. It constitutes the distinction between “people don’t listen to each 
other enough” and “you never listen to me.” A difference in intimacy is a difference in 
expectations for the relationship. 
With ideology, difference becomes more complicatedly linked to cultural and social 
contexts. Ideology practices will link to their contexts in a more large-scale way. This is not to 
say that intersubjectivity and intimacy are not ideological—of course they are. But they can be 
about much more immediate, local actions. Intersubjectivity occurs between interactants in a 
moment—it is not accomplished between nations (or at least, not in the discourse analytic 
perspective taken here). Intimacy, likewise, may be governed in part by ideological notions of 
what relationships should be like in a cultural context, but intimacy is constructed between 
people—not just any people, people accomplishing closeness beyond the intersubjectivity 
needed to get by on a day to day basis. But ideologies are accomplished by large groups of 
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people and maintained over time. The work done to enact or cue ideologies in a moment is not 
only about the interaction or the particular people relating to one another, but is about more 
general sociocultural values and expectations. In the context of close relationships, intimacy is 
what grounds both intersubjectivity (a moment-by-moment accomplishment) and ideology (the 
accomplishment of social groups) in relational interaction. If there were no intimacy, 
intersubjectivity could be mended quickly or even ignored, at least in many contexts. If there 
were no intimacy, ideology could too be ignored, or discussed without any perception that it 
might threaten a relationship irreparably.  
Culture is linked to ideology. Ideologies are cultural ways of making sense of, labeling, 
justifying, explaining and maintaining certain patterns of interaction. Difference in cultural 
contexts has to do with the assumptions that intercultural interaction involves ideological 
difference. Such assumptions are rarely sophisticated enough to see sequential actions as 
involving ideology—most people judge actions from the perspective of their own culture, 
assuming actions mean the same things and thus violating expectations may safely be labeled 
“rude.” What people are aware of is the idea of values as ideological. In intercultural 
relationships, then, there is a more explicit metadiscourse regarding differences in ways of seeing 
the world. To some extent this makes difference easier to label than when people assume they 
share a cultural perspective. When people assume their culture is shared, they attribute 
ideological differences to individuals, and that can be more damaging in a relationship because 
people are then accused of having motives in a different way.  
When people do not assume they share a culture, ideological differences will often be 
attributed to assumptions about background and upbringing. The individual is not held as 
strongly accountable. This does not make intercultural relationships easier, but provides a 
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different sort of vocabulary for talking about moral difference. On the other hand it makes 
difference more “visible” and thus easier to emphasize—which brings this section to conflict. 
Conflict is a different sort of moral practice, one for managing the differences that can emerge 
from intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology and culture. Conflict is the practice for managing 
difference when difference itself can no longer be managed or ignored. Conflict practices may 
seek to reestablish a sense of closeness in relationships—to compromise, ignore, conjoin or live 
with differences by establishing new modes of relating and interacting, or reifying old modes. 
But conflict practices can also emphasize differences and construct distance between people. 
The following sub-sections review the results of analysis for each problem of morality as 
a practice, discuss the techniques for dealing with the problems of the practice, and offer possible 
ideals for guiding critique and improvement of the practice. In this work, “morality” was seen as 
an analytical term to describe the ways in which people employ moral discursive practices for 
achieving certain interactions. “Moral communication” is a term for what would count as 
“moral” moral discursive practice, or the best practices for doing morality interactionally. Of 
course, to try and specify precisely what such practices are across contexts would be impossible 
given the diversity of analyses presented in the last several chapters, and contrary as well to the 
project of grounded practical theory. Thus, in this section I discuss some of the implications from 
the analyses for developing a set of guidelines for understanding, concepts for reflection, and 
issues for action involved in analyzing and doing moral practice. The section thereafter considers 
this project’s contribution to studies of morality in communication and relationships. 
 Intersubjectivity. Chapter four argued that the problem of intersubjectivity for morality 
involved the threat of difference to cause ruptures in an assumedly shared world. One device for 
establishing intersubjectivity involves other-orientation, verbal and nonverbal moves or object 
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manipulations for doing intersubjectivity with particular others. An example of this was 
demonstrated in the clean-up situation between Mike and his mother, Lisa (chapter four, pages 
181-182; also chapter five, pages 223-224): 
Mike:  oh g(h)od this thing better not (.) leak (.) all over the place 
(2.0) ((Mike shows Lisa the bag)) 
Lisa:  (that’s the wrong one/bag) 
Mike:  I tied it 
Lisa:  well you U↑NTIE it  
Mike:  I didn’t wanna have to do that ((walks to the drawer to get a new bag)) 
 
 In this example, Mike expresses concern about the bag he’s used for some leftovers, and 
Lisa criticizes his choice. When Mike attempts to provide an account for his choice, Lisa 
provides a directive which is emotionally marked. Responding this negatively is attributable to a 
few possible reasons. One is that Mike had already set up the bag “as a problem” (with the “oh 
god” preface and complaint). Another possible reason is that he responds to Lisa’s initial 
response with an account rather than an immediate compliance. Furthermore, however, Lisa 
seems to upgrading the wrongness of Mike’s error and emphasizing her disinclination to leave 
the error uncorrected. Her swift and intense response signals an intersubjective problem. Mike’s 
error is treated as serious at least to the extent that he should correct it immediately, without any 
“back-talk.”  
Intersubjectivity is predicated on a shared world. The assumption seems to be “if we’re 
close, we understand each other.” If understanding is taken to be the norm, then 
misunderstanding is treated as remarkable. Intersubjectivity is a minimal requirement for 
interaction. In interpersonal relationships, its requirement appears greater. An intersubjective 
error should be acknowledged immediately and rectified. To try to justify or excuse the error is 
not seen merely as face-saving for the error-maker, but as face-threatening to the other. Accounts 
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for intersubjectivity ruptures needn’t unfold this way. It is a certain type of intersubjectivity 
which does so, one which is perceived not only as an error, but as being due to some lack of 
attention. Lisa’s response to Mike has the implication of “you should have known better.” Again, 
the assumption of shared knowledge is implied, and could have been stated, but was not. 
Intersubjectivity is a key problem for moral practice because knowledge is never entirely 
shared. Thus, practices for demonstrating shared knowledge or a world in common can prove 
difficult. A common example of this is when one person in a relationship remembers something 
asserted as special between the two, while the other has forgotten the situation altogether. Rather 
than attributed to a bad memory or excusable error, this is seen as the result of not taking the 
relationship seriously enough to know and recall its important moments. An ideal of moral 
communication thus requires, at the very least, intersubjectivity between participants. People 
must be recognizable as people and must be able to minimally participate in interaction in order 
for any sort of morality to be achieved.  
Intimacy. Chapter five argued that the problem of intimacy for morality constituted the 
dilemma of potential face-loss due to different judgments when participating in morally 
questionable practices. One example of such a practice involves topics that implicate the 
identities and behaviors of participants. An example of this discussed in chapter five involved a 
group of friends at dinner (chapter five pages 245-246): 
Jane: Jim and Nicky were in the kitchen? And I heard Nicky whisper (1.5) “◦fuck me◦” 
(0.5) 
John: ha 
Jane: ((laughs)) 
Nicky: what? 
Jane: when you were in there= 
Nicky: =m:= 
Jane: =she was tryin to yank the= 
John: =classic Jane taking things out of context 
Nora: she’s trying to get people in trouble 
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((laughter)) 
Nicky: no I think I looked at this 
And said “fuck me” cuz it’s almost empty 
 
In this example, Jane’s comment is not taken as a joke, but is treated as a face-threat that 
needs to be repaired and accounted for. Though these friends had been making sexual jokes 
about others and each other all night, this one was perceived as crossing a line. Making jokes 
about others’ sexuality is tricky. Such jokes can be trivial, funny, or even complimentary, as 
when joking about someone’s impressive sexual abilities. This joke, however, occupies a 
different space, in which the joke seemed to say something negative about Nicky. Why exactly it 
was negative can only be guessed at. But certainly a level of intimacy and comfort was present 
between Jane and the others such that she produced her initial utterance (and even tried to return 
to it) without appearing to realize that it would, or did, have negative implications.  
An assumption here appears to be “if you’re my friend, you won’t interpret me as being 
mean.” Again, a sharedness is posited as the normal basis of interacting. Friends are supposed to 
be charitable to one another, to interpret each other in the best light, and to present positive 
versions of each other to co-present parties. From Nicky’s perspective, Jane’s joke could be seen 
as violating this expectation by offering up a morally questionable account as a laughable for the 
others. From Jane’s perspective, Nicky should perhaps assume that Jane would never seriously 
threaten her face. Intimacy, then, involves problems of expectation regarding assumptions and 
communication of the each other’s identity as basically “good.” And yet, ideas of what 
constitutes a “good identity” or “speaking well of a friend” may not be shared.  
The moral communicative ideal, however, seems to be that one should interpret and 
present friends in the best light possible, based on a shared understanding of what that “best 
light” could be. The same undoubtedly goes for family members. It is quite likely assumed that 
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everyone knows what constitutes a “good person,” and that if we love one another, we will 
assume that the other falls into this “good person” category. Actions should be interpreted in the 
ways which would best fit one’s idea of oneself as a good person. 
 Ideology. Chapter six argued that the problem of ideology for morality involved the ways 
in which ideologies can contradict, revealing differences in ostensibly the “same” cultural 
context. One example of a practice for doing ideology involved espousing fairness expectations 
regarding household chores. In the following example from chapter six, Carl complains about 
having to do the dishes all the time (chapter six, pages 265-268): 
Carl: I never get any ‘elp washing up 
JR: mm 
Jenny: wha- what ‘ave you done today Carl?  
Carl: well- 
Jenny: you haven’t done nothing today except talk to Peter (.) talk to Roy Parker 
Carl: I’ve been researchin on the internet all day. Sometimes it does- in fact it does take a lot of
 time 
 
 In this example, Carl makes a complaint which signals something unfair (that he always 
has to wash the dishes, and that he never gets any help) which Jenny then challenges by making 
a point about Carl’s rather relaxed retired lifestyle. Carl could continue to complain about his 
situation, but this would be interpreted as unfair given Jenny works and he does not. To manage 
the competing ideologies (“men don’t do housework” versus “the person who doesn’t work all 
day should do housework”), Carl acknowledges his lack of out-of-house work, but in a joking 
way that keeps the conversation unserious. Thus, ideologies are problematic because they can 
contradict one another, and therefore must be managed through delicate interactional choices.  
 The assumption involved in this exchange involves a focus on reasserting sharedness. To 
give voice to either ideology would reveal the contradictions and result in a loss of face. Carl 
would have to either admit that he is wrong, or change his orientation to housework, neither of 
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which he appears to be willing to do. Furthermore, changes, even positive ones, would disrupt 
the sense of sharedness and closeness which has already been laid down in an interactional 
pattern over the last couple decades. Families are created out of patterns of involvement and role 
assignment which are reinforced and referenced continually. Any move by Carl to orient to one 
ideology or the other would question the status quo out of which the relationship has to this point 
been constructed. It seems that sharedness is valued and assumed to be normal; thus, it becomes 
correlated with whatever else is assumed to be normal. This is perhaps why, when one person in 
a longstanding relationship suddenly develops a new hobby, it is seen as a potential threat. One 
change can link to others. And whatever has been happening in the relationship already is taken 
as the foundation of sharedness, of the relationship itself. This indicates an ideal of sharedness as 
an ideal of continuation of the pattern. It is better to maintain the status quo if it is intimate than 
to challenge the status quo and risk disrupting intimacy. Thus, change can be a sort of difference 
which implicates other differences. The roles people take on are valued, and a difference—even 
if it could be a good one—is not always immediately seen as positive.    
Culture. Chapter seven argued that the problem of culture for morality involved 
reconciling different ideologies to construct sharedness in a relationship. One example of a way 
in which participants could manage this involved mixing different forms of speech associated 
with different identities. In an example from chapter seven, Mina attempts this when her 
daughter does not comply with a request (chapter seven pages 302-303): 
Mina:  please (.) go to your room 
Tina:  I like it (here)  
Mina:  =Tina= 
Tina:  =(in Finnish)= 
Mina:  go to your room (.) Tina go to your room  
Tina:  (I think I have to be) here 
Mina:  Tin- okay  
(2.0)  
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Mina:  you can't think and write there when (you/we)'re talking sweetie  
Tina:  I can 
Mina:  ( ) (0.8) (I really do miss the school) (.) (a lot) 
Kathryn: m hm 
Mina:  ( ) I just- you know it- it- (.) of course it's- it’s cultural also? But (0.8) i- it felt so 
  good I remember the day you know that Hanna came to visit? And then uh Mrs. 
  Rose- Tina go to your room if you can't do what you are supposed to do  
Tina:  What? 
Mina:  Just go to your room now 
Tina:  I'm thinking  
Mina:  and I'm talking  
 
 In this example, Mina tries to balance a more permissive or open style of communication 
in directing Tina (using qualifiers, request directives, nicknames) with a more strict style 
associated with Finnish child-raising norms (using more direct directives and emphasis). Tina’s 
response to these attempts continually resists them (and at this point they had been going on for 
quite some time, beginning with very gentle suggestions and hint directives, and ending with this 
exchange). Thus, an intercultural problem appears. Tina is fluent in English and Finnish, but has 
been raised and schooled in the U.S. until about a year ago. Mina has lived a lot in the U.S. and 
other places, but was born and raised in Finland. They constitute two members of an intercultural 
family. Tina’s “misunderstandings” appear to be strategic, at least, since they go on for so long, 
and since they follow direct directives.  
 Mina’s approach to the problem of reconciling different ideologies in her talk is to go 
back and forth between them. This does not appear to be successful, however, as it (1) does not 
get Tina to comply for quite some time and (2) provides Tina with the resources to 
“misunderstand” the commands. From Tina’s perspective, her attempts to be close and 
intersubjectively involved in a conversation are rejected. Thus there is already a problem of 
difference between how Tina should and can participate in adult talk (a common enough problem 
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for parents and children) and how Mina can affect her daughter’s actions. An assumption appears 
to be that people should work to share ideologies.  
Here, however, ideologies are simply not shared. Tina does not recognize her mother’s 
attempts at strictness, perhaps partly because her mother includes non-strict language, but also 
because she was mainly raised in the U.S., and is not treated strictly at all by her U.S. American 
father. Tina may not be sophisticated enough to engage in moral practices to the extent her 
mother attempts to, but Mina definitely puts effort in. An ideal of moral communication 
suggested is that intercultural relationships may require more work to establish sharedness: it is 
what people have in common, not their differences, which makes them close. A little difference 
is interesting and even exciting, but too much difference could be taken as anything but.   
Conflict. Chapter eight argued that the problem of conflict for morality involved the 
creation of interpersonal distance and difference through divergent communicative patterns. An 
example of this involved communication aimed at establishing individual effort versus fair 
rewards in a game. An example of this is demonstrated in the Easter egg hunt between Abraham 
and his little brother Dennis (chapter eight pages 350-352): 
Sam:  [Don’t] just follow Abraham Dennis 
Mike:  ( ) 
Jilly:  WHAT (.) They’re everywhere yes 
Mike:  Send him over here then (.) so he’s not following Abraham= 
 
In this example, Samantha, the older sister of Abraham and Dennis, and Mike, their 
father, use communication to guide the Easter egg hunt so as to provide the brothers with an 
(approximately) equal number of eggs. Jilly, on the other hand, keeps out of the situation and 
explicitly states that Dennis needs to find the eggs on his own. Mike appears to blame Jilly for 
the unfairness in some way, as when Jilly shouts back at him (“WHAT”) and Mike notably direct 
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her to direct Dennis to other areas. Later, even after Jilly’s explicit mention that Dennis needs to 
do it himself, Mike and Sam continue and even upgrade their involvement in getting Dennis 
eggs—not just telling him where to go, but finding eggs for him and instructing Abraham to 
hand over his own eggs to Dennis. 
This creation of difference indicates the playing out of the problems of intersubjectivity, 
intimacy, ideology, and culture. Mike and Jilly employ intersubjectivity not for sharedness, but 
for difference, but not seeing each other’s actions as intelligible or demonstrating attention or 
other-orientation. They appear to pursue separate but simultaneous projects with regard to the 
moral practice of child-raising. Furthermore, their participation in moral practices results in non-
intimacy, with criticisms and accounts creating distance rather than closeness. They orient to and 
construct communication to accomplish different ideologies of fairness, both of which exist in 
the U.S. culture. And though both were raised in the U.S., they participate in different political 
cultural communities. All of these construct difference, not sharedness. Difference need not lead 
to negativity, but it is likely to lead to conflict. In this case, difference accomplishes conflict with 
no accompanying or answering attempted at finding sharedness.  
This implicates by contrast an ideal of moral communication: if difference occurs, 
address it, and if addressing it involves conflict, reorient to a shared perspective to overcome 
possible negative outcomes of conflict. That does not happen in this relationship, where 
differences were instead emphasized more and more, sharedness was not sought, and a rift 
developed.  
These considerations indicate that the relationship between ideals of sharedness and 
ubiquity of differences is an important dialectic in moral practice. In order to formulate a 
grounded practical theory based on an ideal, more work would need to be done. However, certain 
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points of critique and reflection can be suggested, for example, why is sharedness considered to 
be categorically positive where ideologies are concerned? How is intersubjectivity interpretively 
linked to ideology? What choices can be made which would orient to sharedness without 
ignoring difference? In what situations would orienting to sharedness or difference be 
problematic, and what techniques could be used to address that? 
As has been mentioned, difference is not necessarily a negative thing. Differences can 
draw people together. Differences make getting to know someone interesting. But difference can 
be tolerated only to a point. Littlejohn and Domenici (2007) note that differences can be 
problematic and even dangerous, but can coexist and work together. Baxter’s (e.g., 2004a, 
2004b) perspective sees difference as normal and inevitable and ultimately productive. But not 
all differences can work together and not all differences are productive. In literature related to the 
systems view (e.g., Bateson, 1972; Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967), similarities can cause 
problems, while differences can be complementary. But the relationship between “difference” 
and “similarity” is constructed, discursively and even moment to moment, and it is incredibly 
complex. Take for example Tannen’s (e.g., 1981) and Cameron’s (e.g., 1998) approach to 
gender. For Tannen, women and men have different communication goals and different 
communication styles or rituals for achieving them. For Cameron, men and women have 
different historically-situated expectations for one another’s appropriate roles, and judge one 
another’s styles accordingly.  
Given that the concept of what counts as difference is complicated, the valuing of 
difference is also complicated. To categorically assert that differences are positive, important and 
necessary ignores the fact that differences can be irreconcilable in important ways. The different 
perspective taken by racist people is not likely to be a difference which is valued. Too often 
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theorists forget that the valuing of difference is itself a contestable position with which others 
may not agree. Theories of communication may champion difference, and with good reason, but 
this ignores the practical challenges of dealing with differences in everyday life. Thus, moral 
communication as an ideal grounded in actual interpersonal interaction is unlikely to make the 
same assumptions about difference that scholars do. Certain differences would not be seen as 
valuable.  
To summarize, “moral communication” is what, for participants in close interpersonal 
relationships, would see as their ideals of talk. And though such ideals would rarely overlap, 
there are some characteristics which are shared at least in the situations and for the data 
described above. Seeking a common interactional ground, for instance, is an intersubjective 
ideal. Interpreting close others well and sharing sensitive information which will be believed to 
be well-received is an intimate ideal. Having a shared understanding despite particular differing 
moral stances (for instance, a “higher order” ideal that trumps other differences) is an ideological 
ideal. Discovering and integrating what is shared in common is an intercultural ideal. And 
managing differences together rather than emphasizing differences to become more apart is a 
conflict ideal.  
Grounded practical theory ends with a theoretical reconstruction of the ideals of a 
practice. Here, I have discussed some of the ideals of morality as a practice. Though some of the 
ideals are specific to the context of interpersonal relationships and should be understood to be 
grounded empiricially in particular data, the underlying ideal around managing difference is 
potentially more generalizable. Good practice, or moral communication, constitutes a 
coordination on the basis of certain critical ideologies in common. This ideal should not be taken 
to imply that coordination means something positive or cooperative in the helpful sense, nor that 
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difference is not valuable. Rather, the ideal is a practical one, signifying the ways in which 
people must be minimally oriented and ideologically intelligible in some ways.  
The ideals summarized above demonstrate that in many close relationships, there are 
some differences which will not be tolerable no matter how much differences and disagreement 
is valued. This is a practical ideal because without something in common, people in close 
relationships may find it hard to carry on in a variety of ways. And morality is, at the end of the 
way, a way in which people carry on together. As Littlejohn and Domenici (2007) note, 
differences are positive in the abstract, but practically challenging.  
Morality is a practice which involves deeply held ideologies which are considered too 
consequential to be different in close relationships. Moral communication could aim at 
establishing sharedness on the accomplishment of important ideologies. Such sharedness is not 
about being “in agreement” all the time (either topically or interactionally), but about managing 
what difference means for a relationship. It is a question of discourse and interaction rather than 
beliefs. The ideals of close relational participants engaged in moral practices will often be 
working at creating this kind of sharedness, even as the points or extent of convergence are 
unarticulated. Where the ideal of sharedness is abandoned, the relationship could very well be 
threatened, and may not even survive.  
The next section discusses important considerations for morality that cut across the 
problems already described. These provide analytical means by which researchers and 
participants can begin to garner what and how people reveal and practice interaction in a moral 
way. These are communicative considerations which provide a starting point for uncovering 
moral problems and techniques through a grounded practical theory approach.  
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Other general considerations. In this section I discuss, taking several angles to a single 
excerpt ([frn.calls08.3.E4.2]), six considerations that cut across the problems of morality which 
are more general problems of communication and which are relevant to moral practice. These 
considerations, like the many practices for morality themselves (as outlined in chapter two) arise 
in relation to intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, and conflict. The first important point 
involves context. For example, in chapter five, sexual topics of conversation had to be handled 
differently in different relational and situational contexts; and in chapters six and seven, cultural 
context was noted in a specific way as being important for moral practice. The second point 
involves symbolic resources: for example, chapter four looked specifically at how gesture, facial 
expression, gaze, and manipulation of objects could all be marshaled to orient to others. Third, 
the notion of difference implies that sometimes, different ideologies, values and goals can 
compete or constitute dilemmas, as in chapters five and six.  
Fourthly, vocabularies and espoused norms can indicate the ways in which participants 
locally understand, explain, and express morality, and this turned out to be relevant in various 
ways throughout the analysis. Fifth, motive is an important concept not because it is always 
appealed to—though in Western cultures, which focus on individual choice, it often is—but 
because it can frame how people reflect on their own moral practices as being directed toward 
particular reasons. In chapter eight, for instance, participants appealed to the idea of intention as 
guiding the production of their particular moral practices. Sixth and finally, the nature of 
interpretation and the many interpretations available in the performance of any practice ensures 
difficulty in managing the meanings of moral practices.  
In looking for the presence of action identifiable as “morality,” the definition used in this 
project suggests that, for interpersonal relationships, moral discursive practices are those which 
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enact commitment, ideology, and the management of difference. In order to identify a situated 
ideal of moral communication, then, one must take account of various contexts, symbolic 
resources, competing goals, vocabularies and espoused norms, invocations of motive, and 
multiplicities of interpretability. 
 Though context may not always be relevant to interactional practices, it is always 
potentially relevant—and of course, it depends on what type and level of context is involved. 
Context can refer to the prior and next utterances, as in traditional conversation analysis. Current 
utterances are always shaped by prior ones, and shaping subsequent ones. Context can also refer 
to the situation—whether interaction is occurring in private or in public, in casual or formal 
situations, at work or at home, in a story at a coffee shop or in a phone call to the pharmacy, etc. 
Context can also refer to relationships, and whether one is interacting with strangers, friends, 
family or lovers. Context can also refer to the cultural communities, practices, geographies and 
nations with which people may identify themselves as coming from a shared background.  
In the example below, for instance, Jill narrates an argument she had with her boyfriend 
about the manner in which he had previously said something to her: 
JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said
 that” like- like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took)
 it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im 
JR: WHAT ((laughs)) was that the last time you talked? 
JILL: I called him last night 
JR: oh alright- I was like oh no 
JILL: I called him last night (xx) he was like “well I thought you were mad at me” and I was
 like “yeah I kinda was you know you need to take responsibility for being an ass” (xx x)
 then he- I was like when you were being mean and you were like “I’m sorry you- you
 thought you heard it that way” 
 
 
In this example, there are only two present participants (Jill and JR) but Jill’s boyfriend, Pete, is 
also a relevant character. In order to understand the meaning of this conversation for the 
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participants, the relationship between Jill and JR, and Jill and Pete (and potentially JR and Pete) 
is important as relational context for the framing of the conversation: why this story is 
newsworthy or being told in the first place, what its implications are for the relationship between 
Jill and Pete, why Jill is upset, etc. It also helps to understand that this is a phone conversation 
rather than face-to-face, so as to know that nonverbal information has not been left out of the 
transcript, but rather for the most part was not there (visible to the participants).  
As a moral discursive practice, the story Jill tells situates her own moral identity in 
relation to Pete’s as an account for her being upset, and perhaps in the larger picture for her 
justification in any complaints she might make about him. JR’s participation in the conversation 
situates her role as a friend to Jill by responding with the expected level of indignation at the 
complaint-worthy remarks (“WHAT”) and simultaneously a concern for the relationship itself 
(“I was like oh no”). In order for participants to formulate their actions for moral practice, and 
design techniques to address interactional problems, context must be taken into account. This is 
as true for researchers as it is for participants. An example of this from chapter four involved 
Raymond’s use of the magazine to attend to his brother. By accounting for the problematic 
nature of magazines as signaling personal reading rather than social interaction, Raymond was 
able to use the magazine in a different way to signal continued interaction with Jeff.  
 Resources for communication can involve many things. Mental states, for example, can 
become a resource—using one’s feeling as a way of accounting for or enacting certain situations. 
Talk can be a resource, not just the content, but also the way in which something is said. “Nice 
jacket” can be a compliment or an insult, depending on its intonation. There are also spatial 
resources—ways of configuring people’s physical stance and configuration, ways of organizing 
rooms and how and where people stand, orders of sitting that can indicate status. The use of 
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objects in spaces also matter, being used to accomplish a number of interactional tasks, or as a 
supplement to other interactional practices. And even the smallest raise of an eyebrow, flick of 
hand, aversion of gaze or alteration of facial expression can be meaningful and treated as 
relevant in interaction. 
 In the excerpt from Jill’s story, there is not a lot of information other than the talk: 
JR: WHAT ((laughs)) was that the last time you talked? 
JILL: I called him last night 
JR: oh alright- I was like oh no 
JILL: I called him last night (xx) he was like “well I thought you were mad at me” and I was
 like “yeah I kinda was you know you need to take responsibility for being an ass” (xx x)
 then he- I was like when you were being mean and you were like “I’m sorry you- you
 thought you heard it that way” 
 
 
Because this conversation took place on the phone, the participants themselves did not have 
access to displaying certain nonverbal behaviors such as eye contact, facial expressions, or 
gestures. However, they still had talk and paralanguage at their disposal. Though there are not a 
lot of details in the transcript, even knowing that JR’s “WHAT” was spoken in louder tone and 
followed by a laugh adds meaning to her response. Verbally, Jill’s use of quotation (reported 
speech) frames the story as a dialogue which unfolded in a certain way. Even Jill’s use of the 
word “ass” demonstrates the use of a resource—expletives—which can upgrade the emotional 
content of a story. Here it also works to position Pete as the “bad guy.” As mentioned regarding 
context, resources are a part of context. Raymond’s use of the magazine, for instance, was the 
use of a resource. The chapter five example of Nicky, Jane and the “fuck me” comment also 
provides an example of resource use. Nicky uses emphasis to repair the sexual meaning of “fuck 
me” as a disappointment meaning in “fuck me.” 
 There are potentially multiple and competing goals to be handled in any conversation, but 
this is a particularly sensitive fact of moral interaction because part of what makes interaction 
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moral is that it is potentially significantly consequential for the people involved. Not only can 
ideologies conflict, but so can the ideology and its explicit espousal; the values of particular 
people; the face wants of participants; and scores of other elements. Furthermore, goals are 
constructed in interaction, and because interaction can change situations moment to moment, it 
can also change the goals. This flux is part of what makes communicating in sensitive situations 
a little like moving through a minefield.  
 This example, from Jill’s story, evinces at least two goals: 
JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said
 that” like- like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took)
 it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im 
JR: WHAT ((laughs)) was that the last time you talked? 
JILL: I called him last night 
JR: oh alright- I was like oh no 
 
 
From Jill’s perspective, her story has to do two things: it has to position herself as the morally 
correct person in the argument, but it also cannot lambast Pete to the extent that Jill would side 
against the relationship, as it seems clear at least at this point that Jill’s annoyance with this one 
action is not perceived as a threat to the entire relationship. JR seems to pick up on this tension 
by displaying a sort of incredulity or exasperation (“WHAT”) while also making sure that the 
argument Jill had with Pete wasn’t their last (a resolution story appears to be being sought), 
hence the “oh alright- I was like oh no” that follows. In this way, Jill and JR negotiate the 
meaning of the fight to the relationship, constructing the incident as an important and complaint-
worthy one, but not a relationally fatal mark against Pete. People often have multiple and even 
competing or dilemmatic goals in conversation. In the example of Ameliah’s error regarding 
JR’s film preferences in chapter five, for example, Ameliah faced a dilemma of complimenting 
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JR’s tastes while proffering an untruth that belied lack of knowledge. Ameliah chose to 
compliment as a higher moral practice than displaying intimate knowledge.  
 People’s language for, talk about, and explicit values regarding morality cannot always 
be relied upon to indicate how they accomplish moral practices or what those practices are for. 
These vocabularies and metadiscourses are important, however, for understanding how people 
formulate morality and how they understand what they are doing. People’s explanations of 
morality are always important for understanding some aspect of practice, though sometimes it 
reveals more of an angle on the practice than explaining the whole of it.  
 Jill’s story includes metadiscourse about certain ways of talking: 
JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said
 that” like- like that’s just not nice 
. 
.  (5 lines deleted) 
. 
JILL: like “yeah I kinda was you know you need to take responsibility for being an ass” (xx x)
 then he- I was like when you were being mean  
 
 
Though Jill does not spell out in detail how Pete’s utterance “sounded,” she gives a number of 
descriptions for it, including “wasn’t very nice,” “just not nice,” “being an ass,” and “being 
mean.” This indicates an explicit norm regarding how people should say things to one another. 
Jill holds Pete accountable for the format of his utterance, and not only the content. The fact that 
there are here multiple constructed dialogues within constructed dialogues indicates that there is 
a strong metadiscursive element to this story—the story is in large part a means of conveying an 
assessment regarding Pete’s criticizeable behavior. Metadiscourse is employed in a conversation 
between Ameliah and JR in chapter seven, for instance, in which Ameliah mitigates a non-U.S. 
American (and thus assumedly one JR would espouse) ideology with explicit comments of what 
she is saying as “stupid” and “terrible.” 
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 The claim to motives is a rhetorical one. Practical logic involves the formulation of 
practices and their ostensible reasons. Motives, in addition to legitimizing the moral practices 
people do, can also be a way of disclaiming responsibility for how a practice “turns out,” as 
when someone can say “I didn’t mean to do that.” The language of motives is, as Burke (1935) 
noted, an abbreviation for a very complex situation that attempts to “boil down” to a single 
driving force, often one supposed to be categorically valued, such as “love,” “duty,” or 
“honesty.” The claim to motive is intention-focused, situating communication within the 
purposeful mind rather than the produced utterance.  
 Jill’s story, for instance, involves a reasoning around actions and why they were taken: 
JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said
 that” like- like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took)
 it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im 
JR: WHAT ((laughs)) was that the last time you talked? 
JILL: I called him last night 
JR: oh alright- I was like oh no 
JILL: I called him last night (xx) he was like “well I thought you were mad at me” and I was
 like “yeah I kinda was you know you need to take responsibility for being an ass” (xx x)
 then he- I was like when you were being mean and you were like “I’m sorry you- you
 thought you heard it that way” 
 
 
Though the whole argument does not get replayed, Jill does describe what the issue was about 
(how her boyfriend’s utterance sounded mean) and why she was upset. She gives reasons for her 
feelings in relation to the interpretation of what was said, and it can be assumed that her 
boyfriend probably did the same. Thus, Jill provides motives for her feelings based on what Pete 
said, identifying his utterance as the trouble source; whereas, when she first brought her reaction 
up to Pete, he located her interpretation as the trouble source and motivation for her feelings. 
Motives are an important ideological referent. In chapter eight for instance, when Mike criticizes 
Jilly’s lack of attention to Dennis, he labels his motive as not wanting Dennis’s sandy hands in a 
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pretzel bag. His criticism is thus framed as merely correcting the negative result of sandy pretzels 
rather than as holding Jilly accountable for the children’s behavior.  
Almost any utterance spoken can be interpreted in many ways. Unlike the claim to 
motives, a focus on interpretability entails a focus on the way in which an utterance is produced 
and the ways in which it can be taken to mean. This makes visible the tensions between different 
goals and contexts, as when someone says “I would have said it differently if I’d known she was 
your grandmother,” or “you know that means something incredibly bad in this country.” Of 
course, these examples make the interpretation focus, when negative, a matter of mental 
knowledge; however, interpretability can be rhetorically exploited.  
In the example we have been examining, for instance, Jill narrates an argument she had 
with her boyfriend about the manner in which he had previously said something to her: 
JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said
 that” like- like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took)
 it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im 
 
 
Pete has made a statement which is interpretable. From Jill’s point of view, he should be able to 
anticipate her interpretation of what he said; from Pete’s point of view, Jill is at fault for having 
heard it as such. The possible argument would never have happened if there hadn’t at least been 
the possibility for the boyfriend’s utterance to be taken in various ways—though this very 
interpretability can also be exploited. Thus, it is not entirely clear what the “reality” of the 
situation is: has Jill misheard, heard what she expected, or is she using the possibility of 
interpretation as an invitation for an argument? Has Pete intended to be mean, was mistakenly 
mean, or is he just using Jill’s interpretation as a way to disclaim responsibility either way? This 
ambiguity is similar to the ambiguity involved in the “fuck me” situation in chapter five. Was 
Jane threatening Nicky’s face for the purpose of humor, or did she just want to make a joke?  
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 Knowing the answers to these questions is not really what is important about analyzing 
this sequence as moral discursive practice. Instead, it allows insight into the moral angles of this 
interaction. Jill’s commitment to JR is displayed through her confiding, and her commitment to 
Pete is implied by her lack of mentioning the instance as a threat to the relationship. 
Ideologically, Jill constructs a problem around ways of speaking to one’s loved one. She 
achieves an interaction with JR (well, re-achieves, since she is relating her achievement with 
Pete) which does a particular belief regarding what romantic relationships are like and how they 
are communicated within the partnership. The difference of interpretability with Pete is managed 
through the story simultaneously to the possible different read on the situation which could be 
given by JR. These differences are worked through to produce a situation in which JR and Jill 
ostensibly share an orientation to the situation and Jill’s relationship with Pete can be seen as 
relatively stable (or at least not in trouble) despite such quarrels. Similarly, in chapter five’s 
“fuck me” faux pas, all the dinner participants work to downplay Jane’s comment, save Nicky’s 
face, and move the conversation out of the danger zone.  
Researchers can use these concepts for determining participants’ local ideals for good 
moral practice. It generally matters to participants where moral practice takes place—and if it 
does not, then that too is a sort of ideal (consistency across, over adaptability to, situations). The 
resources at participants’ disposal will indicate what is usable for and relevant to interaction. 
Norms demonstrate the extent to which participants have an explicit vocabulary and expectation 
for practice, or at least, whether those discourses are available for use in formulating what goes 
on in moral interaction. Motives and interpretability become languages to draw on and ways in 
which participants enact a theory of communication for morality.  
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Any participant can reflect on these ideas in interaction in order to potentially improve 
their moral discursive practices. Some of these concepts are in fact ones people do regularly 
reflect on. However, I did recently discuss the concept of “interpretability” with the friend in 
these examples: I suggested that next time that someone did or said something that annoyed her, 
she might think about how she was interpreting the action as annoying, consider why, and then 
try to come up with alternative explanations. She found it an interesting exercise, but I also 
cautioned her against applying it categorically. Sometimes people do exploit interpretability, and, 
as she did in her conversation with Pete, some people should be held responsible for the 
interpretability of what they say.  
 This section began with a review of results of analysis to propose potential implications 
for an ideal of moral communication. Following that, this section offered some more general 
concerns related to broader problems of analyzing and doing morality—problems which are 
critical to almost any communicative enterprise, but which pose special considerations when 
linked to the problems of morality. The next section considers the implications of these results 
for work in communication and morality. 
Implications for Communicative Approaches to Morality 
 Though this project considered and addressed many potential literatures in LSI and 
communication research, as mentioned in chapter two, the primary audiences addressed are in 
discourse analysis and interpersonal communication research. Discourse analytic and 
interpersonal approaches to morality are numerous. In chapter two, I discussed discourse 
literature related to the proto-morality approach, and discourse and interpersonal literature 
related to what I called more “ideological” approaches, and cultural approaches. In this section I 
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discuss what some of the results and implications described above contribute to work on 
morality.  
 The proto-morality approach is based in work by Garfinkel (1967) and conversation 
analyses which see morality as omnirelevant. This work conceptualizes morality as the 
accountability, responsibility, and commitment to maintaining the interaction order. Interaction 
is always moral because it demands certain expectations and implicates judgment if such 
expectations are violated. Chapter four provided analysis largely within this perspective through 
an investigation into intersubjectivity practices. The analysis joined work on intersubjectivity and 
embodiment to show that intersubjectivity is accomplished through many interactional practices, 
including the use of objects and nonverbal communication. Most conversation analytic work on 
intersubjectivity has focused on talk (such as repair, Schegloff 1992, and tag questions, Hepburn 
& Potter, 2010). The analysis also demonstrated that intersubjectivity can be marshaled in 
particular ways to indicate the relevance of relationships with certain others. This demonstrates a 
way in which identities are oriented to in interaction. 
 The proto-morality perspective, while acknowledged as underlying more complex 
interactions, does not account for other valid meanings of morality indicated by work in many 
areas of the field such as interpersonal communication, as well as many discourse analytic 
studies. Thus, chapter five moved to consider the relational level, where ideologies of how to be 
and do good are grounded in expectations for relationships between people. Chapter five 
demonstrated that the proto-morality approach is important and valid as a way of looking at how 
people demonstrate through communication that they are intimate with one another. But chapter 
five also built on that to look at moral rituals and topics as important morality practices. Thus, 
rather than in most interpersonal research where morality is linked only to espoused values, the 
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discourse approach employed in this project demonstrated that values can be grounded in 
interaction—in the choices people make and the labels they attribute.  
 Furthermore, chapter five demonstrated how intimacy makes difference, and thus 
morality, more consequential. Being close is not just about sharing values, but about sharing 
meanings for actions and assumptions for treating one another a certain way. Rather than relying 
on friends’ reports that they should support one another, analysis showed how support gets done 
in interaction and what happens when it goes awry. Furthermore, support was shown to be a 
tricky process—not just a matter of displaying empathy or kindness (which is itself not 
necessarily easy) but a delicate process of balancing assumptions about the other person with 
assumptions about goodness in the social world.  
 As mentioned in chapter two, research on ideology often looks at it as a negative thing. 
And although, as many have noted, ideologies are accomplished in everyday practice, most 
ideological analyses focus on the societal level rather than situated interaction. Chapter six 
demonstrated how participants can be “doing things with gender” even if the topic of 
conversation never explicitly discusses gender ideologies. This extends work which grounds 
gender in talk (e.g., Cameron, 2006) and work which looks at relational ideals (e.g., Baxter, 
2004b) while taking details of cultural context and embodied, sequential interaction seriously.  
 Chapter six also looks at difference, something many cultural perspectives tend to ignore, 
which is understandable—culture becomes coherent when practices for achieving it are shared in 
a visible way. Chapter seven focused on the more typical context for looking at cultural 
difference, which is in regard to intercultural context. Following Fitch (e.g., 1998), chapters six 
and seven contextualized relationships in their cultural context to understand how people orient 
to notions of culture through their moral practices. Chapter seven looked at the work people do 
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in intercultural relationships to practice morality in intelligible ways with their close others. In 
this context, difference was more explicit. Though stylistic differences were marked, as attested 
in much intercultural research in discourse and interpersonal studies, the ideological assumptions 
linked to stylistic differences proved salient even when they weren’t referenced outright.  
 Chapter eight’s analysis of an ongoing conflict took some of the ideas of scholars such as 
Cameron (1998) and Bailey (2004, 2000a) and situated them within a single family over time. 
This analysis joined many of the conceptualizations of conflict from discourse analysis (through 
interactional preference, alignment, convergence, hostility markers) with interpersonal 
conceptions of conflict as disagreement over values or ideas. The interactional dilemmas and 
practices involved in raising children were shown to be linked to cultural and social ideologies 
regarding fairness, individuality, and appropriateness. Difference was demonstrated to be 
resource for accomplishing and exacerbating conflict, even while the “disagreement” itself was 
avoided. As Bonito and Sanders (2002) have noted, conflict can be avoided while addressing 
disagreement; in this case, conflict was accomplished by avoiding addressing disagreement. 
Rather than seeing conflict as the result of certain styles of interacting, chapter eight proposed 
seeing conflict as an accomplishment, not as a reaction. Conflict does not happen outside of 
people and their relationship, but is constructed through ways of interacting. Though conflict can 
be managed to bring people closer or to overcome difference, it can also serve to emphasize 
difference.  
 These contributions to particular communicative approaches to and theories of morality 
also provide an approach amenable to discourse analysis and interpersonal communication 
scholarship. The analyses undertaken in the previous chapters sough to ground morality in 
discourse as well as understand the importance of morality to relationships. In doing so, analyses 
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attended to empirical details of discourse and to relational contexts and concerns. Discourse was 
not seen to merely reflect moral attitudes, and relational concerns were treated as relevant to 
moral interactions. Thus, morality is a concept of interest to discourse and interpersonal (and 
many other) areas of the communication field, and the analyses employed herein demonstrate an 
approach which values both.  
Furthermore, this work incorporates grounded practical theory in a way that offers a 
unique angle on morality for discourse in interpersonal relationships. In doing so, this project 
provides a normative perspective not always (or even often) taken in discourse and interpersonal 
studies, while providing a new kind of context and practice for GPT. Seeing morality as a 
practice pushes the limits of GPT and the concept of practice. Morality is a dispersed practice 
which applies to individuals, relational units, and groups. It incorporates so-called “micro” 
intersubjective practices as well as more “macro” ideological and cultural practices. It is a 
practice which is embodied and tacit, but nonetheless identifiable and analyzable.  
 The analyses in this project thus bring many perspectives together to account for many of 
the important practices and problems involved in moral interaction. On one hand, this project 
demonstrates how discourse analysis must consider embodiment and environment as an 
important component of interaction. On the other hand, this project proposes that the 
relationships, ideologies and cultural contexts often eschewed in close studies of talk are quite 
relevant to participants’ doings of morality. Furthermore, notions of value, belief and ideology 
provide participants sense-making logics for their interactional choices, but do not require 
analysts to see beliefs as “in the mind” or ideologies as negative or “above” interaction. Finally, 
conflict is advanced as a crucial component of morality through its link to difference. Because 
morality is a way of dealing with difference, and difference is inherently potentially conflictual, 
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morality makes conflict relevant. The next section discusses the limitations and possible 
directions of this project.  
Limitations and Directions in the Communicative Study of Morality 
This project constituted an almost overwhelming undertaking. “Morality” is a weighty 
and consequential concept which has been studied in many ways across many literatures. A 
literature review could have taken a lifetime in itself; to conduct the research and analyze the 
data could have taken even longer. But this work of course represents only a small step and a 
complementary voice to the current and future research on morality. In this section I discuss 
some limitations, and potential future directions, of this project.  
Limitations  
 Because this research drew from so many literatures, each with its own assumptions and 
modes of inquiry, there will be areas where there is not as much depth, or certain work was left 
out. There is always potentially more reading to be done on a topic—every time I revised this 
dissertation, I found more to read than ever before, all of which seemed absolutely critical to 
include. Thus, the scope of the work reviewed herein really only touches on some of the relevant 
and interesting research that is out there. There is much more potentially to be discovered, or 
investigated more fully. Almost anything to be read in the communication field probably has 
something to offer to a study of morality. Furthermore, even taking that admission into 
consideration, it will have been apparent by now that, based on my metatheoretical leanings, I 
devoted more space to certain bodies of literature over others. However, each set of literature 
was attended to with care and does provide representative work in those areas. And by offering 
these glimpses into illustrative scholarship on morality, it provides an entry point for future 
research which will investigate particular areas more fully.  
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 The method of analysis could be faulted for not being more faithful to a particular well-
established tradition, but I hope it has been clear throughout that on particular tradition would not 
have accounted for all of the situated moral practices involved in this study. Conversation 
analysis does not often look at embodiment, and when it does, does not attend to the relational 
level demanded by an interest in interpersonal interaction, nor cultural context. And while action 
implicative discourse analysis employs a similar grounded practical theory orientation, it is 
designed more for institutional rather than everyday interaction. Thus these, and other methods, 
were joined to attend to many important concerns of the project.  
 The most challenging aspect of this project, by far, involved the data collection and 
analysis. The data collection yielded many hours of video, with even more hours of audio to 
supplement it, but most of the video involved snippets from particular interactants. This was fine 
for earlier chapters, but by the time chapter eight arrived, it became clear that conflict could not 
be studied by looking at a 15-minute video; it required a lot of data over time of the same people. 
Luckily the home movies allowed this, and is part of why chapter eight only focuses on one set 
of participants. As it turns out, conflict is a long-term accomplishment. It can be pointed to in 
instances, but is harder to confirm. 
 Regarding the format of data, though I believe all data is useful and legitimate in some 
way, it is important to acknowledge that there is a significant difference between (1) participants 
who know they are being filmed for research, but also know to “be natural” and can do so 
without a researcher present; (2) participants who know they are being filmed for research, and 
know to be “natural,” but are being filmed by a present researcher; (3) participants who are 
filmed for private purposes, but also want to “perform” their posterity; and (4) participants who 
know they are being recorded for research, but that no one will “see” them because it is audio-
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only. This project included these and other recording formats, and differences and implications 
of that have been noted throughout.  
Furthermore, many of the participants featured in these data were known to me, were in 
fact quite close to me. It helps that much of the data which included my presence was rather old, 
but nonetheless, I was in a sense “close” to much of the data. This could be seen as problematic. 
However, I have been analyzing data, and data which includes myself, for more than four years 
at this point. I have been used to seeing myself, to some extent, as “a participant.” Possibly no 
analysis of one’s self and known others could ever be as fresh and bias-free as an analysis of 
total strangers, but all analysis involves interpretation, and interpretation is always attached to a 
perspective.  
 Finally, the analyses bring together a lot of angles—sequential actions, embodiment, 
relationships, cultural context, ideologies—and a lot of concomitant practices, from smiles and 
dispreferreds to gossip and conflict. Thus, they are in a sense complex, but also chock-full of 
interesting details. They attempt to bridge interactional details with social ideals. In that way, 
they are a bit like the project as a whole. The analyses provide starting points, questions to be 
delved into and systematically unpacked in future work. The analyses also show how, though 
future work would benefit from studying single practices in-depth, it is nonetheless a conceit to 
assume morality involves isolable practices. To simplify the analysis of morality as a practice 
may be desirable for specific projects, but the presentation of morality as a whole demands that 
analysis acknowledge that moral interactions are messy and challenging.  
Directions for Future Research 
 Seeing as this project was but one step in an ongoing program, the potential future 
research that could come out if it is substantial. One possibility is a methodological one: to 
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formulate a specific methodology for investigating morality as a practice. Another possibility 
involves a deeper investigation of literature, and potentially developing a theoretical framework, 
based in grounded practical theory, for morality in communication. Different data could also be 
involved. This project focused on video of friend and family interaction. Other research could 
focus in more detail on friendships or family; romantic relationships; public encounters between 
strangers; institutional situations in education, health, politics; or in mediated communication. 
 There are also several concepts which could be explored in detail. Any particular 
practice—for example humor, or criticism—could be analyzed in different moral interactions. 
Each of the problems of morality could also be attended to in different situations or contexts. 
Many more cultural sites could potentially involve different moral practices or different 
meanings for moral problems. And developing a grounded practical theory of moral 
communication as an ideal for practice is an important next step of this project.  
This project has offered a reconstruction of problems and practices of morality, 
influenced by a particular communicative perspective (chapter one), based in literatures from 
across the communication field (chapter two), derived from a discourse analytic approach 
(chapter three) and grounded in empirical data (chapters four through eight). In this chapter, the 
implications of this project have been organized into a grounded practical theory of moral 
communication which explains points of reflection for normative ideals regarding moral 
discursive practices.  
In chapter two I described morality as “a complex construct which can describe 
situations, judgments, ethics, problems, orientations, rituals, identities, and indeed any aspect of 
social life where people pursue valued ideologies in contexts of difference.” It may seem strange 
to say morality is about difference when most commonplace ideas of morality are linked to 
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systems or orders—religions, ethical guidelines, cultural assumptions and political beliefs come 
to mind as characterizing morality. Morality is often assumed not just to be shared, but nearly 
universal. Surely “love” is an international value? Is not “thall shalt not kill” true in all but the 
most extreme cases? Do not we all want to get along and respect one another?  
But once one considers the cases presented herein, contradictions and complications 
immediately arise. The difficulty of morality is not so much in formulating what is right or 
wrong, but in making choices with others in everyday life. It is precisely then that differences 
become apparent, and the expectations of shared moralities are cast into doubt. Garfinkel’s 
(1967) work offered a glimpse behind the unspoken assumptions of interaction, revealing that it 
carried on precisely because people take for granted common understandings. This work sees the 
difference that belies such assumptions as at the heart of morality. Such difference does not only 
rest in what is required to interact, but is linked in practice to everything human beings do 
together, from raising children to building communities.  
Sacks (1975) suggested that “everyone has to lie.” In other words, everyone has to at 
some point provide accounts of themselves (as to for instance the question “how are you?”) 
which are necessarily at odds with the format of certain actions (a question which appears to be a 
request for information) by supplying a socially appropriate yet “untrue” (or unfitted) response 
(one which does not provide the requested information). Similarly, moral practice involves 
pretenses with regard to minimally shared orientation on crucial ideological stances. This does 
not mean that difference is bad, never occasioned or always avoided. Rather, difference must be 
negotiated for what it means to the interactional moment in particular, and the relational 
trajectory in general. It is treated as significant, and yet accomplishing “ordinariness” in 
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relationships requires not over-attending to it. To attend is to potentially emphasize, and to 
emphasize is potentially to create distance. 
If living with difference requires at various points not noticing it, then the task of 
managing the problems of moral difference becomes difficult indeed. On the other hand, if 
difference often leads to conflict (whether explicitly noted or not) then conflict becomes an 
important site for communicatively constructing what morality should be, and in the process, 
who we should be to each other.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Survey, Questionnaire, Interview Schedules 
Survey 
Survey. The following is a brief survey about communication in your life. The purpose 
of this survey is to understand the importance of communication, and communication problems, 
in everyday life. This survey should take 10 minutes or less to complete. Thank you very much 
for your participation. 
1. Communication survey 
Please answer the following questions as best you can. 
2. Communication in your life 
1. How important is communication in your everyday life? 
• Very important 
• Somewhat important 
• Important 
• Not so important 
• Not important 
 
2. In what context do you feel your communication is MOST problematic? In 
other words, in what area of your life do you most wish you could improve 
communication? 
• Work environment/coworkers or boss 
• Family 
• Significant other (person you are dating/married to) 
• Casual interactions (i.e. service encounters) 
• Friends 
 
3. Please choose the following statement that BEST describes how you feel 
about the MIScommunication in your personal life, in reference to the above 
question. 
When I experience miscommunication... 
• it is often because people I talk to have different opinions (religious, political, personal) 
than I. 
• it is often because people I talk to are in a different economic status than I am. 
• it is often because people I talk to are of a different sex than I am. 
• it is often because people I talk to are of a different generation than I am. 
• it is often because people I talk to are not very intelligent. 
• it is often because people I talk to do not listen to me. 
• it is often because people I talk to are of a different cultural background than I am. 
Running Head: THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY 459 
 
 
• Other (please specify) 
 
4. In the following space, please describe the most recent problem you have 
had with another person or people in which you feel communication or 
miscommunication played a major role. What happened? Did the other 
person say anything specific that you remember? Why do you think the 
situation went the way it did? 
 
Please enter some basic information about yourself. 
3. Background Information 
1. Please enter your age or age range 
 
2. Please enter your occupation, jobs, or how you primarily identify yourself 
 
3. Please choose the highest level of education you have completed. 
• Elementary school 
• High school 
• Some college, technical training, or associate's degree 
• College degree (BA, BS) 
• Graduate degree (MA, PhD) 
 
4. Please choose which best describes your family situation 
• Single 
• Single, with children 
• Partnered 
• Partnered, with children 
• Married, no children 
• Married, with children 
• Divorced, no children 
• Divorced, with children 
 
5. (Optional) if you would like to be an anonymous participant in research 
about communication, please type in your email address here, and check 
how you would like to participate in the next question. 
 
6. If you would like to participate in research about communication, please 
indicate in which ways you would be comfortable doing so. All research is 
completely anonymous and poses no or little personal risk. Your responses 
in this survey are not at all binding. You may withdraw your participation at 
any time. If you indicate interest in further participation, a researcher will 
contact you by the email address you provided within a couple days. 
• complete a longer questionnaire about communication 
• Participate in a short phone, instant message, or in-person interview (15-30 minutes) 
• Participate in an in-depth in-person interview (30 minutes to one hour) 
• Participate in a focus group interview with a small group (30-40 minutes) 
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• Carry an audio or video recorder for any length of time and/or video tape special work, 
home or social occasions; or submit a copy of any videos already made 
 
Questionnaire 
1. Describe a vivid memory in your life in which you had to discuss a problem with 
someone and it went well. If you can, focus on what aspects of the communication, or 
what you or the other person said, contributed to a positive outcome.  
a. What led to the confrontation? 
b. What was the situation in which the confrontation occurred? 
c. What kinds of things did you say to the person? How did the person respond? 
d. What about the conversation went well? What happened at the time of the 
conversation? What was the result that happened later? 
e. Why do you think it went well? 
 
2. Can you think of any “memorable messages” or specific sayings that you recall from 
your family or a specific family member? If so, describe what impact you think this 
message had on your life.  
 
3. Think of a person in your life with whom talking is or once was difficult. Why do you 
think it was difficult? Was it to do with personalities? Speaking styles? Backgrounds? 
 
4. What do you think about the role of communication in your life and in society?  
 
5. If you had to change one thing about your own communication style, what would it be 
and why?  
 
The following questions are optional, and are for background purposes only.  
 
A. Please give your nationality _________________________ 
 
B. Please describe how you identify your primary cultural, ethnic, or racial background.  
 
C. Please fill in your gender _______________________ 
 
D. Do you live in a rural, urban, suburban area? Other? 
 
E. Do you practice a religion or consider yourself spiritual? Please specify. 
 
F. Have you ever taken a communication course in college? Please specify.  
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Interview Schedules 
Short Interview Schedule. This open-ended questionnaire is about the role of 
communication in your everyday life. It should take no more than 15-30 minutes to complete. 
Your participation is greatly appreciated.  
 
6. Describe a vivid memory in your life in which you had to discuss a problem with 
someone and it went well. If you can, focus on what aspects of the communication, or 
what you or the other person said, contributed to a positive outcome.  
a. What led to the confrontation? 
b. What was the situation in which the confrontation occurred? 
c. What kinds of things did you say to the person? How did the person respond? 
d. What about the conversation went well? What happened at the time of the 
conversation? What was the result that happened later? 
e. Why do you think it went well? 
 
7. Can you think of any “memorable messages” or specific sayings that you recall from 
your family or a specific family member? If so, describe what impact you think this 
message had on your life.  
a. What was or were the messages, and what is your relationship to that person 
(please do not name)? 
b. How did you interpret the messages when you heard them? Do you interpret them 
differently now? How so? 
c. Have these messages had an impact on your life or the kind of person you think 
you are or want to be? How so? 
 
8. Think of a person in your life with whom talking is or once was difficult. Why do you 
think it was difficult? Was it to do with personalities? Speaking styles? Backgrounds? 
a. What is your relation to the person (please do not name)? 
b. Is this person still in your life? If so, are they still difficult to talk to? 
c. In what situations is the person difficult to talk to, if not all the time? 
d. What about talking to this person is difficult? 
e. Why do you think talking to this person is difficult? 
 
9. What do you think about the role of communication in your life and in society?  
a. What makes good communication and what makes it go wrong, based on your 
experience or from your point of view?  
b. Why is communication important or not? 
c. How often do you think about communication—about what you say or what 
others say, or about how you interact with others? 
d. How do you think communication can or should address problems? 
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10. If you had to change one thing about your own communication style, what would it be 
and why?  
a. What changes in your life do you think would result from this change?  
b. Why do you think this aspect of style is causing you problems or holding you 
back?  
c. What steps have you taken, or could to take, to change your communication style?  
 
The following questions are optional, and are for background purposes only.  
 
A. Please give your nationality _________________________ 
 
B. Please describe how you identify your primary cultural, ethnic, or racial background.  
 
C. Please fill in your gender _______________________ 
 
D. Do you live in a rural, urban, suburban area? Other? 
 
E. Do you practice a religion or consider yourself spiritual? Please specify. 
 
F. Have you ever taken a communication course in college? Please specify.  
 
Long Interview and Focus Group Interview Schedule. This open-ended interview is about 
the role of communication in your everyday life. It should take no more than 30 minutes to an 
hour. Your participation is greatly appreciated.  
 
11. Describe a vivid memory in your life in which you had to discuss a problem with 
someone and it went well. If you can, focus on what aspects of the communication, or 
what you or the other person said, contributed to a positive outcome.  
a. What was the situation—what led up to it and how did you confront the other 
person about it? 
b. How did the person react to being confronted? How did this affect the 
conversation? 
c. What were specific things you remember saying? How did the person respond? 
Do you remember anything specific the other person said? And how you 
responded? 
d. Were there any turning points in the conversation, where it went from positive to 
negative or negative to positive in tone? Can you recall what might have 
precipitated this change, or did it seem to come out of nowhere? Looking back, 
can you make a guess as to what happened?  
 
12. Can you think of any “memorable messages” or specific sayings that you recall from 
your family or a specific family member? If so, describe what impact you think this 
message had on your life.  
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a. What was or were the messages, and who said them? In what situations did the 
person typically say these things—in response to what kinds of events, for 
example? 
b. How did you interpret the messages when you heard them? Do you interpret them 
differently now? How so? 
c. Have these messages had an impact on your life or the kind of person you think 
you are or want to be? How so? 
 
13. Think of a person in your life with whom talking is or once was difficult. Why do you 
think it was difficult? Was it to do with personalities? Speaking styles? Backgrounds? 
a. What is your relation to the person (please do not name)? Have you been close or 
distant? Did or do you see the person often? 
b. Is this person still in your life? If so, are she or he still difficult to talk to? Do you 
ever avoid talking to that person? 
c. In what situations is the person difficult to talk to, if not all the time? Can you 
give specific examples? 
d. What about talking to this person is difficult? Can you give specific examples? 
e. Why do you think talking to this person is difficult? 
 
14. What do you think about the role of communication in your life and in society?  
a. What makes good communication and what makes it go wrong, based on your 
experience or from your point of view?  
b. Why is communication important or not? 
c. How often do you think about communication—about what you say or what 
others say, or about how you interact with others? 
d. How do you think communication can or should address problems? 
 
15. If you had to change one thing about your own communication style, what would it be 
and why?  
a. What changes in your life do you think would result from this change?  
b. Why do you think this aspect of style is causing you problems or holding you 
back?  
c. What steps have you taken, or could to take, to change your communication style?  
 
The following questions are optional, and are for background purposes only.  
 
A. How would you describe your nationality or the country you call home? 
 
B. How would you describe your primary cultural, ethnic, or racial background?  
 
D. Do you live in a rural, urban, suburban area? Other? 
 
F. Do you practice a religion or consider yourself spiritual? Please specify. 
 
G. Have you ever taken a communication course in college? Please specify.  
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Appendix B: Data Description 
Below is the entire corpus from which analysis in this project was drawn. The table in 
chapter three is an abbreviated version showing only what was directly used in the analysis 
chapters. Below is a chart with a list of the examples used in this dissertation. “Corpus” refers to 
the whole set of recordings. “Year” is the time frame in which recordings took place. “Hours” is 
total number of hours of recordings, and may be a greater number than what was presented in 
chapter three (particularly if it includes audio) since the analytical project focused on video (and 
thus only a certain number of hours from corpora containing audio and video). “Format” states 
whether the corpus was video or audio only. “Place” refers to the location of the recording. 
“Language” refers to the primary language(s) spoken in the recording. “Recordings” involve the 
total number of separate video or audio files (same number as in chapter three, since analysis 
was done across recordings even if fewer hours were transcribed).  
 
Whole Corpus 
 
Corpus Year Hours Format Place Language Recordings 
Fam.new 1930s 27 m video (no 
sound) 
CA A.English 1 
Fam.ren 1960s 30 m video CA A.English 1 
Fam.hols 1980s-
90s 
2 h 15m video CA A.English 1 
Fam.evts 1994-
2004 
28h video CA A.English 30 
Frn.don 2004 4 h audio CA A.English 2 
Fam.Frn.vis 2005 3h 15m audio/video CA A.English 4 
Frn.vis/calls 2008 6h 18m audio CA A.English 8 
Fam.Frn.hol 2008 8h 30m audio/video CA/CO A.English 6 
Fam.Frn.jul 2008 9h 45m audio/video England Br.English, 
A.English 
7 
Frn.assigs 2009 9 audio/video CO A.English 8 
Frn.sum 2010 4h 12m video England Br.English, 
German, 
Farsi 
5 
Frn.var 2010 7h audio/video England, 
Am, 
Germany 
Br.English, 
Dutch, 
German  
5 
Fam.vac 2010 3h 10m video Finland Finnish,  
A.English 
3 
Frn.rdm 2010 20h 
40m 
audio/video CO A.English 29 
Fam.nov 2010 2h audio/video CA A.English 4 
Fam.Frn.sum 2010 5h 20m audio/video CA A.English 28 
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List of Examples 
 The examples used in this project are of two types: (1) those used (in chapters three and 
nine) which are not studied in detail as part of the primary argument, or are reproduced from an 
earlier/later detailed analysis; and (2) those used in chapters three through nine which are part of 
the argument of the project (and analyzed in detail) and which are also given a name and excerpt 
number. 
 
Chapter Recording Labels Excerpt # and Name 
3 [fam.evts96.15.E3.2] 
[fam.frn.jul08.7.E1.1] 
“Ellen/Marshall” 
[frn.assigs09.2.E2.2] 
“House of Lords” I 
[frn.assigs09.3.E1.1(audio]  
[fam.jul08.1.E4.1]  
“House of Lords” II 
[fam.jul08.1.E3.1] 
[frn.vis05.1.E2.2] 
[fam.jul08.1.E4.1]  
[frn.rdm08.2.E1.1(audio)] 
[frn.calls08.3.E4.2(audio)] 
“House of Lords” III 
[frn.vis05.1.E2.3] 
[frn.don04.1.2.1(audio)] 
[frn.assigs09.4.E1.1(audio)] 
[frn.assigs09.3.E1.1(audio]  
[frn.don04.1.E3.1(audio)] 
[fam.new30s.1.E1.1] 
n/a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Excerpt 1 “At Home” 
Excerpt 2 “An Old Home Movie”
4 [fam.jul08.1.E2.1] 
[fam.hols88.1.E5.1] 
[fam.jul08.1.E3.1] 
[frn.rdm10.2.E3.1] 
[fam.jul08.1.E2.1]  
[fam.hols94.1.E8.1] 
[fam.hols93.1.E7.1] 
[frn.rdm10.4.E4.1] 
[frn.rdm10.4.E5.1] 
Excerpt 3 “The Newtons” 
Excerpt 4 “The Reynolds” 
Excerpt 5 “The Newtons” 
Excerpt 6 “Hanging Out” 
Excerpt 7 “The Newtons” 
Excerpt 8 “The Reynolds” 
Excerpt 9 “The Reynolds” 
Excerpt 10 “A Dinner” 
Excerpt 11 “A Dinner” 
5 [frn.assigs09.1.E2.1] 
[frn.assigs09.2.E4.1] 
[frn.vis05.3.E4.1] 
[fam.hols93.1.E7.1] 
[frn.rdm10.4.E3.1] 
[frn.rdm10.3.E2.1] 
[fam.hols88.1.E5.1] 
[frn.rdm10.4.E2.1] 
[frn.rdm10.4.E4.2] 
Excerpt 12 “Team A” 
Excerpt 13 “Team B” 
Excerpt 14 “Around the Bay” 
Excerpt 15 “The Reynolds” 
Excerpt 16 “A Dinner” 
Excerpt 17 “Hanging Out” 
Excerpt 18 “The Reynolds” 
Excerpt 19 “A Dinner” 
Excerpt 20 “A Dinner” 
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6 [fam.jul08.1.E4.1] 
[frn.vis05.2.E3.1(audio)] 
[frn.vis05.2.E3.1] 
[frn.vis08.4.E1.1(audio)] 
Excerpt 21 “The Newtons” 
Excerpt 22 “Six Men” 
Excerpt 23 “Six Men” 
Excerpt 24 “Six Men” 
7 [fam.frn.vac10.1.E2.1] 
[fam.frn.vac10.1.E3.2] 
[frn.vis08.2.E1.1(audio)] 
[frn.don04.1.E2.1(audio)] 
[frn.calls08.1.E1.1(audio)] 
Excerpt 25 “The Bantrys” 
Excerpt 26 “The Bantrys” 
Excerpt 27 “Christa” 
Excerpt 28 “Christa” 
Excerpt 29 “Amelia” 
8 [fam.evts98.18.E3.1] 
[fam.evts99.19.E6.1] 
[fam.evts99.19.E3.3] 
[fam.evts98.17.E4.1] 
[fam.evts99.20.E5.2] 
[fam.nov09.1.E1.1(audio)] 
[fam.sum10.2.E1.1] 
Excerpt 30 “Stealing” 
Excerpt 31 “Food in the Room” 
Excerpt 32 “Sand in the Bag” 
Excerpt 33 “Birthday Cake” 
Excerpt 34 “Easter Egg Hunt” 
Excerpt 35 “Dennis’s Temper” 
Excerpt 36 “Painting Contest” 
9 [fam.hols93.1.E7.1] 
[frn.rdm10.4.E4.2] 
[fam.jul08.1.E4.1] 
fam.frn.vac10.1.E3.2] 
[fam.evts99.20.E5.2] 
[frn.calls08.3.E4.2(audio)] 
n/a 
 
Appendix C: Transcription 
Transcript Notations 
(0.0) a pause in seconds/milliseconds 
- a cut-off in speech 
“ “ quoted speech 
* * different vocal style 
(( )) vocal nonverbals 
: extension of sound 
= no discernable pause between utterances 
xxx emphasis 
XX shouted 
. intonation drops 
? intonation rises  
, sustained intonation 
 
 
 
